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Abstract
Survivability is the ability of a system to minimize the impact of a finite-duration disturbance on
value delivery (i.e., stakeholder benefit at cost), achieved through (1) the reduction of the
likelihood or magnitude of a disturbance, (2) the satisfaction of a minimally acceptable level of
value delivery during and after a disturbance, and/or (3) a timely recovery. Traditionally
specified as a requirement in military systems, survivability is an increasingly important
consideration for all engineering systems given the proliferation of natural and artificial threats.
Although survivability is an emergent system property that arises from interactions between a
system and its environment, conventional approaches to survivability engineering are
reductionist in nature. Furthermore, current methods neither accommodate dynamic threat
environments nor facilitate stakeholder communication for conducting trade-offs among system
lifecycle cost, mission utility, and operational survivability.
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) for Survivability is introduced as a system
analysis methodology to improve the generation and evaluation of survivable alternatives during
conceptual design. MATE for Survivability applies decision theory to the parametric modeling
of thousands of design alternatives across representative distributions of disturbance
environments. To improve the generation of survivable alternatives, seventeen empirically-
validated survivability design principles are introduced. The general set of design principles
allows the consideration of structural and behavioral strategies for mitigating the impact of
disturbances over the lifecycle of a given encounter. To improve the evaluation of survivability,
value-based metrics are introduced for the assessment of survivability as a dynamic, continuous,
and path-dependent system property. Two of these metrics, time-weighted average utility loss
and threshold availability, are used to evaluate survivability based on the relationship between
stochastic utility trajectories of system state and stakeholder expectations across nominal and
perturbed environments. Finally, the survivability "tear(drop)" tradespace is introduced to
enable the identification of inherently survivable architectures that efficiently balance
performance metrics of cost, utility, and survivability.
The internal validity and prescriptive value of the design principles, metrics, and tradespaces
comprising MATE for Survivability are established through applications to the designs of an
orbital transfer vehicle and a satellite radar system.
Thesis Supervisor: Daniel E. Hastings
Title: Professor of Engineering Systems and Aeronautics and Astronautics
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1. Introduction
The operational environment of engineering systems is increasingly characterized by
disturbances which may asymmetrically degrade performance, particularly for interdependent
infrastructure systems. In recent years, hostile actors have preyed upon networked
infrastructures, whether physically, electrically, or economically.
* Businesses incurred an estimated $5.5 billion in damages from the 2000 ILOVEYOU
Internet virus which generated thousands and thousands of emails (an assault on Internet
links by overwhelming limited bandwidth) and overwrote important files on servers and
workstations (an assault on Internet nodes).
* The tragic events of September 11, 2001, that injured and killed thousands of people,
may also be viewed as a psychological attack on our interdependent economy, with four
physical disturbances causing a $1.2 trillion loss in the valuation of U.S. stocks in the
week following the tragedy (Kean et al. 2004).
Engineering systems are also vulnerable to natural threats arising from the environment.
* The outage of a generating plant in Parma, OH, in 2003, triggered a massive power
outage across the Northeast, affecting 40 million people in eight states (Abraham and
Efford 2004).
* Hurricane Katrina breached the levees of New Orleans, subsequently flooding 80% of the
city--costing 2,000 lives and over $80 billion in damages (Knabb, Rhome and Brown
2005).
In response to these artificial (i.e., human-directed) and natural disturbances, numerous studies
and several government and academic research initiatives have been launched.
* Following the terrorist attacks of September 1 1th, hundreds of national studies have
identified vulnerabilities in critical economic infrastructures-including information,
transportation, energy, retail, manufacturing, and finance-which reside in the private
sector and are largely not hardened. For example, the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess
U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization surveyed satellite
vulnerabilities to various hostile acts (e.g., denial and deception, interference, jamming,
microsatellite attacks, nuclear detonation) and found that the impact of such surprise
attacks could constitute a "Pearl Harbor" in space. Risks are further exacerbated by
reliance on unhardened commercial systems and inadequate space situational awareness
(Rumsfeld et al. 2001).
* Recent research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) has focused on
corporate security and resilience with an emphasis on creating enterprises with supply
chains robust to high-impact disturbances. For example, the pressure to achieve cost
efficiencies has led to the "leaning" of global supply chains that are now extremely
fragile to disruptions (Sheffi 2005). Empirical evidence indicates the need for balance
between security, redundancy, and short-term profits.
In October 2006 at the University of Southern California's (USC) Center for Systems and
Software Engineering, stakeholders from commercial organizations (e.g., Motorola,
Bosch), defense companies (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing), and
academia (USC and MIT) identified resilience engineering as the top priority for system
of systems architecting (Axelband et al. 2007). An extension of the traditional fields of
reliability engineering and safety management, resilience engineering incorporates the
principles of the Santa Fe Institute and Highly Optimized Tolerance (HOT) (Carlson and
Doyle 2000), positing that safety emerges from an aggregate of system components,
subsystems, software, organizations, human behaviors, and interactions among them. To
be resilient, systems must not only be reliable but must also be able to recover from
disturbances through the design of proactive organizations and processes (Hollnagel,
Woods and Leveson 2006).
While related in terms of the common objective of protecting critical societal infrastructure,
methodological approaches towards mitigating disturbances have evolved almost exclusively
within the context of individual engineering disciplines and infrastructure domains. Given its
development within MIT's interdisciplinary Engineering Systems Division (ESD), this
dissertation aims to consolidate knowledge on survivability residing across numerous disciplines
and application areas. This introductory chapter provides context to the research in Section 1.1
through a brief overview of ESD and the value-based design methods underlying the research.
Section 1.2 summarizes the motivation for enhancing survivability analysis through a detailed
examination of protection concerns for one critical infrastructure: satellite design and operation.
Section 1.3 introduces the research questions, followed by Section 1.4 which discusses the four-
part research approach. Section 1.5 concludes the chapter with an overview of the thesis
structure.
1. 1. Context
1.1.1. MIT Engineering Systems Division
The MIT Engineering Systems Division was founded in 1998 to establish an interdisciplinary
field of study for the engineering of large-scale, complex, socio-technical systems characterized
by significant enterprise level interactions (Moses 2004; Roos 2004). Whereas systems
engineering may be defined as "the art and science of developing an operable system capable of
meeting requirements within imposed constraints" (Griffin 2007), engineering systems embraces
the design (i.e., the "art") and analysis (i.e., the "science") of artifacts while also incorporating
the contextual social and enterprise factors (Rhodes and Hastings 2004). As such, understanding
and improving engineering systems requires a holistic perspective, integrating domains that are
normally treated as separate from traditional engineering. Engineering systems research is
distinguished by particular emphases on (1) interdisciplinary methods which span technology,
management, and policy; (2) temporal system properties, commonly referred to as the "-ilities";
(3) the interconnectedness of product systems with the enterprises that develop and sustain them;
and (4) value stream complexities arising from stakeholder heterogeneity.
The scope of engineering systems research spans operations research and systems analysis;
systems engineering, architecting, and product development; engineering management; and
technology and policy (Hastings 2004). This thesis, however, focuses on systems engineering,
architecting and analysis through advancing value-based design methods. A system architecture
is an integrated description of the operations, components, and technical standards of a system,
consisting of a functional decomposition (from originating requirements) in the behavioral
domain and an allocation of functions to components in the physical domain, all occurring within
an environmental context (Crawley et al. 2004; Richards 2006). A standard definition of
architecture used by the Department of Defense (2003a) is "the structure of components, their
relationships, and the principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution over time."
The process of creating and building architectures is referred to as systems architecting and
concerns itself most with system conceptualization, objective definition, and certification for use
(Maier and Rechtin 2002). Accordingly, systems architecting "strives for fit, balance, and
compromise among the tensions of client needs and resources, technology, and multiple
stakeholder interests" (Maier and Rechtin 2002).
1.1.2. Value-Based Conceptual Design
Within systems engineering, the research focuses on the application of value-based methods to
conceptual design. Value may be defined generally as benefit at cost. As a subjective measure
of benefit from a bundle of consequences that is specified by a stakeholder, value provides a
fundamental metric for relating system properties to desired stakeholder outcomes (Keeney
1992). Empirical evidence suggests that the lifecycle value delivered by systems is primarily
determined at the beginning of development programs (Figure 1-1), highlighting the criticality of
good decision-making during conceptual design.
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Figure 1-1. Critical Front-End in System Development (Gruhl 1992)
As illustrated in Figure 1-2, conceptual design includes both concept development (i.e.,
identification of stakeholders, enumeration and evaluation of design alternatives, and selection of
one or more concepts for further development) and system-level design (i.e., definition of the
architecture, including subsystem decompositions and functional specifications) (Ulrich and
Eppinger 2004). Taking the value-centric perspective during conceptual design empowers
decision-makers' rigorously to evaluate and to compare different system concepts in the
technical domain (e.g., geosynchronous satellite vis-A-vis low-Earth orbit satellite constellation
for a communications mission) using a unifying set of attributes in the value domain (e.g., signal
isolation, information rate, information integrity, and data availability) (Shaw, Miller and
Hastings 2001).
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Figure 1-2. Research Focus: System Development Phases 1 and 2 (Ulrich and Eppinger 2004)
1.1.3. Tradespace Exploration
The value-centric perspective is operationalized in conceptual design through the application of
decision theory to the engineering design process, making cost-benefit tradeoffs explicit in
concept selection (Thurston 1990; Keeney and Raiffa 1993). Extending traditional trade studies,
which may consider a small number of alternative designs, tradespace exploration builds on this
application by adding computer-based parametric models and simulations, enabling comparison
of hundreds or thousands of potential architectures (McManus, Hastings and Warmkessel 2004;
Ross et al. 2004). When coupled with decision analysis, tradespace exploration avoids the limits
of local point solution trades by providing an understanding of the underlying relationship
between the decision-maker preference structure and potential designs. Applied to conceptual
design, tradespace exploration may be used as a quantitative tool for evaluating the benefits,
costs, and risks of alternative architectures-informing critical front-end decision-making. In
addition to evaluating potential technical capabilities, architecture tradespaces may also be used
to explore the implications of policy uncertainties (Weigel and Hastings 2004) and changing
value perceptions (Ross 2006). Figure 1-3 shows a sample tradespace for a "space tug" orbital
transfer vehicle. Each point represents a unique design alternative which was evaluated in terms
of lifecycle cost and utility2 using a parametric computer model.
' While the term stakeholder refers to any entity with an interest in the outcome of a system development, the term
decision-maker refers to the stakeholder with control over the resources for system development.2 Utility may be defined generally as an ordinal metric of stakeholder satisfaction. In this thesis, utility is used to
measure the benefit received by decision-makers.
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Figure 1-3. Evaluation of Design Alternatives Using Tradespace Exploration
1.1.4. "-ilities"
Given that non-traditional design criteria-such as flexibility and robustness, collectively
referred to as "-ilities"--are increasingly regarded as critical system properties for delivering
stakeholder value (Rhodes 2004; McManus and Hastings 2006), ongoing systems engineering
research is seeking to establish descriptive taxonomies and prescriptive methods for the
incorporation of the "-ilities" in system design (Soban and Mavris 2000; de Weck, de Neufville
and Chaize 2004; Fricke and Schulz 2005; Rajan et al. 2005; Ross 2006; McManus et al. 2007;
Nilchiani and Hastings 2007; Silver and de Weck 2007). The "-ilities" may be defined as
temporal system properties that specify the degree to which systems are able to maintain or even
improve function in the presence of change. The "-ilities" explicitly recognize that, in addition
to meeting requirements in a static context, the performance of system architectures is defined by
an ability to deliver value to stakeholders in the presence of changing operational environments,
economic markets, and technological developments (Fricke and Schulz 2005). According to Dr.
Marvin Sambur, former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisitions (Rhodes 2004), a
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generalized new definition for robustness applied to military acquisitions means developing
systems that are:
* capable of adapting to changes in mission and requirements
* expandable/scalable, and designed to accommodate growth in capability
* able to reliably function given changes in threats and environment
* effectively/affordably sustainable over their lifecycle
* developed using products designed for use in various platforms and systems
* easily modified to leverage new technologies
Despite general agreement on their importance, the "-ilities" are neither well-defined nor easily
evaluated in isolation.3 Operationalizing the "-ilities" for value-based design methods, such as
tradespace exploration, is challenging and the subject of ongoing research. For example, after
building a descriptive theory of the systems property of changeability, Ross (2006) developed a
prescriptive dynamic tradespace methodology with the associated metrics of Pareto Trace and
Filtered Outdegree. In building upon the existing theory of changeability, this thesis on
survivability focuses on the particular challenges posed by dynamic disturbance environments
and on how survivability might be better articulated, generated, and evaluated during the
conceptual design of engineering systems.
1.2. Motivation
"Our spacecraft, which take 5 to 10 years to build, and then last up to 20 in a static hardware condition,
will be configured to solve tomorrow's problems using yesterday's technologies" (Brown 2007).
A typical space system architecture is comprised of one or more satellites, launch vehicle(s) for
transportation to operating orbits, ground-based control stations, and communications links
among these nodes to transfer information to end users. With the exception of select civil space
systems, such as the Hubble Space Telescope and International Space Station, that employ on-
orbit servicing, current satellite architectures aim to deliver value over time by developing
reliable individual space vehicles that operate in an inaccessible, hostile environment. As a
result, attempts to apply flexibility and other "-ilities" to space systems are tightly constrained by
the lack of capability to physically service satellites following launch (Richards 2006). A
distinguishing characteristic of the current U.S. space architecture is a high level of risk aversion
stemming from the high cost of space systems combined with the criticality of space mission
areas (on the government side) and drive for investor return (on the commercial side). This
environment has driven satellite designers toward three common design strategies: redundancy,4
proven technology, 5 and long operational lives (Long, Richards and Hastings 2007).
3 Recognizing that design navigates among functional, physical, and environmental domains (Simon 1996),
McManus and Richards et al. (2007) developed the "-ilities Space" to characterize the operational "-ilities" as
temporal motion along three axes: needs (i.e., value domain), system (i.e., technical domain), and context (i.e.,
environmental domain). Section 3.1 provides a detailed description of the "-ilities Space".
4 Space systems incorporate massive redundancy to mitigate the risk of component failure. Components may fail
due to design flaws, emergent interaction effects with other spacecraft systems, exposure to the harsh environment
of space, or other random events. Incorporating redundancy leads to very complex systems, increasing spacecraft
mass and cost. Furthermore, the value of redundant systems is only realized in the event of component failure.
5 As a response to the risk-averse nature of the satellite industry, designers are pressured to incorporate proven (i.e.,
legacy) hardware on space systems. For example, NASA uses Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) as a metric for
1.2.1. Unintended Consequences of Current Satellite Paradigm
The high cost of launching spacecraft combined with a focus on traditional strategic measures of
effectiveness in the space industry (e.g., optimize cost-per-function) have driven U.S. space
architecture from an era of single-payload, short-lived spacecraft to a current state of multi-
payload, long-lived systems. Figure 1-4 depicts the growth in the average design life of active
geosynchronous satellites from under two years in 1965 to over thirteen years in 2003 (Sullivan
2005). While this design philosophy is justified on the basis of economic arguments associated
with the high initial cost of spacecraft and enabled by improvements in supporting subsystems
(e.g., ion propulsion), this design philosophy also has many negative implications. For example,
noting that space system developments now take five to ten years, Brown (2007) describes how
"complexity has bred fragility" in terms of unanticipated modes of failure. Such unanticipated
modes of failure include an acquisitions crisis (Young, Hastings and Schneider 2003) where
development problems with an individual sensor can cripple the schedule and budget of multi-
payload programs (e.g., the National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite System), software-
related common-cause failures that circumvent margin and redundancy (Leveson 2004), and
uncertain technological change.6
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Figure 1-4. Average Design Life of Geosynchronous Satellites (Sullivan 2005)
The consequences of failure for space architecture reliant upon integral, long-lived satellites are
further exacerbated by three trends: (1) the growth of military and commercial dependency on
technological maturity. Classified on a scale of one through nine, most spacecraft designs require a TRL of at least
eight to insure "flight qualified" hardware. While use of proven technology helps to mitigate mission risk, it also
has the negative effect of limiting satellite performance and stalling industry innovation.
6 One downside of long design lifetimes is the inability to update space-based capabilities with modem avionics in a
timely manner during an era dictated by "Moore's Law" (i.e., the doubling of processing speed of new computer
chips every 18-24 months). This slowdown of the space industry's "clockspeed" limits the agility of satellite
operators in capturing emergent terrestrial markets (Saleh et al. 2006).
space systems (Gonzales 1999; GAO 2002; Ballhaus 2005), (2) the proliferation of threats
(Rumsfeld, Andrews et al. 2001; Joseph 2006), and (3) the weakening of the sanctuary view in
military space policy (Mowthorpe 2002; O'Hanlon 2004; U.S. 2006; Covault 2007).
1.2.2. Growth of Dependency on Space Systems
An analysis of recent history indicates that military and commercial stakeholders are increasingly
dependent on space capabilities. On the military side, space capabilities have extended beyond
the strategic missions of the Cold War (e.g., national technical means of treaty verification,
missile warning, communications for National Command Authority) to tactical applications (e.g.,
situational awareness, command and control, navigation). Former Secretary of the U.S. Air
Force James Roche states that, "For the first time in our history, space has become an equal
partner to air breathers [aircraft] (Ballhaus 2005)." Dr. William Ballhaus, former CEO of the
Aerospace Corporation, adds that "Whether in communications, precision weapons, or
surveillance-space has changed the way wars are fought." For example, the U.S. used 30 times
more satellite bandwidth in Operation Iraqi Freedom for military communications than in Desert
Storm (Ballhaus 2005) despite the deployment of fewer troops in the second Persian Gulf War.
On the commercial side, space capabilities have also become a major component of the national
and global economies, accounting for $85 billion in revenue in 2000 (GAO 2002). Commercial
satellite services have become vital to the operation of critical infrastructures, including
telecommunications, transportation, electrical power, water supply, gas and oil storage and
transportation, emergency services, banking and finance, and continuity of government services;
for instance, a 1998 failure of the Galaxy IV satellite disrupted 45 million pagers for three days
and blocked credit card authorization at point-of-sale terminals such as gasoline pumps (Joseph
2006).
1.2.3. Proliferation of Threats
Despite the high dependency of government and commercial stakeholders on space capabilities,
satellite architectures have become increasingly vulnerable to a growing number of threats. In
addition to the challenges posed by severe spacecraft-environment interactions (e.g., growing
vulnerability of miniaturized electronics to solar flares) (Hastings and Garrett 1996; Fulghum
2007), designers must also consider the threats posed by malevolent action (Black 2000). As
space has become a critical enabler of tactical U.S. military operations, and since the U.S.
accounts for approximately 90% of the world's military space expenditures (O'Hanlon 2004),
countermeasures against space assets are a developing asymmetric threat (Thomson 1995). For
example, China's successful test of an anti-satellite (Asat) weapon against an aging Chinese
Feng Yun 1C weather satellite in January 2007 has incited calls for enhancing spacecraft
survivability (Covault 2007). The Asat test underscores several of the findings of the 2001
Rumsfeld Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization:
(1) that satellites are vulnerable to a broad spectrum of hostile acts (e.g., denial and deception,
interference, jamming, microsatellite attacks, nuclear detonation), (2) that the impact of such
surprise attacks could constitute a "Pearl Harbor" in space, and (3) that there is a need to increase
spending on space surveillance and control measures (Rumsfeld, Andrews et al. 2001). While
the recommendations of the Rumsfeld Space Commission regarding military space policy are
subject to debate (O'Hanlon 2004), it is important to note the severity of the potential impact of
an attack on U.S. space assets (CRS 2004) and that such vulnerabilities extend to unsecured
commercial systems upon which government users are dependent (GAO 2002).
1.2.4. Weakening Sanctuary School in Military Space Policy
The importance of addressing the fragility of current space architectures is underscored by the
weakening of the sanctuary view of space in U.S. military space policy. Mowthorpe (2002)
outlines four schools of thought in military space power theory: (1) the sanctuary view that
believes space should not be used as a platform for basing weapons, (2) the survivability view
that believes space forces are inherently less survivable and should not be depended upon for
wartime functions, (3) the space control view which applies the concepts of air superiority and
sea control to space, and (4) the high ground view that believes force application from space will
become a critical determinant of military power. With a focus on utilizing satellites for
reconnaissance purposes, the sanctuary school dominated military space policy in the Cold War
through the 1970's. While the Reagan and first Bush administrations laid the foundation for a
future policy of space control through research and development activities (e.g., 1985 test of an
Asat against a satellite, Strategic Defense Initiative) (Mowthorpe 2002), the Clinton
administration scaled back space control programs before they became operational (e.g., shifting
missile defense efforts back from strategic to theater systems). However, technology
development for space control continued (O'Hanlon 2004). During this decade, the actions and
policy statements of the current Bush administration reflect the completion of a shift from the
sanctuary view to the space control view. For example, the 2002 withdrawal of the United States
from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty now enables the possibility of space-based missile
defense. Furthermore, the release of a new National Space Policy (2006) that compares the
importance of "freedom of action in space" with air power and sea power directly aligns with
space control doctrine.
1.2.5. Synthesis
Given that the need to address space architecture fragility has been articulated by national
leaders, a critical challenge arises: how best to enhance the survivability of space architecture?
Are existing survivability practices of hardening individual satellites or constellations applicable
to these problems? Are there alternative architectures that are intrinsically survivable? For
example, to what extent might architectural agility be emphasized to address the mismatch
between rapidly changing environments and the 15-25 year generational turnover of satellites
(GAO 2006)? Furthermore, given a set of candidate designs, how might alternatives be
systematically evaluated-gaining knowledge regarding the stakeholder value proposition,
mission context, technical performance of candidate designs-in order to down-select to a small
number of alternatives before entering the more costly detailed design and production phases of
system development.
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Figure 1-5. Goal of Front-End Analysis in Complex System Development
Figure 1-5 illustrates the motivation for and general challenge of system analysis: generation and
evaluation of alternatives to increase decision-maker knowledge while management leverage is
high and committed costs are low.
1.3. Scope
1.3.1. Relevant Literature
Technology, management, and policy literatures are consulted to inform all research phases and
to position the unique contributions of the dissertation relative to previous work (Figure 1-6).
Specific disciplinary areas include engineering systems (e.g., uncertainty management), systems
engineering and architecting (e.g., decision analysis, system architecture, tradespace
exploration), survivability engineering (e.g., combat aircraft design), space policy, and defense
acquisitions. The literature review will particularly focus on understanding the strengths and
weaknesses of existing theories and methods of survivability engineering.
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Figure 1-6. Relevant Literature
1.3.2. Research Questions
The following research questions are posed to address the survivability challenges identified in
Section 1.2 while leveraging the emerging dynamic tradespace exploration methods discussed in
Section 1.1.7 The overarching goal is to develop and test a new system analysis methodology for
survivability that empowers designers to evaluate dynamically relevant systems in hostile
environments.8
1. What is a dynamic, operational, and value-centric definition of survivability for
engineering systems?
2. What design principles enable survivability?
3. How can survivability be quantified and used as a decision metric in exploring
tradespaces during conceptual design of aerospace systems?
4. For a given space mission, how can alternative system architectures in dynamic
disturbance environments be evaluated in terms of survivability?
The first research question aims to conceptualize and operationalize survivability for subsequent
investigation. A general definition of survivability is a critical first step because existing metrics
for survivability vary among domains and are traditionally calculated with specific operational
scenarios in mind. The goal of the second question is to develop a framework of structural and
behavioral principles that enable survivability across the entire lifecycle of disturbances. The
principles are to provide designers with a portfolio of concept-neutral strategies for achieving
survivability during concept generation. Existing sets of survivability design principles tend to
exclude non-physical factors and to focus on concept-specific techniques. The third question
identifies the core challenge of the proposed research: quantification of a particular "-ility" to
enable its specification, evaluation, and verification during the conceptual design of aerospace
7 Chapter 2, Problem Formulation, provides a more detailed rationale for the four research questions.
8 Implicit in the research questions are two hypotheses: (1) that survivability can be articulated in the design process
as a dynamic, value-centric system property and (2) that dynamic tradespace analysis can be used to assess system
survivability in hostile environments.
systems. Despite the general agreement regarding the importance of the "-ilities", they are
neither well-defined nor easily evaluated in isolation. Finally, the purpose of the fourth question
is to apply the theories and methods developed in answering the previous questions to current
design issues in space system architecture. In particular, emerging military space radar concepts
will evaluated across threat environments. Addressing this question is of vital importance to the
U.S., given the tens of billions of dollars at stake and the cyclical establishment and cancellation
of space radar programs over the past decade (CBO 2007).
While the first research question is broadly defined to encompass all engineering systems, the
second and third focus on aerospace systems while the fourth specializes on space systems.
There are three reasons for narrowing the scope of successive research questions: (1) to leverage
the researcher's academic background and professional experience, (2) to accommodate finite
time and resources, and (3) to maximize the impact of the research on government and industry.
While the research questions provide for testing the survivability design methodology in the
domain of aerospace systems, the methodology will be constructed for broad applicability.
Therefore, an output of the research is a hypothesis for future work: that the survivability
theories and methods apply to all engineering systems.
1.3.3. Contributions
The fundamental contribution of the research is a clarification of how uncertain future
environments impact current and future system design options. In proposing an integrated
methodology for the specification, evaluation, and verification of survivability in conceptual
design, the general challenge of incorporating a larger set of "-ilities" in systems engineering will
be addressed. Specific contributions include:
* Framework for precisely defining survivability and specifying relationships to "-ilities"
* Dynamic, value-centric conceptualization of survivability
* Portfolio of design principles for survivability
* Extensions of dynamic tradespace exploration to incorporate environmental perturbations
* Evaluation of performance, cost, and survivability of alternative future military space
radar concepts
Four ongoing ESD research challenges are addressed in the research: uncertainty management,
application of interdisciplinary methods, enterprise issues, and stakeholder complexity. In
establishing a descriptive taxonomy and prescriptive methodology for the incorporation of the "-
ilities" in system design, the research integrates methods from disciplines across engineering and
the natural and social sciences. For example, Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE)
combines engineering design with economics, optimization, physics, psychology, and decision
theory. Interactions with government system program offices and system analysts in industry to
gather lead user feedback and apply the tradespace exploration methodology to ongoing system
developments have ensured that enterprise implementation issues are addressed. Finally,
competing stakeholder priorities are a key motivator for a survivability tradespace methodology
as stakeholders frequently possess very different perspectives on trade-offs between mission
performance and survivability.
1.4. Approach
To address the four research questions, a four-step research methodology is followed: (1)
knowledge capture and synthesis, (2) theory development, (3) computer experimentation, and (4)
case applications (Ross 2006). Figure 1-7 depicts the relationships among these four general
phases of the research process. Each phase is not a discrete step in a serial process but rather one
aspect of an iterative, concurrent process of continuous learning, revisiting of assumptions, and
development and testing of theory. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are employed.
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1.4.1. Knowledge Capture and Synthesis
The first phase, knowledge capture and synthesis, is descriptive and focuses on providing a
detailed picture of how survivability is articulated in conceptual design, categorizing existing
definitions and methods, and gathering technical data on engineering systems. Data in the
descriptive phase is gathered from a broad set of technology, management, and policy literatures
(e.g., engineering systems, systems engineering and architecting, survivability engineering, space
policy, defense acquisitions); exploratory interviews with key stakeholders and senior system
architects (to motivate and inform the research, not for statistical significance); and technical
specifications of existing aerospace systems deemed survivable. The primary outputs of the
knowledge capture and synthesis phase are a general conceptualization of survivability that
leverages previous theory and empirical data to ground the subsequent theoretical investigation.
This phase provides methodological insights and system data to the computer experimentation
and case application phases.
1.4.2. Theory Development
The second phase, theory development, focuses on exploring the distinguishing characteristics of
survivability and the "-ilities", understanding the design principles that achieve survivability for
aerospace systems, and determining how to quantify survivability as a decision metric for
dynamic tradespace exploration. Informed by the existing theories and empirical data
synthesized in the previous phase, this normative survivability design methodology is deployed
and tested in the computer experimentation and case applications phases of the research.
1.4.3. Computer Experiments
In the third phase, computer experiments are used to map the descriptive research conducted
during knowledge capture and synthesis to the normative work performed during theory
development. The purpose of the computer experiments is to test the proposed survivability
definition, principles, and metrics for internal validity in a controlled modeling environment. For
example, in one computer experiment, satellite survivability against orbital debris is added as a
design consideration within an existing orbital transfer vehicle tradespace.
1.4.4. Case Applications
In the fourth phase, case applications are conducted to test the prescriptive value of the new
survivability theory in the "messy" real world. As a qualitative check for the external validity of
the survivability design principles, the survivability features of existing, highly-survivable
aerospace systems are inductively mapped to the proposed set of principles. As a quantitative
check for the external validity of the survivability metrics, the theoretical insights from phase
two are deployed in dynamic tradespace exploration study of military space radar. This case
application includes interviews with system stakeholders to elicit multi-attribute utility functions;
consultations with experts to gather sets of potential hostile operating environments; and
computer-based modeling and simulation to assess differential cost, performance, and
survivability of candidate space system architectures.
A key aspect of testing the external validity of the proposed methodology is to apply the research
to ongoing system developments with critical survivability requirements. To meet this goal, lead
user feedback has been gathered from government system program offices and practitioners in
industry and incorporated into the dissertation.
1.5. Structure of Thesis
Eight chapters follow this introduction. Figure 1-8 provides an overview of the thesis structure.
3. Defining Survivability1. Introduction * 2. Literature Review . i i  Survivability conceptualize
conceptualize 4. Survivability Design 5. SurvivabilityPrinciples Tradespace Experiments
-nhsz 6. Methodology Overview:
MATE for Survivability
7. Case Application:
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Figure 1-8. Structure of Thesis
Chapter 2, Problem Formulation, surveys existing methods associated with design for
survivability to identify knowledge gaps and to inform the subject and scope of the problem
statement. The dissertation's guiding research questions (introduced in Section 1.3.2) stem
directly from this problem statement.
Chapter 3, Defining Survivability for Engineering Systems, answers the first research
question by presenting a general conceptualization of survivability. In addition, an "-ilities"
framework is described that relates survivability to other "-ilities", such as flexibility and
robustness.
Chapter 4, Survivability Design Principles, addresses the second research question by
presenting a set of seventeen principles spanning Types I, II, and III survivability. The principles
are derived using deductive and inductive means. The principles are applied to existing,
survivable, aerospace systems-including the A-10 Thunderbolt II combat aircraft, UH-60A
Blackhawk helicopter, Iridium satellite communications system, and F-16C "Fighting Falcon"
combat aircraft-as empirical tests of external validity.
Chapter 5, Survivability Tradespace Experiments, answers the third research question by
operationalizing the conceptual definition of survivability (introduced in Chapter 3) in
experimental tradespaces for an orbital transfer vehicle. Two new survivability metrics, time-
weighted average utility loss and threshold availability, are presented and shown to be
discriminating metrics for navigating survivability tradespaces of thousands of design
alternatives.
Chapter 6, Methodology Overview: MATE for Survivability, answers the fourth research
question by synthesizing lessons learned in the preceding chapters. In addition to leveraging
existing modeling techniques found in the literature (Chapter 2), the design principles framework
(Chapter 4) is consulted for improving the generation of survivability concepts and the
survivability metrics (Chapters 3, 5) are utilized to better evaluate design alternatives. An
example of the methodology for an orbital transfer vehicle is provided for illustration.
Chapter 7, Case Application: Satellite Radar, applies the survivability analysis methodology
introduced in Chapter 6 to future military satellite radar concepts. Survivability "tear(drop)"
tradespaces and response surfaces are used to conduct integrated trades among lifecycle cost,
multi-attribute utility, and survivability of thousands of design alternatives. Prescriptive
technical insights (for both satellite radar and the methodology) are extracted from the case
application.
Chapter 8, Discussion, synthesizes the unique contributions of the thesis, analyzes several
implementation issues regarding MATE for Survivability, and proposes several areas of future
work.
Chapter 9, Conclusion, discusses the performance of the dissertation across the objectives
identified in the introduction and draws general conclusions.
A spiral development approach was pursued for the development and maturation of the theories
and methods proposed in this dissertation. From the initiation of the research in September
2006, several conference papers were completed and presented to gather feedback on
preliminary concepts and ideas. Table 1-1 lists the papers from which much of the content of
this dissertation is derived. The author is grateful for the opportunity to collaborate on his
research with faculty, staff, and students associated with MIT's Systems Engineering
Advancement Research Initiative (SEAri).
Table 1-1. Mapping of Completed Papers to Thesis Chapters
Conference Paper Chapter(s)
Richards, M., Hastings, D., Rhodes, D., and Weigel, A., "Systems Architecting for
Survivability: Limitations of Existing Methods for Aerospace Systems," 6th Conference on 1, 2
Systems Engineering Research, Los Angeles, CA, April 2008.
Richards, M., Hastings, D., Rhodes, D., and Weigel, A., "Defining Survivability for Engineering 1, 3, 4
Systems," 5th Conference on Systems Engineering Research, Hoboken, NJ, March 2007.
McManus, H., Richards, M., Ross, A., and Hastings, D., "A Framework for Incorporating 3 5
"ilities" in Tradespace Studies," AIAA Space 2007, Long Beach, CA, September 2007.
Richards, M., Ross, A., Shah, N., and Hastings, D., "Metrics for Evaluating Survivability in
Dynamic Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration," AIAA Space 2008, San Diego, CA, 3, 5, 8
September 2008.
Richards, M., Ross, A., Hastings, D., and Rhodes, D., "Design Principles for Survivable System
Architecture," 1st IEEE Systems Conference, Honolulu, HI, April 2007.
Richards, M., Ross, A., Hastings, D., and Rhodes, D., "Two Empirical Tests of Design
Principles for Survivable System Architecture," 18th INCOSE Symposium, Utrecht, 4
Netherlands, June 2008.
Richards, M., Ross, A., Hastings, D., and Rhodes, D., "Empirical Validation of Design
Principles for Survivable System Architecture," 2nd IEEE Systems Conference, Montreal, 4
Canada, April 2008.
Richards, M., Ross, A., Hastings, D., and Rhodes, D., "Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration
for Survivability," 7th Conference on Systems Engineering Research, Loughborough, England, 6
April 2009.
Richards, M., Ross, A., Hastings, D., and Rhodes, D., "Survivability Design Principles for
Enhanced Concept Generation and Evaluation," 19 th INCOSE Symposium, Suntec City, 6, 7
Singapore, July 2009.
Ross, A., McManus, H., Long, A., Richards, M., Rhodes, D., and Hastings, D., "Responsive
Systems Comparison Method: Case Study in Assessing Future Designs in the Presence of 7
Change," AIAA Space 2008, San Diego, CA, September 2008.
Roberts, C., Richards, M., Ross, A., Rhodes, D., and Hastings, D., "Scenario Planning in
Dynamic Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration," 3 rd IEEE Systems Conference, Vancouver, 7
Canada, March 2009.
Richards, M., Ross, A., Stein, D., and Hastings, D., "Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration for
Survivability: Application to Satellite Radar," AIAA Space 2009, Pasadena, CA, September 7
2009.
Richards, M., Viscito, L., Ross, A., and Hastings, D., "Distinguishing Attributes for the
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Shah, N., Richards, M., Broniatowski, D., Laracy, J., Springmann, P., and Hastings, D., "System
of Systems Architecture: The Case of Space Situational Awareness," AIAA Space 2007, Long 8
Beach, CA, September 2007.

2. Problem Formulation
This chapter formulates the challenge of designing for survivability as a problem requiring an
enhanced tradespace exploration methodology within the context of current survivability
engineering and system analysis methodologies. After reviewing current state-of-the-art
survivability engineering and system analysis methodologies (Sections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively),
the limitations of the current approaches to survivability engineering during conceptual design
are discussed (Section 2.3). The chapter concludes with a formal problem statement (Section
2.4).
2.1. State-of-the-Practice: Survivability Engineering
Survivability is defined by system engineers as "the capability of a system to avoid or withstand
hostile natural and manmade environments without suffering abortive impairment of its ability to
accomplish its designated mission" (USAF 2005). According to the Department of Defense
(DoD) Regulation 5000.2-R, survivability consists of susceptibility, vulnerability, and
recoverability (DoD 2002):
Vulnerability. The characteristic of a system that causes it to suffer a definite degradation
as a result of having been subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural hostile
environment (AP3.2.5).
Susceptibility. The degree to which a weapon system is open to effective attack due to
one or more inherent weakness (AP3.2.7).
Recoverability. Following combat damage, the ability to take emergency action to
prevent loss of the system, to reduce personnel casualties, or to regain weapon system
combat mission capabilities (AP3.2.8).
Although primarily specified as a requirement in military systems, survivability is an
increasingly important attribute of all systems which must be robust to environments
characterized by system-threatening hazards (GAO 2002). While disturbances may originate
from a wide range of hostile natural and synthetic environments, a universal challenge
confronting system engineers is the specification, development, procurement, operation, and
maintenance of systems with critical survivability requirements (Neumann 2000).
Within the aerospace and defense industries, survivability engineering application areas span
strategic defense (Bennett 1980; Canavan 1997), networked information systems (Baran 1964;
Al-Noman 1998; Northrop et al. 2006), combat aircraft (Throndson 1982; Paterson 1999; Ball
2003), human spaceflight (Heydorn and Railsback 1999; Williamsen et al. 1999), missile defense
(Canavan and Teller 1990; Lin 2003), satellite protection (Canavan 1989; Howard 1993; Nordin
and Kong 1999), unmanned aerial vehicles (Ahn, Lee and Kim 2002; Jeffcoat 2003), and
homeland security (Ball and Atkinson 2006; Perrow 2007). Numerous application areas exist
outside of the aerospace and defense industries as well-ranging from immunization of
individual organisms in the life sciences (Ellison et al. 1999) to the design of crashworthy
Formula-One racing vehicles (Catchpole et al. 2007).
Rather than attempting to broadly survey all application areas of survivability engineering,
Section 2.1 focuses on summarizing the state-of-the-practice of survivability characterization,
quantification, and analysis in aerospace system design. Following a brief note on the historical
evolution of the survivability discipline, the acquisition process, analytic frameworks, and
evaluation techniques underlying modem survivability engineering are discussed. The section
concludes with a mapping of survivability engineering to related disciplines such as system
safety and security engineering.
2.1.1. Historical Context
While the practice of survivability engineering extends back as long as humans have utilized
synthetic artifacts in hostile environments, the modem discipline emerged from the First and
Second World Wars. After being developed within the context of naval ship design and applied
to combat aircraft soon thereafter, the discipline's ascendancy has paralleled the rise of the
modem system sciences-particularly systems engineering, systems analysis, and operations
research (Johnson 1997).
Survivability research stems from a long history of naval architecture that sought to prevent the
loss of ships from sustained damage and to save lives in the event of a ship sinking (Yurick and
Doss 2002). Modem research on survivability engineering is an outgrowth of experience in the
First and Second World Wars and became a formal discipline in the domain of combat aircraft.
Ball and Atkinson (1995) document the history of combat aircraft survivability engineering from
the 1940's to the present day. While the importance of survivability was recognized during the
Second World War (e.g., eight major design evolutions made to the B-17 "Flying Fortress"
between 1942 and 1945 to enhance survivability), survivability was not specified as a formal
design requirement by the military for another 25 years. Before the systems approach for
survivability engineering existed, enhancements were made within the context of individual
aircraft design disciplines and subsystems (e.g., structures made more resistant to enemy fire,
guns and missiles added for self-defense) and relied on combat experience to adapt designs to
more survivable states. Following the loss of 5,000 aircraft by the U.S. military in Southeast
Asia between 1963 and 1973, the importance of the survivability of military aircraft increased
dramatically, and a formal discipline emerged to support the integrated specification, design, and
assessment of highly survivable systems (Ball and Atkinson 1995).
2.1.2. Survivability in U.S. Military Acquisitions
U.S. military acquisition policy requires that survivability be systematically incorporated into
current and future weapons systems. While the Army, Navy, and Air Force each have specific
policies for implementing an integrated survivability program plan in major acquisition
programs, all of the departments base their programs on DoD Regulation 5000.2-R (Ball 2003).
According the Section C5.2.3.5.12 of DoD Regulation 5000.2-R, 9 systems "shall be survivable to
the threat levels anticipated in their projected operating environment...without the crew suffering
acute chronic illness, disability, or death." In particular, program managers are instructed to
establish and maintain a survivability program throughout the system lifecycle, including a full
assessment of system survivability against "all anticipated threats at all levels of conflict, early in
9 See page 95 of DoD Regulation 5000.2-R: Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisitions Programs
(MDAPS) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs, (Program Design, Systems
Engineering Survivability), at http://exploration.nasa.gov/documents/TTT 052005/DoD50002R.pdf.
the program, but in no case later than entering system demonstration or equivalent." DoD
Regulation 5000.2-R also stresses the importance of considering mission effectiveness by
seeking to maximize survivability enhancement features-including threat avoidance, hardening,
and rapid reparability-while minimizing the impact on overall program cost and schedule (DoD
2002).
The survivability program plan is implemented within the context of the defense acquisition
management framework (Figure 2-1). DoD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System, describes the DoD's event-oriented process of translating mission needs into
weapon systems (DoD 2003b). In general, each procurement effort is divided into four discrete
phases: (1) concept refinement, (2) concept and technology development, (3) system
development and demonstration, and (4) production, deployment, and sustainment. The four
phases are separated by key decision points called milestones. During concept refinement, key
performance parameters are specified based on user needs and a preliminary concept-of-
operations (CONOPS) is established. During concept and technology development, technical
feasibility and desirability of the system is further examined before a decision is made as to
whether to make the system a formal acquisition program (Milestone B). During system
development and demonstration, the detailed design of the system is completed, culminating in a
critical design review (Milestone C). Following success at Milestone C, authorization is given to
proceed to fabrication, testing, and deployment of the system during the fourth and final phase.
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Given the diversity of programs procured by the DoD, Instruction 5000.2 recognizes that every
program is unique and may not need to follow the entire process. For example, decision-making
for national security space (NSS) acquisitions is focused on the earlier phases of the lifecycle
given the emphasis on "high-tech," small-quantity programs. This is in contrast to the DoD 5000
model that is focused on making the best large quantity production decision (e.g., conducting
low-rate initial production and testing of Joint Strike Fighter before committing to thousands of
production units). These differences are reflected in NSS Acquisition Policy 03-01 (DoD 2004)
which phases milestones earlier than the DoD 5000 model (as observed in Figure 2-1) and
customizes acquisition activities for satellite development.
Survivability engineering activities occur across all four phases of the system lifecycle (Ball
2003). During concept refinement, expected operational environments are discussed in the
mission needs statement (MNS). These operational environments may include conventional,
electronic, nuclear, biological, chemical, terrorist, and sabotage threats.
During concept and technology development, operational threats are formally specified,
survivability objectives are established, and survivability considerations are incorporated into
test and sustainment plans (Ball 2003). The foundation of the survivability program plan is the
system threat assessment report (STAR). The STAR is issued by a service intelligence agency as
an estimate of the operational, physical, and technological environment in which the system is
expected to function. The STAR is the authoritative document from which survivability
requirements are derived-specifying threat force levels as well as enemy doctrine, strategy, and
tactics (Ball 2003). Prior to all milestone decision points, the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) reviews the STAR to validate the projection of the threat environment at initial operational
capability (IOC) through the first ten years (DoD 2002). Having formally specified the threat,
system survivability objectives are defined and validation criteria are established within the
operational requirements document (ORD). Engineering models at the engagement, mission,
and campaign-levels are developed to analyze the mission effectiveness of design alternatives.
Critical survivability issues requiring testing are incorporated into the test and evaluation master
plan (TEMP). Facilities required to support unique survivability characteristics are identified in
the integrated logistics support plan (ILSP).
During system development and demonstration, the survivability program plan agreed to at
Milestone B is executed. Following a production decision at Milestone C, a complete
assessment of how well the survivability objectives are addressed is made during the production
and deployment phase. If applicable, survivability considerations are incorporated into planned
upgrade packages, including plans for retrofitting survivability features into existing systems
(JTCG/AS 2001).
In the preceding description of survivability in U.S. military acquisitions, the survivability
program plan is neatly decomposed into each phase of the development process. While this
elegant decomposition may be preserved in terms of program phase (in the unlikely absence of
changing requirements, threats, and technologies), such decomposition is not possible regarding
the composition of the functional team focused on survivability. Successful implementation of a
survivability program plan requires a system-level approach to integrate subsystem development
efforts at the highest levels of program management. The following excerpt from the handbook
issued by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability underscores the need
for an interdisciplinary, systems approach.
The diverse activities and functions associated with the survivability discipline range from
analyses of the inherent capability of enemy threats to the effectiveness of those threats in
particular environments; from the engineering of survivability design features or enhancements to
susceptibility of the system; from test and evaluation and analysis of inherent aircraft vulnerability
to damage response of materials to threat impact; from development of analytical assessment
procedures to analysis of combat data; and from the development of vulnerability/susceptibility
reduction techniques to aircraft trade studies that include and interface with other functional
disciplines (maintainability, reliability, etc.). This diversity makes the survivability functional
discipline multidimensional and interdependent. Close technical working relationships, with
interchanges of data and methodology among these activities and functions, require a precise
understanding of the processes and terminology used and the full support of program
management, systems engineering, and Integrated Product Teams (JTCG/AS 2001).
Having discussed how survivability is implemented within the DoD acquisitions structure, the
following section describes the analytic approaches taken by survivability engineers during
conceptual design.
2.1.3. Existing Analytic Frameworks
As discussed in the introduction to Section 2.1, variety of domain- and system-specific
methodologies exist to assess survivability during front-end design activities. At a fundamental
level, most methodologies evaluate survivability enhancement features in terms of minimizing
total system lifecycle cost while others seek to optimize the defensive system's cost-exchange
ratios with the attacker.
In The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design, Ball (2003)
provides an excellent overview of the principles and methods of the survivability engineering
discipline. According to Ball, design for survivability involves two elements (1) increasing the
ability of systems to avoid disturbances (i.e., reduce susceptibility) and (2) increasing the ability
of systems to withstand disturbances (i.e., reduce vulnerability). Figure 2-2 outlines Ball's
general survivability assessment methodology for combat aircraft.
Figure 2-2. Ball's Survivability Assessment Methodology
Because survivability emerges from the interaction of a system with its environment, the
survivability methodology is initiated with a mission threat assessment. Having specified the
type, strength, command structure, equipment, and disposition of the enemy force, a detailed
model of the aircraft is obtained. Next, the susceptibility and vulnerability assessments are
conducted. In a typical susceptibility assessment for a combat aircraft, computer simulations of
the anticipated air defense system and live-fire tests are conducted to determine both the
likelihood that the aircraft is hit as well as the spatial distribution of hits. In a typical
vulnerability assessment, critical aircraft components and their kill modes are identified using
fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). After making
simplifying assumptions (e.g., perpendicular attack direction, uniform distribution of hits over
exposed cross-sectional area), computer programs are used to estimate likelihood that the aircraft
is killed given a random hit.
Following issuance of the STAR and completion of the susceptibility and vulnerability
assessments, survivability assessments of design alternatives are performed for particular
engagement, mission, and campaign scenarios. Given that a system's survival in combat is not a
deterministic outcome that can be predicted with certainty, survivability is measured by a
probability (Ball 2003). For example, at the engagement level, the probability of an aircraft
surviving a one-on-one engagement from a single shot from a single weapon is calculated using
an event tree (e.g., Figure 2-3). Five probability assignments are used from the susceptibility
assessment-P[weapon is active], P[sensor detects], P[fire control solution is obtained],
P[weapon intercepts], P[weapon hits]-and one probability assignment is used from the
vulnerability assessment-P[weapon hit disrupts critical components]. The probability of
surviving the engagement is computed as the complement of the joint probability of these six
assigned values. This same process is applied at the mission and campaign level by allowing
multiple shots from multiple weapons. In order to abstract away the complexity associated with
dependent shot outcome probabilities (e.g., increased aircraft susceptibility and vulnerability if
one of an aircraft's four engines is destroyed by a previous engagement), independent shot
outcomes are assumed.
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Figure 2-3. Kill Chain for Engagement-Level Survivability Assessment (Anderson and Williamsen 2007)
The next step in Ball's survivability assessment methodology is to conduct trade studies to
determine the survivability improvements and cost and performance burdens associated with
each survivability feature under consideration. The mission and campaign survival rates are
computed for both the baseline design and designs incorporating survivability enhancement
features. Several other measures-of-effectiveness (e.g., reliability, maintainability, safety, and
reparability) are also computed for the designs under consideration. Finally, a campaign
measure of effectiveness-typically net lifecycle cost-is selected as the optimization criteria for
determining whether to incorporate different combinations of survivability features. 10
Throndson (1982) presents a representative example of this methodological approach, evaluating
the impact of various signature reduction and hardening features on a baseline combat aircraft
propulsion system.
The final step in Ball's survivability assessment methodology is to test the efficacy of the
proposed survivability enhancement features and identify any emergent survivability issues.
While survivability testing during conceptual design might involve subscale models, final
susceptibility and vulnerability testing usually involves full-scale models for signature
measurement and live-fire testing.
The reliance of Ball's methodology on probabilistic risk assessment (Bedford and Cooke 2001)
and focus on lifecycle cost minimization is shared by the threat evaluation methodology for
satellites documented in the U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center's Systems
Engineering Primer and Handbook (USAF 2005). The survivability analysis methodology in
the handbook consists of six steps. First, three factors associated with the top-level threats
10 Depending on the number of survivability enhancement features and levels under consideration, the number of
operational scenarios under investigation, and the availability of computing resources for modeling and simulation,
it may be burdensome to investigate a full-factorial sample of possible survivability enhancements. Design-of-
experiment techniques are readily applicable to the survivability assessment to mitigate this computational expense
(Brynestad and Newberry 1992).
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enumerated in the STAR are specified using Likert scaling factors: consequence of threat
imposed to the system (Cs), difficulty of an aggressor to impose the threat (Dagg), and
effectiveness of countermeasures (Ecm). Second, a threat risk (TR) level is defined:
TR = C (2-1)
agg cm
Third, threat risks are aggregated using likelihood of the threat (L) as a weighting factor. Fourth,
a lifecycle cost model is created for employment of each countermeasure. Figure 2-4 provides a
sample output at this phase of the analysis.
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Figure 2-4. Example Threat Evaluation Model (USAF 2005)
Fifth, a baseline TR is computed for a design incorporating no countermeasures. In the sixth and
final step, linear programming (Hillier and Lieberman 1995) is employed to minimize TR for a
fixed cost or to achieve a fixed TR for minimum cost.
While The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design describes
survivability engineering only within the domain of combat aircraft, Ball's susceptibility and
reduction techniques are applicable to a variety of domains, including satellite protection (Ball
and Kolleck 2000). Given its life-critical design requirements and high-susceptibility to orbital
debris impacts (due to a surface area of 12,000 m2 and a 15-year design lifetime), military
survivability analysis techniques have regularly been applied to the International Space Station
(e.g., Figure 2-5). For example, to improve the likelihood of the International Space Station
(ISS) maintaining mission capability following orbital debris penetration, Williamsen et al.
(1999) used Ball's analytic framework for a three-phased vulnerability assessment: (1) establish
ISS failure modes, (2) associate each failure mode with a critical damage level, and (3)
determine the probability of orbital debris impacts that induce these critical damage levels.
Having developed this vulnerability model, the survivability implications for alternative internal
equipment designs and crew operational procedures were examined-identifying minor
CONOPS changes that enhanced crew safety following orbital debris penetration.
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Figure 2-5. ISS Debris Threat Assessment (Graves 2002)
Other methodologies take a different approach for determining whether to incorporate
survivability features. Rather than seeking to minimize lifecycle cost, Canavan and Teller
(1990) use the Nitze criterion to evaluate alternative survivability enhancement features for a
space-based ballistic missile defense system. As one of the chief architects of U.S. policy toward
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Paul Nitze advocated that defenses are worth deploying if
they are more cost-effective at the margin (i.e., recurring cost of defense is less than the recurring
cost of the countermeasures that could be used against the defense). The Nitze criterion is
operationalized using cost-exchange ratios (i.e., the marginal cost of defense divided by the
marginal cost of countermeasures). Therefore, in examining the Brilliant Pebbles missile
defense system," Canavan and Teller use cost-exchange ratios to analyze the strategic
interactions between the deployment of an offense (i.e., nuclear attack missiles), the deployment
of a defense (i.e., space-based interceptors to collide with the missiles as they leave the
atmosphere), countermeasures taken by the offense (e.g., anti-satellite vehicles), and counter-
countermeasures taken in turn by the defense (e.g., hardening, evasive maneuvers, decoys).
Before accounting for survivability considerations, a Brilliant Pebbles system was shown to have
highly-effective cost-exchange ratios with Soviet inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
when deployed together inside carrier vehicles. However, when accounting for countermeasures,
11 Described as "the crowning achievement of the Strategic Defense Initiative" by former Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory Director John Nuckolls, the Brilliant Pebbles were a set of non-nuclear watermelon-sized mini-
missiles designed to kinetically intercept and kill ballistic missiles in the boost and early mid-course phases of flight.
absenteeism, and cost-effectiveness relative to other defense strategies, Canavan and Teller
recommended a distributed singlet deployment (i.e., one interceptor per carrier vehicle) for
achieving favorable cost-exchange ratios with the attacker. In addition to informing designers
regarding the strategic interaction between a system and its threat environment over time, cost-
exchange ratios are also used for survivability tactics optimization. For example, Howard's
satellite attrition model (1993) determines an "optimal" decoying strategy based on maximizing
the resources expended by an adversary.
2.1.4. Mapping to Related Disciplines
"In time of crisis, there can be uncertainty over whether a particular survivability problem is related to
security or to reliability, availability, and fault tolerance" (Neumann 2000).
System properties closely related to survivability include safety, security, and reliability. Given
the similarities and interdependencies among these properties (Dotseth 1997), it is important to
distinguish among them. To begin, Table 2-1 provides definitions of safety, security, reliability,
and survivability found in the literature.
Table 2-1. Disciplines Related to Survivability
reliability probability of functioning for a prescribed time
under stipulated environmental conditions
safety freedom from accidents or losses (Leveson 1995)
protection of a system's informational, operational, (Laracy and Leveson 2007)
and physical elements from malicious intent
survivability capability to avoid or withstand hostile natural and
synthetic environments
Safety, "freedom from accidents or losses," is perhaps the discipline most closely linked to
survivability in that both disciplines seek to minimize hazards (i.e., system and environmental
states which will lead to losses) (Leveson 1995). However, whereas the hazards addressed by
system safety encompass both endogenous and exogenous failures (e.g., from operator errors and
component failures to flawed software design, dysfunctional component interactions, and unsafe
organizational evolution) that emerge from the interaction of a system with its environment
(Leveson 2002), the disturbances considered by survivability are all exogenous to the system and
consist of both naturally-occurring and man-made hostile environments. In practice,
survivability and safety engineers may work closely together. This is particularly true for
vulnerability reduction features. For example, the two disciplines cooperated to implement fire
protection systems in the fuel tanks of civilian airliners following the loss of TWA Flight 800
(Ball and Atkinson 2006). However, safety and survivability are not always synergistic. For
example, while the incorporation of infrared flares in combat aircraft to counter heat-seeking
missiles increases survivability, it also reduces system safety by introducing a source of fire (Ball
2003).
Security, "a system property that implies protection of the informational, operational, and
physical elements from malicious intent" (Laracy and Leveson 2007), is closely related to
survivability in that both are concerned with hostile malevolent environments. However,
survivability is distinguished from security by excluding threats internal to the system boundary
while including hostile natural environments. In addition, enablers of survivability include not
only resistance to attack but also robustness under attack and recovery efforts (Ellison, Fisher et
al. 1999).
Reliability, the probability that a component will perform its intended function "for a prescribed
time and under stipulated environmental conditions" (Leveson 1995), is primarily concerned
with internal component failures while survivability is considered with external system
disturbances. Figure 2-6 provides a Venn diagram representation of the relationships among
reliability, safety, survivability, and security.
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Figure 2-6. Relationships between Survivability and Related Disciplines
Other emerging fields related to survivability include resilience engineering and system
assurance. Resilience may be defined as "the ability of a system or organization to react to and
recover from disturbances at an early stage, with minimal effect on the dynamic stability"
(Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson 2006). Resilience is one enabler of increasing the survivability
of systems. Systems assurance has been defined as "the level of confidence that the system
functions as intended and is free of exploitable vulnerabilities, either intentionally or
unintentionally designed or inserted as part of the system" (Baldwin, Komaroff and Croll 2006).
While systems assurance is focused on the challenges of validating military software and parts
security, given the complex international supply webs characteristic of most modern systems,
survivability engineering is focused on the design of systems robust to operational disturbances.
2.2. State-of-the-Practice: Evaluation of Design Alternatives
Having surveyed the practices that characterize modern survivability engineering, existing
practices for evaluating design alternatives are now discussed. This more general review is
necessary for understanding state-of-the-art system analysis methodologies that might be
leveraged within survivability engineering.
Building on the discussion of value-based conceptual design, tradespace exploration, and "-
ilities" in Section 1.1, this section examines existing design processes for evaluating and
selecting design alternatives with respect to stakeholder needs. Whether structured and explicit
or implicit and intuitive, all design teams use a method for selecting concepts for further
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investigation and development (Ulrich and Eppinger 2004). Given that every system exists to
deliver value to stakeholders, a key challenge for any evaluation technique is using subjective
stakeholder needs to drive engineering design decisions (Ross 2006). In other words, in
presenting alternative designs to a decision-maker and recommending "best" designs for
selection, how should analysts establish the link between the value and technical domains?
Decision theory is a field focused on improving how people make decisions (i.e., commitments
to courses of action involving an irreversible allocation of resources). The origins of modern
decision theory may be traced to the foundational work of von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953) on utility quantification, measurement, and normative axioms. Tang (2006) provides an
excellent overview of the three branches of decision theory: the normative, descriptive, and
prescriptive schools (Table 2-2). The normative school concerns itself with how decisions ought
to be made based upon internal consistency and theoretical adequacy (e.g., expected utility
theory). The descriptive school focuses on how decisions are made in reality (e.g., prospect
theory), enabling a better understanding of the implications of human biases. The prescriptive
school seeks to integrate the theoretical and empirical insights provided by the former two
schools to help people make better decisions in practice (e.g., value-focused thinking).
Table 2-2. Summary of Normative, Descriptive, and Prescriptive Theories (Tang 2006)
normative descriptive prescriptive
how people should how and why people help people make better
focus decide with logical decide the way they do decisions
consistency prepare people to decide
criterion theoretical adequacy empirical validity efficacy and usefulness
scope all decisions classes of decisions specific decisions for
tested specific problems
cognitive sciences normative and
theoretical utility theory axioms psychology about descriptive theories
beliefs and preferences decision analysis axioms
analysis of alternatives prevention of processes and
operational systematic human procedures
focus determining errors in inference and end-end decision life-
preferences decision-making cycle
judges "theoretical sages" experimental applied analystsresearchers
Prescriptive decision theory, also referred to as decision analysis, seeks to "prescribe how a
decisionmaker should think systematically about identifying and structuring objectives, about
vexing value tradeoffs, and about balancing various risks" (Keeney and Raiffa 1993).12 A wide
variety of decision analysis techniques exist with varying criteria to evaluate system alternatives
(Hazelrigg 2003). Each technique has applicability to various stages of product development.
Given this thesis' focus on the front-end evaluation of survivability features on stakeholder
12 Decision analysis is similar to optimization in that both aim to identify an "optimal" choice whose outcome is
preferred given an underlying set of objectives. However, while optimization theory deals almost exclusively with
search techniques, decision analysis concerns itself with where the objective function comes from and with which
constraints it must satisfy (Hazelrigg 2003).
value-delivery (Section 1.1), the subsequent discussion will focus on prescriptive, value-based
approaches for conceptual design.
The value-centric perspective is operationalized in conceptual design through the application of
decision theory to the engineering design process-making cost-benefit tradeoffs explicit in
concept selection (Thurston 1990; Keeney and Raiffa 1993). As a decision aid for multi-criteria
assessment of alternatives, multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) provides a construct for
assessing values and subjective probabilities of individuals in the presence of uncertainty due to
risk (Dyer et al. 1992). Founded upon mathematical theory for utility models (Keeney and
Raiffa 1993), MAUT's logical consistency is coupled with a variety of assessment techniques
that address the limited cognitive abilities of decision-makers. As prescriptive theory, MAUT's
potential is implicitly recognized by descriptive theories that characterize human decision-
making (in the absence of such methodological structure) in terms of heuristics and biases
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974) as well as bounded rationality (Gigerenzer and Goldstein 1996;
Simon 1996).
2.2.1. Trade Studies in Conceptual Design
Trade studies are analyses that evaluate a range of design options in terms of costs and benefits.
According to the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook (2007), trades studies are used to
propose and determine the feasibility of design alternatives for a given mission. Systems
engineering texts recommend using legacy systems, new technologies, innovative concepts, and
stakeholder-suggested systems to enumerate the set of design alternatives to be evaluated in a
trade study (Kossiakoff and Sweet 2003).
Despite the extremely negative cost, schedule, and performance implications of making poor
design decisions during conceptual design (Section 1.1.2), development of systems involving
new technologies does not typically involve a broad, systematic exploration of design
alternatives (McManus and Warmkessel 2004). In practice, the intuition of experienced
designers is usually consulted in the pursuit of a feasible solution or solutions (i.e., designs
within the acceptability range of stakeholder cost and benefit), (Maier and Rechtin 2002).
Typically, the unavailability of resources for consideration of a multitude of options compel
design teams to establish favorite baseline "point designs" from which small perturbations are
examined in an analysis-of-alternatives (Ross and Hastings 2005). This approach of rapidly
converging and optimizing on a conceptual design is susceptible to identifying locally optimal
designs that provide only a vague picture of the complexity of the broad space of possible
designs (McManus and Warmkessel 2004).
Figure 2-7 illustrates four levels of trades that can be conducted during conceptual design: (1)
local point solution trades, (2) examination of a small number of point designs in an analysis-of-
alternatives, (3) multi-objective optimization to identify designs along the Pareto front, and (4)
full tradespace exploration. Each type of trade is identified within a notional tradespace, i.e., the
space spanned by an enumerated set of design variables, X,, that specify design alternatives.
While choosing to do a Level I design trade requires the least effort, incomplete understanding of
the broader tradespace may lead to selection of a suboptimal solution (i.e., a dominated point
lying in the interior region of the tradespace). A recommended improvement to local point
solution trades is to conduct a Level 2 analysis-of-alternatives (AoA) to assess the alternatives in
different regions of the tradespace (Herscovitz and Barnett 2007). However, there is no
assurance that the relatively small number of designs in the AoA are non-dominated solutions.
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Figure 2-7. Different Types of Trades within the Design Space (Ross and Hastings 2005)
Extending traditional trade studies, which typically consider a small number of alternative
designs, multi-objective optimization and tradespace exploration leverage computer-based
parametric models and simulations to compare hundreds or thousands of potential architectures.
If full tradespaces are deemed too large to enumerate, analyze, and compare all possible
alternatives, a variety of optimization techniques (e.g., Taguchi, heuristic, gradient, univariate)
may be used to approximate the Pareto front in a Level 3 trade study (Jilla 2002). Finding the
Pareto frontier solution set enables explicit value trade-offs to be made among design
alternatives. However, restricting the trade study to Pareto-efficient designs limits the breadth
of understanding to be gained by mapping the decision-maker preference structure onto the
entire design space. For example, without having enumerated and evaluated designs lying in the
interior of the tradespace, it is not possible to investigate the sensitivity of the "optimal" designs
to changes in the objective function. Therefore, a Level 4 exploration of the tradespace considers
dominated solutions as well as the Pareto front (Ross and Hastings 2005).
2.2.2. Emerging Method: Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) is a conceptual design methodology that
applies decision theory to model and simulation-based design (Ross, Hastings et al. 2004).
Decoupling the design from the need through tradespace exploration, MATE is both a solution-
generating as well as a decision-making framework.'3  Descended from the Generalized
Information Network Analysis (GINA) methodology which applies metrics from information
theory to the quantitative evaluation of communications spacecraft (Shaw, Miller and Hastings
2001), MATE draws on multi-attribute utility theory to expand the analysis to systems that
cannot be modeled as information networks. To date, MATE has been applied to over a dozen
(mostly aerospace) systems and utilized in research examining requirements generation (Diller
2002), policy uncertainty (Weigel 2002), space system architecting and design (Ross 2003),
concurrent engineering (Stagney 2003), spiral development (Roberts 2003), evolutionary
3 The solution-generating aspect distinguishes MATE from traditional decision analyses techniques which focus
only on the evaluation step.
acquisition (Derleth 2003), modularity (Shah 2004), orbital transfer vehicle design (Galabova
2004), and value robustness (Ross 2006). Figure 2-8 summarizes the MATE process.
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Figure 2-8. Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) (Ross, Hastings et al. 2004)
Ross (2003) provides a detailed description of the 48 steps comprising a full MATE study. At a
high level, the process consists of three general phases: need identification, design alternative
enumeration, and design alternative evaluation. In the first phase, the mission needs and
preferences of a decision-maker are defined and specified with attributes (i.e., decision-maker-
perceived metrics that measure how well decision-maker-defined objectives are met). Attributes
and their associated utility curves and multiplicative weighting factors are elicited through
formal utility interviews with decision-makers. Single-attribute utility curves are typically
aggregated using a multiplicative utility function (i.e., a dimensionless metric of user satisfaction
ranging from 0, minimally acceptable, to 1, highest of expectations).
In the second phase, the attributes are inspected and various design variables are proposed.
(Design variables are designer-controlled quantitative parameters that reflect aspects of a
concept, which, taken together as a set, uniquely define a system architecture.) Each possible
combination of design variables constitutes a unique design vector, and the set of all possible
design vectors constitutes the design-space. This solution-generating phase-inspecting the
decision-maker-derived attributes to determine which design variables to include in the trade
study-explicitly links the value and technical domains of a system.
In the third phase, physics-based models are developed to evaluate the lifecycle cost and utility
of the designs under consideration. To assess the full-factorial sampling of the design space,
parametric computer models are used to transform each design vector into attribute values
against which utility functions can be applied. Following a MATE analysis, a limited number of
Pareto-efficient designs may then be matured in a concurrent engineering environment. The
broad, front-end evaluation of thousands of design alternatives on a common, quantitative basis
provides decision-makers a prescriptive framework for selecting designs to carry forward for
more detailed analysis.
One of the advantages of conducting a Level 4 tradespace exploration using MATE over a Level
3 search of the Pareto front using traditional optimization techniques is that the sensitivities of
the design alternatives to changing decision-maker needs, operational (threat) environments, and
technological developments, can be explored. As discussed in Section 1.1.4, the lifecycle system
properties known as the "-ilities" (e.g., flexibility, robustness, survivability) are increasingly
regarded as critical for delivering sustained stakeholder value. A recent Air Force/Lean
Aerospace Initiative report on systems engineering (Rhodes 2004) articulates this need:
...we need to understand what makes an architecture robust, and this is not well understood today... a
robust architecture must be developed against a list of "threats", scenarios, and environments rather than for
a specific point design. A challenge we face is developing strategies and methods for insulating the
architecture against dramatic change- for example, through layering or modularity. There is a need to
separate elements that change rapidly from those that are static- adjusting for "clockspeeds...we need to be
able to envision where the system will be in 20+ years, including the nature of future missions and the
environment it will need to operate in. And, as systems are moving toward more collaborative SoS/FoS,
we need to simultaneously define the context in which the current system will operate, as well as defining
how it will play in multiple contexts over a period of time.
Despite general agreement on their importance, the "-ilities" are neither well-defined nor easily
evaluated in isolation. Two key challenges make the "-ilities" difficult to represent in a classic
tradespace: (1) representation of temporal properties in a static construct (2) axiomatic
restrictions on the incorporation of the "-ilities" in attribute sets (i.e., attributes need to be
perceived as independent, yet the "-ilities" are defined by attribute performance over time). 14
Ross (2006) operationalized six "-ilities" (i.e., changeability, flexibility, adaptability, scalability,
modifiability, and robustness) for assessment in trade studies through the incorporation of time-
dependent context variables in MATE. In a dynamic MATE study, network analysis is applied
to a series of temporally-linked tradespaces, enabling the quantification of "-ilities" as decision
metrics across design alternatives. In order to incorporate time into traditionally static cost-
utility tradespaces, Epoch-Era Analysis (Figure 2-9) is employed whereby a system lifecycle or
"era" is modeled as a set of discrete epochs. Equivalent to short-run analysis in economics, a
given epoch defines a scenario in which constraints, design concepts, available technology, and
articulated attributes remain fixed.
14 The "-ilities" cannot be incorporated as traditional attributes in MATE due to three theoretical inconsistencies:
lack of decomposability, lack of perceived independence, and redundancy. Since their definition is related to
changes in system form or function, they are quantitatively dependent upon other objective function variables.
Tradespace studies typically look at the relation between function and/or form and resulting system performance in
terms of system objectives. The performance in an aggregated, multi-objective space is dependent on performance
in each of the single objectives. In choosing an appropriate aggregation technique, it is important not to double-
count the single objective performances. Aggregating "-ilities", which by definition are measures of the ability to
maintain attributes under changing conditions, into a multi-attribute objective function will run into the problem of
double-counting. An active area of research is seeking to formulate an appropriate basis for aggregating "-ilities"
with other system attributes. In the meantime, the "-ilities" will remain disaggregated and their impact in a
tradespace study assessed independently (McManus, Richards et al. 2007).
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Figure 2-9. Epoch-Era Analysis
Just as a movie reel approximates motion by stringing together multiple static pictures in quick
succession, dynamic MATE strings together multiple static tradespaces over time to approximate
dynamic system contexts and expectations. System states may be represented within an epoch
using a network tradespace. In the limit that the design vectors in the tradespace represent all
meaningful system states, a dynamic model may be approximated within the tradespace as
transitions between design vectors over time. An accessibility matrix specifies the ability of one
design to transition to another, and a transitions rules matrix specifies the time and cost incurred
for a given transition. To evaluate a system's robustness to change, Ross introduced the Pareto
Trace number, the frequency with which a particular design appears in the Pareto front of
enumerated tradespaces. System changeability is measured by Filtered Outdegree, the number of
potential transition paths available to a design, filtered by acceptable cost for change by a
particular decision-maker (Ross and Hastings 2006).
2.3. Limitations of Existing Survivability Methods
"The current state of practice in survivability and security evaluation tends to treat systems and their
environments as static and unchanging. However, the survivability and security of systems in fact degrade
over time as changes occur in their structures, configurations, and environments, and as knowledge of their
vulnerabilities spreads...." (Ellison, Fisher et al. 1999)
Several opportunities to improve the practice of survivability engineering (Section 2.1) may be
identified when analyzing the discipline from the perspective of dynamic, value-driven
tradespace exploration (Section 2.2). This section discusses five limitations of existing
survivability methods: (1) treatment of survivability as a constraint rather than an active trade in
the design process, (2) static nature of system threat assessment reports despite changing
operational environments, (3) assumption of path-independent disturbance encounters, (4)
limited scope of survivability design and analysis, and (5) inability to consider alternative value-
delivery mechanisms.
2.3.1. Treatment of Survivability as a Constraint
Designing an air vehicle to maximize mission effectiveness subject to cost and survivability constraints for
afixed operational situation is the classic cost-effectiveness criterion... "
-pg. 90 of Future Air Force Needs for Survivability, Air Force Studies Board, (NRC 2006)
The first limitation, the treatment of survivability as a constraint rather than an active trade in the
design process, restricts the design space available to designers before conceptual design has
even begun. While specifying a minimum level of survivability may be appropriate for the
design of piloted aircraft, the wisdom of specifying survivability as a constraint on the design of
unmanned aerial vehicles and satellites a priori is less clear because survivability versus quantity
trade-offs may reveal more valuable system designs (Jeffcoat 2003). Since the beginning of the
space era, incorporating survivability as a parameter in system-level trade studies (e.g., with
lifecycle cost and mission utility) has proven to be challenging. The first reconnaissance satellite
program, CORONA, 15 provides a revealing example (Wheelon 1997). Fearing the vulnerability
of CORONA satellites to attack by the Soviet Union, a wide range of defensive measures were
examined, including inflating and deploying decoy balloons and orbit-adjust maneuvers
(Wheelon 1965). However, CORONA protection was never implemented because of the
payload weight required, mutual forbearance towards space warfare (once the Soviets developed
their own reconnaissance capabilities), and an inability to trade film weight (i.e., performance)
with survivability measures.
2.3.2. Static System Threat Assessment Reports
The second limitation of existing survivability methods is attributed to the static nature of the
System Threat Assessment Report. Upheld as the authoritative description of a system's
operational hazards and the document from which survivability requirements are derived, the
STAR suffers from the potential for obsolescence before system end-of-life. For example, the
life span of a combat aircraft from program inception (when the STAR is issued) to removal
from service might stretch beyond 50 years (Ball 2003). A similar disconnect exists for space
system design given the long gestation period and operational life of satellites. Furthermore,
practitioners admit that "selected operational scenarios are not likely to truly represent future
conflicts," "unanticipated technological developments will affect combat operations," and
"adversaries in real conflicts will adapt to our capabilities in unanticipated ways" (Anderson and
Williamsen 2007). Given that survivability is an inherently dynamic property (Ellison, Fisher et
al. 1999), it is troubling that current methods rely on static assumptions.
Utilizing cost-exchange ratios for survivability analysis provides a means for modeling the
strategic interaction between attackers and defenders over the lifecycle of a system. However,
the Nitze criterion does have limitations when applied to the more general challenge of
determining whether to build a defensive system. In particular, cost-exchange ratios may not be
valid if the value of a particular dollar spent on defense is not conserved across actors. This
disparity may have existed during the Cold War given the larger size of the U.S. economy
relative to the Soviet Union; and this disparity certainly exists today given the many asymmetric
threats to U.S. security.
15 The CORONA program refers to a series of 145 photo reconnaissance satellites launched to low Earth orbit
between 1960 and 1972, providing the "backbone of US intelligence capability for twelve precarious years"
(Wheelon 1997).
2.3.3. Assumption of Independent Disturbance Encounters
Survivability analysis is appropriately founded upon probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) given
that the outcome between a system and a disturbance environment is not deterministic.
However, many of the underlying assumptions made in applications of PRA are frequently
inappropriate. For example, Leveson (1995; 2002) documents several limitations of PRA in its
application to system safety. These limitations are even more pronounced in survivability
assessments. The fundamental issue with PRA is that, although it is intended as a systematic
methodology to measure risk in complex systems, two of its key underlying assumptions (in
practice) may not hold for complex systems: that all probability distributions are known and that
system components are independent (Harper, Thornton and Szygenda 2007). In Normal
Accidents, Perrow (1999) finds that failures may also arise from unanticipated, dysfunctional
interactions among components and then subsequently be exacerbated by the rapid propagation
of local failures due to tight coupling in complex systems. These findings are consistent with the
system safety literature which points out additional flaws, such as the limits of redundancy given
common-cause failures (Pate-Cornell, Dillon and Guikema 2004); problems with using historical
data as a representative sample of current failure probabilities; and narrow focus of PRA on
immediate physical failures (Leveson 2002).
Criticisms of the simplifying assumptions of PRA in the safety engineering literature are
certainly valid for existing survivability engineering methods (Ball 2003) that assume linear,
independent weapon encounters despite the existence of nonlinear, dependent failure modes. For
example, systems degraded from an initial disturbance will be more vulnerable to a subsequent
disturbance (and potentially more susceptible as well in the case of an intelligent adversary).
Eliminating path dependencies in the calculation of system susceptibility, vulnerability, and
recoverability abstracts much of the necessary complexity in survivability analysis.
2.3.4. Narrow Scope of Survivability Design and Analysis
The fourth limitation is the limited scope of survivability design and analysis. Since
survivability engineering was established as a formal design discipline in the 1960's, a
tremendous amount of progress has been made to improve the survivability of individual
elements in aerospace system architecture (Nordin and Kong 1999; Paterson 1999).
Less progress has been made, however, at the architecture-level where systems tend to evolve in
an ad-hoc manner-accommodating constraints from legacy systems and forming temporary
coalitions to support emergent missions. More generally, architecting for survivability is a
poorly understood, socio-technical issue, increasingly relevant to all engineering systems. For
example, despite the recognized criticality of low-probability, high-consequence events (Leveson
1995; Sheffi 2005), modeling these events, evaluating the benefits of protective measures, and
internalizing the role of operational behavior, human factors, and supporting infrastructures is the
subject of ongoing research (Leveson et al. 2004). Furthermore, existing models of highly
survivable system architecture from the Cold War (e.g., Nuclear Command and Control System)
are not readily applied given the virtually unlimited resources allocated to such systems in that
era. In analyzing the shortcomings of current methods for the specification, development,
procurement, operation, and maintenance of systems and networks with critical survivability
requirements, Neumann (2000) succinctly describes the state of the discipline:
"The currently existing evaluation criteria frameworks are not yet comprehensively suitable for evaluating
highly survivable systems and networks.... There is almost no experience in evaluating systems having a
collection of independent criteria that might contribute to survivability... "
In the space domain, the need for a comprehensive survivability architecture is particularly
critical given the interdependencies among spacecraft, ground stations, and communications
links (Shellans and Matoush 1992). However, existing design and analysis methodologies focus
on survivability at the satellite-level rather than higher levels in the system architecture (e.g., Air
Force mission area).
2.3.5. Lack of a Value-Centric Perspective
The fifth limitation of existing survivability design methodologies is the lack of a value-centric
perspective. Success of a system before, during, and after a disturbance is dependent on how
much functionality it delivers to its stakeholders, not strictly the physical integrity of system
components. Unless the stakeholders care about the mechanism by which value is delivered,
which is rare, the system is free to deliver value by many possible means. This is particularly
useful for resolving survivability issues when original value delivery mechanisms may be
blocked due to a disturbance. Utilization of value as a unifying metric also enables evaluation of
protection measures at various levels in the system architecture (e.g., explore cost-benefit
tradeoff of increasing hardness of individual satellite vis-a'-vis investing in reconstitution
capability). Taking the value-centric perspective, system designers are freed to consider multiple
paths to achieve the same value delivery (Ross 2006).
2.4. Problem Statement
In addition to meeting requirements in a static context, the performance of engineering systems
is increasingly defined by an ability to deliver value to stakeholders in the presence of changing
operational environments, economic markets, and technological developments. As temporal
system properties that reflect the degree to which systems are able to maintain or even improve
function in the presence of change, the "-ilities" constitute a rich area of research for improving
value delivery over the lifecycle of systems. Applicable across engineering domains, the "-
ilities" are particularly critical to aerospace systems which are characterized by high cost, long
design lives, high complexity, interdependencies with other systems, and dynamic operational
contexts.
Although survivability is an emergent system property that arises from interactions among
system components and between a system and its environment, conventional approaches to
survivability engineering are often reductionist in nature (i.e., focused only on selected properties
of subsystems or modules in isolation). Furthermore, existing survivability engineering
methodologies are normally based on specific operating scenarios and presupposed disturbances
rather than a general theory with indeterminate threats. As a result, current methods neither
accommodate dynamic threat environments nor facilitate stakeholder communication for trading
among system lifecycle cost, performance, and survivability
Given the limitations of existing survivability design methods for aerospace systems (i.e.,
treatment of survivability as a constraint on design, static system threat assessment reports,
assumption of independent weapon encounters, limited scope, and exclusive focus on physical
integrity), there is a need for a design method that (1) incorporates survivability as an active
trade in the design process, (2) captures the dynamics of operational environments over the entire
lifecycle of systems, (3) captures path dependencies of system survivability to disturbances, (4)
extends in scope to architecture-level survivability assessments, and (5) takes a value-centric
perspective to allow alternative value-delivery mechanisms in the tradespace. Recent research
on how decision-makers can recognize and evaluate dynamically relevant designs, including
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (Ross, Hastings et al. 2004) and Epoch-Era Analysis
(Ross 2006), offers a theoretical foundation for the development of an improved design
methodology for survivability.

3. Defining Survivability for Engineering Systems
This chapter addresses the first of the four research questions introduced in Section 1.3.2.
1. What is a dynamic, operational, and value-centric definition of survivability for
engineering systems?
The objective of this chapter is to conceptualize and operationalize survivability for subsequent
analysis. Existing survivability metrics vary both within and across domains and are
traditionally calculated with specific operational scenarios in mind. Therefore, a general
definition of survivability is a critical first step towards the development of a general
survivability analysis methodology.
Three sections comprise this chapter. First, the introductory discussion of the "-ilities" in
Section 1.1.4 is extended and a conceptual framework for relating survivability to the other "-
ilities" is described (Section 3.1). Second, existing definitions of survivability are surveyed and
a general definition of survivability is introduced (Section 3.2). Third, the construct validity of
existing survivability metrics to this general definition is examined, and the survivability metrics
of time-weighted average utility loss and threshold availability are proposed (Section 3.3).
3.1. "-ilities" Framework
"-ilities" may be defined as temporal system properties that specify the degree to which systems
are able to maintain or even improve function in the presence of change. 16  The "-ilities",
including survivability, have in common the concept of "change." It is the "what is changing"
aspect that can be used to differentiate among the "-ilities". System success may be defined in
relation to three primary factors: the expectations on the system (Needs), the system form
(System), and the development and operational environment of the system (Context). This
definition parallels Simon's conceptualization of engineering which "involves a relation among
three terms: the purpose or goal, the character of the artifact, and the environment in which the
artifact performs" (Simon 1996). The dynamics among these three factors determine the
perceived success of the system. The "-ilities" of a system address the ability of the system to
cope with changes in these factors.
Assuming a system-centric perspective, the "-ilities" provide a strategy for system change in
response to changes in needs and context. Changes in context are usually external constraints on
the system: it must operate successfully in the new context. Changes in needs may include
increased expectations on the system (e.g., a demand for higher levels of the same service or
service in more locations) or changes in the metrics of success (e.g., some new function is
demanded of the system). To be successful, the system must deliver more, less, or different,
value as needs change. It is important to recognize that a system designer typically only has
influence over a system's form; the form as mediated by the operational environment determines
the system's performance, and if the performance meets the expectations, the system is perceived
to be successful and hence deliver value to its stakeholders.
16 This excludes some non-operational "-ilities", such as manufacturability, that affect the design of the system but
not its operation.
The variety of "-ilities" in the literature need to be clarified in a structured framework in order to
be useful to system analysts. Given that changing needs, context, and system states are the
common threads which tie the "-ilities" together, one way of taxonomically organizing the "-
ilities" is with a three-dimensional "-ilities Space" (Figure 3-1) with the parameter of time. The
three factors that can change over a system lifetime are the system itself (i.e., an object or group
of objects in physical space, representing hardware designs but also more abstract parts of the
system such as software or operating procedures or connections between the parts); the needs of
stakeholders (i.e., a perceived abstraction in the minds of the stakeholders, often represented by
utilities), and the context (i.e., the development and operational space outside of the system
boundary, represented as constraints, both explicit and embedded in the modeling of the physical
reality in which the system operates). Note that these are not single-dimensional axes per se;
only in an extremely simple case (of one monotonic variable on each axis) could one actually
plot anything quantitatively in this space. For a given context and system state, the performance
is determined in the same units or language as the needs. If the performance exceeds the
expectation level of the relevant stakeholders (i.e., enough needs are met) then the system is
considered successful.
Context
C
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Figure 3-1. "-ilities Space"
In Figure 3-1, a system with configuration S operates in a context C. Its performance is
determined and plotted along the Needs axis such that the system's position in the space is A.
This point is in front of the iso-needs plane determined by the expectations of the users, E, so the
system is successful. However, if the context changes to C', the performance of the unmodified
system is now determined to be B, which does not meet expectations. The system's performance
has been unacceptably degraded by the change in context. It is possible to imagine that, over the
lifetime of a system, it will trace a trajectory through this space. A successful system will
perform at or above the (possibly changing) user expectations throughout its lifetime.
The "-ilities Space" is useful for abstract thinking about the interactions between shifting needs,
contexts, and system configurations over time, and may be used to distinguish between and
among the "-ilities" themselves. 17 Having characterized "-ilities" as temporal system properties
describing the ability of systems to navigate changes in the technical, environmental, and value
domains, a conceptualization of survivability is introduced within this framework.
3.2. Conceptualizing Survivability
3.2.1. Domain-Specificity of Existing Definitions
Definitions for survivability vary across the biological, network security, and aerospace and
defense domains (Table 3-1). While the "continuation of life" is a simple, clear definition for the
life sciences, there is less clarity in defining survivability for engineering systems. Formerly
proposed metrics for survivability include: the range of environments within which an entity
remains operational, the disturbance threshold above which an entity will cease to function, the
degree to which performance remains following a disturbance, and the time required to restore
health following a compromising disturbance. A general definition of survivability is a
necessary precursor to the development of a design process for survivability that may be applied
across domains.
In the 1960's, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) formally defined survivability as "the
system capacity to resist a hostile environment so that it can fulfill its mission" (MIL-STD-721,
DOD-D-500.3). Numerous other definitions and evaluation criteria are noted in Table 3-1.
Traditionally calculated by military planners with specific operational scenarios in mind,
survivability is often defined subjectively-dependent not only on susceptibility and
vulnerability assessments (Section 2.1.3)-but also on the range and breadth of proposed
missions, threat levels, and the availability of supporting assets within missions (Hall 2004).
Even within domains, there are definitional discrepancies. For example, survivability of
communications networks has been defined in terms of reliability as the "probability of retaining
connection between representative pairs of nodes" (Al-Noman 1998), in terms of the capability
of a system "to perform required functions at a given instance in time after a subset of
components becomes unavailable" (Yurick and Doss 2002), and in terms of regeneration as the
"degree to which systems recover from attacks" (Moitra and Konda 2000).
17 McManus, Richards, Ross, and Hastings (2007) define several "-ilities" within the "-ilities Space", including
flexibility, adaptability, robustness, versatility, scalability, and modifiability.
Table 3-1. Spectrum of Survivability Definitions
domain definition/criteria : reference
capability of a system and crew to avoid or withstand a man-made
hostile environment without suffering an abortive impairment of its (DoD 2002)
S ability to accomplish its designated mission
capability of an aircraft to avoid and/or withstand a man-made hostile (Ball 2003)
environment
environmental fitness of organisms; evolutionary longevity of (Darwin 1859)
species to natural selection
- continuation of life (Webster 2008)
percentage of stations both surviving the physical attack and
remaining in electrical connection with the largest single group of (Baran 1964)
surviving stations
property of a system, subsystem, equipment, process, or procedure
that provides a defined degree of assurance that the named entity will
continue to function during and after a natural or man-made
disturbance; qualified by specifying the range of conditions over (NTIA 1996)
which the entity will survive, the minimum acceptable level or post-
disturbance functionality, and the maximum acceptable outage
* duration
probability of retaining connection between representative pairs of (Al-Noman 1998)
nodes
0 capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the
presence of attacks, failures, or accidents
ability to satisfy and to continue to satisfy critical requirements in the
face of adverse conditions; defined with respect to the set of (Neumann 2000)
adversities that are supposed to be withstood
ability of a system to perform required functions at a given instant in (Yurick and Doss 2002)
time after a subset of components become unavailable
capability of an information system to fulfill its mission by
preserving essential services, even when systems are penetrated and (Moore and Ellison 2003)
compromised
physical means of making satellites survivable against threats and the
cost effectiveness ratios, or ratios of attack to defense costs, for the (Canavan 1991)
resulting platforms and constellations
ability of a space system to perform its intended function after being
exposed to a stressing natural environment or one created by an (Nordin and Kong 1999)
S enemy or hostile agent
capability of a system to avoid or withstand hostile natural and
manmade environments without suffering abortive impairment of its (USAF 2005)
ability to accomplish its designated mission
3.2.2. General Definition of Survivability
Given that all systems exist to deliver value, a general definition will achieve domain-neutrality
by defining survivability in terms of value. Furthermore, as an emergent system property that
reveals itself over time, it is critical that the temporal aspects of survivability be internalized.
These principles and the desire for a quantitative formulation guided the development of the
following definition.
Survivability is the ability of a system to minimize the impact of a finite-duration
disturbance on value delivery, achieved through (I) the reduction of the likelihood
or magnitude of a disturbance, (II) the satisfaction of a minimally acceptable
level of value delivery during and after a disturbance, and/or (III) a timely
recovery.
As discussed in Section 1.1.2, a value-centric conceptualization of survivability is desirable
during the conceptual design of systems because it provides a fundamental metric for relating
system properties to desired stakeholder outcomes. Taking the value-centric perspective during
conceptual design empowers decision-makers to rigorously evaluate and compare different
system concepts in the technical domain using a unifying set of attributes in the value domain.
The ability to consider multiple system concepts using a unifying set of attributes is particularly
useful for survivability when original value delivery mechanisms may be blocked by a
disturbance.
In addition to conceptualizing survivability as a value-centric property, it is also important to
recognize the inherently dynamic nature of survivability. Survivability emerges from the
interaction of a system with its environment over time. Depending on stakeholder needs,
survivability requirements may allow limited periods during which the system operates in a
degraded state, unavailable state, or safe mode (Bayer 2007).
Recognizing survivability as a dynamic system property informs three general survivability
design strategies over the lifecycle of a disturbance. Type I survivability, susceptibility
reduction, is the reduction of the likelihood or magnitude of a disturbance. Type II survivability,
vulnerability reduction, is the minimization of the disturbance-induced losses on value delivery.
(Systems that are Type II-survivable may exhibit graceful degradation in which at least minimal
functionality is maintained in the event of disturbance-induced losses. The reduced magnitude
and rate of value losses in systems that degrade gracefully is in contrast to fragile systems where
small disturbances may cause total system failure.) Type III survivability, resilience
enhancement, is the maximization of the recovery of value-delivery within a permitted recovery
time. Figure 3-2 provides a notional illustration of Type I, Type II, and Type III survivability in
terms of value delivery over time [V(t)].
V(t)
value
Figure 3-2. Conceptualization of Survivability
In Figure 3-2, time is discretized across four epochs, periods of a fixed environmental context
and static stakeholder needs (Ross, Rhodes and Hastings 2008). Following successful value
delivery during baseline environmental conditions and stakeholder expectations (Epoch la), the
system experiences a finite disturbance that degrades performance. Value delivery expectations
on the system may be lower during the disturbance (Epoch 2) and in the time period immediately
following (Epoch 3) before returning to baseline expectations (Epoch lb). Type I survivability,
depicted as a dashed horizontal line, is achieved if the disturbance fails to reduce V(t) below the
required value threshold [ V] over all of the Epochs. In order to determine whether the system is
Type II or Type III survivable, two additional factors must be defined: the minimum acceptable
value to be delivered during and immediately after the disturbance [Ve] and the permitted
recovery time elapsed past the onset of the disturbance [Tr. In Figure 3-2, the solid line depicts
a system achieving Type II survivability by maintaining V(t) at a level above Ve during Epoch 2
and Epoch 3. The solid line also depicts a Type III-survivable system as V(t) recovers to a level
above Vx within T,. In general, by defining t' as the time of the beginning of Epoch 2 (i.e.,
beginning of a disturbance encounter), three conditions are required for the achievement of
survivability:
1. V(t)E,  Vx , when t<t'
2. V(t) > V when It - t' < T,
3. V(t),lP > V[E
,  when t -t'1 > T
This general definition conceptualizes survivability as the relationship between stochastic system
value trajectories and changing stakeholder expectations across nominal and disturbed
environmental states. The conceptualization is consistent with both engineering practice and
concepts of risk held by executives. In engineering practice, temporary outages of functionally
during and immediately following disturbances are frequently permitted such as with
information systems following natural disasters (Ellison, Fisher et al. 1999) and with
interplanetary spacecraft entering safe mode following anomalies (Bayer 2007). The case of
direct broadcast TV is another example in which an outage time of 0.3% of the year (i.e., 25
hours) is permitted due to Ku-band rain attenuation (Pratt, Bostian and Allnutt 2003). To meet
this annual Tr, DIRECTV communication links are design with a margin of 5.7 decibel (Figure
3-3).18
rain attenuation
C/N
Clear sky C/N
Epoch l a
STr 
-
SEpoch 2
Carrier-to-noise ratio (C/N) margin is a design
tradeoff between the outage level that
customers can be expected to tolerate, the
maximum allowable diameter of the receiving
dish antenna, and the power output from the
satellite transponders (12.2-12.7 GHZ Ku-band)
Vx=8.6 dB
Ve=O dB
link margin
(5.7 dB)
Epoch lb
time
Figure 3-3. Survivability Example: Direct TV
The decision analysis literature also supports the conceptualization of survivability in Figure 3-2,
particularly V,x and Ve. In analyzing managerial perspectives on risk, March and Shapira (1987)
observe that there are two focal values in executive-level decision-making: a target level of
performance and a survival level. With these two reference points, the outcome space is
partitioned into three parts: success, failure, and extinction. 19 March and Shapira's two focal
values are analogous to the critical value thresholds of V and Ve and their outcome space
partitioning aligns with the potential trajectories of V(t).
18 Given that recovery from rain attenuation is instantaneous, the permitted recovery time is assumed to be zero and
Epoch 3 is excluded from Figure 3-3.
19 March and Shapira (1987) further observe prospect theoretic behavior around these critical value thresholds:
managers barely above the performance target are risk averse while managers below (or expected to be below) the
performance target are risk taking.
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3.2.3. Distinguishing Between Survivability and Robustness
Due to the confusion associated with the "-ilities" definitions and relationships (McManus and
Hastings 2006), it is helpful to discuss the similarities and differences that survivability has with
a closely related "-ility": robustness. Both survivability and robustness are measures of the
ability of systems to reduce the sensitivity of their outputs to changes in the environment. Using
the "-ilities Space" framework (Figure 3-1), Figure 3-4 depicts a sample robust system (AB) as
maintaining performance and meeting stakeholder expectations despite a changing
environmental context. Survivable systems are also insensitive to context changes. For
example, a passively survivable system (AC) is able to maintain performance at or above
minimal expectations. This is also the case for actively survivable systems, whether through
adaptation (AD) or recovery (ADE).
Context
AB: robust
AC: survivable C
AX: failure
Minimal Control
B - - D Performance
Operational AD: survival
Performance adaptation
DA: full
recovery
DE: altered
recovery
A
Needs
(performance, System
expectations)
Figure 3-4. Sample Survivable and Robust System Trajectories within the "-ilities Space"
Although related, survivability and robustness are distinct. While designing for robustness
focuses on accommodating permanent changes in context (e.g., continuous noise factors,
programmatic policy shifts), design for survivability focuses on the mitigating finite changes in
context (e.g., impulse event). Therefore, survivability can be considered a special case of
robustness with a finite condition on disturbance duration. Figure 3-5 illustrates this distinction.
Whereas the robust system might be able to accommodate three new epochs, the survivable
system must only sustain utility [U] delivery during and after a finite disturbance (e.g., the loss
of U2 in Epoch 2 followed by partial recovery of U2 in Epoch ib).
Robust
Accommodating a permanent change in context
time
Epoch Y
Epoch Z
Survivable
Recovers from a finite change in context
Epoch la Epoch 2 Epoch lb
U2--0U 2
-32= 31
flb,end -
3LLIb,srart =1 partial recovery
Figure 3-5. Distinguishing Between Survivability and Robustness
Given this distinction between survivability and robustness, one might ask at what point do
repeated disturbances constitute a change in context? In other words, is there a clear
demarcation between designing for survivability and designing robustness? As illustrated in
Figure 3-6, there is no rigid division between the two "-ilities". Rather, there exists a continuum
of disturbance encounters with survivability and robustness located on opposite ends of the scale.
When the ratio of system life spent in nominal operating conditions (T1) to the duration spent in
disturbance epochs (Td) is much less than one, then the focus is on design for survivability.
However, in the limit that T approaches zero as intervals between disturbances become shorter,
a new context has arisen and the focus in on design for robustness.
T T a1. * Td 4 Tlb 0 Td + T1  -1 Td TT1d-e d T1e1* Td T1f
Epoch l a Epoch 2 Epoch Ib Epoch 2 Epoch i Epoch 2 Epoch Id Epoch 2 Epoch le Epoch 2 Epoch If
Figure 3-6. Continuum Between Survivability and Robustness
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3.3. Operationalizing Survivability
3.3.1. Construct Validity of Existing Metrics
Although a diverse array of survivability definitions and criteria exist (Table 3-1), survivability is
traditionally incorporated in design as a binary metric using probabilistic risk assessment. As
articulated in Ball's foundational work on combat aircraft survivability (Ball 2003), the
probability of surviving a one-on-one engagement, Ps, is the complement of the probability of
hit, PH (susceptibility), times the probability of kill given a hit, PKIH (vulnerability):
PS= - PK = - , PK/H (3-1)
(The susceptibility portion of the calculation, PH, can be further decomposed into a five-step
event tree or kill chain. For example, at the engagement level, five probability assignments are
used to assess system susceptibility: P[weapon is active], P[sensor detects], P[fire control
solution is obtained], P[weapon intercepts], and P[weapon hits].)
In order to reduce the complexity associated with dependent shot outcome probabilities,
independent shot outcomes are assumed for computing survivability to multiple-shot
engagements, PSIE (Ball 2003). For example, when the individual shots PK are identical and
equal to a single-shot probability of kill (PK|ss) for all N shots, PSIE, is:
PSE 1- PKIE = ( PKISS)N (3-2)
This logic is extended for computing, campaign-level survivability, CS, assuming a campaign of
N missions with a constant mission survivability rate:
CS = (Ps)N = (1-PK)N (3-3)
While these metrics for assessing single-shot, engagement, and campaign-level survivability
provide an elegant mathematical framework for structuring and analyzing the survivability of a
system throughout its operational life, challenges remain for the survivability analyst. As
discussed in Section 2.3.3, the reliance on probabilistic risk assessment and its underlying
assumptions is problematic given the complex nature of complex systems and the known
dependencies in a disturbance encounter. For example, the susceptibility of a satellite is not
conserved as a constant probability across disturbance encounters if its maneuverability and
defensive countermeasures have been reduced by a previous encounter.
Another challenge associated with current survivability metrics are their binary nature. The
ability of space systems to gracefully degrade to reduced levels of capability is frequently cited
as an enabler of survivability (Hopkins 1971; Duren 2004; Siddiqi and De Weck 2006).
However, a binary Ps value applied across systems during conceptual design does not internalize
the magnitude or rate of system degradation--a capability which may be useful for
distinguishing between systems that fail precipitously and systems that can achieve partially
functional states. Additionally, for systems that are not safety-critical (e.g., autonomous science
missions), the impact of critical failures varies by when the failure occurs. To address the
limitations of binary risk metrics, recent work (Wertz and Miller 2005; Wertz 2006) has
extended traditional risk assessment techniques by introducing the concept of expected
productivity. Expected productivity provides an aggregate measure of mission risk by
quantifying mission performance based on the expected value of productivity (e.g., number of
images of star systems for observatories, number of rocks tested for sampling roving missions).
While valuable for providing a continuous (non-binary) measure of the magnitude of risk,
defining an aggregate productivity metric may be difficult or impossible for systems intended to
accomplish multiple independent missions. The applicability of expected productivity may also
be limited for non-scientific missions. In particular, the mission tasks of service-oriented space
systems (e.g., military satellites) may not necessarily be specified a priori, and critical
survivability requirements may dictate the preservation of a minimal level of functionality over
the entire mission duration.
The metrics discussed above generally view disturbances as sequences of short-duration
variations in the operating environment. Another body of literature has framed this problem
from a dynamic perspective focusing on both sustained variations in the environment and
temporary shocks (Bogdanoff and Kozin 1985; Kharoufeh and Cox 2005). The shock-based
reliability literature provides a time-dependent characterization of system state. However, the
application of these shock models is focused on the part and component levels rather than
system-level unit-of-analysis.
Another challenge for the system analyst relates to the architectural tradespace: how to conduct
integrated tradeoffs regarding the varying cost, mission utility, availability, and survivability of
alternative system designs? Because these characteristics are interdependent (as survivability
design features and operational tactics may lower mission utility and increase cost), pursuing the
highest survivability for a given design alternative does not necessarily maximize that system's
mission effectiveness. For example, in the lead-up to World War II, 900 pounds of armor were
added around the cockpit and fuel tanks of the Brewster F2A "Buffalo" fighter. While these
modifications were based on combat data from the European theater, the higher wing loading
decreased F2A's service ceiling, maneuverability, and maximum speed-turning a marginally
acceptable fighter into an unacceptable one (Ball 2003).
To conduct tradeoffs among the availability, survivability, and capability of alternative designs,
one approach (Ball 2003) is to define a measure of mission effectiveness, MoME, as a product of
the three system attributes:
MoME = Availability -Survivability -Capability (3-4)
MoME provides a single metric for evaluating the mission effectiveness of systems in an
operational environment (informing strategic decisions such as managed attrition). However, the
aggregated metric is of limited prescriptive value during design because the lifecycle costs of
alternative designs are not constant. For example, a system with extremely high survivability
that can be acquired at greater cost will have a higher MoME but may not allow a useful number
of units to be purchased. Conversely, while a lower survivability rate for a satellite within a
constellation may be more than offset by a higher availability or capability rate in the MoME
computation, the implications of a lower survivability rate may be very negative from a
constellation design perspective depending upon the satellite design life and replacement costs.
Other existing quantifications of survivability and related terms include the reliability function
and inherent availability (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2006). The reliability function, also known as
the survival function, provides the probability that a system will be operational for at least a
given time, t.
R(t) = 1- F(t) = e- t/MTBF (3-5)
Inherent availability, A,, provides the probability that a system will be operational at any given
time in the future, given a mean time between failure, MTBF, and mean time to repair, MTTR.
MTBFA, = MTBF (3-6)
MTBF + MTTR
In addition to providing only a binary metric for system health, the reliability function and
inherent availability are of questionable construct validity for survivability. Both reliability and
availability are concerned with the ability of a system to perform its function under prescribed
environmental conditions whereas survivability is concerned with the state of a system that
emerges based upon the interaction of that system with external disturbances. Furthermore, the
assumed constant failure rates do not apply when disturbances are finite and impulsive in nature.
While existing survivability approaches have a remarkable legacy for improving the survivability
of individual systems (e.g., significantly enhanced combat aircraft survivability improvements
from WWII to the present day), evaluation of survivability at higher levels in the system
architecture (e.g., constellation, space mission area) is both desirable and required given the
increasing interdependencies among systems in networked environments. Based on the precepts
discussed in the Section 3.2, three desirable criteria for evaluating survivability are: (1) value-
based, to allow comparisons across technically-diverse system concepts, (2) dynamic, to allow
assessment (and enhancement) of survivability across the lifecycle of a disturbance, and (3)
continuous (rather than a discrete, binary characterization), to enable distinction between systems
that gracefully degrade and those that fail immediately following a disturbance. In addition, it is
also desirable to have survivability metrics that are intuitive as decision metrics and that don't
require assumptions to be made regarding the independence of disturbance events. Guided by
the definition of survivability in Section 3.2 and driven by these criteria, the following two
sections introduce two metrics for the assessment of survivability in tradespace studies during
conceptual design: (1) time-weighted average utility/utility loss and (2) threshold availability.
3.3.2. Survivability Metric #1: Time-Weighted Average Utility Loss
The development of metrics with construct validity for survivability as defined above requires
evaluating a system's ability both to minimize value losses and to meet critical value thresholds
before, during, and after environmental disturbances. There are many ways to operationalize
value, and one approach is to use utility functions. In this thesis, a multi-attribute utility function
is utilized (Keeney and Raiffa 1993) but the approach is not dependent on this formalization.20
The multi-attribute utility function, U(x), is an aggregation of single-attribute utility functions,
U'(x), which reflect preferences over multiple single attributes, x' (von Neumann and
Morgenstern 1953). Given that attributes are varying over time, one can define U(x(t)), or in
shorthand, U(t). Using this characterization of a system's utility delivery over the design life
(TdI), the time-weighted average utility may be defined:
Ut= = U(t) dt (3-7)
Tdl
In addition, time-weighted average utility loss may be defined to assess the difference between
the beginning-of-life, design utility, Uo, and the time-weighted average utility achieved by a
system across operational environments:
UL = U0 -U, (3-8)
While time-weighted average utility loss is useful for evaluating the impact of various
survivability features on a single system, it is less useful for comparisons across systems since Uo
is not conserved across designs (i.e., a constant utility loss applied across designs in the
tradespace will have varying implications for survivability). For example, over-designed
systems may have design utilities much greater than the utility threshold required in nominal
conditions, Uo >> U, while Uo may approach U in systems with small performance margins.
Therefore, to appreciate the survivability implications of a system's ability both to incorporate
margin in value delivery and to minimize losses in value, it is necessary to evaluate time-
weighted average utility loss relative to Uo.
3.3.3. Survivability Metric #2: Threshold Availability
As the expected (average) temporal utility experienced, time-weighted average utility assesses a
system's lifecycle performance over nominal and disturbed environments. However, while this
enables continuous evaluations to be made across systems regarding ability to minimize utility
loss, it is a measure of central tendency that does not internalize ability to meet critical utility
thresholds. Two threshold levels are identified on the emergency utility scale, U(t). Ue is the
minimally acceptable level in an emergency epoch and is therefore always zero. U is the level
of utility provided by a design that achieves zero utility on the nominal scale when measured on
the emergency scale.21
To evaluate the ability of a system to meet these critical utility thresholds, threshold availability,
AT, is proposed as a survivability metric. AT is defined as the ratio of the time that U(t) is above
operable (required or emergency) utility thresholds (i.e., time above thresholds [TA T]) to the total
design life:
20 For systems that have multiple attributes, computing a single scalar value function that fully reflects decision-maker
preferences can be difficult. As a proxy for V(t), the multi-attribute utility function, U(t) (Keeney and Raiffa 1993), can be used
to reflect the preference ordering of V(t), if not the magnitude of that preference.
21 While the definitions of the critical utility thresholds are complex, they are carefully chosen to reflect the preferences regarding
design acceptability as elicited from the multi-attribute utility interview process.
TAT
A, = (3-9)
Td
While structured similarly to the traditional metric of inherent availability (Blanchard and
Fabrycky 2006), AT is unique in that the critical utility threshold varies across nominal,
disturbance, and recovery epochs. Performance losses, such as degradation or finite outage of
capability, may be allowable in disturbance environments (i.e., Ux and Ue both correspond to the
minimally-acceptable level of utility delivery, U(x)=O, during their respective epochs).
The proposed metrics are related to existing frameworks and metrics in the literature. In general,
the use of utility theory for survivability evaluation is discussed in Langworthy and Wells
(1998). Threshold availability is essentially a modification of inherent availability that allows
for a variable threshold of stakeholder expectations. Time-weighted average utility is analogous
to the Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY). Often used in the medical community for patients
evaluating treatment options, QALY is a multi-attribute quantity that varies as a function of time.
QALYs scale the length of each year of remaining life by the quality of life expected in that year.
The scaled years are then added to form QALYs. Thus, many years of low quality are equivalent
to fewer years of high quality (Johannesson 1995).
3.3.4. Considerations for Implementation
One implication of value thresholds changing as a function of disturbance encounters is that
definition and scale of a utility axis will vary across epochs and is therefore not consistent across
the system lifecycle. For example, the set of attributes and their associated acceptability ranges,
utility curves, and relative weights, may change for decision-makers across nominal and
perturbed environmental states. This presents a challenge: how to present lifecycle utility data if
the utility axis is a moving target? The general response to this challenge is to elicit the
applicable multi-attribute utility functions across all potential epochs from the decision-maker.
However, excessive resources may be required to collect such data without a process for
bounding the large set of future environmental states.
If one assumes that the attribute set and weightings composing the utility function are constant
throughout the mission, then one can define a utility function, U(x), that reflects preference
ordering across the normal, disturbance, and recovery epochs. U(x) is constructed by increasing
the acceptability range of the single-attribute utility functions, U(x'). First, the single- and multi-
attribute utility functions during nominal operating conditions, U,(x), are elicited from the
decision-maker. Second, the single- and multi-attribute utility functions during emergency
conditions, U(x), are elicited. Third, as described above, U, and Ue are set to reflect the
minimally acceptable level of utility during the nominal and disturbed periods, respectively
(Figure 3-7). Given that U(x) reflects decision-maker preference orderings across all epochs and
provides a consistent scale, time-weighted average utility is computed using the emergency U(x).
This approach assumes that, during an emergency, decision-makers are willing to accept lower
levels of performance but will raise expectations back to nominal levels following an emergency
(i.e., V> Ve).
Un=O (V )  Un= 1nominal, Un() I I
emergency, U() I I
U=O (Ve) U=l1
Figure 3-7. Setting Required and Emergency Value Thresholds
In summary, existing survivability metrics focus on assessing the physical integrity of systems
using binary characterizations of system state. This chapter introduced the metrics of time-
weighted average utility loss and threshold availability to capitalize on the benefits of evaluating
survivability as a value-based, dynamic, and continuous system property. These metrics assess
survivability based on the ability of systems to meet or exceed required levels of value delivery
during nominal and perturbed environmental conditions. The metrics are unique but
interdependent (e.g., high average utility may imply high threshold availability, although high
threshold availability may not imply high average utility). The metrics will be applied together
in Chapter 5, Survivability Tradespace Experiments, to test their ability to discriminate among
design alternatives.

4. Survivability Design Principles
This chapter addresses the second of the four research questions introduced in Section 1.3.2.
2. What design principles enable survivability?
The objective of this chapter is to develop and test a taxonomy of survivability design principles
(i.e., concept-neutral strategies of architectural choice) that may be used to enhance the
generation of design alternatives during the critical front-end of product development (Figure
1-5). Existing sets of survivability design principles tend to exclude non-physical factors and to
focus on concept-specific techniques. A general set of design principles allows the consideration
of survivability strategies that may mitigate disturbances across the entire lifecycle of a given
encounter. Within the context of tradespace exploration, the design principles are intended to
augment the creativity of system designers by ensuring evaluation of a broad set of design
alternatives.
Chapter 4 is composed of five sections. Following a brief survey of related survivability design
principle frameworks (Section 4.1), survivability observations are made from historical systems
to provide context (Section 4.2). The research approach for developing and testing the
survivability design principles is then described and illustrated (Section 4.3). This section
describes the process for enumerating the initial set of survivability design principles as well as
the subsequent empirical testing to validate their completeness and rigor. Having established the
validity of seventeen design principles, each principle (and its contribution to susceptibility
reduction, vulnerability reduction, or resilience enhancement) is described (Section 4.4). The
chapter concludes with a discussion of two different classes of survivability design principles,
their temporal mapping to disturbance encounters, and implications for concept generation
activities (Section 4.5).
4.1. Related Frameworks
A variety of taxonomies exist to inform the development of survivable systems. However, most
of these taxonomies are domain-specific. For example, informed by the evolution of combat
aircraft design, Air Force Instruction 62-201, "System Survivability," outlines eight strategies for
achieving survivability: redundancy, threat-effect tolerance, active defense, deception, hardness,
reconstitution, avoidance, and proliferation (SecAF 1994). Ball (2003) describes how these eight
strategies may be incorporated into aircraft design through twelve survivability enhancement
concepts. These twelve concepts are divided evenly between susceptibility reduction and
vulnerability reduction concepts (Table 4-1).
Table 4-1. Twelve Survivability Enhancement Concepts (Ball 2003)
susceptibility reduction vulnerability reduction
threat warning component redundancy
noise jamming and deceiving component location
signature reduction passive damage suppression
expendables active damage suppression
threat suppression component shielding
weapons and tactics, flight performance, component elimination or replacement
and crew training and proficiency
Recognizing that large-scale information systems must mitigate elevated risks of intrusion and
compromise, recent research has also focused on the design of survivable networks. Work at
Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering Institute discusses four properties system must exhibit
in order to maintain service in the presence of attacks: attack resistance, attack recognition,
recovery of full and essential services, and adaptation and evolution to mitigate future attacks
(Ellison, Fisher et al. 1999). Table 4-2 shows their enumeration of strategies for achieving each
property.
Table 4-2. Taxonomy of Strategies Related to Survivability (Ellison, Fisher et al. 1999)
Survivability Taxonomies of Strategies
Aspect
Resistance * traditional security, including encryption and covert channels
* diversity and maximized differences in individual nodes
* analytic redundancy and voting
* specialization, division of labor, trust, and information
* continuous validation of trust
* exhibited stochastic properties and random behavior
* analytic redundancy and testing (including failures in software, encryption,
Recognition and trust)
* intrusion monitoring and suspicious activities
* system behavior and integrity monitoring
Recovery * physical and information redundancy
* non-local copies of information resources
* preparation, readiness, contingency planning, and response teams
* general or specific changes to resist, recognize, or recover from newAdaptation and vulnerabilities that are discovered
Evolution
* broadcast of warnings to other nodes
* broadcast of adaptation and evolution strategies
* deterrence through retaliation or punishment
Other work focused on the design of survivable network services has applied lessons from
biological and ecological systems. In particular, Nakano and Suda (2007) examine immune
systems, social insects, and cellular systems as examples of biological networks that are
inherently scalable, adaptable, and survivable. Immune systems provide protection by
identifying and eliminating pathogens in a highly-distributed manner. Responses are highly
adaptive and scalable and retain a memory of infections. Furthermore, the lack of centralized
control eliminates the potential for a single-point-failure. Similarly, social insect colonies (e.g.,
ants, wasps, termites, bees) achieve survivability as large-scale adaptive systems. Leveraging
specialization (e.g., foraging, nest-building, defense) and swarm intelligence, these colonies are
survivable even if a large portion of the constituents are killed. Finally, cellular systems achieve
survivability through communication mechanisms that enable systems to evolve from single cells
in a highly decentralized and parallel process. Nakano and Suda (2007) extract five principles
from these three examples of biological survivability: (1) emergence of collective behavior from
simple behavior rules, (2) self-organization through localized interactions, (3) redundancy, (4)
natural selection, and (5) diversity.
Another area of research related to the development of survivability design principles is the work
of Jugulum and Frey (2007) to extract robust design strategies from the U.S. patent database.
Jugulum and Frey define robustness in terms of product consistency; making the outputs of
systems insensitive to variations in the environment, manufacturing, deterioration, and customer
use patterns. As such, robust design focuses on the setting of design parameter and tolerance
levels during detailed design activities. Noting that few robust design methods are directly
applicable to the generation of concepts (in contrast to the many for evaluation of those
concepts), Jugulum and Frey examined over 200 patents that claimed robustness as a key
advantage over the prior art and proposed nineteen general robustness strategies which cross-cut
domain applications (Figure 4-1).
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Figure 4-1. Representation of Robust Design Strategies in a P-Diagram (Jugulum and Frey 2007)
Given that survivability is a subset of robustness (Section 3.2.3), many robustness strategies are
synergistic with survivability design principles. However, it is important to note two
distinguishing characteristics. First, the unit of analysis and scope of traditional robust design
techniques is frequently smaller and more detailed than the system-level survivability examined
in this thesis. Second, threats to robustness typically consist of continuous, statistically-sampled
noise with limited magnitude. This stands in contrast to survivability where finite-duration
disturbances originate from sources external to the product system.
The survivability design principles derived in this chapter are complementary to existing
taxonomies given their general nature and architectural scope. In contrast to the domain-specific
survivability frameworks for combat aircraft and network design, the design principles
introduced here are intended for general applicability. The design principles are distinguished
from the enumeration of robust design strategies by considering a larger unit of analysis (i.e.,
system architectures rather than component technologies) and by focusing on the mitigation of
system-external disturbances of finite duration rather than the design of systems insensitive to
continuous noise factors. This latter contrast is representative of the overall distinction between
survivability and robustness: survivability is a special case of robustness with a finite condition
on disturbance duration (Section 3.2.3).
4.2. Survivability Observations from Historical Systems
Before making prescriptive statements regarding survivability design principles, it is necessary to
understand how designers have previously pursued system survivability. While Section 2.1
provided an overview of current approaches to designing for survivability, it is also helpful to
examine the survivability strategies of deployed systems. In this section, a retrospective
overview of two systems is provided: the B-17 Flying Fortress in World War Two (WWII) and
the U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS) during the Cold War. In both cases,
survivability was key driver in the system design and operation.
4.2.1. B-17 Flying Fortress
Ball (2003) provides an excellent history of the B-17 Flying Fortress, a U.S. Army Air Corps
bomber that evolved into its classic design over the course of several modifications to enhance
survivability. As discussed in Ball, the B-17 is one of the most famous bombers of WWII.
Over 12,000 were built between July 1940 and August 1945, and B17's carried 40% of the
bombs dropped in the European theater. The B-17's were first deployed by the British in groups
of three to four in daylight raids over France, Germany, and Norway. Their initial survivability
was very poor as the B-17C was lacking in firepower and highly susceptible to concentrated
fighter attacks. In fact, the German Luftwaffe referred to the B-17 as the "Flying Coffin".
However, operational experience with the B-17 influenced the development of new mission
tactics and several design evolutions to enhance survivability. In response to the threat posed by
German fighters, the commanders began deploying the B-17 in formations consisting of
hundreds of bombers. While this increased the probability of early detection, the tactic enabled
mutual protection by concentrating defensive firepower. Eight major design modifications were
also made to enhance survivability. These modifications included the addition of heavy armor
plating, self-sealing fuel tanks, and equipment to support as many as thirteen heavy machine
guns.
The evolutionary approach taken to enhance B-17 survivability-incorporating feedback from
combat experiences in successive design iterations-stands in contrast to current approaches to
survivability. With the developments of stealth, precision targeting, and stand-off weapons,
combat aircraft survivability has improved by orders of magnitude. However, sensitivity to
downside losses has increased as the absolute number of airborne platforms is reduced (e.g.,
contrast the 12,000 B-17's to the 21 B-2's built). These sensitivities to even very low losses
(e.g., F-117 shoot-down in Kosovo) coupled with the limited opportunities for experiential
learning in combat underscore the importance of survivability for all design iterations. However,
the focus on platform survivability raises the question of whether the architectural survivability
(i.e., overall survivability of the mission capability) has been sacrificed due to the tremendous
reduction in the number of units purchased.
4.2.2. U.S. Nuclear Command and Control System
The collection of offensive, defensive, and intelligence systems operated by U.S. Strategic
Command to fulfill the mission of strategic deterrence is perhaps the most notable effort to
develop a survivable system architecture. Military systems for nuclear war may be broadly
decomposed into reconnaissance systems for target selection; ground- and space-based sensors
for early warning; fixed and mobile command and control centers; and the triad of offensive
submarines, bombers, and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Given that the systems
were designed to operate in a wide range of extremely hostile environments-from the extreme
blast, heat, and fallout of a nuclear exchange to the impact of a chemical, biological, or
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons-a host of survivability lessons may be extracted from
the design of their technical, operational, and organizational architecture.
Rather than analyzing all military systems associated with strategic deterrence, the focus here is
on the U.S. nuclear command and control system (NCCS) during the Cold War. When the U.S.
switched from a policy of massive retaliation to one of flexible response in 1961, survivable
communications (i.e., maintaining operational capability after a Soviet first-strike) between
central authorities and the nuclear forces became a military requirement.22 As a system designed
against this nuclear decapitation attack scenario, the NCCS is a strong candidate for a case study
on survivability.
The NCCS may be functionally decomposed into five areas: situation monitoring, tactical
warning, decision-making, force management, and force direction (Critchlow 2006). Situation
monitoring includes both the collection of strategic intelligence to anticipate crises and weather
monitoring to support airborne operations. Tactical warning consists of the set of activities to
determine the origin, size, and target of an attack. In supporting decision-makers in crafting a
response, tactical warning requires a high degree of certainty (e.g., dual phenomenology
provided by satellites and radars). Force management and direction includes the standard
operating procedures involved in assuring negative and positive control (i.e., prevention of
accidental launches and implementation of presidential release orders, respectively).
The current survivability of the NCCS is attributed to four design principles: (1) hardening, (2)
mobility, (3) redundancy, and (4) concealment (Critchlow 2006). These four design principles
manifest themselves differently in the various nodes and links of the NCCS (e.g., contrast
hardening of the NORAD Cheyenne Mountain Complex to the Milstar satellite constellation).
Additionally, each design principle does not contribute equally to architecture survivability. For
example, in the early 1980's, there were concerns that Soviet strategic forces could overwhelm
virtually all U.S. ground-based command and control and that the U.S. was dependent on
airborne command posts and TACAMO relay aircraft for post-attack control over the submarine
force (Bracken 1983; Blair 1985). These concerns suggest that mobility was more important for
achieving NCCS survivability than the hardening and redundancy provided by the network of
fixed command locations in the Pentagon, Offutt Air Force Base, Fort Ritchie, and Cheyenne
Mountain (Critchlow 2006).
22 If early warning sensors detected a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union during the period of 1955-60, U.S. policy
was to launch a full retaliation between the time of launch and strike. As such, the NCCS was superfluous after the
Presidential release order and was therefore not originally designed for survivability (Bracken 1983).
While the four design principles of NCCS survivability discussed previously provide a fairly
complete enumeration of physical strategies for achieving survivability, the discussion neglects
critical architectural elements of operational behavior and organizational design. For example,
with decision cycles in a nuclear war measured in minutes (Blair 1985), development of a
scripted operational plan for every conceivable contingency may be as essential to providing a
credible deterrent against a decapitation threat as the survivability of the nuclear force itself.
The sensitivity of NCCS survivability to operational behavior and organizational design is best
illustrated in the transition in the 1960's away from the massive retaliation policy to a flexible
response paradigm that required NCCS survivability (Bracken 1983). Facing the challenge of
inheriting a legacy NCCS infrastructure that was not designed for survivability but without
resources to build a new infrastructure, designers succeeded in re-architecting the existing NCCS
infrastructure for survivability by restructuring tactics, procedures, and operating rules. In
particular, the decapitation risk was mitigated by making the presidential command center a
"safety catch" that, when operational, prevented other command centers from firing. If the
safety catch was removed, second-strike emergency authorization was implicitly granted to
decentralized authorities (i.e., one- and two-star generals), removing the prospect of a single-
point failure in the command structure.
Four main lessons may be extracted from tracing the evolution of NCCS through the Cold War
with implications for survivability design principles. First, the success in re-architecting the
system for survivability in the 1960's illustrates the importance of considering methods that
extend beyond the domain of physical design to include organizations and operational behavior.
Given the success in transitioning the NCCS in the 1960's from a non-survivable to a survivable
system without major physical modifications, might it be possible similarly to transition existing
systems to less vulnerable states today by restructuring procedures and operating rules? Second,
the emphasis on executing scripted contingency plans underscores the criticality of timely
decision-making under uncertainty within hostile environments. Third, the strategic interactions
characterizing the NCCS context (e.g., Mutually Assured Destruction) suggests that it is not
adequate to consider individual disturbance events when dealing with an intelligent adversary.
Rather, it is necessary to take a longer view by considering design principles for survivability
which may influence the behavior of adversaries over multiple encounters. Fourth, while the
NCCS is an excellent case for enumerating design principles for survivability, it is important to
note its limitations: (1) the design principles explicitly linked to NCCS survivability (Critchlow
2006) are limited to the physical domain, and (2) the design principles as manifested in the
NCCS are unlikely to be affordable solutions to current survivability challenges. While
addressing the latter issue of incorporating cost-benefit trade-offs for survivability features in the
analysis is the subject of Chapters 5, 6, and 7, the present chapter focuses on an approach for
expanding the number of survivability design principles under consideration.
4.3. Approach: Generating and Evaluating Design Principles
A four-step approach is pursued for generating and evaluating the survivability design principles:
(1) deduce design principles from generic system-disturbance representation, (2) select
operational systems with survivability requirements, (3) trace survivability enhancement features
on operational systems to design principles, and (4) revise design principle set to reflect
empirical observation.
Evaluating the design principles through empirical testing is a critical aspect for validation. In
addition to objectivity and control, empiricism-the doctrine that knowledge derives from
experience-comprises an underlying principle of the scientific method. The benefits of
empiricism for enriching the quality of systems engineering research and for enhancing the
standing of systems engineering in the academic community have been well documented
(Valerdi and Davidz 2007). In the process of defining survivability design principles, empirical
testing ensures completeness, logical consistency, and taxonomic precision. Testing for both
internal and external validity is an essential step in the development of a verifiable, repeatable,
and theoretically-sound methodology (Frey and Dym 2006).23
4.3.1. Deductively Enumerate Design Principles
The first step of enumerating survivability design principles is based on a generic system-
disturbance framework. Having established a definition of survivability (Chapter 3) and
reflected on survivability observations from existing frameworks (Section 4.1) and historical
systems (Section 4.2), a preliminary framework was developed for visualizing and deriving
design principles of survivability. Consisting of the minimum set of elements needed to describe
the interaction between a system and a given hostile environment, Figure 4-2 illustrates a simple
network representation of heterogeneous nodes and arcs of the technical system architecture, a
system operator characterized by an internal change agent, and a hostile environment
characterized by an external change agent. Changes in the arrangement of these elements are
used to provide insights into various survivability strategies.
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Figure 4-2. Generic System-Disturbance Representation
The external change agent in Figure 4-2 is an abstraction of a source of disturbances, which
could consist of an intelligent adversary or natural phenomenon. For the case of an intelligent
adversary, decision-making of the external change agent is based on an "observe 4 decide -)
act" (ODA) cycle. Observation of the system and its environmental context informs value-
23 While internal validity is concerned with logical consistency, external validity refers to the empirical relevance of
the theory (e.g., Can the findings be generalized? Is the methodology applicable outside of a laboratory-setting?)
(Neuman 2006).
maximizing decision-making, which in turn governs disturbance activity. This model of the
behavior of the external agent is inspired by the Boyd cycle, also known as the Observe, Orient,
Decide, and Act (OODA) loop (Osinga 2006). (In this research, the orient phase is considered a
subset of the decide phase.) Figure 4-3 provides an illustration of the dependencies among the
four processes of the OODA loop. Developed to prescribe activity in combat, the OODA loop
emphasizes getting "inside" the decision cycle of an enemy to enhance military success and
survivability. The ODA loop representation of the decision-making of an intelligent adversary
was employed to parse out the design principles of survivability that are related to the strategic
interaction between the internal and external change agents.
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Figure 4-3. John Boyd's OODA Loop (Osinga 2006)
Utilizing the generic system-disturbance representation, twelve design principles for enhancing
survivability were initially enumerated and illustrated. Table 4-3 shows the original set of design
principles and their associated definitions.
Table 4-3. Initial Set of Twelve Survivability Design Principles
1.1 prevention suppression of a future or potential future disturbance
1.2 mobility relocation to avoid detection by an external change agent
1.3 concealment reduction of the visibility of a system from an external change agent
1.4 deterrence dissuasion of a rational external change agent from committing a disturbance
1.5 preemption suppression of an imminent disturbance
1.6 avoidance maneuverability away from disturbance
2.1 hardness resistance of a system to deformation
2.2 evolution alteration of system elements to reduce disturbance effectiveness
2.3 redundancy duplication of critical system components to increase reliability
2.4 diversity variation in system elements (characteristic or spatial) to decrease
effectiveness of homogeneous disturbances
3.1 replacement substitution of system elements to improve value delivery
3.2 repair restoration of system to improve value delivery
As an example of how each design principle was illustrated, the Type I design principle of
concealment was abstractly represented as a blending of the system nodes and links into the
internal context whereas the Type II design principle of hardness was represented as an increase
in the thickness of the shells around each node. Richards et al. (2007) provides a complete
description of the initial twelve design principles.
4.3.2. Select Existing Survivable Systems
Having deductively enumerated twelve survivability design principles from an abstract
framework, the design principles were empirically tested against operational systems with
critical survivability requirements. In selecting systems for examination, four factors were
considered: (1) stratified sampling across the aerospace domain, (2) the disturbance
environments associated with a system's operational context, (3) access to data regarding system
survivability features, and (4) a desire to extract insights from systems that achieve survivability
at multiple levels in their system architectures. Given these factors, the A-10OA Warthog combat
aircraft, UH-60A Blackhawk helicopter, F-16C combat aircraft, and Iridium satellite
communications network were selected for the empirical tests. This sample draws across four
major classes of aerospace systems: helicopters designed for low-vulnerability, aircraft designed
for low-susceptibility, aircraft designed for low-vulnerability, and a resilient satellite
constellation. The survivability features of these systems address both natural and hostile
environmental disturbances. Given the maturity of all four systems, a large amount of open-
source data is available regarding their survivability features and operational experience.
Finally, in contrast to the three military aircraft systems, the selection of Iridium enables analysis
of survivability at a higher level in the system architecture-where survivability is achieved
through generalized dependence (Neumann 2000) among a constellation of satellite systems
rather individual constituent nodes.
To illustrate the testing of the preliminary set of design principles, the UH-60A Blackhawk
helicopter will be used as a running example in the following two sections. (The empirical
testing of design principles against the survivability enhancement features of the A-10OA, F-16C,
and Iridium network is described in Appendix A, Appendix B, and Appendix C, respectively.)
In selecting the Blackhawk, the unit of analysis is a piloted helicopter operating in a hostile
combat environment (e.g., confronting guns and missiles carried by enemy air and ground
systems). The required value threshold for the system is a safe and successful completion of a
given mission. The emergency value threshold is met if the crew and vehicle are able to exit the
combat zone despite a failure to achieve mission objectives. Survivability features may add
value over the entire lifecycle of a given disturbance (e.g., Epoch la, Epoch 2 and Epoch lb).
4.3.3. Trace Survivability Features to Design Principles
The process of empirically testing the initial survivability design principles begins by attempting
to establish traceability from survivability features in operational systems to the baseline set of
design principles (e.g., a bumper shield installed on a satellite for mitigating the impact of orbital
debris would map to the design principle hardness). These mappings are not necessarily one-to-
one. For example, weapon systems on a combat aircraft might be used for prevention,
deterrence, and preemption--each of which constitutes a unique design principle of Type I
survivability. By conducting such mappings for the survivability features over multiple systems,
the validity of the design principles can be evaluated (i.e., Are there survivability features that
cannot be traced to any design principles? Does each design principle have a clear meaning
within the domain of a particular class of systems?).
In establishing traceability, matrices are used to qualitatively illustrate the mapping of
survivability features in operational systems to the twelve design principles. One matrix is
constructed for each system under investigation. Survivability features (grouped by subsystem)
comprise the rows and the baseline set design principles comprise the columns. Relationships
are represented with "X" marks - an indication that one of the functional requirements of the
feature (row) achieves survivability utilizing a particular set of design principles (columns). It is
expected that utilization of a particular feature should involve the application of one or more
design principles. If logical inconsistencies or other issues arose while establishing traceability,
those portions of the matrices are shaded in grey. These grey regions are subjected to more
rigorous analysis and will potentially inform improvements to the existing design principle set.
The, UH-60A Blackhawk, a medium-lift utility or assault helicopter used by the U.S. Army and
over twenty military services around the globe, provides a representative example of the process
of tracing the survivability features in existing systems to the survivability design principles. As
a tactical transport, the UH-60A lift capability can accommodate a fully-equipped eleven-person
infantry squad or a 105 mm Howitzer, its crew of six, and 30 rounds of ammunition (USA 2006).
Just as the A-10 Warthog design was inspired by the need to address the vulnerabilities of the
Air Force's fixed-wing aircraft in Vietnam (Appendix A), development of the UH-60A was a
direct response to the large number of Army helicopters lost in Southeast Asia between 1963 and
1973. Selected as the winner of the Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System competition, the
UH-60A had a firm design requirement on vulnerability. Figure 4-4 illustrates some of its
vulnerability reduction features, including redundant or armored components and systems, a
structure tolerant to 23mm shells and designed to progressively crush in the event of a crash, and
passive stabilization strategies in the event of a loss of rotor control (Ball 2003).
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Figure 4-4. Some Vulnerability Reduction Features on the UH-60 Blackhawk (Ball 2003)
First introduced into the U.S. Army in 1979, Blackhawk helicopters have served in combat, from
the 1983 Grenada invasion to the present day in Iraq. As noted in (Ball and Atkinson 1995), the
emphasis on reducing the UH-60A vulnerability paid off in Grenada where the Blackhawk
"sustained and survived small arms and 23mm anti-aircraft fire while carrying out its mission of
transporting and supporting Army Rangers. Of the 32 Blackhawks used in Grenada, ten were
damaged in combat. One helicopter had 45 bullet holes that damaged the rotor blades, fuel
tanks, and control systems, yet it still managed to complete its mission."
Table 4-4. Tracing of UH-60A Blackhawk Survivability Features to Initial Design Principles
UH-60A: Sample Survivability Features
a modularized transmission (eliminates exposed shaft and lube system)
$ operates 1+ hours after loss of all oil
> noncatastrophic failure allows autorotation
rotor blades tolerant to high-exolosive incendiary (HEI) proiectile
elastomeric hub with no lube, tolerant to HEI projectiles X
large vertical tail with long boom provides anti-torque in forward flight
" shaft supports provide damping for damaged shaft
" no bearings or lube in cross-beam rotor
0 tail rotor blades ballistically tolerant X
Sdamaged parts of tail rotor thrown away from helicopter
crashworthy armored seats and retention system X
e shatterproof cockpit window X
, minimum-spall materials used in cockpit X
2kevlar armor to stop HEI fragments X
airframe progressively crushes on impact X
protective armor withstands hits from 23mm shells X
two self-sealing/crashworthy tanks located away from ignition sources X X X
E 
short, self-sealing feed lines X
engine-mounted suction pumps X
Scross feed capability X
closed cell foam around tanks X
hydrodynamic tolerant fuel tanks X
maneuverability X X
two widely separated engines
.o titanium fire walls X
- fire detection with two shot fire extinguishingX
widely separated engine to transmission input modules
no fuel ingestionX
good one engine out capability
two independent, separated mechanical controls with disconnects X
tail rotor is stable if pitch rod is severed
spring drives tail rotor blades to fixed pitch setting if control signal lost
controls are ballistically tolerant X
two independent, separated, and shielded hydraulic power subsystems X
third electrically driven backup power subsystem X X
quick disconnects and leak isolation valves
less flammable hydraulic fuel X
two door-mounted 7.62mm machine guns X X X
E infrared jamming flares X
~chaff dispenser X
m missiles and rocketsX X X
Table 4-4 presents the results of tracing UH-60A survivability features to the design principles.
With a clear emphasis on vulnerability reduction (Type II survivability), 41 survivability features
were identified (Ball and Atkinson 1995; USA 2006) and divided into six areas: rotor blade and
drive train, structure, fuel system, propulsion, flight control, and armament. Many insights were
revealed while mapping the 41 features to the design principles. Most critically, eight of the UH-
60A survivability features were found to be untraceable to the original set of twelve design
principles. Three potentially new design principles are discussed to account for these
discrepancies. In addition, needed revisions were found to two existing design principles.
The first row of Table 4-4, "modularized transmission eliminates exposed high speed shafts and
multiple lube systems with exposed oil components," is the first UH-60A survivability feature
that does not employ any of the existing design principles. As a survivability design which
reduces vulnerability to a "loss of lubrication" kill mode (Ball and Atkinson 1995), this feature
employs a hazard elimination strategy. Hazard elimination, a reduction in the number of system
failure modes, is a foundational goal of system safety (and followed by hazard reduction, hazard
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control, and damage reduction in priority in system safety engineering) (Leveson 1995).
However, hazard elimination is not represented in the preliminary set of design principles. This
gap is also apparent for the survivability feature of "no cross bearings or lube" in the cross-beam
tail rotor drive system. A similar problem is also evident for the survivability feature of [fuel
system] short, self-sealing fuel lines. While the ability of the fuel lines to self-seal (and hence
reduce the probability of fuel supply depletion kill mode) is recognized as employing the design
principle of repair, the shortness of the lines-reducing susceptibility to fires and explosions-is
not traced to any of the design principles. Integrating across these three examples, the first
unique insight from the UH-60A is a need for a design principle offailure mode reduction.
The second new design principle derived from the UH-60A stems from five untraceable
survivability features: [rotor blade and drive train] (1) non-catastrophic failure allows
autorotation (i.e., forward momentum of helicopter provides some lift by spinning main rotor in
the event engine failure), (2) large vertical tail with long boom provides anti-torque in forward
flight (i.e., forward momentum provides some yaw control if tail rotor is lost), (3) damaged parts
of tail rotor thrown away from helicopter, [flight control] (4) tail rotor is stable if pitch rod is
severed, and (5) spring drives tail rotor blades to fixed pitch setting if control signal lost. Each of
these survivability features leverage "the physics of the incipient failure" to prevent or delay the
failure mode (Clausing and Frey 2005). From a functional perspective, the underlying principle
employed by each of these five survivability features is an elimination of immediate danger by
automatically compensating for failure (i.e., a fail-safe design).
Two problematic UH-60A feature mappings inform the third new design principle: the need for
containment within Type II survivability. By incorporating the feature of [flight control] quick
disconnects and leak isolation valves, the Blackhawk reduces the probability of a hydraulic fluid
fire by containing the propagation of failure (Ball and Atkinson 1995). This containment
principle, which fits within the system safety technique of hazard control, is also employed by
the incorporation of shaft supports that provide damping of a damaged shaft [rotor blade and
drive train] to protect the overall structural integrity. As with many systems with high-energy
transfers, helicopters are tightly-coupled and highly-tuned systems (i.e., they exhibit impedance
matching) in order to maximize efficiency. A vulnerability of such systems is the tendency for
failures to rapidly propagate. The UH-60A clearly incorporates the principle of containment to
limit the propagation of such failures.
In addition to the three design principles uncovered above, the Blackhawk test case also exposed
problematic aspects of two of the original survivability design principles: (1) the need to
decompose the design principle of diversity into heterogeneity and distribution and (2) the need
to distinguish between redundancy and margin. As defined in the preliminary design principle
set, diversity is characteristic or spatial variation to limit the effectiveness of homogeneous
disturbances. This is an extremely broad definition that includes variation in both the properties
(i.e., heterogeneity) and locations of system elements (i.e., distribution). These are two
fundamentally different concepts. Five UH-60A examples of the diversity design principle that
would be clearly mapped to a distribution principle include the survivability features of [fuel
system] two self-sealing/crashworthy tanks located away from ignition sources, [propulsion] two
widely separated engines, widely separated engine to transmission input modules, [flight control]
two independent, separated mechanical controls with disconnects, and two independent,
separated, and shielded hydraulic power subsystems.
Redundancy, which was originally defined in terms of duplication of critical system components,
is a poor fit for two survivability features in the Blackhawk: [rotor blade and drive train] operates
1+ hours after loss of all oil and [propulsion] good one engine out capability. Redundancy
implies substitution of components to maintain a consistent level of performance whereas an
ability to fly for over an hour after loss of oil is indicative of design margin. While redundancy
and margin are related in terms of having something "extra," they are fundamentally different
concepts because margin implies a continuum of capability which, if reduced, may impact end-
user value.
4.3.4. Revise Design Principles
The final step of generating and evaluating a general set of survivability design principles is to
revise the framework following each empirical test. In this iterative process, there is an inherent
tension among competing desires for clarity, mutual independence, collective exhaustiveness,
and maintaining a tractable number of principles. For example, the process of attempting to
trace the survivability features of the UH-60A Blackhawk helicopter to the existing design
principles was a strong driver against minimizing the size of the set. Not all of the survivability
features of the UH-60A were successfully mapped to the existing design principles as the size of
the set of Type II design principles was expanded by five.
Table 4-5. Revisions to Design Principles from UH-60A Empirical Test
Insight Implication
Survivability features that employ design Add new Type II design principle of
margin are untraced margin
2 Imprecise definition of diversity - includes Decompose diversity intoboth characteristic and spatial heteroaeneity and distribution
Survivability features that reduce the number Add new Type II design principle of
of system failure modes are untraced failure mode reduction
4 Survivability features employing "physics-of- Add new Type II design principle offailure" are untraced fail-safe
5 Survivability features that limit or slow the Add new Type II design principle ofpropagation of failures are untraced containment
As shown in Table 4-5, extensive modifications were required of the Type II survivability set to
accommodate the results of the UH-60A empirical test: the decomposition of diversity into the
design principles heterogeneity and distribution; the distinction drawn between redundancy and
margin; and the addition of the design principles of failure mode reduction (2.6), fail-safe (2.7),
and containment (2.9). While heterogeneity, distribution, and margin are specializations of the
original set of design principles, failure mode reduction, fail-safe, and containment are
fundamentally new design principles which were excluded from the preliminary framework.
These modifications are valuable for helping systems engineers consider a larger set of
survivability techniques. Additionally, capturing the subtle functional differences among design
principles may expand the design space enumerated from form-function mapping in conceptual
design. Table 4-6 shows the tracing of the Blackhawk survivability features to the revised set of
design principles.
Table 4-6. Tracing of UH-60A Blackhawk Survivability Features to Revised Design Principles
Design Principles
Type I (Reduce Susceptbility) Type II (Reduce Vulnerabity) Type III
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UH-60A: Sample Survivability Features 
__ I
c modularized transmission (eliminates exposed shaft and lube system) X
operates 1+ hours after loss of all oil X X
noncatastrophic failure allows autorotation X
rotor blades tolerant to high-explosive incendiary (HEI) projectile X
elastomenc hub with no lube, tolerant to HEI projectiles X
aarge vertical tall with long boom provides anti-torque in forward flight X
shaft supports provide damping for damaged shaft X
_ no beanngs or lube in cross-beam rotor X
o tail rotor blades ballstically tolerant X
2 damagea parts of tail rotor thrown away rom helicopter X
crashworthy armored seats and retenton system X
E shatterproof cockpit window X
Z minimum-spall matenals used in cockpit X
2 kevlar armor to stop HEI fragments X
airframe progressively crushes on impact X
protective armor wittstands hts from 23m snells X
two self-sealing/crashworthy tanks located away from inition sources X X X X
Sshort, self-sealing feed lnes X X
a engine-mounted suction pumps X
cross feed capability X X
Sdlosed cell foam around tanks X
hydrodynamic tolerant fuel tanks X
maneuverability X X
Stwo widely separated engines X
titanium fire walls X
S fi re detection with two shot fire extinguishing X
widely separated engine to transmission input modules X
no fuel ingestion X
good one engine out capabiliy X
two independent, separated mechanical controls with disconnects X X X
tail rotor is stable if pitch rod is severed X
controls are ballistically tolerant X
two independent, separated, and shielded hydraulic power subsystems X X X
third electncally dnven backup power subsystem X X X X
quick disconnects and leak isolation valves X
less flammable hydraulic fuel
two door-mounted 7 62mm machine guns X X X
infrared jamming flares X
cha!ff dispenser X
missiles and rockets X X
In addition to empirically testing the design principles against the validated survivability features
of the Blackhawk, three additional empirical tests were conducted using the A-10A Warthog
(Appendix A), F-16C Fighting Falcon (Appendix B), and Iridium satellite communications
network (Appendix C). In tracing the initial design principles to the survivability features of the
A-10A (which was conducted in parallel with the Blackhawk empirical test), similar insights
emerged (e.g., need to clarify redundancy, need to decompose diversity). Following the F-16C
and Iridium empirical tests, no further modifications or refinements were required of the design
principle framework.
4.4. Validated Set of Seventeen Design Principles
Utilizing the four-step approach described in the preceding section, seventeen survivability
design principles were enumerated. These are classified as six design principles for Type I
survivability, nine design principles for Type II survivability, and two design principles for Type
III survivability.
4.4.1. Type I (Reduce Susceptibility)
The six principles for enhancing Type I survivability (i.e., susceptibility reduction) are: (1.1)
prevention, (1.2) mobility, (1.3) concealment, (1.4) deterrence, (1.5) preemption, and (1.6)
avoidance.
Prevention is the suppression of a future or potential future disturbance. Through the
prevention design principle, disturbances are not given the opportunity to become a threat to the
system. An example of prevention is the suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) before a
conflict, intended to remove threats to friendly aircraft.
Mobility is relocation to avoid detection by an external change agent. Through the mobility
design principle, the disturbance agent's ability to effectively observe the system is diminished
because the system is changing locations, thereby making a decision to attack the system more
difficult. Examples of the principle include the Navy TACAMO E-6 strategic communications
aircraft which is constantly changing locations to avoid detection, and the Scud launcher
vehicles, which were often relocated during the first Gulf War conflict to confound U.S. forces
attempting to destroy them.
Concealment is the reduction of the visibility of a system from an external change agent.
Through the concealment design principle, the disturbance agent's ability to effectively observe
the system is diminished because the system is difficult to identify or isolate, thereby making a
decision to attack the system more difficult. Examples of the principle include the B-2 Spirit
stealth bomber and the F- 117 Nighthawk stealth aircraft. In addition to minimizing the ability of
external change agents to identify systems, concealment may be also employed in a deceptive
manner to minimize the ability of agents to isolate systems (e.g., decoys).
Deterrence is the dissuasion of a rational external change agent from committing a disturbance,
increasing the perceived costs above the perceived benefits of an attack. Through the deterrence
design principle, the disturbance agent is convinced not to carry out the disturbance. An
example of the principle is the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction pursued during the Cold
War. Opponents realized that any action would cause an effect of such high cost that any benefit
received would not make the action worthwhile.
Preemption is the suppression of an imminent disturbance. Through the preemption design
principle, the disturbance agent's ability to act is removed or diminished immediately prior to
committing the act. An example of the preemption principle is the interception of hostile
missiles, whether immediately before launch or during flight.
Avoidance is maneuverability away from a disturbance. Through the avoidance design
principle, the disturbance agent's action is reduced in effectiveness through the system actively
relocating. Examples include aircraft missile evasion and precision landing of robotic
exploration vehicles on Mars.
4.4.2. Type II (Reduce Vulnerability)
The nine principles for enhancing Type II survivability (i.e., vulnerability reduction) are: (2.1)
hardness, (2.2) redundancy, (2.3) margin, (2.4) heterogeneity, (2.5) distribution, (2.6) failure
mode reduction, (2.7) fail-safe, (2.8) evolution, and (2.9) containment.
Hardness is the resistance of a system to deformation. Through the hardness design principle,
the system is able to resist more of the effects of a disturbance by raising the intensity required to
have negative effects on the system. Examples include Milstar satellite radiation hardening and
the Ml Abrams tank armor.
Redundancy is the duplication of critical system functions to increase reliability. Through the
redundancy principle, the system reduces the effectiveness of a disturbance by requiring multiple
failures to achieve the same effect as a disturbance on a non-redundant system. Examples
include back-up GEO communications satellites and the Space Shuttle avionics system of five
identical general-purpose computers.
Margin is the allowance of extra capability for maintaining value delivery despite losses. For
example, the A-10 combat aircraft has lift margin with its long, low-set wings that are able to
maintain flight even when missing half of a wing. The A-10 also has propulsion margin with an
ability to survive the loss of one of its two engines.
Heterogeneity is variation in system elements to mitigate homogeneous disturbances. Through
heterogeneity, systems reduce the aggregate impact of a single type of disturbances. For
example, heterogeneous operating systems have been proposed to reduce the effectiveness of
malware. An example of an operational system using heterogeneity as a design principle to
improve survivability is the nuclear "triad" of land-based ICBM's, airborne bombers, and
nuclear submarines.
Distribution is separation of critical system elements to mitigate local disturbances. For
example, in order to realize the survivability benefits of redundant flight controls on the A-10,
the two mechanical assemblies are functionally and spatially separated.
Failure mode reduction is the elimination of system hazards through intrinsic design. Such
hazards might be eliminated through component substitution (e.g., following Apollo 13, the
replacement of Teflon insulation in the oxygen tanks with stainless steel), design simplification
(e.g., reliance on flight-proven hardware), decoupling of failure modes (e.g., placing critical code
in read-only memory), and through the reduction of hazardous materials (e.g., using hybrid
propulsion systems in place of solid propellant) (Leveson 1995).
Fail-safe is the prevention or delay of system degradation by leveraging the physics of incipient
failure. Fail-safe designs may eliminate immediate danger by automatically compensating for
failure. Several examples of fail-safe are discussed in the Blackhawk test case in Section 4.3.3
(e.g., autorotation of rotor blade).
Evolution is the alteration of system elements to reduce disturbance effectiveness (engineered
mismatch). Through the evolution design principle, the system actively changes itself to reduce
the effectiveness of a disturbance. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the B-17 design and tactics
evolved extensively over the course of the Second World War.
Containment is the isolation or minimization of the propagation offailure. For example, the
Blackhawk helicopter reduces the risk of hydraulic fluid fires by incorporating quick disconnects
and leak isolation valves in the flight control system.
4.4.3. Type III (Enhance Resilience)
The two principles for enhancing Type III survivability (i.e., resilience enhancement) are: (3.1)
replacement and (3.2) repair.
Replacement is the substitution of system elements to improve value delivery. Through the
replacement principle, the system is restored through the substitution of an undamaged element
for a damaged component. An example is the launch of XM-3 and XM-4 satellite radio satellites
to replace XM-1 and XM-2 due to solar panel fogging that reduced Boeing 702 satellite lifetimes
from fifteen to six years.
Repair is the restoration of a system to an improved state of value delivery. Through the repair
principle, the system is restored through a modification of damaged components to a less
damaged state. An example is the STS-61 mission placing Corrective Optics Space Telescope
Axial Replacement (COSTAR) on the Hubble Space Telescope in 1993.
4.5. Synthesis
The process of tracing survivability features of real systems to the design principles and the
subsequent improvements and eventual validation of the theory illustrates the value of empirical
research in systems engineering. As a first step, development of the survivability framework and
principles benefited from a deductive approach that emphasized an abstract theoretical
framework. Following the generation of a set of hypotheses (i.e., the initial twelve design
principles), experiments were conducted (i.e., tracing of survivability features of existing
systems to design principles). Based on the results of the experiments, new hypotheses were
proposed (i.e., new sets of design principles) for subsequent testing.
Based on the results of the experimentation, the seventeen general design principles in Table 4-7
are found to characterize all of the survivability features employed by four existing, survivable
aerospace systems: F-16C, Iridium, A-10A, and UH-60A. Given the stratified sampling of these
systems across the aerospace domain, it may be argued that the seventeen design principles
constitute a complete framework for informing concept generation of survivable aerospace
systems during front-end design activities. The modifications made to the preliminary set of
principles (Table 4-3) enable consideration of a larger set of survivability techniques. Capturing
the subtle functional differences among design principles also expands the potential design space
enumerated from form-function mapping in conceptual design.
Table 4-7. Validated Set of Survivability Design Principles
1.1 prevention suppression of a future or potential future disturbance
1.2 mobility relocation to avoid detection by an external change agent
1.3 concealment reduction of the visibility of a system from an external change agent
1.4 deterrence dissuasion of a rational external change agent from committing a disturbance
1.5 preemption suppression of an imminent disturbance
1.6 avoidance maneuverability away from an ongoing disturbance
2.1 hardness resistance of a system to deformation
2.2 redundancy duplication of critical system functions to increase reliability
2.3 margin allowance of extra capability for maintaining value delivery despite losses
2.4 heterogeneity variation in system elements to mitigate homogeneous disturbances
2.5 distribution separation of critical system elements to mitigate local disturbances
failure mode elimination of system hazards through intrinsic design: substitution,
reduction simplification, decoupling, and reduction of hazardous materials
2.7 fail-safe prevention or delay of degradation via physics of incipient failure
2.8 evolution alteration of system elements to reduce disturbance effectiveness
2.9 containment isolation or minimization of the propagation of failure
3.1 replacement substitution of system elements to improve value delivery
3.2 repair restoration of system to improve value delivery
Figure 4-5 depicts the time intervals during which each of the seventeen design principles may
positively affect value delivery in a disturbance lifecycle. Principles enhancing Type I
survivability add value before a disturbance impacts a system, Type II principles add value
during the disturbance, and Type III principles add value following a disturbance impact. While
the design principles are helpful for aiding the creative brainstorming of a larger set of
survivability techniques in each phase of a disturbance, they are not intended as a checklist for
completeness. Rather, the enumeration provides designers with a portfolio of options from
which to consider a larger tradespace of survivable designs. The success of this portfolio of
survivable design principles will vary with context. Designs that achieve a successful balance of
survivability, performance, and cost will almost certainty incorporate a subset of the seventeen
principles with varying emphasis.
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Figure 4-5. Mapping of Design Principles to Disturbance Lifecycle
As illustrated in Figure 4-5, each design principle is classified as either passive or active. A
focus on passive principles will lead to the construction of closed (static) systems that resist
disturbance based on projections of the operational environment. A focus on active principles
will lead to the construction of open (dynamic) systems that cope with future uncertainty by
stressing architectural agility to recover from disturbances (Table 4-8). The distinction between
passive and active survivability is useful because it specifies which design principles may be
used based on the changeability of the architecture (Ross 2006). For example, the current
generation of communications satellites has a low degree of changeability due to the
inaccessibility of the orbiting vehicles following launch. In order to achieve survivability in the
harsh environment of space, designers focus on the passive design principles of radiation
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hardening and redundancy (increasing mass, complexity, and cost). If on-orbit servicing
vehicles were to be developed, the changeability of communications satellites would increase.
This would provide designers the option of incorporating design principles of active survivability
such as repair, replacement, and evolution via servicing missions in lieu of costly hardening and
radiation techniques (Richards 2006).24
Table 4-8. Passive vs. Active Survivability
Passive Survivability Active Survivability
Philosophy Survivability is something that a system Survivability is something that a system
has does
Characteristics proactive, resistant, robust reactive, flexible, adaptive
Design concealment, hardness, redundancy, prevention, mobility, deterrence,
Principles margin, heterogeneity, distribution, preemption, avoidance, evolution,failure mode reduction, fail-safe containment, replacement, repair
Presupposes knowledge of disturbance Acknowledges uncertainty in projection ofenvironment future disturbances
Architecture Closed (static) Open (dynamic)
Defensive barriers at system-level to Architectural agility to deter, avoid, and/or
Design Focus resist disturbances recover from disturbances
Failures Causal chain (often linear) Tight couplings, functional resonance
(nonlinear)
RelatedDisciplines Safety engineering, risk analysis Operations analysis, real options analysisDisciplines
Table 4-8 describes how the design principles may be broadly decomposed into passive
(structural) principles that seek to maintain value delivery through static design elements and
active (behavioral) principles that focus on either eliminating disturbances or on agile
architectures for rapid recovery. However, it is important to note that the passive/active
attributes of the design principles are not absolute distinctions but rather representative of a
continuum between two different design philosophies. For example, concealment is not
amenable to this binary categorization as many concealment features on combat aircraft are
active in nature (e.g., chaff and flare dispensers). These features require situational awareness,
decision-making, and action by the pilot (i.e., the ODA cycle of the internal change agent).
The scope of this chapter-the development of a validated set of survivability design
principles-is only one aspect of improving the articulation, evaluation, and implementation of
survivability during the conceptual design of engineering systems. The next step is a
24 Changeability may also serve as an enabler of active survivability in space systems through internal, adaptive
system behavior (rather than through the external, flexible changes offered by on-orbit servicing). For example,
self-similar modular architectures enable reconfigurability which accommodates graceful degradation (Siddiqi and
De Weck 2006) through the survivability design principles of containment and repair. Each of these architectural
properties related to changeability-whether classified as flexible, adaptable, or reconfigurable-serve as path
enablers of survivability by reducing the time and/or costs associated with exercising various combinations of active
survivability design principles.
quantitative implementation of the principles into a system analysis methodology. In the
following chapter, the survivability metrics from Chapter 3 are applied to a series of tradespace
computer experiments for comparing designs on the basis of their lifecycle cost, design utility,
and survivability. Having demonstrated this modeling approach, a methodology is introduced in
Chapters 6 and 7 for using the design principles to expand the set of system design trade-offs
under consideration.
5. Survivability Tradespace Experiments
This chapter addresses the third of the four research questions introduced in Section 1.3.2.
3. How can survivability be quantified and used as a decision metric in exploring
tradespaces during conceptual design of aerospace systems?
The objective of this chapter is to examine the survivability metrics introduced in Chapters 2 and
3 through their application to a series of computer experiments. Drawing upon both existing and
proposed metrics, the ability of each metric to specify, evaluate, and verify survivability in trade
studies during conceptual design is analyzed. (As discussed in Section 2.2, trade studies are
analyses that evaluate a range of design options in terms of costs and benefits.) The computer
experiments are focused on establishing the internal validity of the survivability metrics.
Therefore, systems were selected for testing the survivability metrics for which threats and
mitigating strategies are well-documented. Subsequent application of the metrics in Chapter 7 is
focused on testing for external validity by seeking prescriptive insights.
Five desirable characteristics for conducting survivability assessments are used to evaluate the
approach taken by each computer experiment. First, does the methodology allow survivability to
be actively traded with traditional measures-of-effectiveness (e.g., lifecycle cost, mission
utility)? Second, are the dynamics of hostile operational environments incorporated into
survivability considerations over the entire lifecycle? Third, are path-dependencies associated
with system state internalized? Fourth, is survivability considered at the architectural level?
Fifth, does the methodology take a value-centric approach to allow alternative value-delivery
mechanisms in the tradespace, ensuring that the survivability analysis is focused on the
preservation of mission utility (vice physical integrity of constituent nodes)?
These five questions are answered in each of Chapter 5's three survivability test cases. In
Section 5.1, cost-exchange ratios (i.e., evaluating system survivability in terms of optimizing a
defensive system's cost-exchange ratios with the attacker) are evaluated through their application
to a simple model of space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD). In examining this existing
approach to the front-end evaluation of survivability, general findings for space-based BMD are
also discussed. In Section 5.2, existing survivability metrics are applied to an emerging
tradespace methodology. In particular, survivability considerations are incorporated into a
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration study of an orbital transfer vehicle operating in a debris
environment. Limitations of the existing survivability metrics and static MATE methodology
applied in this study are used to inform Section 5.3, where the MATE analysis of orbital transfer
vehicles is extended and customized to accommodate the dynamics and path dependencies
associated with assessing survivability as a stochastic property across the system lifecycle. Both
existing and proposed survivability metrics are applied to the computer experiment. Section 5.4
summarizes the lessons learned and draws general conclusions from the three computer
experiments.
5.1. Test Case #1: Cost-Exchange Ratios
The Nitze criterion was introduced in Section 2.1.3 as one accepted means for assessing novel
defenses. The central tenet of the Nitze criterion is that defenses are worth deploying if they are
more cost-effective at the margin (i.e., recurring cost of defense is less than the recurring cost of
the countermeasures that could be used against the defense). System analyses applying the Nitze
criterion therefore focus on calculating the cost-exchange ratios associated with attack,
countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures. This section revisits the work of Canavan and
Teller (1990) in applying the Nitze criterion to evaluate alternative survivability enhancement
features for a space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Since the technical issues
involving the first-order survivability of space-based BMD are well-documented (Canavan and
Teller 1990), this test case applies existing assumptions to build a simple model of space-based
BMD. Accordingly, the focus of the analysis is on the strengths and weaknesses of using cost-
exchange ratios as a decision metric.
Following a brief overview of space-based BMD and discussion of survivability considerations,
a parametric, first-order model of space-based BMD is developed to assess a tradespace of
candidate defensive alternatives. Interrelationships between cost, performance, and survivability
of systems pursuing alternative strategies are explored. The section concludes with general
comments on space-based BMD and a synthesis of lessons learned from employing cost-
exchange ratios for front-end survivability assessments.
5.1.1. Overview: Space-Based Ballistic Missile Defense
The utilization of space-based interceptors to protect the United States and its allies from ballistic
missile attack has been the subject of decades of research and development activities. Beginning
with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Project Defender in the 1960's, several
candidate systems have been proposed. In the early 1990's, the Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes (GPALS) system envisioned a constellation of several thousand "Brilliant
Pebbles" that would provide boost and early mid-course defense against ballistic missile
launches from all over the world (Blaha, Pendergraft and Riley 2007). Although abandoned for
political and economic reasons (e.g., post-Cold War peace dividend, desire to maintain 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the former Soviet Union), GPALS reached a high level of
technical maturity. Over the past decade, the world situation has further evolved and a strong
value proposition for space-based BMD may be made by proponents in terms of technology
(e.g., ability to track missile launches in boost-phase, difficulty for offense to deploy
countermeasures in boost-phase relative to midcourse phase), safety (e.g., desire to intercept
nuclear-tipped missiles over hostile territory), geopolitics (e.g., increased number of hostile
nations seeking ballistic missiles, heightened pace of proliferation of missile technology, recent
North Korean tests), funding availability (e.g., burgeoning U.S. Missile Defense Agency budget),
legality (e.g., 2002 withdrawal of U.S. from ABM Treaty), and political support (e.g., 2002
National Security Policy Directive 23 which directed the development and testing of a space-
based defense).25 Despite these arguments, a host of issues remain (e.g., potential to militarize
space in a way that damages U.S. interests in the long-term) (O'Hanlon 2004; Rance 2007). The
issue explored in this section focuses on the efficacy of space-based BMD given the
countermeasures that can be deployed against it: how to make such a system survivable?
25 A host of arguments have also been made against space-based BMD in terms of technology and national security
strategy (Stares and Pike 1985; Pike 1986; Canavan and Teller 1990; DeBlois 2004; Wright, Grego and Lisbeth
2005)
Described as "the crowning achievement of the Strategic Defense Initiative" by former Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory Director John Nuckolls, the Brilliant Pebbles were a set of non-
nuclear watermelon-sized mini-missiles designed to kinetically intercept and kill ballistic
missiles in the boost and early mid-course phases of flight. Without accounting for survivability
considerations, the Brilliant Pebbles were shown to have highly-effective cost-exchange ratios
with Soviet ICBMs when deployed in carrier vehicles (Canavan and Teller 1990; Canavan
1991). However, when accounting for countermeasures, absenteeism, and cost-effectiveness
relative to other defense strategies (e.g., hardening, decoy and maneuver), the Brilliant Pebbles
embraced a distributed singlet architecture (i.e., one interceptor per carrier vehicle) for achieving
favorable cost-exchange ratios with the attacker. In examining the strengths and weaknesses of
using cost-exchange, the computer experiment in this section will return to and attempt to build
on these previous assessments of how to best achieve a survivable space-based BMD system.
5.1.2. Survivability Considerations
Candidate kinetic-kill space-based BMD systems suffer from many susceptibilities and
vulnerabilities characteristic of most spacecraft as well as unique fragilities arising from the
nature of their mission (e.g., global coverage, immediate response time). As discussed in
Wheelon (1986), space systems are subject to attack. For one, target acquisition may be
conducted by direction finding from emissions of electromagnetic radiation, passive infrared
sensing of electrical energy against the backdrop of space, or microwave radar or laser tracking.
Once targets are acquired, satellites may be tracked given the predictability of their orbits and
AV penalties associated with maneuvering, particularly in low Earth orbit (LEO). Wheelon also
notes that destroying LEO satellites is not difficult given that it is only necessary to stand in their
path to destroy them given high relative velocities. Of course, kinetic attacks are not the only
disturbances against which a potential space-based BMD would need to contend. Several other
potential hazards are documented in the literature (Giffen 1982; Wheelon 1986; Hastings and
Garrett 1996; Wilson 2001; Tribble 2003).
In addition to recognizing the generic threats facing any space system, it is also important to
recognize the unique fragilities introduced by the space-basing of missile defense. First,
interceptors must be in LEO in order for the defender to be within a distance equal to the product
of its velocity and the time its takes the attack missile to accelerate to ballistic trajectory (i.e.,
before the discriminatory targeting problem brought about by decoys arises) (Canavan and Teller
1990). This constraint forces systems to be at 500 km or less in altitude (Canavan and Teller
1990). Furthermore, such systems must be somewhat distributed in order to account for
absenteeism-a factor of approximately 20% which is driven by the defenders velocity (Canavan
and Teller 1990). Therefore, the space-based BMD architectures in the tradespace will consist of
a thin shell of satellite carrier vehicles in LEO holding one or more interceptors (where n= 1 in
case of Brilliant Pebbles).
Given the susceptibility and vulnerability of LEO space systems and the unique fragilities arising
from the space-based BMD mission area, what survivability features might be deployed to
increase the efficacy of a future system? While all seventeen principles offer options for
architectural improvement, this section examines the impacts of increasing the number of
interceptors available over a given field of regard (margin) and decreasing number of
interceptors per carrier vehicle (distribution).
5.1.3. Tradespace Analysis
In order to analyze the survivability of alternative missile defense systems, a two-step modeling
effort is pursued. First, a baseline space-based BMD system is designed to understand the
minimum number of interceptors required on-orbit to maintain a high-degree of confidence in a
leak-proof defense (i.e., >95% probability of intercepting all hostile missile launches) within a
reasonable budget. Second, the impact of distributing the BMD architecture over multiple
carrier vehicles is modeled in the event that an adversary pursues countermeasures (rather than
simply launching more missiles). Trade-offs are examined among a Brilliant Pebbles (i.e.,
singlet) system and less distributed BMD systems using carrier vehicles with multiple
interceptors. Sensitivity analysis is conduced on the most critical assumptions and the computer
experiment concludes with a discussion on how other design principles (e.g., hardening) may be
added to the tradespace for a more complete assessment of survivability.
The purpose of modeling a baseline space-based BMD system is to understand the relationship
between the number of interceptors within a given field of regard and a target performance level
of the system (i.e., the probability of a leak-proof defense against a limited hostile launch). As
such, the first-order model allows trades between desired performance and investment in
additional interceptors.
There are two independent variables in this baseline case: (1) the number of total interceptors
deployed and (2) the anticipated number of rounds of launch. The second independent variable
reflects the CONOPS of the BMD (i.e., the number of rounds of ICBMs launches across which
defensive interceptors are allocated). Thirty design vectors are considered, representing the full-
factorial sampling of the two design variables.
* number of interceptors deployed in LEO [10 30 60 100 150 225 350 500 750 1000]
* anticipated number of rounds of launch [l 2 3]
Having generated design alternatives, a simple model translates each design vector into the
performance parameters of the probability of a leak-proof defense (per round) and the cost of
defense. Given that the focus of this section is on the implications of using cost-exchange ratios
for survivability analysis, the assumptions and governing equations underlying the simple model
are provided in Appendix D.
Figure 5-1 shows the baseline space-based BMD tradespace, displaying the performance of the
thirty design alternatives. The costs of the systems vary from 10 to 40 billion dollars, and the
probability of a leak-proof defense (against a three-missile salvo from any point on the Earth's
surface) ranges from less than 10% to performance in excess of 0.99 probability.
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Figure 5-1. Baseline Space-Based BMD Tradespace
Table 5-1 shows a promising baseline architecture (circled in Figure 5-1) given its high
probability of leak-proof defense and (relatively) low cost.
Table 5-1. Promising Point Design for Baseline Space-Based BMD
ConstantslAssumptions
probability of missile intercept 0.5
number of missiles launched per round 3
cost of interceptor 30 million $
BMD development cost 10 billion $
time between launch and warhead deployment 600 sec
effective radius from which missiles are launched (interceptor) 2000 km
interceptor velocity 6 km/sec
radius of Earth 6378.1 km
pi 3.1416
Independent Variables
number of interceptors 225
anticipated number of rounds of launch 2
Intermediate Variables
interceptor range 5600 km
absentee factor 0.193
number of interceptors fired per missile 7
Having identified a promising design, a sensitivity analysis was conducted on the CONOPS to
explore the implications of alternative tactics on architecture performance (Figure 5-2).
Missile Defense Tradespace (launched missiles = 3, P[intercept]=0.5)
------------------ --------------- -- -----------
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Figure 5-2. Sensitivity Analysis on Assumed BMD CONOPS
As illustrated by the encircled points in Figure 5-2, the baseline architecture is reasonably
survivable across CONOPS ranging from committing all to 33% of available interceptors for a
particular engagement.
Following the sensitivity analysis, a local optimization is performed on the promising point
design to identify the minimum number of interceptors required subject to the constraint that a
leak-proof defense is delivered 95% of the time (rather than the 225 currently employed for a
98% probability). That value is computed as 187 interceptors.
Before proceeding, it is important to note the first-order nature of the calculations performed
above. While first-order parametric models are useful for depicting relative trends, it would be
unwise to extract general results without higher fidelity models, improved cost estimates, and
more complete sensitivity analysis on the extensive number of assumptions (e.g., probability of
missile intercept, interceptor velocity, ICBM launch time). Nevertheless, the model is adequate
for our purpose of roughly estimating the relationship between the number of available
interceptors within a particular field of regard and the performance of the BMD. This
relationship may inform the system requirements of the BMD (e.g., 225 interceptors) and the
extent to which graceful degradation may be allowed to occur before an emergency value
threshold is reached (e.g., 187 interceptors).
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Having established a required baseline capability for the space-based BMD in terms of the
number of interceptors required within a particular field of regard, the impact of countermeasures
against the defensive interceptors is examined. The published model of Canavan and Teller
(1990) is applied to explore the tradeoff between distributed and concentrated BMD architectures
when an ICBM launch is preceded by a direct-ascent attack designed to "poke a hole" in the
"umbrella" of interceptors. The particular scenario examined in this case is ten direct-ascent
weapons launched at BMD carrier vehicles prior to launch of three ICBMs. Assumptions made
regarding the marginal cost of attack are documented in Appendix D. Defender costs are carried
through the calculations as mass on-orbit before being later converted to a dollar value assuming
a $10,000/kg launch cost.
To examine trade-offs among a Brilliant Pebbles (i.e., singlet) system and other BMD systems
using carrier vehicles with multiple interceptors, two design variables are considered: (1) number
of carrier vehicles and (2) number of interceptors per carrier vehicle. An important intermediate
variable calculated in the analysis is the mass of a carrier vehicle, which is calculated in Canavan
and Teller (1990) as a function of the number of interceptors (n):
MassCarrier = 100n 2/3  (5-1)
Other intermediate variables include the required and emergency number of interceptors within a
particular field of regard. Both are directly computed using the total number of interceptors in
the architecture multiplied by the absentee factor. The expected number of interceptors
represents the number of interceptors available for BMD following attack. Using the
formulation by Howard (1993), this value is computed as the difference between the number of
available interceptors within the field of regard and the number of interceptors eliminated by
anti-satellites:
ExpNumlnt = Totallnt * Absentee- NumASAT * EffectASAT* NumlntPerCV (5-2)
Next, the cost of defense is computed as the redundant capability launched on-orbit as margin in
the BMD constellation. Specifically, it is computed as a function of the mass of any interceptor
(and associated carrier vehicle) launched in excess of those needed to meet the performance
requirement (i.e., 225 interceptors).
Four dependent variables are computed, two binary and two continuous. The first two consists
of logic tests regarding the architectural performance (Is the expected value threshold met? Is
the emergency value threshold met?). The subsequent two compute the ratio of the cost of
defense to the cost of the offense and survivability. A survivability index is assumed to be 1 if
the expected value threshold is met, 0 if the emergency value threshold is not met, and linearly
scaled for intermediate cases.
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Table 5-2. "Brilliant Pebbles" Point Design of 235 Singlets
Constants/Assumptions
probability of ASAT intercept 0.5
minimum number of interceptors - requirement 225
minimum number of interceptors - emergency 187
mass of interceptor 100 kg
absentee factor 0.19
launch cost 10,000 $ per kg
ASAT cost 3 million $
number of ASAT launched 10
Independent Variables
number of carrier vehicles 250
number of interceptors per carrier vehicle 1
Intermediate Variables
total number of interceptors 250
mass of carrier vehicle 100.0 kg
required number of interceptors - field of regard 42
emergency number of interceptors - field of regard 35
expected number of interceptors - field of regard 42.5
cost of attack 30 million $
cost of defense 126 million $
Dependent Variables
meet expected value threshold (i.e., requirement)? yes
meet emergency value threshold (i.e., survivable)? yes
cost-exchange ratio (defenselattack) 4.20
survivability 1.00
Table 5-2 illustrates a "Brilliant Pebbles" point design in the parametric model that calculates the
survivability and defense-offense cost-exchange ratios for various BMD architectures. This
particular architecture-the Brilliant Pebbles singlet case of n=l1 when 250 interceptors are
deployed--exceeds both the emergency and expected value thresholds with the lowest cost-
exchange ratio.
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Survivability of Distributed vs. Concentrated Space-Based BMD Systems
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Figure 5-3. Survivability as a Function of Cost-Exchange Ratios
Figure 5-3 illustrates the survivability of all 45 candidate architectures as a function of the cost-
exchange ratio with the offense. This figure is consistent with the proponents of space-based
BMD who argue that the only survivable missile system is a Brilliant Pebbles configuration.
Another interesting result of this figure is the fact that all architectures which achieve at least a
95% probability of leak-proof defense (which is any point in Figure 5-3 that has a non-zero
survivability value) have a cost-exchange ratio with the offense of at least two. This means that,
in a strict application of the Nitze criterion, no redundant "Pebbles" should be launched because
the cost-exchange ratio favors the attacker. However, a more narrow interpretation of the Nitze
criterion applied to the simple model might be that all configurations incorporating more than
one interceptor per carrier vehicle should be dismissed as dominated solutions.
As in the preceding case of establishing the baseline space-based BMD system, the trade-offs
presented in this computer experiment are only of a first-order nature and require higher-fidelity
models before specific implications for Brilliant Pebbles might be argued. For example, is it true
that a decision-maker would only be willing to accept a leak-proof missile defense system if the
probability of completely successful intercepts is 95%? Such assumptions bound the
computation of survivability in Figure 5-3.
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5.1.4. Key Insights
"Bacteria, polyps, ants, and bees are the living proof that, given inhospitable conditions, colonies stand a
better chance of survival than individuals... .A colony of microsatellites will be less vulnerable than a
normal satellite, not only to gamma radiation and solar storms, but also to cutbacks" (Van Kasteren 2004).
Three general conclusions may be drawn for space-based BMD from the first-order model. First,
redundant constellation nodes are expensive mechanisms for making satellite capabilities
insensitive to attack given the large cost of mass on-orbit. Second, as previously advocated (by
Canavan, Teller, and Lowell), it is wise to distribute capability over as many spacecraft as
possible to minimize cost-exchange ratio with a potential attacker. Third, maximizing the
allowable loss of interceptors within a particular field of regard may enable non-catastrophic,
graceful degradation of a BMD constellation. Possibilities for future work include exploring the
impact of maneuver tactics on cost-exchange ratios with homing attack vehicles, exploring the
impact of radiation hardening carrier vehicles on cost-exchange ratios with nuclear weapons, and
modeling the uncertainty of the attacker (e.g., unknown BMD survivability features) and
defender (e.g., unknown scope and magnitude of BMD countermeasures) to consider a wide-
range of possible future engagements and to compute the value of perfect information on both
sides.
In addition to general findings regarding space-based BMD, insights from the simple test case
also include implications of utilizing cost-exchange ratios in survivability analysis. These
implications are discussed in terms of the five desirable criteria provided in the introduction of
Chapter 5. First, applying cost-exchange ratios to parametric computer models does allow
survivability to be traded with relative costs. However, in a assuming a baseline system, it is not
possible to directly trade system performance and survivability. Second, the test case fails to
incorporate the dynamics associated with a particular threat encounter or lifecycle performance
by relying on a deterministic assessment of mission utility. Third, while cost-exchange ratios are
useful for thinking through the strategic interactions between attacker and defender behavior, the
test case failed to internalize path dependencies in system-state. Fourth, the test case
successfully demonstrates that cost-exchange ratios can be applied to studies extending to
architectural scope by evaluating survivability strategies at the satellite and constellation level.
The fifth and final criterion, providing a value-centric assessment, is partially addressed by
translating all offensive and defensive actions into a dollar figure. As discussed in Section 2.1.3,
Paul Nitze's criterion of deploying novel defenses if it is more cost-effective at the margin is an
intuitively appealing construct. However, cost-exchange ratios may be of limited value if the
value of a particular dollar spent on defense is not conserved across actors. This problem may
have existed for the space-based BMD system during the Cold War (given the larger size of the
U.S. economy relative to the Soviet Union); and this problem of applying the Nitze criterion
certainly exists today when discussing the context of conventional military systems facing
asymmetric threats. Therefore, while cost-exchange ratios are intuitively appealing and
applicable for conducting relative tradeoffs among candidate survivability features, they are
limited in prescribing absolute tradeoffs of whether to pay for a particular survivability feature.
5.2. Test Case #2: Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) was introduced in Section 2.2.2 as an emerging
conceptual design methodology that applies decision theory to model and simulation-based
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design (Ross, Hastings et al. 2004). This section explores how survivability metrics can be
incorporated into multi-attribute utility tradespaces.
One of the principal challenges of incorporating "-ilities" such as survivability in tradespace
studies is the inherent dependencies of the "-ilities". As temporal constructs, the "-ilities" are
difficult to represent in a traditionally static tradespace (Section 1.1.4). In addition, since their
definition is related to changes in system form or function, they are quantitatively dependent
upon other objective function variables. Tradespace studies typically look at the relation
between function and/or form and resulting system performance in terms of system objectives.
The performance in an aggregated, multi-objective space is dependent on the performance of
each of the single objectives. In choosing an appropriate aggregation technique, it is important
not to double-count the single objective performances. Incorporating "-ilities", which by
definition are measures of the ability to maintain attributes under changing conditions, into a
multi-attribute objective function creates the problem of double-counting. Therefore, "-ilities"
such as survivability are disaggregated from other system attributes and their impact on the
tradespace is assessed independently.
To illustrate the incorporation of survivability into MATE, the survivability of a space tug
vehicle operating in low-Earth orbit (LEO) is investigated. The tradespace for this system is
simple, well understood, verified, and fairly "rich" in the sense that the "best" system is
dependent on the interaction of user needs, environment, and physical constraints in non-trivial
ways (McManus and Schuman 2003). The survivability is defined in terms of sustained tug
performance in an orbit with an impact threat from micrometeorites and orbital debris. While
passive (e.g., hardening) and active (e.g., maneuvering for collision avoidance) survivability
strategies exist, this test case focuses on the addition of bumper shielding. Parametrically-varied
designs are evaluated for the effect of the shielding on value delivery in a baseline analysis of
cost and utility. Survivability is then calculated as the probability of sustaining mission through
the threat environment for a ten-year operational life. Since the physical survivability of
spacecraft to orbital debris is well-documented (Klinkrad 2006), this computer experiment can
utilize existing impact models and focus on the methodological challenges associated with
incorporating existing metrics for survivability into a static MATE analysis. Furthermore, the
computer experiment can serve to illustrate how adding survivability as a decision metric to
lifecycle cost and multi-attribute utility may affect front-end design choices.
5.2.1. Overview: Space Tug
A space tug is a vehicle designed to rendezvous and dock with a space object; make an
assessment of its current position, orientation, and operational status; and, then, either stabilize
the object in its current orbit or move the object to a new location with subsequent release
(Richards, Springmann and McVey 2005). A notional schematic of a space tug is provided in
Figure 5-4.
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Figure 5-4. Sample Space Tug Configuration (de Peuter, Visentin and Fehse 1994)
A previous MATE study explored the tradespace for a general-purpose servicing vehicle
(McManus and Schuman 2003). Three attributes formed the multi-attribute utility function: total
AV capability, capability of the grappling system, and response time. To provide these
attributes, three design variables were considered in subsequent modeling activities: manipulator
mass, propulsion type, and fuel load. A full-factorial, design space was sampled and analyzed-
featuring 128 designs-by inputting each possible combination of design variables from a set of
enumerated values over a range into (1) a parametric cost estimation model and (2) a physics-
based performance model. Building on the previous architecture trade study, the MATE model
discussed in this section incorporates survivability into the tradespace. Survivability is measured
in terms of probability of sustained tug performance in a LEO debris environment for a ten-year
mission life. For modeling simplicity, space tugs assume one of two states: operational or non-
operational due to catastrophic debris impact.
5.2.2. Survivability Considerations
There are millions of kilograms of objects in Earth orbit that pose a series of challenges to space
mission designers. Table 5-3 summarizes the threat to LEO spacecraft by combining data on
debris flux from two sources: (1) NASA's EVOLVE breakup engineering model for objects less
than 10 cm in diameter (Remo 2005) and (2) empirical data of debris greater than 10 cm in
diameter.26 To provide context to these cross-sectional area flux levels, the total expected
number of annual collisions between debris and all operational LEO satellites is also included in
Table 5-3 (Lai, Murad and McNeil 2002; UCS 2006).27 Despite the precision suggested by the
calculations in Table 5-3, it is important to note that our ability to understand the actual
distribution of debris momentum is dependent upon drawing inferences from a very small set of
the overall debris population (Lai, Murad and McNeil 2002).28
26 Published in NORAD's catalog and available for download from Air Force Space Command: http://www.space-
track.org/perl/login.pl.
27 Assumes 10 square-meters as the average exposed surface area of the 352 LEO spacecraft listed in the UCS
Satellite Database (Lai, Murad and McNeil 2002).
28 Given the finite resources available for space situational awareness, a large portion of the estimates of the debris
population are susceptible to large sampling errors.
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Table 5-3. Cumulative Annual Debris Impact Risk in LEO
Object Diameter Cross Section Flux LEO
Data Source (cm) (collisions/m 2/year) collisions/year2 9  Result
0.1 8.0 x 10-4 2.82 Degradation
(Remo 2005) 0.3 2.0 x 10-4  0.70 Damage
0.5 1.0 x 104  0.35 Damage
1 4.0 x 10-5  0.14 Severe Damage
Tracked Debris 10 2.5 x 10-6 8.80 x 10 3  Severe Damage(NORAD catalog) 100 5.0 x 10-7  1.76 x 10-  Severe Damage(NORAD catalog) 1000 1.0 x 10-9  3.52 x 10-6  Severe Damage
The environmental hazards posed by orbital debris in LEO lead designers to focus on protection
measures for long-lived spacecraft. The amount of damage sustained by a spacecraft is
dependent on a variety of factors: debris mass, debris relative velocity, debris shape, debris
composition, satellite structure, and location of impact. In general, there are two methods-
passive and active-for protecting spacecraft from most debris. Active techniques involve
having an awareness of incoming debris threats and a means to avoid or mitigate impact.
Passive techniques include shielding, redundancy, and reducing the exposed satellite cross-
sectional area signature along the leading edge (the angle-of-attack of most LEO debris) (Wertz
and Larson 1999).
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Figure 5-5. Satellite Bumper Shield (Lai, Murad and McNeil 2002)
The model focuses on the protective measure of bumper shielding. 30 Multi-layer bumper shields
provide an effective form of passive protection against debris fragments smaller than 1 cm in
diameter. Bumper shields provide survivability to spacecraft by fragmenting or vaporizing a
projectile in the first layer, dispersing the impulsive projectile into a particle cloud that impact
the subsequent shield layers over larger areas (Figure 5-5). The design parameters of a bumper
system are the thickness and material of the outer wall, the spacing between the outer wall and
backup layers, and the thickness and material of backup layers. The empirically-derived
equation for the thickness of the primary shield required for there to be no deflection, rupture, or
spalling, tb, is given:
29 Assuming a 10 m2 cross-sectional area for LEO satellites.
30 Ground-directed active debris avoidance is an expensive proposition as it requires active tracking of co-orbiting
objects, additional propellant, coordination with tracking facilities operated by U.S. Space Command, and
coordination with spacecraft in adjacent orbits. Also, active collision avoidance is only practical against large
objects as ground-based tracking provides poor accuracy in debris orbit propagation.
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tb = (5-3)
where m is the projectile mass in g, v is the projectile velocity in km/s, and S is the spacing
between shields in cm (Lai, Murad and McNeil 2002).
While the previous MATE study focused on trades among the efficiency and response time of
the propulsion system, grappling capability, and cost, the addition of bumper shielding to the
design space introduces new trades between expected lifetime and mass penalties. To illustrate
these trades, orbital debris and shielding models are added to the MATE analysis of space tug.
After adding six levels of shielding to the design space (Table 5-4), several computations are
performed. First, the probability of a debris collision occurring to a space tug is computed. This
depends not only on debris flux and collisions per area per year but also on the satellite cross-
sectional area (which varies by design). A ten-year operational life for space tugs is assumed, as
is an 800 km apogee operational orbit (i.e., the most-heavily utilized LEO regime with the largest
number of potential on-orbit servicing customers) (UCS 2006). Second, a distribution of
momentum for the impacting debris is computed, assuming an average collision velocity of 7
km/s and a probability density function of debris mass based on the integrated flux distribution
(based on NASA's ORDEM2000 model31) and utilizing empirical relationships for relating
debris diameter to debris area and debris area to debris mass (Badhwar and Anz-Meador 1989).
Third, the conditional probability of surviving a debris impact is computed using the shielding
model. For this purpose, survival is defined as no penetration of the primary shield. Fourth, the
added dry mass for shielding is incorporated into cost, vehicle sizing, and propulsion models.
The full-factorial sampling of the design variables allows for all first-order and interaction
effects to be taken into account.
Table 5-4. Space Tug Design Options (n=768)
Manipulator Mass Propulsion Type Fuel Load (kg) Shield Mass (kg)
Low (300 kg) Storable bi-prop 30 5
Medium (1000 kg) Cryogenic bi-prop 100 20
High (3000 kg) Electric 300 100
Extreme (5000 kg) Nuclear-thermal 600 300
1200 500
3000 1000
10000
30000
5.2.3. Tradespace Analysis
This section presents the results of the space tug MATE analysis. After showing the impact of
bumper shielding on the baseline tradespace (where shielding only hurts performance because
utility is based solely on grappling capability, AV, and responsiveness), an experimental
tradespace is presented which display cost, utility, and survivability data for each design. In this
approach, survivability is evaluated in terms of an increased probability of delivering value for
the entire ten-year mission design life for a given debris environment.
31 See httr://orbitaldebris.isc.nasa.gov/model/engrmodel.html.
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The original space tug analysis showed an interesting trade-off between capability, cost, and
speed (McManus and Schuman 2003). Several different classes of vehicles occupied different
regions of the Pareto front, including small chemically fueled vehicles for low AV maneuver,
servicing, and inspection; small electric vehicles that can apply considerable AV, although
slowly; and large, expensive vehicles that can apply large AV's quickly but only at high launch
costs (for chemical fuel) or high development cost and risk (for nuclear-thermal vehicles).
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Figure 5-6. Baseline MATE Tradespace
The current analysis adds shielding mass as a design parameter. Figure 5-6 depicts the baseline
space tug tradespace. The horizontal axis is cost (in millions of dollars) and the vertical axis is
multi-attribute utility, which is a function of AV capability, grappling system capability, and
response time. Each point is a candidate system design-a unique combination of the four
design variables (Table 5-4). The Pareto-efficient region of the tradespace-where utility is
highest for a given expenditure-is located along the non-dominated surface running from the
bottom-left through the top-left and ending at the top right region of the plot. Design #367, an
"Electric Cruiser," is shown in Figure 5-6 as a sample design near the Pareto front. The diagram
of the electric cruiser is from a deeper integrated concurrent engineering study reported in
Galabova et al. (2003).
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In the baseline MATE tradespace, utility is affected negatively by the addition of shielding,
which only adds cost and reduces AV capability. This effect is uneven, with smaller, less
expensive vehicles being affected the most. Families of vehicles differentiated only by how
much shielding they have are visible as clusters. On the far left of the figure, many clusters run
to the right (added costs) and also sharply down (decreased utility), indicating that adding
shielding moderately increases cost, but strongly degrades utility. Other families of vehicles
(e.g., those near the center) show cost increases but without strong impact on utility. Finally, a
few families (mostly near the top of the figure) show only cost increases, because these electric
propulsion vehicles have excess AV capacity above user needs, so the added weight of the
shielding does not decrease utility.
The baseline cost-utility tradespace is valuable to decision-makers during front-end design as it
enables cost-benefit analysis across 768 concepts-avoiding the limits of local point solutions-
and, most fundamentally, maps the decision-maker preference structure to the design space.
However, the tradespace dimensions are of limited applicability to a survivability analysis of a
space tug. The shielding design variable is shown to only add cost and/or reduce utility in this
representation, meaning that every perturbation off of one of the baseline 128 designs (i.e., full-
factorial of first three design variables in Table 5-4) is dominated. Given that survivability
features may add value to the space tug in the presence of disturbances-and given the problems
associated with incorporating "-ilities" such as survivability as an attribute within multi-attribute
utility functions-additional axes for survivability metrics must be added to the tradespace for a
decision-maker to have an integrated perspective of cost, performance, and survivability.
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Figure 5-7. Static MATE Tradespace with Five Degrees of Freedom
Figure 5-7 provides an experimental survivability tradespace representation featuring five
dimensions of data. Each design is characterized by location, shade, size and cluster. As in
Figure 5-6, location specifies cost and utility. Shade specifies the probability of no bumper
shielding penetration by orbital debris over the ten-year mission life. Size is proportional to the
mass of the space tug and each linked cluster identifies a group of homogeneous space tugs
which vary only by different levels of shielding. The impact of shielding on the cost, utility, and
survivability of each baseline space tug design (n=128 before the six levels of shielding are
introduced as a factor) may be directly observed. As increasing levels of shielding are added
within a given cluster, cost increases, design utility decreases (usually), and the probability of
sustaining mission for ten years increases. Without violating any axioms in utility theory or
hiding/abstracting information from decision-makers, explicit tradeoffs may be made between
the mission performance and survivability of candidate designs.
The metric for survivability in Figure 5-7 is the probability that debris does not penetrate the
space tug shield over the ten-year mission life. This probability is computed by (1) estimating an
effective bumper shield thickness from the shield mass in the design vector and the geometry of
the design; (2), calculate the maximum size particle that the shield can withstand, and (3) using
the debris distribution information and the geometry of the vehicle to calculate the probability of
an impact with a particle of greater size, which is assumed to destroy the vehicle.
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The results showed (not surprisingly) that small vehicles had low risk even with minimal
shielding, while larger vehicles had some risk that was improved by adding shielding mass.
Figure 5-7 illustrates the varying impact of shielding in different regions of the tradespace.
High-cost, high-mass designs (towards the right on the chart, and represented by larger dots)
clearly become more survivable as shielding is added (shown by the darkening of the dots).
These improvements are obtained with a modest and consistent increase in cost (basically, the
cost to build and launch the shield structure), and a modest, or in many cases zero, loss of design
utility. Improvements in survivability are less pronounced for lower-cost, lower-mass designs
(shade darkens only slightly, often in the first increment of shielding). For these low-mass space
tugs, the added dry mass has a severe negative effect on utility as AV capability drops. The
implication here is that there is a reduced benefit for smaller space tug vehicles to shield, at least
beyond a minimal level, and there is a high cost. This makes intuitive sense as small, low-cost
space tugs will have a smaller exposed cross-sectional area (reducing probability of collision)
and will also incur proportionately larger AV penalties for shielding mass. For these lower-cost
assets, survivability might be better addressed with a portfolio approach to risk management.
Given ongoing debates on the value of an operationally responsive space paradigm (Section
8.3.6), these tradespaces may serve as a construct for evaluating expensive, high-capability
spacecraft and lower-cost, low-capability, distributed space systems.
By making tradeoffs between cost, performance, and survivability explicit, the multi-
dimensional tradespaces introduced in this section provide a framework for exploring a large set
of alternative space tug architectures. While judgments of value are inherently subjective and
left to decision-makers, application of MATE will enhance the discovery of these "best" designs.
This approach shows that the consideration of survivability may drive the choice of "best"
designs to be different from selecting Pareto-optimal designs since these solutions are generally
less survivable.
5.2.4. Key Insights
Adding survivability to the trade study of space tug vehicles exposed many strengths and
weaknesses of the static MATE methodology. At the outset, it was found that survivability does
not fit the definition of an independent system attribute (since survivability reflects the ability to
maintain performance across the attributes with time and conditions); thus, survivability cannot
be combined with other attributes into a multi-attribute utility function or other single selection
criteria. Perhaps, more importantly, is the knowledge of the tradespace generated by the method
and presented to a decision-maker. In the test case, the knowledge of where to apply passive
hardening (e.g., not to small vehicles) and the modest pay-off of passive methods even for large
vehicles was illustrated rapidly. The complex trade-offs involved are still difficult to visualize,
but by using various graphical methods and looking for root causes for observed trends, the
knowledge necessary for reasonable upfront decisions can be gained. This clarification of, and
extraction of knowledge from, the analyzed tradespace is the essence of tradespace exploration,
so in this sense the test case was a successful illustration of MATE.
Revisiting the set of five desirable criteria for the survivability test cases shows mixed results for
the static MATE computer experiment. First, it is shown that the baseline cost-utility tradespace
may be readily extended to incorporate survivability as an active trade in the decision-making
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process. This is an improvement from the cost-exchange ratios which do not allow such
integrated trades. Unfortunately, no improvements are made vis-a-vis cost-exchange ratios on
the second and third criteria. The lifecycle dynamics of survivability are not internalized as a
fixed probability value is used to summarize survivability performance over the entire
operational life. Path-dependent system vulnerability is also not considered given the
assumption of binary system states. Fourth, the MATE methodology is amenable to the
evaluation of systems at the architecture level. However, only satellite-level trades are
demonstrated in this test case. Fifth, the use of multi-attribute utility succeeds in providing a
value-centric assessment.
In summary, the second test case demonstrated that existing probabilistic conceptualizations of
survivability may be readily incorporated into the static MATE methodology. However, the
unsatisfied criteria (of incorporating lifecycle dynamics and internalizing path dependencies)
inform opportunities to extend and customize the MATE approach for improved survivability
assessments.
5.3. Test Case #3: MATE for Survivability
The third test case for examining how survivability can be quantified and used as a decision
metric in tradespace studies builds directly on the second test case. Recognizing that the existing
survivability metrics (e.g., probability of shield penetration) and tradespace methodologies (e.g.,
static MATE) fail to assess survivability as a dynamic, continuous, and path-dependent system
property, the new survivability metrics of time-weighted average utility loss and threshold
availability are operationalized in a dynamic MATE study. As introduced in Chapter 3, the
metrics are based on a characterization of survivability as the ability of a system to meet required
levels of value delivery during nominal and perturbed environmental conditions. To illustrate
how time-weighted average utility loss and threshold availability might be utilized in trade study,
the space tug tradespace is revisited and expanded to include susceptibility reduction,
vulnerability reduction, and resilience enhancement features. In particular, integrated cost,
performance, and survivability trades are performed for space tug vehicles incorporating bumper
shielding (Lai, Murad and McNeil 2002), collision avoidance (Klinkrad 2006), and on-orbit
servicing (Long, Richards and Hastings 2007) to mitigate the impact of orbital debris.
The modeling approach for applying the survivability metrics consists of four aspects: (1) static
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration, (2) Epoch-Era analysis (Ross and Rhodes 2008), (3)
stochastic simulation of space tug operation, and (4) Monte Carlo analysis. First, the legacy
MATE study on space tug vehicles is extended to incorporate a broader set of survivability
enhancement features. Second, Epoch-Era Analysis is performed in which satellite lifetimes
(i.e., eras) are modeled as sets of discrete time periods with fixed contexts and needs (i.e.,
epochs). Applying techniques from network analysis, static tradespaces from MATE are linked
over time wherein nodes represent satellite configurations and arcs represent satellite state
transitions. System eras for the candidate space tug designs are modeled by stringing together
representative sequences of baseline (i.e., ambient environment) and disturbance epochs (i.e.,
debris conjunction events).32 Third, a stochastic simulation of space tug operations is performed
32 Given the focus on survivability in this paper, the only changes across Epoch boundaries in the space tug model
are finite-duration disturbance events in the environment (i.e., debris impacts) and changing stakeholder
expectations (i.e., short-term relaxation of stakeholder expectations during disturbance and recovery Epochs). When
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in which debris impacts are modeled as forced transitions of space tugs in the tradespace to lower
utility designs (or end-of-life states). Each run of the simulation produces a utility trajectory
(i.e., a plot of multi-attribute utility over time) for a candidate space tug in the tradespace.
Fourth, a Monte Carlo analysis is performed across the stochastic, path-dependent utility
trajectories, and the survivability metrics are applied.
This section follows the general format of the previous two test cases. Following a description
of how active survivability strategies are incorporated into the design vector, the software
architecture of the dynamic space tug model is summarized and survivability metrics (including
both existing and new) are applied to a series of experimental tradespaces. Local response
surfaces are drawn to illustrate the impact of the survivability features in each region of the
tradespace. After demonstrating the ability of the metrics to discriminate among the varying
survivability of design alternatives and how to incorporate the metrics into traditional cost-utility
tradespaces, key insights of the test case are discussed.
5.3.1. Addition of Active Survivability to Space Tug Design Vector
Building on both the baseline space tug trade study and second test case that investigated only
passive bumper shielding, the dynamic MATE model presented in this section incorporates
passive and active survivability strategies into the tradespace.
Table 5-5. Space Tug Design Options (n=2560)
Design Variables
Manipulator M ss Propulsion Type Fuel Load(kg) Shield Mass Servicin Collision Avoidance
Low (300kg) Storable bi-prop 30 I 30 no no
Medium (1000kg) Cryogenic bi-prop 100 j 100 yes I
High (3000 kg) Electric (NSTAR) 300 300
Extreme (5000 kg) Nuclear Thermal 600 I 500
1200 1000 survivability features
3000 -- - -----------------
10000
30000
While the baseline MATE study focused on trades among the efficiency and response time of the
propulsion system, grappling capability, and cost, the addition of survivability features to the
design space introduces new trades between cost, design utility (i.e., utility achieved under
nominal conditions at beginning-of-life), and survivability. Table 5-5 depicts the six design
variables used to specify a given design vector (i.e., design alternative), including three variables
for survivability features. Each of the three variables is intended to drive a particular type of
survivability. For Type I survivability, susceptibility reduction is achieved through active
collision avoidance of cataloged debris objects. Susceptibility is also reduced by selecting
design vectors of small spacecraft (which will have smaller exposed cross-sectional areas to the
debris flux). For Type II survivability, vulnerability is reduced by selecting higher levels of
bumper shielding. In addition, vulnerability may also be reduced by selecting space tugs of
higher capability-potentially providing margin to degradation losses. For Type III
focused on survivability, transitions in a dynamic MATE study primarily comprise (1) forced transitions to lower
utility states during disturbance events and (2) transitions to higher utility states during recovery.
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survivability, resilience may be enhanced by paying an upfront insurance fee for on-orbit
servicing and repair in the event of non-catastrophic debris impacts.
5.3.2. Implementation of Dynamic Model
Figure 5-8 provides a high-level perspective of how the space tug survivability model is
implemented over seven general steps. First, 2560 space tugs designs are defined through a full-
factorial sampling of the six enumerated design variables.
>1mm debris flux
(ORDEM2000)
0 conjunction event generator
designs
Space Tug
Model
Design Lifecycle
Utility \ / Cost
Survivability
Architecture Tradespace
-------mmmm---
G r -------------~c~~,events 500 Monte Carlo6 e t runs per satellite
hit hit hit
sericej service
utility
statistics on
Monte Carlo runs
,t
Figure 5-8. Overview of Dynamic Space Tug Model
Second, the static space tug model and multi-attribute utility function are used to assess the
lifecycle cost and design utility of each design vector. After imposing dry mass and cost
penalties for the shielding (variable mass penalty as specified by design variable), servicing
($100 million dollar insurance fee and 50 kg docking ring) (McVey 2002), and warning service
for active collision avoidance (assumed fee of 5% of baseline space tug cost), the legacy model
calculates the lifecycle cost and design utility of the expanded design vector.
Third, conjunction events-defined here as the passage of debris object greater than 1 mm in
diameter within 25 meters of the satellite-are generated according to a Poisson process where
the arrival rate is determined by the debris flux. Assuming that the space tugs are launched in
2009 to a 800 km circular orbit at a 42.60 inclination (a relatively populated region of LEO), the
orbital debris flux is extracted from NASA's ORDEM2000 model. Flux is assumed isotropic
and constant over the ten-year operational life.
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Fourth, given a conjunction event, the baseline susceptibility of each satellite to a debris hit is
computed as the ratio of the satellite cross-sectional area to the cross-sectional area of the
conjunction sphere. Figure 5-9 shows a histogram of the probability of a hit given a conjunction
event for all candidate space tug designs.
Baseline Susceptibility Across the Tradespace
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Figure 5-9. Conjunction Outcomes
Fifth, given a hit, the probability of an encounter with one of three possible sizes of debris is
computed: (1) a small debris impact, (2) a medium debris impact, or (3) a large debris impact.
(Debris of <1mm diameter are termed micro and are assumed to have no impact on system
functionality.) Table 5-6 enumerates the impact outcomes as reported in Remo (2005) as well as
the modeling assumptions made regarding the degradation of a space tug design for a given size
impact. The modeling of damage due to impact is a complex subject depending both on the
debris and the spacecraft being impacted. As this is a conceptual design study with limited
characterizations of the debris and spacecraft, the damage assumptions are coarse. The energies
involved in large debris impacts (>10 cm) are so great that it is unlikely that any spacecraft
would survive (Hastings and Garrett 1996). Conversely, when encountering debris smaller than
1mm, spacecraft without dedicated shielding experience limited degradation. For modeling
simplicity, these micro impacts are not considered. The effect of medium impacts will depend
on which part of the spacecraft is hit. Regardless of where the impact occurs, some spacecraft
capability will be lost. Since spacecraft behavior is modeled in terms of capability, the effect of
impact is represented as a reduction in space tug capability level.
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Table 5-6. Debris Impact Outcomes
While the probability of encounters with micro and large debris objects are constant for a given
exposed cross-sectional area, the probability of encounters with small and medium debris objects
varies relative to the maximum debris size impact that can be sustained by the bumper shielding
of a given space tug without deflection, rupture, or spalling. (As discussed in detail in Section
5.2.2, the size of objects large enough to penetrate the bumper shield varies based upon the
thickness of the shield, which in turn depends on the shield mass and satellite body area. Using
an empirically-derived bumper shield model, empirically-derived relationships for relating debris
diameter to debris mass, and assuming the approximate average orbital relative velocity in
ORDEM2000 of 7 km/s, the maximum debris diameter for a small hit is computed.) Table 5-6
illustrates this variable threshold as x cm, meaning that an impact by a debris particle <x cm will
not penetrate the shield. However, assuming that the shield covers the leading edge +450 and
surfaces 90' to the ram direction, there is an approximately 10% chance that impact occurs on an
unshielded portion of the spacecraft (Wertz and Larson 1999). Therefore, hits by small debris
are assumed to penetrate the spacecraft 10% of the time, reducing the space tug capability level.
Finally, given the three critical debris diameter thresholds of 1 mm, x cm, and 10 cm for each
satellite, and using the spatial density of debris of those diameters in ORDEM2000 (Figure
5-10), the cumulative probability that the intercepting particle of debris falls into each of the
debris size bins is computed.
117
debris 1 mm -x cm- 10 cm
diameter micro small medium large
impact severe
outcome degradation damage satellite lossoutcome damage
end-of-life /10% chance end-of-lifemodelingof loss in loss in collisionof loss inassumption no impact capability avoidance
capability level with 99%(7 km/s) levelevel with 99%
success
Debris Spatial Density (800 km circular, i=42.62)
10
10-10
10-3 102 10-1  100 101 102
debris size (cm)
Figure 5-10. Spatial Density of Debris
Because the outcome of a conjunction event is probabilistic and path-dependent in nature, a
Monte Carlo analysis is performed over the sixth step. The ten-year operational life of each
space tug is simulated 500 times to generate a diverse range of possible utility trajectories. 33
While AV expenditures from normal mission operations slowly degrade capability (at a rate of
1/15 of the AV budget per year), the most significant drivers of utility change are debris impact
events and servicing. For each conjunction in a given run of the simulation, the probability of an
encounter with a given type of debris is used to probabilistically insert disturbance epochs of
small, medium, and large debris encounters. The implications of a given encounter may be
uneventful, non-catastrophic (utility degradation), or catastrophic (U=O for the remainder of the
10-year period). In the event of an encounter with a large debris object, space tugs that did not
invest in collision avoidance are catastrophically impacted while those tugs investing in
avoidance are able to maneuver away from these cataloged objects with 99% success (Klinkrad
2006). In the event of a medium encounter, the debris object is too small to track (and hence
avoid) but too large to completely shield. Space tug degradation from this penetrating impact is
modeled as a forced transition in the tradespace network whereby the grappling capability design
variable of the space tug is reduced by one discrete level. For example, if a space tug with "low"
grappling capability (U=.3) is subjected to a non-catastrophic hit, grappling capability drops to
"none" (U=.O), a minimalistic operational state in which no utility is derived from grappling.
For those design vectors including a servicing option, an on-orbit repair is attempted following a
non-catastrophic hit. Successful servicing missions restore grappling capability to the original
(baseline) level in the design vector. (A given servicing mission is assumed to have a 70%
success rate. Response times are lognormally distributed with a mean of six months and a
33 See Section 6.6.4 for a general discussion on determining the appropriate number of Monte Carlo trials in a
convergence study.
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standard deviation of a year.) In the event of an encounter with a small debris object, any debris
hitting the bumper shield is stopped. However, as bumper shielding does not completely cover
the satellite (as it is concentrated around the most susceptible and vulnerable regions), a 10%
probability of non-catastrophic impact is assumed.
Having sampled 500 utility trajectories over the distribution of possible impact and recovery
sequences for each of the 2560 space tug designs, summary statistics are collected in the seventh
and final step of the model to measure trends in lifecycle survivability. These statistics include
the existing and proposed metrics of survivability discussed in the following section.
5.3.3. Tradespace Analysis
This section presents the results of the dynamic MATE analysis. After showing the impact of
the survivability features on the baseline tradespace, results from the dynamic state
characterization of space tug designs are shown. These results include sample utility trajectories,
application of the survivability metrics within the baseline tradespace, and the introduction of a
new survivability tradespace that allows integrated trades to be made among cost, performance,
and survivability. The section concludes with a response surface analysis of each survivability
feature-investigating the impact of shielding, collision avoidance, and servicing on each space
tug design.
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Figure 5-11. Baseline Space Tug Tradespace
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While the second test case added 6 possible combinations of survivability features for each of the
design alternatives in the baseline set of 128 design vectors, this test case adds 20 combinations.
Figure 5-11 depicts the new space tug tradespace of 2560 design alternatives. During normal
operating conditions, space tug utility is affected negatively by the addition of survivability
features which only add cost and reduce AV capability. As discussed in the previous test case,
the baseline tradespace dimensions are of limited applicability since all designs incorporating
survivability are dominated solutions in this representation.
Utility Trajectory
5
time (years)
Vx
10 V10 e
Figure 5-12. Sample Utility Trajectory
As discussed in Chapter 3, survivability is an emergent system property which may be defined as
the ability of a system to maintain value delivery within stakeholder-defined thresholds over the
lifecycle of a disturbance. The dynamic space tug model operationalizes this definition by
generating utility trajectories of alternative designs in the presence of orbital debris events.
Figure 5-12 presents a sample utility trajectory output from the model, illustrating V(t) (i.e.,
dynamic multi-attribute utility) over a possible 10-year operational life. Following normal
degradation during the first 18 months of operation (modeled as nominal AV expenditures), two
non-catastrophic debris impacts occur in quick succession during the latter part of the second
year. Due to the reduction in expectations from Vx to Ve for a year following the first impact
(and renewed following the second impact), V(t) does not pass below the value threshold. The
first debris impact prompts a request for servicing that is successfully filled during the second
year. A similar sequence of events-consecutive debris hits followed by successful servicing-
occurs between the third and fifth years. In both cases, large quantities of utility are lost while
critical value thresholds are met.
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Figure 5-13. Sample Utility Trajectory Outputs from Design Vectors 19 and 1137
Figure 5-13 depicts six more sample utility trajectories. The top row illustrates the outcomes
from three Monte Carlo runs of design vector 19, DV(19), and the lower row illustrates three
runs of DV(1137). The cell in the upper left depicts the most common utility trajectory output
from the model: slight utility degradation over time without any debris impacts. While the
middle upper cell shows DV(19) receiving (and recovering from) two non-catastrophic debris
impacts, the upper right cell shows the mission ending prematurely at year five from a
catastrophic impact. Similar erratic utility trajectories are observed across the lower row.
Interestingly, while both run 3 (bottom left) and run 426 (bottom right) of DV(1137) reveal an
active space tug at end-of-life, both spend at least a year below V due to failed and delayed
servicing operations, respectively.
As survivability is a stochastic, path-dependent property, the outcome of any particular run for a
given design vector is not necessarily representative or meaningful from a decision-making
perspective. Rather, each utility trajectory constitutes one data sample from a continuous
distribution of potential system lifecycles. Furthermore, there is a need to distinguish across
collections of utility trajectories of different design vectors (e.g., illustrated by rows in Figure
5-13). However, observing all 128,000 utility trajectories-500 runs of each of the 2560 design
vectors-is not practical from a decision-making perspective. Therefore, the survivability
metrics introduced in Chapter 3-(tie-weighted average utilitysutility loss and threshold
avaiabilitgure 5-13 d-are applied as aggregate measures for each set of space tug utility trajectories.
availability--are applied as aggregate measures for each set of space tug utility trajectories.
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Figure 5-14. Distributions of Time-Weighted Average Utility
Figure 5-14 depicts the distributions of time-weighted average utility achieved by 20% of the
design vectors over 500 Monte Carlo runs. (A random sample of 20% was selected to aid in
information visualization.) Each column of identically-shaded points represents the distribution
of time-weighted average utility for a single space tug design vector. To organize the data, the
columns are ordered along the horizontal axis in terms of design utility-the deterministic
beginning-of-life utility (Vo) achieved by a space tug before stochastic losses accrue from normal
degradation and orbital debris. The design utility here is equivalent to the utility axis in the
baseline tradespace (Figure 5-11). A 450 line is also drawn to show the maximum time-weighted
average utility value achievable.
The results are illuminating, showing a consistent pattern of highly-skewed distributions towards
design utility. The histogram of DV(2541) in Figure 5-14 is displayed as a representative
distribution of the highly-skewed behavior of time-weighted average utility across simulation
runs. One interesting trend observed is the general regression of maximum time-weighed
average utility values from Vo for space tugs as design utility increases. This is due to both the
increased susceptibility of larger (and generally higher-utility) space tug vehicles to orbital debris
and to the lower AV margins of the more massive space tug vehicles. (Given the full-factorial
enumeration of design vectors, tradespace artifacts, such as the paring of low fuel mass with
high-capability tugs, may result.) An additional behavior across the distributions is the presence
of maximum time-weighted average utility outliers (in which no losses or degradation are
observed vis-a-vis the design utility line) beginning around design utility values of 0.7. These
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outliers are attributed to simulation runs of high-capability electric propulsion space tug designs
that were set with excessive AV margins and that did not suffer from orbital debris impacts.
The highly-skewed, long-tailed nature of the distributions of time-weighted average utility across
simulation runs was also observed for the distributions of threshold availability. Figure 5-15
shows the output from DV(2541) utility trajectories as a sample distribution.
Threshold Availability - Design 2541 (n=500)
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Figure 5-15. Sample Distribution of Threshold Availability
Having generated a data set of utility trajectories and having applied two new measures of
lifecycle survivability, the new metrics are compared to existing survivability metrics and
integrated with measures of cost and design utility.
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Figure 5-16. Application of Survivability Metrics to Baseline Tradespace
Figure 5-16 presents four separate survivability tradespaces, each incorporating one of four
different survivability metrics to the baseline cost-utility tradespace in Figure 5-11. The top two
tradespaces apply existing static conceptualizations of survivability while the bottom two
tradespaces apply the proposed dynamic measures of survivability. Each survivability metric is
depicted in shade (i.e., darker means more survivable). In addition, to indicate the varying
susceptibility of small and large space tugs to orbital debris, the size of each point in the
tradespaces is correlated with exposed cross-sectional area.
The results across the four tradespaces vary tremendously, indicating the importance of
understanding and selecting the correct metric or metrics for evaluating system survivability (i.e.,
depending on the metric chosen, very different conclusions may be drawn). The top-left
tradespace, P[no penetration], shades each space tug design by the probability of no debris
penetration over the 10-year operational life. In this representation, lower-cost designs achieve a
high degree of survivability due to their low-susceptibility while the survivability of high-cost
designs fluctuates as a function of shielding and collision avoidance. (Resilience enhancement
strategies, such as servicing, are exogenous to this survivability metric.) The top-right
tradespace, P[U(t=-10)>0], is shaded by the probability of a non-zero utility (i.e., operational)
space tug at end-of-life. Here, the high survivability of lower-cost designs is again observed.
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The survivability of high cost designs varies considerably as a function of all three survivability
features.
The bottom-left tradespace in Figure 5-16, time-weighted average utility-5th percentile, shades
each point by the level of time-weighted average utility achieved by 95% of the simulation runs
of that design vector. For example, a value of 0.53 for time-weighted average utility-5th
percentile means that 95% of the simulation runs of that design vector achieved a time-weighted
average utility of at least 0.53. (Rather than use a potentially misleading measure of central
tendency such as average for the highly-skewed distributions, aggregate simulation results for
time-weighted average utility and threshold availability are reported as percentiles.) The results
here are naturally correlated with design utility. Many designs deemed survivable by this metric
are found in the interior of the traditional cost-utility Pareto front. Interestingly, clusters of space
tugs (varying only by survivability design variables) are observed where there is a non-
monotonic relationship between adding levels of survivability features (indicated by rising costs)
and time-weighted average utility. The bottom-right tradespace, threshold availability-5 th
percentile, shades each point by the proportion of time over the 10-year operational life spent
above the critical value threshold. (As illustrated in Figure 5-13 and discussed in Chapter 3, this
threshold varies depending on environmental context.) In contrast to time-weighted average
utility, threshold availability generally rises as survivability features are added to each space tug.
Threshold availability also appears to be sensitive to space tug size as smaller, less-susceptible
designs achieve higher availability than their larger counterparts. Exceptions to these trends are
also observed, including the low-availability of the extremely low-cost designs due to their tight
performance margins.
The four tradespaces shown in Figure 5-16 present four conflicting (yet interdependent)
perspectives regarding the survivability of the 2560 candidate space tug designs. Each
tradespace presents useful information to the decision-maker. However, there is a need to
aggregate the information to allow integrated tradeoffs among other decision metrics for cost,
performance, schedule, and risk. While the upper two tradespaces communicate the relative
survivability of designs based on binary calculations of survivability, the two lower tradespaces
are based upon the definition of survivability as a continuous, stochastic, and path-dependent
property that is assessed over the entire operational life. Therefore, in order to incorporate all of
the information contained in the utility trajectories (rather than small samples of the data such as
the utility state at end-of-life), the next two tradespaces focus on applying the new survivability
metrics.
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Figure 5-17. Survivability "Tear" Tradespace l- Space Tug
To address the need for trading lifecycle cost, performance, and survivability of design
alternatives, Figure 5-17 introduces a survivability "tear(drop)" tradespace representation. (Use
of the wloss for " is meant to describe regret associated with system utility loss.) The purpose
of the survivability tear tradespace is to integrate deterministic cost and design utility data with
the distributions of time-weighted average utility loss and threshold availability. Preserving the
cost and design utility axes of the baseline tradespace, the new survivability metrics are
integrated using shade (threshold availability-5gur percentile) 5-17, such a line drawn to the median time-
weighted average utility. By definition (see Section 3.3.2), the length of this line is the median
time-weighted utility loss across the 500 utility trajectories for each space tug design. Rather
than the 95t" percentile, the median is selected for summarizing the distribution of time-weighted
utility loss for two reasons: (1) ease of visualization for this particular data set by shortening the
length of utility loss tails (from 95 th to 50 th percentile) and (2) recognition that decision-makers
are likely to be more risk-averse regarding threshold availability (a construct for measuring
assured access to some level of minimum capability) than time-weighted average utility (a
construct for assessing degree of degradation).
Some interesting trends can be observed in Figure 5-17, such as the poor performance of very
low-cost and very expensive designs in terms of threshold availability (due to low-performance
margins and high-susceptibility, respectively). Irregular reductions in utility loss can be
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observed as survivability features are added to clusters of baseline space tug designs. Smaller
utility losses appear to occur in the lower-cost (smaller), lower-susceptibility region of the
tradespace. Unfortunately, one consequence of tagging each of the 2560 design alternatives with
four data attributes is that Figure 5-17 becomes very concentrated and difficult to interpret.
Pareto Efficient Set for Cost, Utility, Utility Loss and Threshold Availability (n=594)
1
0.9
0.8 r
CDC
=rT
0.7 0
0.
0.6 W
0)
0.5=
0.4
CD
0.3 CD
3
-J -045002000 2500
cost ($M)
Figure 5-18. Four-Dimensional Pareto Surface of Survivability Tear Tradespace
Figure 5-18 reduces the concentration of Figure 5-17 by filtering the 2560 designs for Pareto-
optimality over the four decision metrics: cost, design utility, median time-weighted utility loss,
and threshold availability. When considering the tradespace in four dimensions, the surface of
Pareto efficient designs contains three individual Pareto sets (as determined by a projection onto
the cost-utility, cost-availability, cost-utility loss planes) as well as other points that would not
project onto any of these two-dimensional surfaces. These other points exist at the tradeoffs
among design utility, threshold availability, and time-weighted utility loss for the decision-maker
and represent "compromise" value solutions.
Counterintuitively, as decision metric axes are added to filter for Pareto-efficiency, more designs
will remain after filtering in the survivability "tear" tradespace. This is because as each axis is
added, a new two-dimensional Pareto front is created with a new set of projected compromise
solutions. For example, a cost-utility filter applied to Figure 5-17 leads to 111 Pareto-efficient
designs while a cost-utility-utility loss filter leads to 279 Pareto-efficient designs. As a fourth
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metric is added for filtering (as in Figure 5-18), 594 designs are deemed Pareto-efficient. This
growth of Pareto-efficient designs as decision metrics are added is analogous to the multi-
stakeholder problem in utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa 1993).
One implication of filtering over the four decision metrics is that several interior designs become
Pareto-efficient based upon their superior performance in terms of survivability. Rather than
only allowing the selection of designs dominant in terms of cost and utility at beginning-of-life,
the filtered survivability tear tradespace presents alternative designs that may offer superior
performance over a lifecycle of disturbances.
Having filtered the tradespace, it is now possible to conduct trades among designs along the four-
dimensional Pareto surface. For example, Table 5-7 lists the design variable settings and
performance parameters for five design vectors circled in Figure 5-18. In the $400-600M range,
the nuclear DV(424) is optimized in terms of cost and design utility while the electric DV(1205)
is slightly dominated in terms of cost and design utility but with a 68% improvement in 5th-
percentile threshold availability. As an example in the $2.5-3B range, DV(1744) is similar to
DV(2535) in cost and design utility but requires a tremendous sacrifice in survivability (i.e., 0.43
rather than 0.06 median utility loss and a 0.76 difference in threshold availability). As an
extreme case of high-survivability, the characteristics of DV(2417) are also shown. As indicated
in Figure 5-18, all five design are located along the four-dimensional Pareto surface.
Table 5-7. Characteristics of Circled Design Vectors in Figure 5-18
Design Vector ID 424 1205 1744 2535 2417
Manipulator Capability Low Medium High Extreme Extreme
Propulsion System Nuclear Electric Nuclear Electric Electric
Propellant Mass (kg) 3000 1200 30000 10000 30
Shield Mass (kg) 30 100 30 500 1000
Avoidance Passive Active Passive Passive Active
Serviceable No Yes No Yes Yes
Cost ($M) 439.1 577.6 2815 2607 2079
Design Utility 0.79 0.77 0.97 0.90 0.31
Median Utility Loss 0.13 0.11 0.43 0.06 0.02
Threshold Availability (5%) 0.32 1.0 0.24 1.0 1.0
The results in Figure 5-18 and Table 5-7 demonstrate two key benefits of the survivability tear
tradespace analysis: screening and down-selecting among thousands of design alternatives with
survivability as an explicit decision criterion. Interestingly, most of the designs in the cost-utility
Pareto front have much lower threshold availability-and considerably higher utility loss-than
interior designs while several of the highly-survivable space tugs are only slightly dominated in
terms of cost and design utility.
Having introduced a survivability "tear" tradespace for enabling integrated trades to be made
across alternative concepts in terms of cost, performance, and survivability, the impact of each of
the three survivability design variables on the survivability of each of the 128 baseline designs
(i.e., full-factorial of first three, non-survivability design variables in Table 5-5) is now
examined. This analysis may be used for maximizing the survivability of an individual satellite
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(if a baseline design concept has already been selected) as well as for investigating the overall
sensitivity of the satellite tradespace to various survivability enhancement features.
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Figure 5-19. Survivability Response Surfaces - 128 Baseline Designs
Figure 5-19 plots survivability response surfaces for each of the baseline designs. Each design
point is located in terms of cost and average time-weighted average utility 34 and shaded by 5th
percentile threshold availability. Linked clusters (labeled 1 through 128) indicate a common
baseline space tug of fixed manipulator mass, propulsion type, and fuel load. The impact of
survivability features is evaluated by finding the lowest-cost inverted triangle in each cluster to
identify the baseline space tug design (which incorporates only 30 kg of shielding and no
avoidance or servicing). Then, the response surfaces for shielding, servicing, and avoidance may
be identified by examining the solid black, dashed red, and dashed green lines, respectively.
Designs incorporating no servicing are represented with three-sided shapes (i.e., as triangles for
designs with avoidance and as inverted triangles for designs with no avoidance) while designs
that do incorporate servicing are represented as four-sided shapes (i.e., as squares for designs
with avoidance and as diamonds for designs with no avoidance).
34 Time-weighted average utility is the average across a single trajectory while average time-weighted average utility
is the average of this value across the set of 500 Monte Carlo trials. As the response surface plots are drawn to
reveal causal relationships, average is used in place of median for reporting time-weighted average utility to
accentuate variance in survivability outcomes.
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Interesting trends may be indentified in the (relatively) sparse, high-cost region of Figure 5-19.
For example, increasing the shielding appears to increase threshold availability as shielding mass
is increased, while average utility benefits only from the initial increases in shield mass.
Avoidance appears to have no statistically significant impact across the 500 runs (as availability
is constant and average utility fluctuates slightly up or down). Servicing has a very positive
impact on both survivability metrics in this region of the tradespace. Unfortunately, it is hard to
extract survivability response surface trends across this display of the entire tradespace given the
density of clusters in lower-cost regions.
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Figure 5-20. Variation in Survivability Response Surfaces
To compare survivability response surfaces in different regions of the tradespace, Figure 5-20
magnifies five low-cost designs and one high-cost design from Figure 5-19. While the width and
height of each magnification is conserved to enable comparison, the cost and average utility axes
are necessarily different. At this higher resolution, the impact of shielding, avoidance, and
servicing on both individual tug designs and different regions of the tradespace can be better
observed. Table 5-8 shows the baseline design variable settings for each of the design vectors
displayed in Figure 5-20.
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Table 5-8. Characteristics of Baseline Design Vectors in Figure 5-20
Baseline Design Vector ID 5 27 29 62 120
Manipulator Capability Low Low Low Medium Extreme
Propulsion System Bi-prop Electric Electric Electric Nuclear
Propellant Mass (kg) 1200 300 1200 3000 30000
The impact of shielding on average utility and threshold availability is very different across these
regions of the tradespace. For baseline design number 5, BD(5), shielding has a negative impact
on both cost and average utility while providing no appreciable gains in threshold availability.
This is also true of BD(27). The shielding impact on BD(5) and BD(27) stands in stark contrast
to BD(120) where the first two increases in shielding mass result in large increases in average
utility and threshold availability at only marginal increases in cost. However, after the first two
increases in shielding mass in BD(120), survivability benefits diminish while dry mass penalties
accumulate. BD(29) and BD(62) represent intermediate cases where the first increase in
shielding mass (from 30 to 100 kg) yields slight improvements in average utility and threshold
availability before negative returns occur at 300 kg of shielding.
Avoidance does not have much of an impact on survivability in either region of the tradespace.
The only general trend observed is the assumed 5% cost penalty associated with incorporating
active collision avoidance. Indeed, some designs even occasionally show losses in average
utility for incorporating active collision avoidance (despite the fact that, as modeled, avoidance
can only improve utility trajectories). The limited impact of avoidance is due to the fact that
detectable debris encounters (assumed to be >10 cm in diameter) are extremely rare events.
Therefore, the avoidance response surface is horizontal to account for the cost penalty while
slight, vertical fluctuations may be attributed to random variation over the 500 Monte Carlo
trials.
Unlike shielding and avoidance, servicing has a positive impact on average utility and threshold
availability across the tradespace. The impact is not uniform, however, as BD(120) (with its
higher exposed cross-sectional area) is more susceptible to debris impacts. This space tug is
much more likely to experience multiple, non-catastrophic debris impacts over its operational
life and therefore benefit substantially from servicing (increasing average utility approximately
25%). Servicing has a smaller positive impact on the lower-end designs, particularly in terms of
threshold availability.
5.3.4. Key Insights
The process of developing survivability metrics and applying them within the dynamic
survivability model yielded several insights for the space tug tradespace. In terms of space tug
survivability, one interesting result is the criticality of the inherent survivability derived from the
baseline design vector (before incorporating survivability design variables). For example,
selecting baseline tugs with smaller cross-sectional areas has a much greater impact on
susceptibility reduction than active collision avoidance. Similarly, increasing grappling
capability margin has a greater impact on reducing vulnerability than bumper shielding. Another
modeling insight is the extreme sensitivity of the results to the damage model for small- and
medium-sized impacts (for which limited empirical data exist). Of all the results, Figure 5-18 is
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the most interesting from a decision-making perspective as it reveals that the cost-utility Pareto-
optimal designs exhibit poor survivability while many highly survivable designs are only slightly
dominated in terms of cost and utility.
The customized MATE methodology pursued in the third test case performs well against the five
desirable criteria for survivability tradespace studies. First, through the use of "tear" tradespaces
and survivability responsive surface plots, the methodology allows integrated trades to be made
among cost, performance, and survivability. Second, interactions with the disturbance
environment are incorporated across the entire system lifecycle through a stochastic assessment
of utility trajectories. Third, path-dependencies in system state are tracked in the dynamic
model. Performance against the fourth and fifth criteria remains unchanged from the previous
test case: the methodology is amenable to systems at the architecture level (but only tested at the
satellite level) and the multi-attribute utility enables a value-centric assessment.
In summary, the third test case indicates that the metrics of time-weighted average utility/utility
loss and threshold availability can be applied prescriptively to the evaluation of the survivability
of alternative satellite designs. The metrics are unique but interdependent. As illustrated in
Figure 5-21, high time-weighted average utility implies high threshold availability (although
high threshold availability does not imply high average utility). Taken together, the metrics
serve as powerful discriminators of survivability performance.
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Figure 5-21. Relationship between Time-Weighted Average Utility and Threshold Availability
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5.4. Lessons Learned
This chapter described the process of applying existing and proposed survivability metrics to
both existing and emerging tradespace analysis methodologies. This process was valuable for
obtaining a deeper understanding of the state-of-the practice in survivability analysis (discussed
in Chapter 2) and of the challenges associated with operationalizing the conceptualization of
survivability (proposed in Chapter 3) in tradespace studies.
Table 5-9 summarizes the evaluation of each test case in terms of the five desirable criteria
introduced at the beginning of the chapter. The first test case utilizing cost-exchange ratios
performs well in terms of providing an architectural assessment of space-based missile defense
but only provided relative insights for comparing across designs. However, neither the lifecycle
dynamics of disturbances encounters nor the path dependencies associated with system state are
considered. The second test case attempts to incorporate survivability considerations into the
emerging MATE methodology. While the strengths of MATE are evident in this test case (i.e.,
value-based design approach with clear cost-benefit trades), the static nature of the model allows
only existing, static survivability metrics to be applied to the tradespace. The third test case
builds on the strengths of the second test case while addressing its shortcomings. By following a
dynamic MATE approach and implementing a customized system state model, survivability is
assessed as a dynamic, continuous, and path-dependent system property
Table 5-9. Evaluation of Survivability Test Cases
#2: Multi-Attribute#1: Cost- #3: Customized
Exchange Ratios Expaon Dynamic MATEExploration
Survivability only with relative
Actively Traded costs r urviva bi
survivabiity trades survie bigity trades
Incorporates fstochas i
Lifecycle Dynamics
Internalizes Path pendnt
Dependencies vnerability with
evuate amenable but amenable but
Architectural Scope ation tested only at tested only at
ies system-level system-level
Value-Centric only for relative
tradeoffs amongAssessment evluation cit evaluation cts survivability features
The third test case demonstrates progress towards a new approach to conducting survivability
assessments during early design phases. The survivability metrics of time-weighted average
utility loss and threshold availability are shown to be internally valid and the customized
implementation of dynamic MATE for the space tug system performed satisfactorily against the
five desirable criteria. However, work remains to (1) refine and generalize the dynamic
tradespace approach pursued in the third test case into an integrated methodology and (2)
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demonstrate the prescriptive value of the metrics in trade studies of architectural scope. The
following two chapters address each of these respective challenges.
134
6. Methodology Overview: MATE for Survivability
This chapter addresses the fourth and final research question introduced in Section 1.3.2.
4. For a given space mission, how can alternative system architectures in dynamic
disturbance environments be evaluated in terms of survivability?
While the previous chapter focused on the development and verification of metrics for evaluating
survivability in tradespace studies, this chapter introduces an end-to-end methodology for system
analysts to apply those metrics during conceptual design. In particular, an integrated set of
processes is described for incorporating time-weighted average utility loss and threshold
availability within trade studies. The methodology is termed Multi-Attribute Tradespace
Exploration for Survivability as it builds upon the legacy MATE process (Section 2.2.2).
Phase 1
Define Value Proposition
Phase 3
Characterize Disturbance Environment
Phase 4
a pply Survivability Principles
Phase 6
Phase 7
Apply Survivability Metrics
Relationship to MATE I Phase 8
olvd NExplore Trades andRefine Analysis
Figure 6-1. Phases of Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration for Survivability
The proposed methodology provides system analysts a structured approach for determining how
a system can maintain value delivery across operational environments characterized by
disturbances. Figure 6-1 provides an overview of the eight phases comprising MATE for
Survivability. Arrows illustrate dependencies among the processes, with above diagonal arrows
indicating coupled processes with feedback from subsequent phases. Each box is shaded to
indicate the relationship of the phase to the legacy MATE process. The phases are briefly
described below.
1. Elicit value proposition - Identify mission statement and quantify decision-maker
needs during nominal and emergency states.
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2. Generate concepts - Formulate system concepts that address decision-maker needs.
3. Characterize disturbance environment - Develop concept-neutral models of
disturbances in operational environment of proposed systems.
4. Apply survivability principles - Incorporate susceptibility reduction, vulnerability
reduction, and resilience enhancement strategies into design alternatives.
5. Model baseline system performance - Model and simulate cost and performance of
design alternatives to gain an understanding of how decision-maker needs are met in a
nominal operational environment.
6. Model impact of disturbances on lifecycle performance - Model and simulate
performance of design alternatives across a representative sample of disturbance
encounters to gain an understanding of how decision-maker needs are met in perturbed
environments.
7. Apply survivability metrics - Compute time-weighted average utility loss and
threshold availability for each design alternative as summary statistics for system
performance across representative operational lives.
8. Explore trades and refine analysis - Perform integrated cost, performance, and
survivability trades across design space to identify promising alternatives for more
detailed analysis.
The eight phases of MATE for Survivability follow in sequence but feedback can occur for
Phases 2, 4, 5, and 7. In general, feedback is concentrated on the refinement of system concepts
(in Phases 2 and 4) based on emergent lessons from the tradespace analysis.
In the eight sections that follow, each phase of the methodology is discussed. After providing a
general description and motivation for each phase, specific tasks for each phase are enumerated.
To illustrate the methodology, selected examples from the space tug computer experiment are
provided throughout the chapter. Following the step-by-step description of the tasks, the overall
methodology is summarized in the ninth and final section.
To supplement the introduction to MATE for Survivability provided in this chapter, Appendix E
provides a more detailed description of each of the 29 tasks comprising the methodology. In
particular, the inputs, outputs, and key activities are described for each task.
6.1. Phase 1: Elicit Value Proposition
The first phase of MATE for Survivability is focused on gaining a precise understanding of the
value proposition for the system under analysis. This value proposition will drive the process of
selecting and evaluating design alternatives. Five tasks comprise the first phase: (1.1) develop
mission statement, (1.2) identify decision-maker, (1.3) elicit multi-attribute utility function, (1.4)
specify emergency value threshold(s), and (1.5) specify permitted recovery time(s).
6.1.1. Develop Mission Statement
Developing a mission statement involves identifying the purpose for the creation of the system,
stating the vision for the system development, and establishing boundaries for the system
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concepts to be considered. The goal of defining the mission is to clearly articulate stakeholder
needs and the context in which a system is to be developed.
6.1.2. Identify Decision-maker
As discussed in Ross et al. (2004), MATE formalizes the inclusion of various stakeholders
typically not considered by the design engineer. Depending on the purpose of the MATE study,
these may include external policy stakeholders, organizational stakeholders, and system user
stakeholders. In MATE for Survivability, the identification of a decision-maker is synonymous
with identifying a representative customer stakeholder (which may be separate from end-user
stakeholders) since this stakeholder controls the resources for the system development and is
responsible for providing design requirements. If the system is dominated by multi-stakeholder
considerations, it may be possible to identify a "benevolent dictator" decision-maker who seeks
to create a successful system by balancing competing stakeholder requirements while remaining
within budget.
6.1.3. Elicit Multi-Attribute Utility Function
Following Task 1.2, the system analyst engages with the decision-maker to extract objectives
from the mission statement. Attributes are defined by the decision-maker as quantifiable
parameters for measuring how well decision-maker-defined objectives are met.35 In lieu of fixed
requirements to drive the design process, acceptability ranges for each attribute are elicited
(where the minimally acceptable level becomes a requirement and extra benefit is delivered for
exceeding that level). In order to satisfy the axioms of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (Keeney
and Raiffa 1993), the analyst must ensure that the attribute set is defined by the decision-maker;
including precise definitions for each attribute with units, an acceptability range, and a
monotonic preference for the direction of increasing goodness.
Having agreed to a set of attributes and acceptability ranges, the analyst next elicits the single-
attribute utility functions to assess the amount of benefit provided to the decision-maker for a
particular level of attribute. Utility is an ordinal metric (ranging from 0 to 1) that captures the
preferences of the decision-maker across the acceptable attribute levels in the presence of
uncertainty (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). For systems that have multiple attributes (N)
with varying weights (k;), computing a single scalar value function that fully reflects decision-
maker preferences can be difficult. As a proxy for benefit, the multi-attribute utility function,
U(X), as defined in Keeney and Raiffa (1993), is used to reflect preference orderings.
N
KU(X) +1 = [Kk,U,(X,)+1] for K 0
N (6-1)
or U(X)= U(X,)k, for K =
t=l
N
where K is the solution to K +1= [Kk, +1]; and -1 < K < 1,K 0. (6-2)
i=1
3 Attributes must be complete, operational, decomposable, non-redundant, minimal, and perceived independent
(Keeney and Raiffa 1993).
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The issue of stakeholder value elicitation is core to the MATE process and well-documented in
existing literature. Ross (2003) provides a detailed explanation of the multi-attribute utility
function and a description of recommended techniques for eliciting the single-attribute and
multi-attribute utility functions (i.e., lottery equivalent probability method and comer point
interviews, respectively). To examine the trade-off between rigor and ease of implementation,
Spaulding (2003) discusses the implications of simplifying the elicitation of single-attribute
utility functions using hand-drawn utility curves and linear, risk-averse preference relationships.
6.1.4. Specify Emergency Value Threshold
To incorporate survivability considerations into the need identification phase, it is necessary to
elicit changing decision-maker expectations across disturbance environments. Survivability
emerges from the interaction of a system with its environment over time. Depending on
stakeholder needs, survivability requirements may allow limited periods during which the system
operates in a degraded state, unavailable state, or safe mode (Bayer 2007).
As discussed in Section 3.3.4, one implication of value thresholds changing as a function of the
environment is that the definition and scale of the utility axis will vary across epochs. A general
response to this implication is to elicit applicable multi-attribute utility functions across all
potential epochs from the decision-maker. However, depending on the particular system under
analysis and the decision-maker, it may be possible to assume that the attributes comprising the
utility functions are constant (with variation only in terms of acceptability ranges and scaling of
the single-attribute utility functions). Therefore, the analyst should inquire whether the lower
bounds of attribute acceptability may be temporarily broadened in the presence of finite-duration
disturbances and, if so, the magnitudes associated with that extension.
As in the process of eliciting utility functions during nominal conditions, the process of eliciting
attribute acceptability ranges during disturbance and recovery epochs requires the analyst to
engage in a scenario-based dialogue with the decision-maker (e.g., following the loss of satellite
X before the launch of satellite Y, can you accept a higher maximum acceptable revisit time for
ground targets?). This scenario-based dialogue may help to place the decision-maker in the
proper mindset for the utility interview and help the analyst determine whether different
emergency value thresholds need to be elicited for each disturbance type.
6.1.5. Specify Permitted Recovery Time
Establishing the duration of the emergency value threshold defines the boundaries for system
recovery. In performing this activity, it is useful to understand the time constants associated with
performing the mission of the system under investigation (e.g., availability requirements for on-
demand operations). In the limit that the permitted recovery time goes to zero, the required value
threshold is operable over the entire system life.
6.2. Phase 2: Generate Concepts
In the first phase, the MATE for Survivability methodology was initialized by eliciting the value
proposition for the system under analysis. In the second phase of concept generation, analysts
and engineers formulate the design effort by explicitly linking back to the value proposition.
Four activities comprise the second phase: (2.1) identify constraints, (2.2) propose design
variables, (2.3) map design variables to attributes, and (2.4) finalize baseline design vector.
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6.2.1. Identify Constraints
Constraints are requirements that must be satisfied in order for the system to be feasible.
Constraints may derive from physical laws, concepts-of-operations, policy (e.g., requirement to
use domestic launch vehicles), and environmental considerations (e.g., minimum practical orbit
altitude to avoid atmospheric drag). As demonstrated in Ross (2006), some constraints are
subject to change and must be carefully tracked as shifts may significantly alter the "best"
outcome for a particular problem.
6.2.2. Propose Design Variables
The concept generation phase of tradespace exploration is concerned with the mapping of form
to function. In thinking through solutions for how the attributes might be acquired, the designer
inspects the attributes and proposes various design variables (and associated ranges and
enumerations). Design variables are designer-controlled quantitative parameters that reflect an
aspect of a concept, which taken together as a set uniquely define a system architecture. Each
combination of design variables constitutes a unique design vector, and the set of all possible
design vectors constitutes the design-space. In the process of proposing design variables, a
natural tension exists between including more variables to analyze larger tradespaces and the
computational limits on evaluating a larger set of designs.
6.2.3. Map Design Variables to Attributes
Design variables are mapped to the attributes to ensure that the system concepts address the
needs articulated by the decision-maker. As illustrated in Table 6-1, this mapping consists of a
qualitative assessment in which a modified Quality Function Deployment process is followed.
(The qualitative assessments may be revisited after models have been developed in Task 5.2.)
Table 6-1. Design Value Mapping Matrix - Space Tug
E
Attributes
Delta-V 27S M 1
Equipment Capability 0 0 9
Total 18 10 19
Four general steps comprise mapping the design variables to attributes. First, a matrix is drawn
with the elicited attributes as columns and the proposed design variables as rows (or vice versa).
Second, estimates regarding the strength of the relationship between the design variables and
attributes are made in the intersecting cells. Typically, a non-linear scale is used: 0 (no impact),
1 (low impact), 3 (medium impact), and 9 (strong impact). Third, the rows are summed to
provide an estimate of the importance of a particular design variable. (An aggregate sum is
computed for each design variable row as an indicator of the importance of its inclusion in the
design-space. The size of the tradespace grows geometrically as design variables are added,
requiring the pre-screening of design variables if limited computing resources are available.)
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Fourth, the columns are summed to provide an estimate of the degree to which each attribute is
addressed by the proposed set of design variables. Verifying that each attribute is affected by the
design variable under consideration is crucial to ensure that the trade study includes concepts that
are traced to the value proposition of the decision-maker.
6.2.4. Finalize Baseline Design Vector
The concept generation phase is completed with the finalization of the design variables,
including the range and step size for each design variable (e.g., Table 6-2). Whether discrete or
continuous, the selection of the number of steps for a given design variable may be broken into
the enumeration phase and the sampling phase. In the enumeration phase, a "full" range of
values is selected that will drive the dependent variables across a large range. In the sampling
phase, a subset of values in the enumerated range is selected for inclusion in the tradespace
analysis. The sampling phase is necessary to efficiently utilize finite computing resources.
Table 6-2. Baseline Design Vector (n=128)
Manipulator Mass Propulsion Type Fuel Load (kg)
Low (300kg) Storable bi-prop 30
Medium (1000kg) Cryogenic bi-prop 100
High (3000 kg) Electric (NSTAR) 300
Extreme (5000 kg) Nuclear Thermal 600
1200
3000
10000
30000
6.3. Phase 3: Characterize Disturbance Environment
Following completion of the first iteration of concept generation in a typical tradespace study,
the analyst models and simulates the design alternatives to calculate the costs and utilities of
alternative concepts. However, in MATE for Survivability, it is first necessary to characterize
any disturbances in the operational environment (Phase 3) and to apply the survivability
principles to the tradespace (Phase 4). Phase 3 is comprised of three tasks: (3.1) enumerate
disturbances, (3.2) gather data on disturbance magnitude and occurrence, and (3.3) develop
system-neutral models of disturbance environment.
6.3.1. Enumerate Disturbances
The first step of applying the design principles is to enumerate potential disturbances. Prior to
consulting the design principles, this step is necessary to provide context to the survivability
analysis. Data for the system threat assessment may be derived from a combination of causal
methods, historical data, scenario planning, and aggregated expert opinion (e.g., Bayesian
treatment, Delphi technique, interactive approach).
6.3.2. Gather Data on Disturbance Magnitude and Occurrence
Task 3.2 is to gather data on the magnitude and occurrence of different disturbance types to
support subsequent model development (e.g., Figure 6-2). Just as each attribute may vary in
importance to the decision-maker, the impact of each type of disturbance on system performance
may vary. If all disturbances are not of equal concern, an importance score for each disturbance
is assigned based on the magnitude of impact and likelihood of occurrence.
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Figure 6-2. Average Orbital Velocity for LEO Debris
In the process of gathering data on disturbance magnitude and occurrence, it is important to
check for non-additive disturbance interactions (e.g., in the case of a combat aircraft, the
combination of an adversary jamming warning sensors and firing a missile will impact the
system more than each disturbance in isolation). If multiple disturbances are likely to occur
together and impact the system in a nonlinear way, such combinations of disturbances should be
treated as separate disturbances. (In the case of intelligently-engineered disturbance
environments, such interactions may be common.)
6.3.3. Develop System-Independent Model(s) of Disturbance Environment
Having gathered data to characterize the disturbance environment, it is necessary to organize,
structure, and format the data for subsequent disturbance modeling. Given the baseline system
concept developed in Phase 2 and knowledge of the disturbance environment, descriptive models
of each disturbance type are created. The models are parametric in nature to allow for
applications to all design vector variations within a given system concept.
6.4. Phase 4: Apply Survivability Principles
After the baseline set of design variables is established and the disturbance environment is
characterized, the survivability design principles are applied to the tradespace. Applying the
design principles (Phase 4) supplements the concept generation activities in Phase 2 by
incorporating survivability strategies that mitigate the disturbances identified in Phase 3. This
phase consists of five steps: (4.1) enumerate survivable concepts from design principles, (4.2)
parameterize survivable concepts with design variables, (4.3) assess ability of design variables to
mitigate disturbances, (4.4) filter survivability design variables, and (4.5) finalize design vector.
6.4.1. Enumerate Survivable Concepts from Design Principles
The seventeen design principles (Section 4.4) are consulted to inform the generation of system
concepts that mitigate the impact of each disturbance. Each design principle provides a concept-
neutral architectural strategy for achieving survivability. These architectural strategies include
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both structural principles (e.g., distribution, heterogeneity) as well as behavioral principles (e.g.,
prevention, avoidance). To instantiate these design principles, the designer must select how each
structural or behavioral principle may be represented in a concept (i.e., the encapsulation of a
mapping of function to form). Figure 6-3 illustrates how susceptibility reduction, vulnerability
reduction, and resilience enhancement strategies are incorporated into the design vector of the
"space tug" orbital transfer vehicle.
Type I Type II Type III
Susceptibility reduction Vulnerability reduction Resilience enhancement
> Active collision avoidance > Bumper shielding > On-orbit servicing
> Reduced cross-sectional > Increased capability insurance for timely repair
area (derived) margin (derived)
I (Lai
45 m2  5 m2  2002)
Figure 6-3. Survivability Concepts for Space Tug
6.4.2. Parameterize Survivable Concepts with Design Variables
To operationalize the proposed survivability concept enhancements for tradespace exploration,
each concept is parameterized by specifying a representative set of design variables. While
concepts are qualitative descriptions of system strategies, design variables are quantitative
parameters that represent an aspect of a concept that can be controlled by a designer. Each
design variable includes units and an enumerated range of values for analysis. Determining the
enumeration range for each survivability feature is informed by data on disturbance magnitude
and occurrence.
Given the competing desires for including more design parameters to explore larger tradespaces
while minimizing the computational constraints associated with modeling an excessive number
of design vectors, both a reasonable number of design variables and a reasonable number of steps
(for continuous variables) must be chosen. To reduce the total number of design variables
considered, the baseline set of design variables is consulted, utilizing existing design variables
where possible in the process of concept parameterization.
6.4.3. Assess Ability of Design Variables to Mitigate Disturbances
The ability of candidate survivability design variables to mitigate the impact of system
disturbances is assessed to determine which design parameters to include in the system model.
Estimating the degree of impact of each survivability design variable on each disturbance type
follows a process analogous to the design value mapping matrix (where the ability of proposed
design variables to impact the attributes is evaluated).
If multiple design variables and disturbances require assessment, a matrix of survivability design
variables (rows) and disturbances (columns) may be structured with the strength of relationship
assessed in intersecting cells (e.g., 0, 1, 3, 9). In the process of building the matrix to estimate
the effectiveness of the survivability design variables, it may be necessary to consolidate
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redundant design variables. While most survivability enhancement concepts are specified by a
unique design variable or set of design variables, a few design variables may serve to
parameterize more than one principle and concept. In consolidating duplicate design variable
rows in the survivability design matrix, the maximum mitigating impact score for each
disturbance is used.
6.4.4. Filter Survivability Design Variables
After applying the design principles to incorporate survivability considerations into concept
generation, it may be necessary to filter the expanded number of design variables for inclusion in
the tradespace. This filtering process begins by examining the representation of the seventeen
design principles across the consolidated set of design variables. While it may not be wise or
possible to include design variables spanning all seventeen design principles (e.g., tension of
many susceptibility reduction and vulnerability reduction features), it is useful for the system
analyst to understand the implications of including or excluding particular design variables on
the tradespace. For example, design variables which utilize multiple principles should receive
particular consideration for inclusion. Also, if the operational environment of the system being
designed is highly uncertain, it may be wise to ensure representation of Type I, Type II, and
Type III survivability trades in the design-space.
If multiple disturbances are included in the system analysis, it is necessary to aggregate the
impact of each consolidated design variable across the disturbances. For example, a linear-
weighted sum for each survivability design variable may be computed by summing across the
rows in the survivability design matrix, weighting each disturbance based on the importance
score in Task 3.2.
6.4.5. Finalize Design Vector
Finalizing the design variables is required before modeling and simulating the design
alternatives. Finalizing the design vector requires an understanding of the relationship between
the design variables and attributes as well as between the design variables and disturbances.
Several considerations are recommended for determining which survivability design variables to
incorporate into the baseline design vector: the aggregate mitigating impact score of a particular
design variable, the distribution of design variables across survivability design principles,
downstream computational constraints associated with growing the design-space, and whether a
particular survivability enhancement feature should be permanently turned "on" (i.e., making
survivability enhancement features that are certain to be incorporated into design constants). For
example, Table 5-5 shows the final design vector for space tug.
6.5. Phase 5: Model Baseline System Performance
In Phase 5, the lifecycle cost and design utility (i.e., utility at beginning-of-life) of each design
alternative is computed by evaluating the design vectors in a physics-based, parametric model.
This phase consists of four steps: (5.1) develop software architecture, (5.2) translate design
vectors to attributes, (5.3) translate design vectors to lifecycle cost, and (5.4) apply multi-
attribute utility function.
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6.5.1. Develop Software Architecture
The initial mapping of design variables to attributes during concept generation (Task 2.3)
consisted of using judgment and experience to determine which design variables to include in the
trade study. In developing the software architecture, this mapping is performed at higher fidelity
in which an N-squared matrix documents how design variables will be translated to attributes
through intermediate variables (Table 6-3). Modules within the matrix enable the model to be
decomposed to enable parallel development.
Table 6-3. N-squared Matrix for Space Tug Software Architecture
---- -- -r-
a) " a)
a. ) 0 U)LI
. C "
0 a' E " 0tX
Constants XX
Generate SpaceTu s X
Propulsion Attributes X X
Grappling Attribute X X I
Lifecycle Cost X X-- -
Shieldin Effectiveness X X -
Impact Events X X X
Oututs X -XXX XXXX
6.5.2. Translate Design Vectors to Attributes
Following completion of the software architecture, the sampling plan of the design variables is
determined. (Due to the geometric growth of the tradespace, multi-disciplinary optimization
techniques may be required in lieu of a full-factorial sampling.) This sampling of the tradespace
is then input to the parametric computer model which calculates the set of attribute values for
each design vector.
6.5.3. Translate Design Vectors to Lifecycle Cost
In addition to translating design variables to attributes, the model also translates design variables
to estimates of lifecycle cost. Developing cost models during the conceptual design phase of
complex systems is a challenge. While detailed bottom-up estimating may be accurate for
established programs, it is a weak method for systems with immature designs and low
technology readiness. Analogy-based estimating may be applied only if similar systems exist.
When known physical, technical, and performance parameters can be related to cost, the
parametric costing method is best for conducting conceptual designs under time constraints
(Wertz and Larson 1999).
6.5.4. Apply Multi-Attribute Utility Function
Having calculated the performance of design alternatives across the attributes of concern to the
decision-maker, these attribute levels are input to the elicited utility functions to arrive at an
overall assessment of decision-maker satisfaction.
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6.6. Phase 6: Model Impact of Disturbances on Performance
Phase 6 involves modeling and simulating the performance of design alternatives across a
representative sample of disturbance encounters to gain an understanding of how decision-maker
needs are met in perturbed environments. While the previous phase is focused on assessing
deterministic measures of system effectiveness (i.e., lifecycle cost, design utility), this phase
focuses on dynamically characterizing system performance from a path-dependent, probabilistic
simulation. Phase 6 consists of four tasks: (6.1) calculate stochastic susceptibility, (6.2) model
probabilistic vulnerability, (6.3) model probabilistic recovery, and (6.4) generate distributions of
utility trajectories.
6.6.1. Calculate Stochastic Susceptibility
Having gathered data and developed a system-independent model of the disturbance
environment (e.g., debris flux as a function of mass per m2), a system-dependent model of the
disturbance environment is created (e.g., debris flux as a function of mass per exposed cross-
sectional area). For example, Figure 5-9. Conjunction Outcomes, shows the baseline
susceptibility of the 2560 designs in the space tug tradespace. If disturbances occur
probabilistically, a Monte Carlo analysis is conducted to generate representative distributions of
disturbance timelines for the design vectors.
6.6.2. Model Probabilistic Vulnerability
Given that a disturbance has affected the system, the impact of the disturbance is characterized
through a probabilistic vulnerability model. Since there may only be mid-fidelity
characterizations of the environment and system during conceptual design, the damage
assumptions are often coarse (e.g., Table 5-6. Debris Impact Outcomes). The vulnerability
model takes the form of a probabilistic lottery in which multiple runs are required to extract the
distribution of potential outcomes. Although static, the vulnerability model is only activated
when directed by the stochastic susceptibility model to capture the dynamics of utility loss over
the lifecycle. Path-dependencies are incorporated into the vulnerability model by transitioning
between pre-enumerated degraded states in the case of non-catastrophic losses.
6.6.3. Model Probabilistic Recovery
Given the occurrence of a disturbance, system degradation in the vulnerability model, and
incorporation of Type III survivability design principles in the design vector, system recovery is
modeled. As with the vulnerability model, the recovery model takes the form of a lottery in
which outcomes are determined probabilistically and require multiple runs to determine central
tendency. In the case of partial recovery, path-dependencies are incorporated by transitioning
among pre-enumerated states.
For space tug design vectors incorporating a servicing option, an on-orbit repair mission is
attempted following non-catastrophic debris hits. Successful servicing missions fully restore
grappling capability to the original (baseline) level in the design vector.
6.6.4. Generate Distributions of Utility Trajectories
As defined in Chapter 3, survivability is the ability of a system to maintain value delivery within
stakeholder-defined thresholds over the lifecycle of a disturbance. Tradespace exploration for
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survivability incorporates this definition by evaluating utility performance of alternative designs
across disturbance events. These utility trajectories are plotted over time with any applicable
value thresholds and permitted recovery times to characterize survivability. Because utility
trajectories are probabilistic and path-dependent in nature, a Monte Carlo analysis is performed
to generate representative distributions.
DV(1137) - Run(3/500)
0.25
- V(t)
2 Threshold
0.05 ---0.05 ---- --- - - -  - - -
0
0 2 4 6 8 10
time (years)
Figure 6-4. Sample Utility Trajectory Output from Dynamic State Model
The dynamic space tug model demonstrates the definition of survivability by simulating utility
trajectories of alternative designs in the presence of orbital debris events. Figure 6-4 presents a
sample utility trajectory output from the model, illustrating V(t) (i.e., dynamic multi-attribute
utility) over a possible ten-year operational life. Following normal degradation during the first
eighteen months of operation, two non-catastrophic debris impacts occur in succession. Due to
the reduction in expectations from the required value threshold to the emergency value threshold
following the first impact (and renewed following the second impact), V(t) does not pass below
the value threshold. The first debris impact prompts a request for servicing that is successfully
filled during the second year. A similar sequence of disturbances--consecutive debris hits
followed by successful servicing--occurs between the fourth and sixth years. In this case,
however, no servicing occurs and the system fails to meet the required value threshold when
expectations are reset to the required value threshold.
As survivability is a stochastic, path-dependent property, the outcome of any particular run for a
given design vector is not necessarily representative or meaningful from a decision-making
perspective. Rather, each utility trajectory constitutes one data sample from a distribution of
potential system lifecycles. Therefore, a Monte Carlo analysis is conducted by running the
simulation until a representative distribution of utility trajectories is generated.
Determining the appropriate number of Monte Carlo trials requires a trade-off between the
accuracy of the reported survivability metrics and computing time. While 1,000 is a typical
baseline for the number of trials to consider, the complexity of the calculations may require more
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or less trials to be performed (Hazelrigg 1996). To determine the number of trials, it is advisable
to conduct a convergence study on a small number of design vectors to examine the sensitivity of
the reported survivability metrics to the number of Monte Carlo trials. For example, Figure 6-5
shows how 5th percentile threshold availability for one design vector varied as a function of the
number of Monte Carlo runs in one set of simulations. While smaller runs (e.g., 100 trials)
diverge considerably from the most accurate estimate of 20,000 trials, 500 trials achieve a good
balance between accuracy and computing time. Therefore, 500 runs were conducted for each
design vector before reporting the median time-weighted utility loss and 5 th percentile threshold
availability in the tear tradespace (Figure 5-17). Precisely understanding the variance of the
reported survivability metrics is particularly critical if the tear tradespace is subsequently filtered
for Pareto efficiency.
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Figure 6-5. Monte Carlo Convergence for One Design Vector
Having modeled the impact of disturbances on system lifecycles and generated distributions of
utility trajectories for each design vector, the next challenge is to distinguish across distributions
of utility trajectories of different design vectors. However, observing all 128,000 utility
trajectories-500 runs of each of the 2560 design vectors-is not practical from a decision-
making perspective. Therefore, the survivability metrics are applied as aggregate measures for
each set of utility trajectories.
6.7. Phase 7: Apply Survivability Metrics
Having generated utility trajectories over the distribution of possible degradation and recovery
sequences for each design vector, summary statistics are collected to measure central tendency of
lifecycle survivability. Phase 7 consists of three tasks: (7.1) establish percentile reporting levels,
(7.2) calculate time-weighted average utility, and (7.3) calculate threshold availability. Before
describing the three tasks of Phase 7, the survivability metrics introduced in Section 3.3 are
briefly reviewed.
The survivability metrics evaluate a system's ability both to minimize utility losses and to meet
critical value thresholds before, during, and after disturbances. Given a characterization of a
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system's value delivery over time, V(t), using a multi-attribute utility function, U(t), the time-
weighted average utility loss may be defined:
UL = Uo U(t) dt (6-3)
Tdl
Time-weighted average utility loss may be used to assess the difference between the beginning-
of-life, design utility, Uo, and the time-weighted average utility achieved by a system across
operational environments during its design life, Tdl. However, while this metric enables
continuous evaluations to be made of the ability of systems to minimize degradation, it does not
internalize the ability to meet critical value thresholds.
Threshold availability, AT, evaluates the ability of a system to meet critical value thresholds. AT
is defined as the ratio of time above thresholds TAT to the total design life:
TAT
A, = (6-4)
Tdl
6.7.1. Establish Percentile Reporting Levels
The output of the survivability simulation is a distribution of utility trajectories for each design
alternative. To enable comparisons among design alternatives, it is necessary to extract
measures of central tendency from the utility trajectories. Time-weighted average utility and
threshold availability, introduced in Chapter 3, are intended to provide these measures.
However, experience indicates that the distributions of the survivability metrics are often highly-
skewed, suggesting the use of percentiles rather than potentially misleading measures of central
tendency such as an average. To determine what percentile level to use (e.g., time-weighted
average utility-5 th percentile is the level of time-weighted average utility achieved by 95% of the
simulation runs of that design vector), the analyst must incorporate two considerations. First, the
selected percentiles will ideally show variation across the tradespace to allow the decision-maker
to discriminate among design alternatives using the survivability metrics. Second, the selected
percentiles will reflect decision-maker risk preferences (where risk aversion manifests itself
through the selection of lower percentiles). Selection of the percentile reporting levels is an
iterative process with Task 8.1, Conduct Integrated Tradespace Exploration.
6.7.2. Calculate Time-Weighted Average Utility and Threshold Availability
The percentile reporting levels are applied to the distributions of the two survivability metrics,
adding two probabilistic quantities for inclusion with the deterministic metrics of lifecycle cost
and design utility in the tradespace. For example, see Figure 5-14. Distributions of Time-
Weighted Average Utility and Figure 5-15. Sample Distribution of Threshold Availability.
6.8. Phase 8: Explore Tradespace
Having applied the survivability metrics, the final phase focuses on tradespace exploration: (8.1)
conduct integrated cost, utility, and survivability trades and (8.2) select design for further
analysis.
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6.8.1. Conduct Integrated Cost, Utility, and Survivability Trades
The purpose of tradespace exploration is to map the decision-maker preferences in the value
domain onto the space of possible designs in the technical domain. Traditionally, these are
presented in a cost-benefit format in which multi-attribute utility is plotted against lifecycle cost
(in accordance with the philosophy of cost as an independent variable). With technically diverse
designs evaluated against a common set of attributes, unified trades may be made and interesting
designs (e.g., Pareto-optimal) may be identified for more detailed analysis.
In conducting tradespace exploration for survivability, the probabilistic survivability metrics of
time-weighted average utility loss and threshold availability are integrated with the cost-utility
metrics using a survivability tear tradespace representation. Decision-makers may navigate the
tradespace by examining designs near the top-left (high utility, low cost) with high availability
(darker) and minimal utility loss (shorter tail). For example, Figure 6-6 presents a survivability
tear tradespace from space tug in which designs at the Pareto-surface of cost, utility, and utility
loss are displayed.
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Figure 6-6. Three-Dimensional Pareto Surface of Survivability Tear Tradespace
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6.8.2. Select Designs for Further Analysis
In the final task, the broad knowledge gained from exploring the tradespace may be applied to a
variety of activities: magnification of a particular region of the tradespace by reducing the range
and decreasing the step size of design variables, sensitivity analysis of uncertain model
parameters, and the selection of a smaller number of design vectors for higher-fidelity modeling.
For example, Figure 6-7 shows how a survivability response surface analysis may be conducted
to assess how the survivability design variables affect performance across the survivability
metrics. This analysis may be conducted on specific designs for prescriptive insights as well as
across the entire tradespace to reveal general trends.
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Figure 6-7. Survivability Response Surfaces along Pareto-Front of Cost and Average Utility
6.9. Synthesis
The 8-phase, 29-step process introduced in this chapter provides a structured approach to the
evaluation of the survivability of design alternatives that will be operating in dynamic
disturbance environments. The intent of the process is to couple the benefits of Multi-Attribute
Tradespace Exploration in conceptual design with the benefits offered by the survivability design
principles and metrics. In particular, the MATE for Survivability approach is a value-driven
process in which the designs under consideration are directly traced to the value proposition, and
the measures-of-effectiveness reflect the preferences of the decision-maker during nominal and
perturbed environmental states. By following a parametric modeling approach, broad
exploration of the tradespace is enabled in which the decision-maker gains an understanding of
how their value proposition maps onto a large number of alternative system concepts. By
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emphasizing breadth rather than depth, promising areas of the tradespace may be selected with
confidence for further analysis, and sensitivities between survivability design variables and
disturbance outcomes may be explored. Figure 6-8 provides a flow chart of the process and
identifies relationships with the legacy MATE process.
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Figure 6-8. Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) for Survivability
Both the survivability design principles and metrics are fully integrated into MATE for
Survivability. The process for incorporating survivability considerations within the design
formulation phases (3 and 4) constitutes a top-down approach for consulting the design variables
and generating concepts that may be better equipped to operate in the presence of environmental
disturbances. The benefits of the approach are twofold: (1) augment the creativity of system
designers by ensuring consideration of a broad tradespace of design alternatives and (2) quickly
screen and prioritize a large number of candidate design variables before proceeding to the
design evaluation phase. In applying the design principles to space tug, many latent survivability
trades were found within the baseline set of design variables. The process provides an explicit
means for recognizing these latent trades and informing utility-survivability interactions.
Application of the survivability metrics to subsequent tradespace exploration allows these
interactions to be quantified and traded by the decision-maker.
Table 6-4 provides a Task Structure Matrix of each of the 29 steps within MATE for
Survivability as well as a bird's-eye view of the dependencies among tasks. Each row consists
of a particular task with "X" marks specifying inputs to that task. The "X" marks in the upper-
right region (above the diagonal of solid black boxes) indicate feedback from subsequent tasks
(e.g., insights from conducting cost-utility-survivability trades in Task 8.1 may inspire numerous
changes to the formulation of the design problem). The Task Structure Matrix representation
illustrates the highly-coupled nature of conceptual design activities. Given the extensive
feedback of tradespace exploration (Phase 8) to previous tasks, Table 6-4 underscores the
151
importance of pursuing modeling and simulation activities at a level of fidelity that is consistent
with the ability to conduct several iterations of the overall process.
Table 6-4. Task Dependencies of MATE for Survivability
Develop mission statement
Identfly deacision maker
Elicit mult-attnbute utility function
Specify emergency value threshold
Specify permitted recovery time
Identify constraints
Propose design vanables
Map design vanables to attnbutes
Finalize baseline design vector
Enumerate disturbances
Gather data on disturbance magnitude and frequency
Develop model(s) of disturbance environment
Enumerate survivable concepts from principles
Parametenze survivable concepts with design variables
Assess abilty of design variables to mitigate disturbances
Filter survivability design variables
Finalize candidate design vectors
Develop software architecture
Translate design vectors to attributes
Translate design vectors to lifecycle cost
Apply mulb-attnbute value function
Calculate stochastic susceptibility
Model probabilistic vulnerability
Model probabilistic recovery
Generate distnbutions of utility traectones
Establish percentile reporting levels
Calculate average utility and theshold availability
Conduct integrated cost utility, and survivability trades
Select designs for further analysis
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Incorporating survivability considerations into the conceptual design phase stands in contrast to
most survivability analysis methodologies which examine the cost-effectiveness of survivability
features during detailed design. By incorporating survivability considerations before a baseline
system concept has been established, MATE for Survivability allows survivability to be
incorporated earlier and more effectively into the design process.
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7. Case Application: Satellite Radar
This chapter applies Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration for Survivability (Chapter 6) to an
analysis of potential future military satellite radar constellations. Given the repeated attempts
over the past decade by the U.S. military to acquire a satellite radar capability and the tens of
billions of taxpayer dollars at stake, satellite radar offers a promising subject both to test the
proposed survivability analysis methodology and to gather prescriptive insights to inform
ongoing trade studies. Following an introduction to the history of satellite radar and a discussion
of the scope of the analysis in Section 7.1, each phase of MATE for Survivability is applied in
Section 7.2. The chapter concludes in Section 7.3 with a discussion of the implications of the
case application for satellite radar and for the underlying methodology.
7.1. Introduction to Satellite Radar
This section provides a brief introduction to contextualize and motivate the application of MATE
for Survivability to satellite radar (SR). After describing the military value of SR, the
advantages and disadvantages of transitioning the airborne radar surveillance mission to space
are discussed in Section 7.1.1. An overview is also provided of recent attempts by the U.S.
military to acquire a satellite radar capability. In section 7.1.2, the scope of the SR case
application is outlined. A notional SR enterprise diagram is introduced, informing the
enumeration of dynamic context factors that, while exogenous to the control of the SR program
manager, are critical to program success. Finally, the relationship between the SR case
application and ongoing collaborative work at MIT's Systems Engineering Advancement
Research Initiative is described.
7.1.1. Historical Context
Radio detection and ranging (radar) is the process of transmitting modulated waveforms using
directive antennas to search for targets within a volume of space. Under ideal conditions,
electromagnetic energy travels through space in a straight line at a constant speed. If the energy
meets an electrically leading surface, waves are reflected and the reflections are picked up by the
receiving antenna. The reflections or "echo" may be processed to extract target information.
The presence of a reflected signal is used to detect targets while the angle of reflection indicates
the direction of the target. The time delay between the transmitted signal and received signal
provides range. The spectrum of the received signal indicates the target velocity using the
Doppler shift. Moving targets against a stationary background may also be detected using the
spectrum of the received signal.
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Figure 7-1. Synthetic Aperture Radar Image Acquired During a Sand Storm (Chang and Bender 2005)
As active sensors, radars enable all-weather detection of forces, providing tremendous value to
military users operating in harsh environments (Figure 7-1). Developed over the first half of the
20 th century, radar's military benefit was first fully realized by the British during the Second
World War in homeland defense against German air attacks. The line-of-sight visibility of radar
has driven militaries to deploy radars at increasingly higher vantage points (Corcoran 2000).
The U.S. military currently deploys radars on a variety of aircraft systems (e.g., E-8C Joint
Surveillance Target Attack Radar System [JSTARS], E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control
System [AWACS]) and uninhabited aerial vehicles (e.g., MQ-1 Predator, RQ-4 Global Hawk).
In the 1990's, several studies were conducted on moving the airborne surveillance mission to
orbital platforms (Wickert, Shaw and Hastings 1998; DeLap 1999; Preiss, Fiedler and Kellett
1999). For example, the 1995 Space Sensors Study investigated the feasibility of transitioning
the JSTARS mission of ground-moving target identification (GMTI) and the AWACS mission of
air-moving target identification (AMTI) to space (DeLap and Suhr 1996). The study found that
the required satellite masses would be prohibitively expensive given 1995 technology and
recommended allowing emerging commercial telecommunications systems to mature enabling
technologies.
There are several advantages associated with space-based radar surveillance (DeLap and Suhr
1996; Corcoran 2000). First, the higher vantage point enables superior performance in the
coverage rate of a given area. Depending on orbital altitude and constellation density, satellite
platforms may offer continuous line-of-sight of the entire globe. Second, space systems provide
access to denied areas far behind enemy lines. This access offers high elevation angles that may
mitigate terrain masking. Third, in contrast to airborne systems, satellites are always on-station
to support near real-time tasking. Fourth, the space-basing of radar sensors improves operator
survivability. Controllers in U.S.-based ground stations replace vulnerable pilots and eliminate
the need for the overseas deployment of large maintenance crews.
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There are also several disadvantages associated with space-based radar surveillance. First,
significantly more power is required at orbital altitudes given that the received power decreases
as the inverse of the altitude to the fourth power. Ignoring losses, the equation for received
power, Pe, is given in terms of transmitted power, Pt, antenna gain, G, wavelength, A, target cross
section, o, and range, R.
p P, "G: 2 2oP G' o- (7-1)(4r)3 -R 4
Second, individual satellites are unable to loiter and maneuver above targets (given the drive for
lower orbital altitudes to cope with the radar range equation and the extreme AV penalties
associated with maneuvering in LEO). Therefore, large numbers of satellites may be required to
provide continuous coverage over small geographic areas. Third, there is likely to be no
opportunity for the satellites to be repaired or upgraded (other than software updates) over their
operational lives. As a result, design lives are likely to be much shorter than airborne
alternatives. Fourth, as articulated in Section 1.2.3, satellite survivability is an issue given the
proliferation of threats to space systems. The fifth and final disadvantage of space-based radar
surveillance is the extensive risk associated with technology development (e.g., deployable
active electronically scanned arrays [AESA], lightweight solar arrays, space-time adaptive
processing) (Davis 2003).
Over the past decade, there have been several attempts by the U.S. military to acquire a
capability for space-based radar surveillance. In 1998, the Air Force and several other agencies
initiated the Discover II program to demonstrate GMTI in space with direct in-theater tasking
and downlink. As a precursor to the launch of a 24-satellite constellation, two prototype
satellites equipped with 40 m2 AESA radars operating at 10 GHz were to be launched into 770
km circular orbits with a 530 inclination. The target unit production cost was $100 million with a
target 20-year lifecycle cost of $10 billion (CBO 2007). However, the system was cancelled in
2000 due to its uncertain costs and schedule, poorly explained requirements, and lack of
operational concepts and trade-off analysis (Tirpak 2002). Following cancellation, Discoverer II
was reborn in 2001 as a new acquisition program called Space-Based Radar. Using the same
technology as Discoverer II, Space-Based Radar intended to follow a spiral development model
with an initial operational capability by 2010. However, the program was effectively killed in
the 2005 Defense Appropriations bill when lawmakers provided just $75 million of the $327
million requested by the President's budget (Singer 2004). In a repeat of history, the program
was restructured again in 2005 and renamed Space Radar. Following the "back-to-basics"
acquisition model of focusing on technology development before system development, Space
Radar intended to have an initial operating capability by 2015. Citing a lack of affordability, the
program was cancelled for a third time in March 2008 (Clark 2008). While technology
development continues, there is currently no formal acquisition program for military satellite
radar.
In summary, radar systems provide unique all-weather reconnaissance and surveillance
capabilities. Transitioning radar sensors from airborne to space platforms is challenging given
the range requirements and strict size, weight, power, and reliability requirements imposed by
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satellites. Over the past decade, military satellite radar programs have faltered due to immature
technology as well as due to fractured management among system acquirers. Given these
historical lessons, future analyses of satellite radar should emphasize front-end systems
engineering activities. Such activities should include defining operational utility across
stakeholders, exploring the multi-dimensional tradespace offered by alternative radar designs and
constellation structures, and assessing the impact of future contextual uncertainties (e.g.,
environmental disturbances) on performance over the entire system lifecycle.
7.1.2. Scope of Analysis
As reported by the Congressional Budget Office (2007), future satellite radar systems are
intended to carry out four missions: (1) synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging, (2) ground
moving-target identification, (3) three-dimensional terrain mapping, and (4) open-ocean
surveillance. This mission set excludes the AMTI mission, which is 100 to 1000 times more
difficult than the GMTI mission for similar radars (Table 7-1).
Table 7-1. Order-Magnitude Comparison of GMTI to AMTI (Davis 1999)
GMTI AMTI Difference (dB)
Target RCS 10 0 to -10 10 to 20
Revisit Rate (sec) 30 10 5
Volume coverage X 3X 5
A20-30 dB!
In applying the MATE for Survivability process to satellite radar in this chapter, the focus is on
the GMTI mission. Past analyses of satellite radar alternatives have focused on the SAR imaging
and GMTI missions because they are considered the highest priority for the new system and
because detecting and tracking targets on the ground should be more difficult than detecting and
tracking targets at sea (CBO 2007). In this analysis, the decision was made to assess operational
utility in terms of GMTI in order to focus the analysis on survivability considerations for a single
military decision-maker rather than introduce multi-stakeholder tensions across users of SAR
and GMTI.36
36 See Ross (Ross 2006) for one approach for incorporating multi-stakeholder considerations into MATE and Ross
et al. (2008) for a specific application of the methodology to competing stakeholders in satellite radar.
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Figure 7-2. Satellite Radar Enterprise
As discussed in Chapter 6, an important task preceding formal attribute elicitation from the
decision-maker is to clearly establish the boundaries for system development and operation.
Figure 7-2 presents an enterprise diagram of a notional satellite radar (SR) system. Traditionally,
such a diagram may be used to narrow the scope of analysis by informing what parameters are
under the control of the design team and what factors are exogenous to the system boundary. As
illustrated by the four boxes within the SR context, there are several exogenous factors that affect
the value delivered by SR, yet are outside of the control of the SR program manager.37
To better identify, quantify, assess, and manage the risks of developing complex space systems,
the MIT SEAri research group collectively developed the Responsive Systems Comparison
method (RSC) in 2008 to evaluate the ability of systems to deliver value across changing future
37 Figure 7-2 illustrates four types of dynamic uncertainty that are exogenous to the control of the SR program
manager: mission needs (i.e., Strategy/Policy), funding (i.e., Resources), supporting infrastructure (i.e., Capital), and
operational environment (i.e., Radar Product). First, any SR system will be designed, developed, and operated
within a complex institutional environment with multiple stakeholders and competing priorities. For example, the
importance of SAR imaging relative to GMTI may drive the system development in different directions. Second,
given the long development times of space systems, the annual funding allocations for SR are uncertain over the
development lifecycle. Third, the supporting infrastructure for the SR platforms will directly impact the system
value delivery. Supporting infrastructure may include the availability of technologies (typically developed and
matured in research and development organizations) as well as system-of-systems considerations. For example, the
future availability of the transformational satellite communications system or collaborative airborne intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms will directly affect the operational value of the SR system. Fourth, the
operational environment of the SR system is also highly uncertain (e.g., adversary tactics) and directly impacts the
value delivery of the SR system.
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contexts (Ross, McManus et al. 2008). RSC builds on the MATE approaches of aligning
stakeholder value elicitation with the designs under consideration and of the broad evaluation of
thousands of design alternatives. In particular, RSC uses dynamic, value-driven tradespace
exploration (Section 2.2.2) to account for the impacts of time-varying contexts and requirements
on program cost, schedule, performance, and risk. The intent of RSC is to allow decision-
makers to recognize and value dynamically-relevant designs while operating with limited design
resources.
Concurrent with its development, RSC was applied to SR to explore the sensitivity of alternative
architectures to the distribution of future uncertainties enumerated in Figure 7-2. These
uncertainties include changes to national security strategy, funding instability, dynamic threat
environments, and uncertain technology readiness and availability of supporting infrastructures.
Just as the design variables parameterize aspects of a system concept (which taken together as a
set uniquely define a system architecture), epoch variables may be used to parameterize and
define a system context.38 Table 7-2 lists and enumerates the epoch variables that were selected
by the RSC development team to characterize the contextual uncertainty for satellite radar.39
Table 7-2. Epoch Vector for SR
Epoch Variable Number Enumerated Units/Notes
Category Epoch Variables of Steps Range
Imaging vs. 1=SAR<GMTI
Strategy/Policy Tracking Utility 3 [1,2,3] 2=SAR=GMTI
Expectations 3=SAR>GMTI
Resources Budget Constraint na na Use tradespace to vary "costs"
1 =MatureCapital Radar Technology 3 [1,2,3] 2=Medium 3=Advanced2=Medium 3=Advanced
Communication 1=AFSCN
Capital Infrastructure 2=WGS+AFSCN
Collaborative 2 [1,2] =Available
AISR Assets 2=Not available
[9,19,44,45,49,60,8 Lookup table of geographic
4,94,103] region & target op. plans
Threat 1=No jammingRadar Product 2 [1,2]Environment 2=Hostile jamming
38 Given the exogenous uncertainties characterizing the context and stakeholder expectations over the SR system
lifecycle, RSC seeks to identify value-robust designs by incorporating broad distributions of plausible future context
states. In particular, rather than making static assumptions regarding each uncertainty or assuming fixed worst-case
values, the future context states are parameterized using an epoch vector. In a process analogous to the parametric
concept generation phase in a traditional MATE analysis, each key uncertain system exogenous factor is
characterized by an epoch variable. An epoch variable is a quantitative parameter that reflects an aspect of an
uncertain future context. Each possible combination of epoch variables constitutes a unique epoch vector, and the
set of all possible epoch vectors constitutes the set of state-scenarios. While epoch variables are not directly under
the control of the program manager, the probability of some epoch variable levels from arising may be influenced by
the program manager (e.g., research and development dollars on technology readiness).
39 When proposing epoch variables and enumeration ranges, a natural tension exists between including more
variables to analyze larger sets of plausible futures and the computational limits on evaluating a larger set of
scenarios. Iterative structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with domain experts representing
stakeholders from the four areas of system exogenous uncertainty identified in the satellite radar enterprise diagram
(Figure 7-2). Based on those discussions the epoch variables for the SR system context were derived and are shown
in Table 7-2.
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While the Responsive Systems Comparison method was developed to address the general
challenge of incorporating dynamic system contexts into tradespace exploration, the focus in this
chapter is on incorporating survivability considerations given uncertain operational
environments. Table 7-2 shows that a limited number of environmental factors were
incorporated into the RSC analysis (e.g., jamming, availability of relay backbone). However,
other environmental factors were not considered (e.g., debris), and dedicated survivability design
variables were not incorporated into the tradespace (e.g., shielding). By incorporating these
survivability considerations using MATE for Survivability, the SR case application in this
chapter serves as both a specialization and an extension of the analysis of satellite radar
alternatives performed by SEAri using RSC.4 0
7.2. Application of MATE for Survivability
7.2.1. Phase 1: Elicit Value Proposition
The attributes and utility functions for GMTI are based on the decision-maker value elicitation
by the RSC development team. In this process, attributes (i.e., quantifiable parameters for
measuring how well decision-maker-defined objectives are met) are extracted from the mission
statement in addition to associated acceptability ranges, single-attribute utility curves, and a
multi-attribute aggregation.
The attributes are intended to operationalize the general objectives of the mission statement:
The purpose of the analysis is to assess potential satellite radar architectures for providing the
United States Military a global, all-weather, on-demand capability to track moving ground
targets. The system should provide situational awareness to support tactical military operations
while maximizing cost-effectiveness and surviving disturbances in the natural space
environment.
In probing decision-maker needs for objective statements, the concept-of-operations for the
system is discussed to structure and clarify the process of defining attributes. This scenario-
based dialogue helps to place the decision-maker in the proper mindset for the attribute
elicitation. Figure 7-3 provides an illustration of the satellite-level concept-of-operations for
satellite radar. In particular, satellites in a Walker constellation perform the GMTI mission by
observing donut-shaped areas on the surface of the Earth. The field-of-regard for each satellite is
limited by specifying minimum and maximum grazing angles within which the Doppler shift of
moving targets may be detected. While satellites may be limited in their ability to look forward
or backward (removing two wedges from the circle), it is assumed in the model that the satellite
will be able to rotate 3600 for full visibility. By optimizing the radar search to the target deck
input to the model, the attributes of a given design alternative may be calculated.
40 The RSC development overlaps with MATE for Survivability in three phases: (1) value elicitation, (2) concept
generation, and (3) modeling of baseline (static) system performance.
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Figure 7-3. SR Concept-of-Operations
Given this concept-of-operations for satellite radar, six attributes for the GMTI mission were
derived from interview data: (1) number of target boxes, (2) minimum detectable target velocity,
(3) minimum detectable radar cross section, (4) target acquisition time, (5) track life, and (6)
tracking latency. These attributes provide quantitative performance metrics that can be used to
define mission utility for a tactical military user. 41 While the former three attributes are satellite-
level properties that characterize the performance of the radar sensor, the latter three attributes
characterize constellation performance (i.e., their calculation is dependent upon cooperation
among system nodes in the overall architecture).
Table 7-3 defines the six attributes and provides ranges of acceptability. Each attribute delivers
zero utility when it is at the "worst" value that is still acceptable to the stakeholders. A utility of
one is reached when the stakeholders are fully satisfied. Increasing utility (from 0 to 1) is
indicated in Table 7-3 by the direction of the arrows. As illustrated by the subsequent single-
attribute utility functions, attributes that range over many orders of magnitude tend to be
logarithmically related to utilities, while attributes that have narrower ranges are generally
linearly related to utilities.
41 The attributes are translated to a utility function using multi-attribute utility methods (Keeney and Raiffa 1993).
While formal methods exist for eliciting the mapping of attributes to utilities by interviewing stakeholders (i.e.,
single-attribute utility functions), these methods are resource-intensive. Since multi-attribute utility methods are not
part of the RSC development effort, utility elicitation is simplified in this case application whereby the attribute set
is based directly on interview data and the acceptability ranges and single-attribute utility functions are based on
order-of-magnitude estimates by the RSC development team.
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Table 7-3. SR Attributes (GMTI)42
Attribute Definition Acceptable
S....R ange
number of 200x200 km target boxes (consisting of
number of target targets with a given velocity and radar cross
boxes section) that can be imaged by a single satellite
during a single pass
minimum detectable lowest possible velocity of a target that can be 5 - 50
velocity (m/s) detected from the backdrop of its surroundings
minimum detectable minimal target area capable of reflecting a signal
radar cross section detectable by the radar's receiver in response to a 0.01 - 1000
(m2) radar pulse
target acquisition 95th percentile longest duration until a randomly 0 (- 300
time (min) assigned target can be tracked
95th percentile shortest duration of continuoustrack life (min) 1 - 60target monitoring
tracking latency 95th percentile longest duration until Moving 1 - 240(min) Target Identification data is received by warfighter
Number of Target Boxes. The number of target boxes is defined as the number of 200x200 km
target boxes that can be imaged by a single satellite during a single pass while maintaining the
minimum required radar cross section and detectable velocity for a given target set. Figure 7-4
depicts the single-attribute utility function and weighting factor (ki) for number of target boxes.
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Figure 7-4. Utility for Number of Target Boxes
42 The attributes are used to compute the utility using multi-attribute utility methods. Given the sensitive nature of
precisely quantifying the military value proposition for satellite radar, the attribute ranges and utility functions are
based on approximate data provided by the decision-maker. While conducting formal utility interviews are
preferred for mapping the attributes to utility, these proxy values are better than assuming an objective function. In
general, the attributes that range over many orders of magnitude are assumed to map logarithmically to the
attributes, while attributes with narrower ranges have a more linear mapping. Although independently elicited, the
attribute set maps closely to the attribute set used in a 2002 study of SBR alternatives by Lincoln Laboratories:
tracking area, minimum detectable speed, SAR resolution, SAR area, geolocation accuracy, gap time, and center of
gravity area (Spaulding 2003).
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Minimum Detectable Velocity. MDV describes the lowest possible velocity of a target that can
be detected from the backdrop of its surroundings. In order to determine this attribute, a
minimum velocity allowed by physics is determined as a function of the transmit frequency,
satellite velocity, and antenna size. This pure MDV assumes an object traveling directly below
the satellite. In order to take into account the loss of tracking ability as a target moves farther
towards the horizon, the cosine of the elevation angle is multiplied by pure MDV. Thus, the
computed MDV is the best tracking possible for a target at a maximum viewable distance. A
user would get a better minimum detectable velocity as the target moves within this boundary;
however it is always assumed that the target is placed at the boundary. Figure 7-5 depicts the
single-attribute utility function and weighting factor for MDV.
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Figure 7-5. Utility for Minimum Detectable Target Velocity
Minimum Radar Cross Section. The cross section is defined as the minimal target area, in
square meters, capable of reflecting a signal detectable by the radar's receiver in response to a
radar pulse. The minimum RCS is calculated as a product of the range and azimuthal resolutions
of targets at a fixed reflectivity, and therefore does not have to account for the backscattering
coefficients of various surfaces and viewing angles. It therefore carries with it the tacit
assumption that the satellite will dwell long enough to achieve parity in range and azimuthal
resolutions. Figure 7-6 depicts the single-attribute utility function and weighting factor for
minimum RCS.
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Figure 7-6. Utility for Minimum Radar Cross Section
Target Acquisition Time. Target acquisition time is the 9 5th percentile longest duration until a
randomly assigned target (that can be tracked) is detected. Since gap lengths are probabilistic in
nature, a 9 5th percentile is used to provide the effective worst case time. While the target
acquisition time will generally be significantly lower than the computed time, this model outputs
a time that will not only better reflect the variance in the systems, but will also provide users
with a realistic idea of the maximum amount of time they may need to wait before acquiring an
observation of a target. Figure 7-7 depicts the single-attribute utility function and weighting
factor for target acquisition time.
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Figure 7-7. Utility for Target Acquisition Time
Target Track Life. Track life is the 95 th percentile shortest duration that a target may be
continuously monitored, where continuous observation is defined as an observation with no
interruption lasting longer than a minute. Limiting the permitted interruption allows for satellites
to work together to monitor a target. (In practice, this attribute is almost entirely a satellite-level
rather than constellation-level attribute, given that the number of satellites necessary for assured
global coverage from LEO is higher than the designs under consideration. Therefore, this
attribute is largely an indicator of the size of the radar swath.) Figure 7-8 depicts the single-
attribute utility function and weighting factor for target track life.
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Figure 7-8. Utility for Track Life
Tracking Latency. The tracking latency is the 9 5th percentile longest delay between GMTI data
collection on the space platform and the reception of GMTI data by the warfighter. Figure 7-9
depicts the single-attribute utility function and weighting factor for tracking latency.
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Figure 7-9. Utility for Tracking Latency
To determine the multi-attribute utility for the GMTI mission, a simple linear-weighted sum is
used in which the single-attribute utilities are multiplied by their respective ki weighting factors:
6
U(X) = k, .- U(X) (7-2)
To incorporate survivability considerations into the value elicitation phase, it is necessary to
consider whether stakeholder expectations change during and immediately after disturbance
events. If this is the case, the acceptability ranges of the attributes comprising the utility function
may be relaxed for short durations. In addition, it is also possible that the attribute set
comprising the utility function will change. These changes are operationalized by characterizing
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stakeholder needs over time through a required value threshold (i.e., zero utility in nominal
environments), an emergency value threshold (i.e., zero utility in perturbed environments), and a
permitted recovery time (i.e., allowable time before performance expectations return to nominal).
For the case of a constellation of military radar satellites, tactical user expectations for GMTI are
unlikely to change as a function of localized disturbances from the natural space environment.
In contrast to the space tug system that provides an infrastructure capability for infrequent
servicing events, the satellite radar system is intended to support real-time operations. Assured
access to the GMTI capability may be critical to the warfighter. Furthermore, as a military
system, it is reasonable to consider disturbance events as part of the normal operating
environment. Therefore, it is assumed that the required value threshold of the decision-maker is
equivalent to the emergency value threshold (i.e., Vx=Ve=0). Since expectations on the satellite
radar are constant over the lifecycle, it is unnecessary to specify permitted recovery time.
7.2.2. Phase 2: Generate Concepts
Following elicitation of decision-maker attributes, the RSC development team generated several
alternative design concepts for the satellite radar tradespace. The concepts generated were
limited to conventional vehicles, and informed by existing analyses of military satellite radar
(Post, Bennett and Hall 2006; CBO 2007; Pillai, Li and Himed 2008). Current or near-future SR
technology documented in the literature (Davis 1999; Davis 2003) constrained the design space.
It was assumed that satellite radar platforms are deployed in constellations to provide suitable
coverage statistics. The satellites interact with existing or near-future space communication and
ground communication infrastructure to disseminate GMTI data. Consideration was also given
to the possibility of direct, in-theater tasking and downlink. Given these basic assumptions and
general concept, a wide range of possible designs were enumerated based on the preliminary set
of design variables (Table 7-4).
Table 7-4. Preliminary Design Variables for Satellite Radar
Variable Nam Definition Range
Radar Bandwidth .5 1 2 rGHz]
Radar Frequency X, UHF
Physical Antenna Area 10 40 100 200 [mA2]
Receiver Sats per Tx Sat (bistatic) 0 1 2 3 4 5
Antenna Type Mechanical vs. AESA
Satellite Altitude 800 1200 1500 rkm]
Constellation Type 8 Walker IDs
Communications Downlink Relay vs. Downlink Only
Tactical Downlink Yes/No
Processing Space vs. Ground
Maneuver Package lx, 2x, 4x
Hardened Yes/No
Serviceable/Tugable Yes/No
Constellation Option none, long-lead, spare
The preliminary design vector in Table 7-4 includes elements of the radar sensor deployed,
orbital properties of the satellite platforms, communications systems, and other satellite
capabilities. Selecting a value for each particular design variable involves making a host of
trade-offs. For example, as discussed by the Congressional Budget Office (2007), two major
options exist for radar antennae: AESA or conventional reflectors. While the AESA design
allows the radar beam to be steered electronically (and are also helpful for cancelling clutter and
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mitigating electronic jamming), the reflector is lighter and less expensive than an AESA. An
example of an orbital trade is the selection of inclination angle: higher inclinations provide better
access to polar regions but at the expense of equatorial areas.
Even before considering orbit and constellation trades, just the radar range equation (introduced
in Section 7.1.1 without losses, L) provides a multi-dimensional tradespace.
P .G2 0-R =.4 . (7-3)
Pax p (4r)3. L
In selecting orbit altitude (i.e., range), higher orbits are desirable as they provide better coverage
of the Earth's surface and have lower velocities for GMTI. However, the wide-area surveillance
rate for GMTI is proportional to the radar's power-aperture product and is inversely proportional
to the square of the altitude (CBO 2007).
Increasing the transmitted power is desirable as it improves the signal-to-noise ratio at the
receiver and helps to overcome signal propagation losses. However, increasing Pt also drives up
satellite cost by increasing the mass required for energy production and storage. Similarly,
increasing antenna gain is desirable for concentrating power on targets and increasing the
reception area. Conversely, materials technology constraints may limit the deployment of large,
light, deployable apertures.
Another tradeoff inherent in the radar range equation is the selection of radar frequency. While
high-frequency wave forms enable higher-resolution radar images, they are also susceptible to
atmospheric attenuation and other signal attenuation losses.
Having generated a parametric space that covers a wide range of possible designs (Table 7-4),
the design variables are mapped to the attributes to ensure that the system concepts address the
needs articulated by the decision-maker. Table 7-5 provides the design value mapping matrix for
satellite radar, evaluating the importance of each preliminary design variable against attributes
for GMTI, SAR imaging, and programmatic cost and schedule.43 This mapping consists of a
qualitative assessment following a modified Quality Function Deployment process (as
documented in Section 6.2.3.)
43 In applying RSC to satellite radar, the developed team focused on overall program utility, including attributes for
GMTI, SAR imaging, cost, and schedule. The application of MATE for Survivability in this chapter uses a subset of
the attribute analysis, focusing on the mission utility provided by GMTI.
166
Table 7-5. Design Value Mapping Matrix - Satellite Radar
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The design value mapping matrix helps to establish the design vector by indicating which design
variables are of highest priority based on their total impact across the attributes (rows), and by
ensuring that the selected design variables adequately drive value delivery across all of the
decision-maker-derived attributes (columns).
Table 7-6 shows the baseline design vector established by the RSC development team. Several
assumptions are implicit in the selected design vector, including the use of a monostatic radar
architecture, circular orbits, and an AESA design. Despite these assumptions which limit the
design space, a full-factorial sample of the enumerated design variables yields 23,328 candidate
system designs. Although this is a very large number, particularly in comparison to the small
number of alternatives analyzed in similar studies (CBO 2007), consideration of tens of
thousands of designs is not impractical assuming that an efficient model can be developed.
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Table 7-6. Baseline Design Vector - Satellite Radar
Orbit Altitude 3 [800,1200,1500] *10A3 m
Walker ID Number 8 [1:8] Walker Lookup Table
Radar transmit frequency 1 [10] *10^9 Hz
Antenna Area 3 [10,40,100] m^2
0=AESA,Antenna Type 1 [O] 1 =Mech
Radar Bandwidth 3 (0.5,1,2] *10A9 Hz
Peak Transmit Power 3 [1.5,10,20] kW
0=backbone,Communications Downlink 2 [0,1] 1 =ground1=ground
Tactical Downlink 2 [0,1] 0=yes,1=no
Tugable 1 [1] 0=no, 1=yes
4=baseline,
Maneuver Package 3 [4,5,6] 5=baseline*2,
6=baseline*4
1 =nothing,
Constellation Option 3 [1:3] 2=long lead parts,
3=spares built
7.2.3. Phase 3: Characterize Disturbance Environment
Once the baseline design vector is established, the next step in a traditional MATE study is to
model the performance of the design alternatives to estimate lifecycle cost and utility. In MATE
for Survivability, this step is preceded by two phases: characterizing the disturbance environment
(Phase 3) and applying the survivability principles to the design vector (Phase 4).
Having selected a general system concept for the satellite radar system, environmental
disturbances are enumerated and characterized. Table 7-7 shows the disturbances for an Earth-
observing satellite operating at 800-1500 km and a 530 inclination. Since all disturbances are not
of equal concern, an importance score for each disturbance is assigned based on the magnitude of
impact and likelihood of occurrence. The importance estimates for the first four disturbances in
Table 7-7 are based on Pisacane (2008) and the subsequent estimates are based on engineering
judgment. For example, aerodynamic drag forces from the upper atmosphere may degrade orbits
and chemically erode surfaces (Tribble 2003). However, given that the circular orbits in the
design vector begin at 800 km, this disturbance is of low importance to the design vector. In
contrast, micrometeorites and debris are of serious concern for Earth-observing constellations.
168
Table 7-7. Environmental Disturbances to Satellite Radar"
Disturbance Importance (1-10)
Atmospheric drag fluctuations 1
Arc discharging 3
High-flux radiation 4
Micrometeorites/debris 7
Signal attenuation 5
Change in target definition 4
Failure of relay backbone 6
Loss of tactical ground node 2
Having enumerated disturbances types, the disturbances are checked for non-additive
interactions. For example, an intelligent pairing of certain disturbances by an adversary may
lead to non-linear losses in value delivery. Given an intelligent adversary, it would be necessary
to include such combinations of disturbances as additional rows in Table 7-7.
For the analysis of satellite radar, the focus is on naturally occurring disturbances in the space
environment that are assumed to be randomly distributed. Therefore, while it remains necessary
to model the impact of extreme combinations of disturbances (e.g., loss of communications relay
coupled with global signal attenuation) in Phase 6, such interactions do not dominate the general
characterization of the disturbance environment in Phase 3.
7.2.4. Phase 4: Apply Survivability Principles
Following enumeration of disturbances, the seventeen survivability design principles (Section
4.4) are consulted to inform the generation of system concepts that mitigate the impact of each
disturbance. Each design principle provides a concept-neutral architectural strategy for
achieving survivability. Given the baseline set of design variables and environmental
disturbances, a variety of concept enhancements may brainstormed for the satellite radar mission.
The first two columns of the Survivability Design Variable Mapping Matrix (Table 7-8) illustrate
this mapping. For example, the design principle of margin is applied to the satellite constellation
as well as to four different spacecraft subsystems (i.e., power generation, communications,
propulsion, and data storage). The design principle of redundancy is also applied to different
elements of the system architecture, including the satellite-level, constellation level, and ground
segment. In all, 24 concepts are generated from 13 of the survivability design principles. (Given
the focus on natural disturbances, the selected Type I survivability design principles that modify
the observations, decision-making, and actions of hostile actors are not applicable).
44 The importance score provides a relative ranking of disturbances in the space environment on mission impact.
The scores may range from 0 (i.e., effects produced can be ignored) to 10 (i.e., effects produced will negate
mission).
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Table 7-8. Survivability Design Variable Mapping Matrix
disturbances
design principles concept enhancements design variables (units)
prevention reduce exposed s/c area antenna area (m^2) 9 0 3 9 0 0 0 0
mobility
concealment
w deterrence
. preemption
avoidance si/c maneuvering AV(m/s) 9 0 3 1 0 0 0 0
avoidance s/c servicing interface 9 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
ground receiver maneuverability mobile receiver 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3
radiation-hardened electronics hardening (cal/cmA2) 0 3 9 1 0 0 0 0
hardness bumper hielding shield thickness (mm) 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0
duplicate critical s/c functions bus redundancy 0 1 9 3 0 0 0 0
redundancy on-orbit satellite spares extra s/c per orbital plan 0 1 3 3 0 3 0 0
multiple ground receivers ground infrastructure level 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 9
over-design power generation peak transmit power (kW) 0 0 3 9 9 0 0
over-design link budget assumed signal loss (dB) 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0
margin over-design propulsion system AV (m/s) 3 0 3 0 3 9 0 0
excess on-board data storage s/c data capacity (gbits) 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
excess constellation capacity number of satellites 0 1 3 9 0 0 0 0
C. interface with airborne assets tactical downlink 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
I- heterogeneity communications downlink 0 0 1 1 9 0 9 3
tactical downlink 0 0 1 1 9 0 9 3
distribution spatial separation of spacecraft orbital altitude (km) 1 1 3 3 0 9 0 0
spatial separation of s/c orbits number of planes 0 0 3 9 0 1 0 1
failure mode reduction reduce s/c complexity bus redundancy 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0
fail-safe autonomous operations autonomous control 0 0 0 0 3 0 3 3
flexible sensing operations antenna type 0 0 0 0 3 9 0 0
evolution radar bandwidth (GHz) 0 0 0 0 9 3 0 0
retraction of s/c appendages reconfigurable 0 0 9 3 0 0 0 0
containment s/c fault monitoring and response autonomous control 0 1 3 1 0 0 0 0
replacement rapid reconstitution constellation spares 0 1 3 9 0 0 0 0
-- repair on-orbit-servicing s/c servicing interface 9 1 3 3 0 3 0 0
The next step illustrated in Table 7-8 is to parameterize the survivable concepts by specifying
design variables. While concepts are qualitative descriptions of system strategies, design
variables are quantitative parameters that represent an aspect of a concept that can be controlled
by a designer. To reduce the total number of design variables considered, the baseline set of
design variables is consulted, utilizing existing design variables where possible in the process of
concept parameterization. The final step is to assess the degree of impact of each survivability
design variable on each disturbance type. In a process analogous to the design value mapping
matrix where the ability of candidate design variables to drive system attributes is assessed
(Table 7-5), the ability of the candidate survivability design variables to mitigate the impact of
system disturbances is now assessed. As illustrated in the disturbance columns in Table 7-8, the
number (i.e., 0, 1, 3, or 9) indicates the level of impact that the design survivable has on
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mitigating a given disturbance based on the use context provided by the particular concept
enhancement. For example, the design variable of assumed signal loss in the link budget will
reduce the impact of signal attenuation but will not directly mitigate any of the other
disturbances.
Table 7-9 shows how the redundant design variables are consolidated and ordered to inform
selection of the final design variables. While most survivability enhancement concepts are
specified by a unique design variable or set of design variables, a few design variables may serve
to parameterize more than one principle and concept. For example, providing the satellite with a
servicing interface (i.e., docking port) may enable utilization of an orbital transfer vehicle for
enhanced maneuverability as well a robotic servicing vehicle for on-orbit repair of damaged
components. In consolidating duplicate design variable rows in the survivability design matrix,
the maximum mitigating impact score for each disturbance is kept. The design variables and
disturbances columns in Table 7-9 illustrate the output of this task for the satellite radar system.
Table 7-9. Selection of Survivability Enhancement Features for Inclusion in Design Space
design variables (units)
Type I
survivability design principles
Tvoe II
disturbances
type impact
tacticaldownlink X 3 3 3 3 9 3 9 3 baseline 162
communications downlink X 0 0 1 1 9 0 9 3 baseline 116
eak transmit power (k) X 0 0 0 3 9 9 0 0 baseline 102
antenna area (m^2) X 9 0 3 9 0 0 0 0 baseline 84
number of planes X 0 0 3 9 0 1 0 1 baseline 81
AV(m/s) X X 9 0 3 1 3 9 0 0 baseline 79
constellation spares X 0 1 3 9 00 0 0 78
number of satellites X 0 1 3 9 0 0 0 0 baseline 78
orbitalaltitude(km) X 1 1 3 3 0 9 0 0 baseline 73
shield thickness (cm) X 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 63
autonomous control X X 0 1 3 1 3 0 3 3 61
busredundancy X 0 1 9 3 0 0 0 0 60
s/c servicing interface X X 9 1 3 3 0 3 0 0 57
radar bandwidth (GHz) X 0 0 0 0 9 3 0 0 baseline 57
reconfigurable X 0 0 9 3 00 0 0 57
hardening X 0 3 9 1 0 0 00 52
antenna type X 0 0 0 0 3 9 00 51
extra s/c per orbital plan X 0 1 3 3 0 3 0 0 48
assumed signal loss (dB) X 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 45
telemetry X 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 36
ground infrastructure level X 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 9 33
s/cdatacapcity(gbits X 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 24
mobile receiver X 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 3
n ^l (
Finally, the consolidated set of baseline and survivability design variables is examined to select a
small number for inclusion in the tradespace. As illustrated in the "type" column in Table 7-9,
many survivability design variables are already inherent in the baseline tradespace (i.e., latent
survivability trades).
Four considerations may be incorporated into the process of determining which dedicated
survivability design variables to include. First, the coverage of the consolidated set of design
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variables across the seventeen design principles may be inspected (Table 7-9). While it may not
be wise or possible to include design variables spanning all seventeen design principles (e.g.,
tension of many susceptibility reduction and vulnerability reduction features), it is useful for the
system analyst to understand the implications of including or excluding particular design
variables on the tradespace. For example, design variables which utilize multiple principles
should receive particular consideration for inclusion. Also, if the operational environment of the
system being designed is highly uncertain, it may be wise to ensure representation of Type I,
Type II, and Type III survivability trades in the design-space.
Second, the mitigating impact of each consolidated design variable across the set of disturbances
may be estimated by using a linear-weighted sum (in which weights are based on disturbance
impact) (Table 7-7). In Table 7-9, the survivability design variables are ordered by this estimate
of mitigating impact.
Third, it is important to consider downstream constraints associated with the modeling effort and
computing resources when expanding the design-space. While it may be theoretically possible to
parameterize all of the design principles and selectively sample the design-space using multi-
disciplinary design optimization techniques (e.g., genetic algorithms), such an implementation
would require orders-of-magnitude increases in the modeling effort. While the geometric growth
of the tradespace (as design variables are added) may be addressed by selectively sampling the
tradespace or by gaining access to a super-computer, developing a stochastic, physics-based
performance model for every disturbance and mitigating design variable is not a task that may
offloaded to computers. Therefore, unless the system analyst has access to a team of engineers,
there is a limit to how many survivability design variables may be incorporated into the final
design vector.
Fourth, engineering judgment and knowledge gained from previous iterations of the MATE
model may inform whether a particular survivability enhancement feature should be permanently
turned "on" (e.g., moving the binary survivability design variable of autonomy to the constant
variable list). Given these four considerations, two additional survivability design variables were
selected for inclusion in the satellite radar tradespace: constellation spares and shielding
thickness.
Table 7-10. Finalized SR Design Vector (n=3888)
n=3888 survivability variables
-----------------------------
Orbit Altitude (km) Walker ID Antenna Area (mA2) I Constellation Spares
800 5/5/1 10 I 0
1500 9/3/2 40 I 1
27/3/1 100 I 2
66/6/5 I
Peak Transmit Power (kW) Radar Bandwidth (MHz) Comm. Architecture I Shield Thickness (mm)
1.5 500 Direct Downlink Only I 1
10 1000 Relay Backbone 5
20 2000 I10 I
I- -------------
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Table 7-10 provides the final design vector for satellite radar. As the independent variables for
subsequent tradespace exploration, sampling these parameters is intended to define concepts that
offer interesting trades among lifecycle cost, design utility, and survivability. Although two
dedicated survivability design variables have been added to the final design vector, the 3888
possible combinations is less than the 23,328 possible combinations contained in the baseline
design vector in Table 7-6. This reduction in the design space occurs because the number of
steps has been reduced for orbit altitude and Walker ID number 4 5 while the tactical downlink and
maneuver package design variables have been set to fixed values.
In this application of MATE for Survivability, it is possible to add survivability design variables
while reducing the size of the overall design vector because the survivability analysis
incorporates lessons learned from a previous iteration of static tradespace exploration.46 In
particular, knowledge of the tradespace generated by the baseline design vector and performance
model informs setting some design variables to constants where obvious design decisions exist
(e.g., including tactical downlink). This downstream knowledge of the tradespace also informs
the selection of enumeration steps and ranges (e.g., halving candidate Walker constellations by
fixing inclination at 530 while increasing average constellation size to improve coverage
statistics). Reducing the size of the design vector is helpful for accelerating the computation of
the static cost-utility tradespace in Phase 5, and crucial for the computationally-intensive
modeling of utility trajectories in Phase 6.
7.2.5. Phase 5: Model Baseline System Performance
Following the completion of the concept and context generation activities, the RSC development
team created an efficient, mid-fidelity computer model to determine the attribute, utility, and cost
values for each design enumerated in the tradespace. To enable concurrent and collaborative
model development, the satellite radar system was decomposed into several MATLAB modules
to determine attribute values and intermediate variables given a design. The attribute outputs are
then used to compute lifecycle cost and design utility.
Table 7-11 shows the software architecture for the satellite radar model. The model translates
designs from the design vector in a given epoch and computes the corresponding costs,
attributes, and utilities. In particular, each design of interest is enumerated, and then run through
the modules sequentially by a main loop, which stores the computed values for each design for
subsequent exploration and analysis. As evidenced by the lack of above-diagonal dependencies
in Table 7-11, the modules are carefully structured such that they can be executed sequentially
without iteration or optimization loops. Eliminating feedback among modules is critical for
achieving reasonable runtimes (of a few minutes) on current desktop computers.
45 The Walker notation is used to describe symmetrical constellations of satellites in circular orbits. The three
numbers refer to the number of satellites, the number of orbital planes, and the phasing of satellites in adjacent
planes, respectively.
46 The MATE for Survivability study of satellite radar followed the application of the baseline MATE process to
satellite radar by the RSC development team.
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Table 7-11. NZ Diagram of Software Architecture for Satellite Radar
0
0 0
(0 0
Desi n Enumerator
Taret Xa .
_ cc C :3 ) cu
Orbit XXRadar XXXXConstellation XXtsX X
RadOn-Board Processor X X X
Communications X X X
Ground Processor X
Satellite Bus X X X X X
Attributes XX X X X X X
Cost X X X X X
Utilit X
Survivability XX X XX
The following paragraphs briefly describe the key computations performed by the individual
modules. Given finite project resources, modules are written at an intermediate level of fidelity.
Direct physics-based models are used where possible, and simplifying assumptions and
heuristics are applied for less sensitive parts of the analysis.
Design Enumerator. Given the design variables (Table 7-10), the design enumerator creates a
list of candidate designs through a series of nested "for" loops. Each design is numbered
sequentially and stored.
Constants. The constants module returns a data structure containing fixed values regarding
technology availability (e.g., specific performance of solar array), modeling assumptions (e.g.,
diameter of tactical downlink dish), and parametric cost estimating relationships. These
constants span the payload, processing, communications, and bus subsystems. In the
development of RSC, modeling activities involved creating a unique static tradespace for each
enumerated epoch context (Table 7-2). As each epoch is defined by varying constants in the
epoch vector, many of the constants become variables in RSC. In contrast, in the application of
MATE for Survivability, a single static tradespace is computed given a fixed set of constants
representing a nominal epoch context. The nominal context is based on the availability of
technology with technology readiness level (TRL) 9 or higher, current generation launch
vehicles, and a communications infrastructure based on DoD's Wideband Global SATCOM
System (WGS) and the Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN). Communications
jamming is turned off in the computation of baseline system performance.
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Design Space Selector. The design space selector takes a sample of enumerated designs. In this
case application, a full-factorial sample is selected, including all 3,888 possible combinations of
the eight design variables.
Target. The target module selects a target set from the list of targets elicited from subject matter
experts. The target is characterized by a constant array of structures, each containing target
location, RCS, velocity, and terrain type. Terrain type is operationalized as minimum elevation
angle. For the baseline system performance, the target set is based on an operations plan which
distributes large moving targets in East Asia and small moving targets in the Middle East.
Orbit. The orbit module computes basic orbital properties that are required inputs to the radar
module. Given an orbital altitude and Walker formation, orbit radius, satellite velocity,
maximum eclipse length, and orbit period are computed using basic geometry. A circular orbit
and a spherical earth are assumed, as well as constant satellite altitude and velocity.
Radar. The radar module computes the performance attributes of the radar specified by the
design variables as a function of the calculated orbit and given target deck. Computation of the
radar attributes is complicated because the attributes can be traded against one another. To
decouple these computations, a major assumption of the CONOPS is that evaluation of particular
attribute occurs when the radar is operating in such a way as to optimize that attribute.47 For
example, the minimum detectable RCS is computed by assuming a dwell time long enough to
achieve the maximum theoretical performance by the given bandwidth and dimensions of the
radar system. However, when evaluating the number of target boxes, the sensor dwells on each
target only for the duration necessary for detection before advancing to the next target area.
Therefore, most radar systems evaluated achieve good minimum RCS while the average number
of target boxes is the attribute most sensitive to the traditional radar performance metrics of
antenna area and power. While not realistic in practice, such assumptions are reasonable for
evaluation purposes (e.g., had dwell time been fixed, minimum RCS would have become
sensitive to antenna area and power).
Given these simplifying assumptions, the radar module uses basic geometry and physics to
calculate several intermediate variables and the desired performance attributes (Wertz and
Larson 1999). The module is decomposed into twelve sub-modules. First, given the antenna
area design variable, the length and width of the AESA is computed assuming a 4:1 length to
width ratio. Second, beamwidth is estimated given the antenna area and transmit frequency and
decibel value for transmitted signals. Third, the minimum detectable velocity is computed by
calculating the pure MDV (as a function of the radar and satellite velocity) and then adjusting for
the curvature of the Earth. (The MDV assumes that at some point the target of interest is
travelling along the range direction towards the satellite in a vector parallel to the tangent plane
of the earth at the sub-satellite point.) Fourth, the minimum and maximum elevation angles are
determined by using the pure MDV to find the largest angle at which targets with the slowest
velocity in the target deck are still detectable. Fifth, the distances from the satellite to the earth
are computed when looking along the minimum and maximum elevation angles. Sixth, the radar
47 By nature, AESA radars are flexible systems open to a wide variety of CONOPS. Rather than modeling the
optimal CONOPS at all times in the simulation (outside of the study's scope) or including different CONOPS in the
design vector (computationally prohibitive), this assumption makes the performance modeling tractable.
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swath width is calculated using the range, signal wavelength, antenna width, and minimum
elevation angle. Seventh, the angular difference of the leading and trailing radar beams from the
center of the Earth is estimated at the subsatellite point. Eighth, the duty cycle is found as the
product of pulse repetition frequency and pulse width. Ninth, the average power utilization of
the radar is calculated given the design variable of peak transmit power, duty cycle, and transmit
efficiency. Tenth, the antenna gain is computed as a function of antenna diameter, transmit
efficiency, and frequency. Eleventh, the unattenuated range resolution of the satellite is
computed as a function of beamwidth and gain, given the speed of light and assuming a constant
noise value. Twelfth, the time per target per beam to achieve an acceptable signal to noise ratio
is computed and used to determine the amount of time needed to dwell on a target to get
sufficient RCS resolution. Finally, the radar module applies the calculated performance
attributes to the radar range equation to check for errors.
Constellation. The constellation module inputs the calculated radar performance attributes and
orbit values and outputs coverage statistics and communications availability. Coverage statics
are also pre-computed for cases involving the random loss of one or more satellites. The
constellation module uses the time and altitude data from the orbit module to simulate satellite
movement on a minute by minute basis, projecting the surface area that each satellite can cover
in each minute using the swath information from the radar module. An iterative simulation
tracks the relative position and motion of targets, satellites, communications systems, and
warfighter users of the GMTI data.
Figure 7-10. Visualization of SR Constellation Module
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The computed coverage statistics match outputs in similar evaluations of satellite radar
alternatives (CBO 2007). A dynamic visualization of satellite look-angles for target detection
and communications (Figure 7-10) further validates the constellation module.
On-Board Processor. Taking inputs from the constants, orbit, and radar modules, the on-board
processor module estimates the latency increment as well as the raw sensor data rate of the
payload. Processor mass, cost, and power requirements are also computed.
Communications. The communications module estimates the data latency and the data
throughput attributes as well as the mass, power, and cost of the spacecraft communications
architecture. With inputs from the constants, design space selector, orbit, radar, constellation,
and on-board processor modules, communications requirements and performance are determined
using a link budget (Pratt, Bostian and Allnutt 2003). Given an input data rate from the radar
module and downlink opportunities from the constellation module (assuming a 9 5th percentile
worst case time between in view downlink locations), required compression and transmission
rates are determined. (A data storage system is also sized for the direct downlink architecture.)
These requirements are used to determine power requirements for an acceptable signal-to-noise
ratio. As certain power requirements are unreasonable, the code selects among multiple satellite
dish diameters in order to compensate for large data rates.
There are two communications architectures in the tradespace: direct downlink and relay
backbone. For direct downlink, the downlink availability times multiplied by a latency factor
determines the required downlink data rate. This downlink data rate is sent to the link budget to
determine the mass, power, and cost of the communications system. For relay backbone, the
downlink data rate is set by the capability of the system being utilized (e.g., WGS). The
backbones are assumed to always be in view rather than a direct downlink which requires the
satellite to be in view of a ground station.
Ground Processor. The ground processor module sets the latency associated with processing
the data received from the constellation before it is received by the warfighter. As with other
subsystem modules, recurring and non-recurring engineering costs are estimated.
Satellite Bus. The satellite bus module determines the spacecraft characteristics necessary to
support the radar payload and communications system. First-order models of satellite structure,
power, and propulsion subsystems are applied as well as heuristic measures for the attitude
control and thermal control subsystems. The satellite bus module outputs the mass and cost of
each satellite in the constellation.
Structural requirements are based on a panel-beam model of the deployed radar plane (designed
to a stiffness criterion) and a simple mass-fraction model of the bus. The power subsystem is
sized by integrating the power requirements of the other subsystems and calculating the mass of
the solar array required to produce that power and the batteries needed for storage (at end-of-
life). Propulsion requirements are determined by calculating the amount of propellant used
throughout the spacecraft's lifetime, including maneuvers.
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The satellite bus module also determines the U.S. launch vehicle and U.S. launch site for the
satellites. Given orbit altitude, inclination, and Walker constellation type, the launch sub-module
uses the assumptions in Table 7-12 (Isakowitz, Hopkins and Hopkins 2004) to select the least
expensive vehicle that can be used, its launch cost, the available launch site, and the maximum
number of satellites that may be launched by each vehicle.
Table 7-12. Launch Vehicle Assumptions in SR Model
Launches per yearVehicle Payload to LEO Launch Cost k$ Cape Canaveral Vandenberg
Atlas V 400 12,500 kg 75000 12 n/a
Delta IV Medium+ 13,327 kg 116500 17 9
Atlas V 500 20,520 kg 110000 12 n/a
Delta IV Heavy 23,260 kg 154000 17 9
Ares I 24,453 kg 400000 4 n/a
Ares V 145,000 kg 1000000 1 n/a
Attributes. The attributes module takes the attributes calculated by the subsystem modules and
wraps them in a single structure. It also computes attributes that are simple functions of
intermediate variables from separate modules (e.g., adding processing and communications
latencies for tracking latency).
Cost. The cost module collects the non-recurring and recurring engineering cost estimates from
the satellite subsystem modules to calculate the cost of an individual satellite and to estimate a
baseline program lifecycle cost. Finally, an overall program lifecycle cost is computed based on
the constellation sparing strategy.
Utility. Given outputs from the attribute module and the utility functions elicited from the
decision-maker in Section 7.2.1, the utility module calculates the single-attribute utilities and the
multi-attribute utility for each design alternative.
Survivability. Once the costs and benefits of design alternatives in a static context have been
determined by calculating overall lifecycle cost and multi-attribute utility, the survivability
module examines the performance of design alternatives in dynamic operational environments.
The survivability module and its associated outputs are the subject of Section 7.2.6.
Having provided an overview of the satellite radar model, the remainder of this section describes
the output of the static tradespace analysis. The baseline tradespace consisting of lifecycle cost
and design utility is introduced, and the effect of each design variable on the tradespace is
examined.
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Figure 7-11. Baseline SR Tradespace
Figure 7-11 shows the baseline SR tradespace which evaluates each design alternative in a static,
nominal environment. Each point represents a unique system architecture and is plotted in terms
of a twenty-year lifecycle cost (in billions of dollars) and multi-attribute utility (as defined in
Section 7.2.1). While 3888 design alternatives are generated from a full-factorial sampling of
the design variables (Table 7-10), only 2268 are plotted in Figure 7-11 for consideration. This
42% reduction of the tradespace occurs because many of the designs fail to perform above the
minimum acceptable level in one or more attributes. For example, the constellations composed
of satellites with an antenna area of 10 m2 are filtered from the tradespace (see Figure 9-11 in
Appendix F).
The baseline tradespace includes 198 cost-utility Pareto-optimal designs (i.e., designs of highest
utility at a given cost). Within this set, the baseline tradespace reveals interesting trade-offs
among Walker constellation type, antenna area, peak transmit power, and cost. Several different
satellite radar constellations occupy different regions of the Pareto front, including sparse
constellations with low power-aperture products, and dense constellations with greater transmit
powers and antenna areas. In a simple MATE analysis, promising designs identified in the
baseline tradespace (e.g., designs on the "knee" of the Pareto front) might be selected for further
evaluation.
To verify that the model outputs reasonable results, a sensitivity analysis is conducted on the
relationship between the input design variables and output attribute performance levels. In
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Figure 7-12, each box plots the sensitivity of an attribute (row) to a design variable (column). As
the design variables are discrete, the plots are a series of lines, and differences in these lines
indicate sensitivity (highlighted by shading). Accordingly, Figure 7-12 is similar to the design
value mapping matrix in Table 7-5, but the results shown are from a physics-based model, not a
set of assumptions and expert opinion. The numbers from the design value mapping matrix are
overlaid on each plot, and a comparison is made. Most sensitivities behave as expected,
validating the engineering judgment during concept generation.
Field of Regard
Imaging
Latency
MDV
Min RCS
# of Target
Boxes
# Targets per
Pass
Radar
Resolution
Antenna Antenna QpMr Comm Maneuver Orbit Peak Radar
Area Type Backbone TactK al Altitude Power Bandwidth
9 i9 I
ZL~C WElI~7I~IJEEWWI7
Walker Constelation
D # Option
q s*idWWo*JDW0Frr
Revisit Rate LLEI[I 9I] Wi [01[F~] ]]
Geolocation
Accuracy
Target
acquisition time
Track life
Track latency igLuIIWI LJI DIW Vcrot1iuS tu
Figure 7-12. Design Vector to Attribute Sensitivity Study
To provide insights into engineering trades and interpret the results of the static analysis, a
sensitivity analysis is also performed for each design variable on the baseline tradespace. In
particular, a third dimension is added to the tradespace (i.e., shape) to examine the overall effect
of each design variable on cost and utility.
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Figure 7-13. Effect of Walker Constellation on Baseline SR Tradespace
Figure 7-13 shows the effect of the Walker constellation design variable on the tradespace. The
horizontal and vertical axes of the baseline tradespace are preserved to indicate lifecycle cost and
utility, respectively. The dots in Figure 7-11 are replaced with shapes to indicate Walker
constellation type. Examining the Pareto front in Figure 7-13 shows a direct correlation of
constellation size with cost and utility. While sparse, five-satellite constellations occupy the
lower-left of the tradespace, denser constellations dominate the upper-region region of greater
cost and utility. This is an intuitive result as the denser constellations perform better in the
attribute of target acquisition time. The larger constellations also have the potential to perform
well in the attribute of target track life by handing-off tracks to successive satellites.
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Figure 7-14. Effect of Peak Transmit Power on Baseline SR Tradespace
Figure 7-14 examines the effect of peak transmit power on the tradespace. As expected, low
power systems dominate the lower performance, less-costly region of the Pareto front and higher
power systems comprise the high performance region. The effect is not uniform as Pareto-
efficient antennae with 20 kW of peak transmit power may deliver less utility than lower-
powered systems due to the impact of antenna area. (The effect of antenna area, in addition to
the effect of orbit altitude, radar bandwidth, and communications architecture, may be observed
in the figures of Appendix F.) Ultimately, however, if one limits the search of the tradespace to
the Pareto efficient region, power-aperture product becomes a clear trade between cost and
performance.
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Figure 7-15. Effect of Shielding Thickness on Baseline SR Tradespace
Moving on to the dedicated survivability variables in the design vector, Figure 7-15 shows the
effect of shielding thickness on the baseline SR tradespace. Interestingly, every design
comprising the 198-count Pareto set incorporates the minimum shielding thickness of 1 mm. As
demonstrated previously in the space tug computer experiments, the mitigating impact of
survivability enhancement features on environmental disturbances is not accounted for in the
static tradespace. In contrast to the previous space tug experiments, there is no utility loss
associated with shielding because loss of AV from the mass penalty does not impact the
attributes of satellite radar. However, the mass penalty of increasing shielding to 5 mm or 10
mm adds lifecycle cost (as a function of the exposed cross sectional area being shielded). As a
result, all designs with increased shielding are in the interior region of the tradespace.
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Figure 7-16. Effect of Constellation Spares on Baseline SR Tradespace
Figure 7-16 shows the effect of constellation spares on the baseline SR tradespace. As with
shielding thickness, no designs incorporating this survivability design variable (i.e., choosing to
have at least one or two constellation spares for unplanned attrition) are included in the set of
Pareto-optimal designs. Again, this is because purchasing spare satellites adds cost (i.e.,
typically over $1B) without an impact on the utility of the system at beginning-of-life.
The subsequent section describes how the static tradespace analysis of satellite radar is extended
to incorporate survivability considerations over the entire lifecycle.
7.2.6. Phase 6: Model Impact of Disturbances on Performance
Having calculated the lifecycle cost and beginning-of-life utility for each design alternative, the
survivability module examines the performance of design alternatives in dynamic operational
environments. The occurrence of uncertain future disturbance events from the natural space
environment is modeled in a stochastic simulation, and a Monte Carlo analysis is conducted to
extract representative distributions of utility trajectories. Two disturbances are incorporated into
the analysis: micrometeorites/debris impacts and signal attenuation.
As an extension of the baseline MATE analysis, the survivability module is the final element of
the SR software architecture. As shown in Table 7-11, the module receives inputs from the
constants vector (e.g., bumper shielding materials), design space selector (e.g., shield thickness),
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constellation module (e.g., pre-computed coverage statistics for degraded constellations),
satellite bus module (e.g., exposed cross-sectional area), and attributes and utility modules.
These inputs are then used to model the susceptibility, vulnerability, and resilience of design
alternatives. The output of an individual run of the model is a dynamic characterization of the
system performance in the attributes. This dynamic characterization is translated to a multi-
attribute utility trajectory for ten years of operational life. Since the simulation is path-dependent
and stochastic, 500 Monte Carlo trials are conducted for each satellite radar constellation in the
design vector.
Design
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Cost Utility
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Figure 7-17. Incorporation of Survivability Considerations into Satellite Radar Tradespace
Figure 7-17 provides a flow-chart representation of how survivability considerations are
incorporated into the satellite radar tradespace. Treating the baseline MATE model as a black-
box, implementation of the survivability analysis involves seven general steps. First, the design
vector is expanded to include survivability design variables (Table 7-10), including the addition
of three levels of satellite shielding and the option to purchase up to two spare spacecraft to
enable rapid reconstitution of the constellation. Taking a full-factorial sample of the design
vector, this expansion grows the design space by a factor of nine. Second, the baseline MATE
model of satellite radar is run to assess the performance of the expanded set of design
alternatives. Accounting for the added cost and weight of shielding as well as the added cost of
purchasing extra spacecraft, the attributes are recomputed followed by the calculation of total
lifecycle cost and design utility. The preceding Section 7.2.5 shows the output of this static
analysis.
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In the following three steps, constellation health is modeled using a probabilistic simulation. In
the third step, susceptibility to debris impacts is modeled as a function of the exposed cross-
sectional area of alternative constellations and a typical debris flux for Earth-observation
satellites. Debris event times, defined as an impact by an object >1 mm, are randomly generated
according to a Poisson process (with the Poisson parameter set to the average inter-arrival time
of historical debris flux) (Wiedemann et al. 2008). Given a debris event, the type of impact is
determined by probabilistically sampling the distribution of debris sizes and assuming a fixed
relative velocity of 7.5 km/s. Susceptibility to global signal attenuation is also modeled in the
third step using Poisson arrivals (and assuming an average inter-arrival time of five years).
Whereas susceptibility to debris varies by satellite design and constellation type, susceptibility to
global signal attenuation is assumed uniform. The duration of attenuation events, assumed to
average six months, is also modeled using the Poisson distribution.
In the fourth step, the vulnerability of the designs to the generated disturbances is assessed. In
the case of debris events, the ability of the satellite shielding to block the debris is determined
based on the shield thickness and the momentum of the impacting debris. If a debris impact can
be repelled by the shield, no losses occur and the simulation exits the vulnerability model. If the
shield is not thick enough to repel the debris, satellite vulnerability is assessed probabilistically
using conservative assumptions from a binary loss model (i.e., curve one in Figure 7-18). Taken
from the literature (Wiedemann, Oswald et al. 2008), the empirically-derived loss model is based
on the kinetic energy of the debris. If satellite failure occurs, the impact on constellation
performance is determined by re-computing multi-attribute utility. In particular, the values of
target acquisition time and track life for the degraded constellation are found using pre-computed
coverage statistics from the constellation module. These attribute levels are used to recalculate
the single-attribute utilities and overall multi-attribute utilities at the time of the debris impact.
In the case of signal attenuation, vulnerability is based simply on the availability of a relay
backbone for downlink communications. Attenuation is assumed to have no impact if such a
backbone exists. If no backbone is available, a total loss of mission utility is assumed for the
duration of the attenuation event.
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Figure 7-18. Failure Probability as a Function of Impact Kinetic Energy (Wiedemann, Oswald et al. 2008)
186
In the fifth step, the resilience of each design is assessed. If the output of the vulnerability model
is a satellite loss, the design vector is checked for the availability of spare satellites. If a spare is
available, a replacement satellite is launched. (Once launched, ground spares are not replaced.)
The time of launch is assumed to be six months plus a random delay (according to a Poisson
process with an expected value of six months). At the time of satellite replacement, the attribute
levels and utilities are recomputed for the constellation. By continuously monitoring
constellation performance in the attributes, multi-attribute utility may be assessed over the entire
lifecycle. This dynamic characterization of overall system health is termed a utility trajectory.
Figure 7-19 shows a sample utility trajectory, showing the impact of satellite loss, satellite
replacement, and signal attenuation (in the absence of a relay backbone) on constellation
performance. As discussed in Section 7.2.1, the required value threshold of the decision-maker
is equivalent to the emergency value threshold (i.e., Vx=Ve=O).
Sample Satellite Radar Utility Trajectory
5
time (years
Vx=Ve=o
Figure 7-19. Utility Trajectory Output from a Single Run of the Simulation
In the sixth step, time-weighted average utility and threshold availability are calculated at the end
of each ten-year simulation as summary statistics for the utility trajectory output. As each run of
the simulation is stochastic and path-dependent, a 500-run Monte Carlo analysis is performed for
each design to obtain a significant sample of utility trajectories. In the seventh step, the
probabilistic survivability metrics are integrated with the deterministic metrics of lifecycle cost
and design utility for integrated tradespace exploration. These final two steps, application of the
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survivability metrics and tradespace exploration, are described in detail in the following two
subsections.
7.2.7. Phase 7: Apply Survivability Metrics
Having modeled the impact of disturbances on the lifecycle performance of the design
alternatives, the survivability metrics are applied to the utility trajectory outputs. Applying the
survivability metrics requires establishing a percentile reporting level for the distribution of each
metric.
Figure 7-20 depicts the distributions of time-weighted average utility achieved by 20% of the
design alternatives over 500 Monte Carlo runs. (A random sample of 20% was selected to aid in
information visualization.) Each column of points represents the distribution of time-weighted
average utility for a single satellite radar design vector. (Figure 7-21 shows a histogram for one
of these distributions.) To organize the data, the columns are ordered along the horizontal axis in
terms of design utility--the deterministic beginning-of-life utility achieved by a constellation
before stochastic losses accrue from disturbance events. The design utility here is equivalent to
the utility axis in the baseline tradespace (Figure 7-11). A 450 line is also drawn to show the
maximum time-weighted average utility value achievable.
Distributions of Time-Weighted Average Utility (20% Sample of Tradespace)
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Figure 7-20. SR Distributions of Time-Weighted Average Utility
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The results in Figure 7-20 are fairly uniform, showing a consistent pattern of highly-skewed
distributions towards design utility. In contrast to the distributions of time-weighted average
utility in the space tug computer experiment (Figure 5-14), the majority of utility losses are
relatively small, as illustrated by the concentration of points near design utility. Interestingly,
worst-case outcomes from the Monte Carlo simulation vary across the tradespace. While the
tail-end of time-weighted average utility distributions for high design utility constellations (>0.6)
fall only slightly below design utility values, the tail-end of distributions for mid-range design
utility constellations (0.3-0.6) may extend down to 0.2 time-weighted average utility. This result
underscores the ability of large, distributed constellations (in the high utility region) to sustain
satellite losses with minimal impact on coverage statistics. Conversely, the impact of satellite
losses on target acquisition time and target track life on intermediate-sized constellations in the
mid-utility region is much greater. Utility losses in the low utility region are small. Although
consisting primarily of small constellations, low-utility designs counter-intuitively have low
sensitivity to satellite losses because of their baseline attribute performance levels. In particular,
these designs deliver most of their value by their radar performance in the number of target
boxes, minimum detectable target velocity, and minimum detectable radar cross section. Since
these attributes are calculated at the satellite-level and performance in the constellation-level
attributes is already low at beginning-of-life, constellation degradation has a less significant
impact on time-weighted average utility.
Time-Weighted Average Utility - Design 3109 (n=500)
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Figure 7-21. Distribution of Time-Weighted Average Utility for DV(3109)
Figure 7-21 shows the histogram of time-weighted average utility for DV(3109), a representative
example of the skewed, long-tailed distributions across simulation runs. As shown in Table
7-13, DV(3109) consists of a large Walker constellation falling in the mid-utility range.
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Table 7-13. Properties of DV(3109)
orbit altitude 1500 km
Walker constellation 27/3/1
transmit frequency 10 GHz
antenna area 40 m2
antenna type AESA
radar bandwidth 500 MHz
peak transmit power 10 kW
tugable no
comm. architecture direct downlink
tactical link yes
shield thickness 5 mm
satellite spares 0
lifecycle cost $25.4B
design utility 0.43
While the time-weighted average utility distributions are characterized by highly-skewed and
long-tailed distributions, the distributions of threshold availability are much more limited in
range. Given the size of the constellations and the setting of the emergency value threshold at
zero utility, virtually all constellations are able to exceed the emergency value threshold
following satellite losses from orbital debris. However, the emergency value threshold is
violated for constellations relying exclusively on a direct downlink in the presence of global
signal attenuation. Therefore, threshold availability values become an indicator of whether
constellations utilize a relay backbone for communications.
Having examined the distributions of the survivability metrics, a percentile reporting level is
established for each metric. Reflecting the risk aversion associated with failing to meet
emergency value thresholds due to disturbances from the natural space environment, the
reporting percentile for threshold availability is set at the 1st percentile (i.e., 99% of the runs
perform above the reported availability level). Given that utility losses within permissible
thresholds are less severe, the reporting percentile for time-weighted average utility loss is set at
the 95th percentile (i.e., 95% of the runs experiences utility losses below the reported level).
Sensitivity of the results to the percentile reporting level is performed during tradespace
exploration by producing a survivability tear(drop) tradespace for multiple reporting percentiles
and analyzing variance across the sets of Pareto-efficient designs.
7.2.8. Phase 8: Explore Tradespace
Having evaluated the cost, utility, time-weighted average utility loss, and threshold availability
of each design alternative, integrated trades are made among the satellite radar constellations.
Designs in the Pareto-efficient region are examined for prescriptive insights, and interesting
designs are flagged as candidates for more detailed design. Following the survivability tear
tradespace analysis, response surfaces are drawn to examine the impact of the survivability
design variables on time-weighted average utility.
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Figure 7-22. Survivability Tear Tradespace - Satellite Radar
Figure 7-22 presents the survivability tear tradespace for satellite radar. Addressing the need for
trading lifecycle cost, performance, and survivability of design alternatives, deterministic cost
and design utility data are integrated with the probabilistic metrics of time-weighted average
utility loss and threshold availability. Preserving the cost and design utility axes of the baseline
tradespace, the survivability metrics are incorporated using shade (threshold availability-1s t
percentile) and a line (for 9 5 th percentile time-weighted average utility loss) drawn to time-
weighted average utility.
A close inspection of Figure 7-22 yields several insights. Several clusters of similar design with
fixed utility and variable cost are visible, reflecting insensitivity of utility to communications
flexibility, bumper shielding, and constellation spares. While baseline utility remains fixed as
the cost of these survivability enhancements are added to a given constellation, performance in
time-weighted utility loss and threshold availability varies. As design options progress towards
the interior region of the tradespace (i.e., to the right, away from the Pareto front of cost and
utility), survivability performance generally improves. The effect is not uniform, however, with
several constellation clusters in the lower-end of the Pareto front unable to eliminate utility
losses even with all survivability design variables at the highest setting. Most importantly, the
tear tradespace shows that the time-weighted average utility of alternative satellite radar
constellations (realized in operation) is different from the baseline utility achieved by the designs
before disturbances are considered. Therefore, depending on the importance of survivability vis-
a-vis cost and utility, the rank order preferences of the decision-maker on the static design space
(e.g., baseline tradespace in Figure 7-11) are subject to change.
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Figure 7-23. Magnified Survivability Tear Tradespace
Figure 7-23 magnified a portion of the Pareto front region of the tear tradespace. Accordingly,
the high level trends observed in Figure 7-22 may be observed in more detail for a smaller
portion of the tradespace. Each horizontal cluster of constellations grows in cost and improves in
the survivability metrics as survivability variables are increased. In particular, lifecycle costs
grow 15-30%, threshold availability increases from -0.90-0.95 to -1.00, and utility losses
decreases a variable amount. Interestingly, many highly survivable systems are located in the
middle of the horizontal clusters (rather than on the right side of highest cost).
To mitigate the complexity associated with visualizing the variation in cost, utility, and
survivability performance-both within clusters and across the entire tradespace-filters may be
applied to reduce the number of designs under consideration. For example, if designs located off
the Pareto front of cost and design utility are eliminated from the tear tradespace, only 198 of the
2268 designs remain (see Figure 7-24). However, this filtering is undesirable given that the
remaining designs are frequently the least survivable. If utility loss is applied as a third
optimization axis to the filter, a three-dimensional region of Pareto efficiency consisting of 290
designs is identified (Figure 7-25). (This region includes a larger number of designs since it
includes the original Pareto front of cost and utility as well as the new Pareto front of cost and
utility, and "compromise" designs lying on the projected surface between the two planes.)
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Figure 7-24. Pareto Front of Survivability Tear Tradespace
Pareto Efficient Set for Cost, Utility, and Utility Loss (n=290)
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Figure 7-25. Three-Dimensional Pareto Surface of Survivability Tear Tradespace
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Figure 7-26. Four-Dimensional Pareto Surface of Survivability Tear Tradespace
Finally, if threshold availability is added as a fourth axis to the filtering criteria, 760 designs are
identified in the Pareto region (Figure 7-26).
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Figure 7-27. Magnified and Filtered Survivability Tear Tradespace
Having applied the filtering logic to identify a four-dimensional Pareto region of cost, utility,
utility loss, and threshold availability, Figure 7-27 shows the designs that remain in the
magnified region of the tear tradespace. While the filtering has greatly reduced the number of
designs under consideration, dozens of "optimal" design remain within this central region of the
tradespace. Five designs of particular interest are circled and labeled in Figure 7-27 for further
investigation. Two of the designs, DV(2908) and DV(3718), are selected given their location in
the traditional Pareto front. The other three designs are selected given their strong performance
in the traditional metrics of cost and utility while also achieving high survivability. To
complement the examination of DV(2908) and DV(3718), DV(2901) and DV(3711) are selected
as survivable alternatives within the same constellation cluster. In addition, DV(3231) is
selected as a survivable alternative located in the interior region. DV(3231) is included in the
analysis because its high survivability is insensitive to the selected percentile reporting levels of
the survivability metrics (see Figure 9-14 in Appendix F to see Figure 7-27 with time-weighted
utility loss reported at the 9 9 th percentile).
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Table 7-14. Properties of Circled Design Vectors in Figure 7-27
orbit altitude (km) 1500 1500
Walker constellation 9/3/2 9/3/2 27/3/1 66/6/5 66/6/5
transmit frequency (GHz) 10 10
antenna area (m^2) 100 100 40 40
antenna type AESA AESA
radar bandwidth (MHz) 2000 2000
peak transmit power (kVV) 20 20
tugable no no
comm. architecture direct relay relay direct relay
tactical link yes yes
shield thickness (mm) 1 1 10 1
satellite spares 0 2 2 0 2
lifecycle cost ($B) 22.3 25.8 31.2 54.8 57.4
utility 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.74 0.74
utility loss (95th) 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00
utility loss (99th) 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01
threshold availability (1st) 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.95 1.00
Table 7-14 shows the design variable inputs and decision metric outputs of the satellite radar
model for the five designs of interest. The designs are divided into two groups, with DV(2908),
DV(2901), and DV(3231) located in the lower-left of the Pareto region, and DV(3718) and
DV(3711) located in the upper-right region. Comparing columns allows explicit trades to be
made between cost and survivability. For example, selecting DV(2901) in lieu of DV(2908)
increases cost by $3.5B (through the addition of a relay communications system and the
purchase of two satellite spares) but reduces utility loss to 0.01 and increases threshold
availability to 1.00. Similarly, the additional $3.6B cost of DV(3711) reduces utility loss to
effectively zero and increases threshold availability to 1.00.
Rather than improving the survivability of a Pareto front design exclusively through survivability
enhancements, substituting DV(3231) for DV(2908) also improves survivability through the
benefits afforded by a different system architecture. Although located close to the cost and
utility values of DV(2908), DV(3231) has a different constellation structure consisting of more
numerous, less-capable satellites. In particular, the Walker constellation is increased from 9/3/2
to 27/3/1, and the antenna area of each satellite is decreased from 100 to 40 m2. The more
distributed constellation structure combined with the investments in shielding and satellite spares
yields a design that is highly survivable to even the most risk-averse decision-maker (Figure 9-14
in Appendix F).
While the primary goal of the tear tradespaces is to identify designs that achieve a good balance
of cost, utility, and survivability, the preceding analysis also yielded prescriptive insights
regarding the impact of the survivability design variables on a couple of point designs. Given
that the fundamental goal of tradespace exploration is to gain a broad understanding of the
design space, this analysis on two point designs is applied to the entire tradespace through the
construction of survivability response surfaces.
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Figure 7-28. Survivability Response Surfaces for Satellite Radar
Figure 7-28 shows survivability response surfaces for each of the baseline designs. Each design
point is located in terms of cost and average time-weighted average utility (i.e., average value of
time-weighted average utility over all Monte Carlo trials). Linked clusters indicate a common
baseline design of constant Walker constellation type, altitude, antenna area, peak transmit
power, and communications architecture. Each cluster consists of nine points, representing the
full range of possible combinations of the two survivability design variables. The impact of
survivability features may be observed by finding the lowest-cost point in each cluster to identify
the baseline satellite radar design (which incorporates only 1 mm of shielding and no spares).
Then, the response surfaces for shielding and spares may be viewed by examining the solid and
dashed lines, respectively.
General prescriptive insights may be extracted from Figure 7-28 regarding the impact of
shielding and sparing on the average utility achieved by design alternatives. Whether increasing
to 5 mm or 10 mm, shielding universally adds cost but offers limited survivability benefits given
the natural debris flux present in the orbits under consideration. The response surfaces for
constellation spares are more interesting, revealing variable impact of the purchase of one or two
additional satellites on average utility. For example, in the lower-left Pareto region of the
tradespace featuring 9/3/2 Walker constellations, designs with spare satellites have higher
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average utility values. The impact is not linear, however, with diminishing returns associated
with the purchase of the second spare. Different behavior is observed in the upper-right Pareto
region consisting of 66/6/5 Walker constellations. While the same relative trend of increasing
average utility with the purchase of spares may be observed under high magnification, the impact
is extremely small. The response surfaces show similar behaviors in the interior region of the
tradespace. With rare exceptions, shielding for natural debris adds cost with limited benefit to
average utility while the impact of satellite spares varies as a function of constellation density.
7.3. Synthesis
Having applied MATE for Survivability to an analysis of military satellite radar, this section
offers general insights for the system under investigation and for the methodology itself.
7.3.1. Satellite Radar Insights
Before providing specific insights on satellite radar, it is important to note two caveats. First, as
discussed in Section 7.1, in addition to the survivability considerations that add complexity to the
acquisition of any operational military system, attempts to acquire a military satellite radar
capability over the past decade have been further characterized by fractured management,
competing stakeholder needs, immature technology, and uncertain cost estimates. Therefore, the
scope of the analysis in this chapter addresses only one part of what would be a complex
development program. Second, as will be discussed in Section 8.2.2, cost estimation and
performance modeling of future technologies are activities that can only be conducted at low to
medium fidelity during conceptual design. The results, accordingly, reveal broad trends and
provide general insights. While the results are valuable for a comparative analysis to guide the
selection of a few promising alternatives for more detailed design, it would be unwise to
associate absolute certainty with any of the projected cost, utility, and survivability values.
From the baseline performance modeling, the satellite radar case application revealed an
extremely broad tradespace, with alternative designs varying in cost by an order-of-magnitude.
Performance in the six GMTI attributes varied tremendously as a function of Walker
constellation, power-aperture product of the radar sensor, and downlink options.
Given the results from the dynamic tradespace model, the satellite radar alternatives are
survivable to the space environment (of orbital debris and signal attenuation). The survivability
metrics applied to the utility trajectory outputs indicate that the enumerated constellations are
able to meet the acceptability criteria for GMTI as specified in the utility functions. While time-
weighted average utility is reduced following satellite losses in small and medium sized
constellations, the reductions are small and the distributions of threshold availabilities remain
above 90% at even the 1st percentile. However, when applied to sparse constellations, this
finding is sensitive to changes in the decision-maker's acceptability ranges for target acquisition
time and track life.
Although the satellite radar constellations are found to be survivable, the tear tradespace analysis
shows that the rank-order preferences of the decision-maker on alternatives are subject to change
when environmental disturbances are taken into account. By adding time-weighted average
utility and threshold utility as additional decision metrics, designs in the interior region of the
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tradespace join the Pareto front designs in the "optimal" set. Resolution of these integrated cost,
utility, and survivability trades requires dialogue with the decision-maker.
The tradespace model yielded several insights regarding the cost and survivability implications
of the design variables. Counterintuitively, maximizing survivability design variable levels (and
hence constellation cost) does not necessarily equate to the most survivable satellite radar
system. In fact, shielding is found to have a very limited impact on time-weighted average
utility. In contrast, supplementing direct downlink communications with a relay option is very
important for mitigating signal attenuation. Investments in satellite spares have a variable
impact, with sparse constellations benefitting the most from the option to rapidly reconstitute.
There are diminishing returns, however, when purchasing additional spares.
Most interestingly, survivable designs that are most insensitive to decision-maker risk
preferences (e.g., percentile reporting level for time-weighted average utility) mitigate
disturbances architecturally. The tear tradespace identified constellations that are co-located in
the baseline tradespace (of cost and utility) with variable survivability performance. In
particular, by sacrificing individual satellite performance and accepting moderate growth in
lifecycle cost through selecting a more distributed constellation of less-capable satellites, it is
possible to achieve higher levels of survivability.
7.3.2. Methodological Insights
Introduced in Chapter 6 as a formalization of the experimental tradespace analysis approaches
pursued in Chapter 5, MATE for Survivability was successfully applied in this chapter to a
satellite radar system. Building on a static MATE analysis, the methodology allowed
survivability considerations to be incorporated into concept generation and tradespace
evaluation. In concept generation, the designs principles revealed latent survivability trades in
the initial design space and informed definition of a new design vector incorporating explicit
survivability enhancements. In tradespace evaluation, the survivability metrics were applied to
probabilistic utility trajectory outputs from a dynamic state model, enabling discrimination of
thousands of design alternatives in terms of survivability.
In the case application, MATE for Survivability was applied following the conclusion of the
baseline MATE analysis. An advantage of applying the methodology following an iteration of
MATE is the ability to incorporate lessons learned into the formulation of the survivability
analysis. For example, given the computational constraints associated with implementing a
stochastic, path-dependent simulation of the health of alternative satellite constellations, it was
very helpful to reduce the number of alternative satellite radar constellations (from tens of
thousands to thousands) based upon insights gleaned from the initial tradespace exploration.
However, a disadvantage of applying MATE for Survivability after completing a baseline
MATE study is the challenge of adapting a static model to a dynamic analysis. Unless
insensitive to the external environment, modeling the impact of disturbances changes the
intermediate variables and attribute calculations. Given the need to assess system health over the
entire lifecycle, a more efficient model with faster runtimes may be possible if survivability
considerations are factored into the initial software development.
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Many recommended practices for implementing MATE for Survivability emerged from the
satellite radar case application. First, given that the survivability metrics are dependent on the
percentile reporting levels, it is important to examine the sensitivity of the results to the selected
percentile of the distribution (e.g., stability of set of designs on four-dimensional Pareto surface
when reporting time-weighted average utility loss at the 9 5th and 9 9 th percentiles). Second, the
broad insights that may be derived from the design variable impact tradespaces, tear tradespaces,
and response surfaces, should be complimented by querying individual point designs. Close
inspection of individual designs (including design variables, intermediate variables, calculated
attributes, and performance metrics) allows the analyst to gain a deeper understanding of the
causal relationships in the performance model as well as to verify model accuracy. Third,
producing the filtered tear tradespace should not mark the end of the survivability analysis but
rather mark a departure point for navigating the tradespace with the decision-maker. Although
the 760 designs along the four-dimensional Pareto surface in the satellite radar tear tradespace
are less than the 2268 in the unfiltered tradespace, they are significantly more than the 198
designs along the traditional Pareto front of cost and utility. Therefore, having identified the
region of optimal trade-offs among cost, utility, and survivability, it is particularly important to
engage with the decision-maker in the process of selecting a small number of alternatives for
more detailed design.
The application of MATE for Survivability also reinforces the benefits of the methodology
relative to existing approaches. As with the space tug computer experiment, the analysis of
satellite radar showed that using tradespace exploration solely to identify designs on the
traditional Pareto front of cost and utility excludes the most survivable designs. Furthermore, the
methodology allows system-level and architecture-level survivability trades to be made in
concert rather than delaying survivability considerations until after selection of a baseline system
concept. As demonstrated by the response surfaces for the survivability design variables,
incorporating survivability considerations into the definition of the system concept is important if
the dedicated survivability design variables (e.g., shielding) are less critical to achieving
survivability than the fundamental system architecture (e.g., constellation type). By applying the
concept-neutral criteria of lifecycle cost, multi-attribute utility, and the survivability metrics, the
tear tradespaces may be used to identify promising design alternatives among thousands of
technically-diverse systems.
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8. Discussion
This chapter summarizes the unique contributions of the research (Section 8.1), discusses
implementation issues associated with applying Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration for
Survivability (Section 8.2), and proposes ideas for future work (Section 8.3).
8.1. Unique Contributions
There are four primary theoretical contributions of the thesis: (1) a clarification of the
relationship between survivability and the other system properties known as the "-ilities", (2) a
framework of survivability design principles for enhancing concept generation, (3) value-centric
metrics for assessing survivability over entire system lifecycles, and (4) an integrated
methodology to allow decision-makers to conduct trade-offs among system costs, benefits, and
survivability.
8.1.1. Clarification of Relationship between Survivability and other "ilities"
As discussed in Section 1.1.4, recent research within the systems engineering and system
analysis communities has sought to develop descriptive taxonomies and prescriptive methods for
incorporating the "-ilities" into system design. Given the long development and operational
lifecycles that characterize modem engineering systems, there is a need for systems that continue
to deliver stakeholder value in the presence of change. Accordingly, beyond-first-use design
criteria such as flexibility, robustness, survivability, and others are increasingly recognized as
critical properties of successful engineering systems. However, while most decision-makers
agree that the "-ilities" are important system properties, they are not well defined (nor easily
evaluated) in isolation. Completed dissertations within ESD (Suh 2005; Wang 2005; McConnell
2007; Lin 2009) have generally focused on evaluation methodologies for a few important "-
ilities" (e.g., real options for scalability and flexibility). While Ross (2006) developed a
changeability framework for defining and quantifying several "-ilities" (i.e., robustness,
flexibility, adaptability, modifiability, and scalability), addressing the particular challenges of
survivability analysis was outside of the scope of these foundational efforts.
Definitions for survivability vary across the biological, network security, and aerospace and
defense domains. As a result, a diverse range of domain-specific definitions exist for
survivability (Table 3-1). Even within domains characterized by consistent definitions, a diverse
array of survivability conceptualizations exist (e.g., range of environments within which an
entity remains operational; disturbance threshold above which an entity will cease to function;
degree to which performance remains following a disturbance; time required to restore health
following a compromising disturbance). To generalize existing definitions and operationalize
survivability for value-centric tradespace exploration, survivability is defined generally in this
thesis as the ability of a system to minimize the impact of finite-duration environmental
disturbances on value delivery.
In the process of defining survivability for engineering systems (Chapter 3), several taxonomic
distinctions between survivability and other "-ilities" are made. These distinctions are useful for
placing survivability in the context of previous work as well as for the more general challenge of
categorizing the "-ilities". For example, building on the seminal work of Simon (1996), the "-
ilities Space" (Figure 3-1) allows "-ilities" to be classified in terms of changes in three
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dimensions: environmental context, stakeholder needs, and system design. Recent research has
applied the "-ilities Space" to clarify and to structure the variety of "-ilities" in the literature in
order to make the "-ilities" more useful to system analysts (McManus, Richards et al. 2007).
In this thesis, the "-ilities Space" is used to distinguish survivability from the closely related
system property of robustness. Both survivability and robustness are measures of the ability of
systems to reduce the sensitivity of their outputs to changes in the environment. However,
although similar, survivability and robustness are distinct. While designing for robustness
focuses on accommodating permanent changes in context (e.g., continuous noise factors), design
for survivability focuses on the mitigating finite changes in context (e.g., impulse event).
Therefore, survivability can be considered a special case of robustness with a finite condition on
disturbance duration.
Precisely defining and distinguishing survivability from the other "-ilities" is an important step
towards the rigorous specification of a larger class of "-ilities" in engineering design (i.e.,
extending analyses beyond traditional "-ilities" such as reliability and maintainability).
Furthermore, precisely understanding survivability is critical to enumerating a full set of
survivability design principles.
8.1.2. Survivability Design Principles for Concept Generation
A prerequisite to the evaluation of the survivability of alternative concepts in tradespace
exploration is the generation of survivable alternatives. As concept-neutral strategies of
architectural choice, design principles augment the creativity of system designers by informing
consideration of a broad tradespace of technically-diverse system concepts. These concepts, in
turn, may be parameterized with design variables for subsequent tradespace exploration. While
several conceptual frameworks of survivability design strategies exist (Ellison, Fisher et al. 1999;
Ball 2003; Nakano and Suda 2007), these frameworks tend to exclude non-physical factors (e.g.,
organizational resilience), to focus on domain-specific instantiations of survivability (e.g.,
combat aircraft), and to offer no guidance on operationalizing each strategy for concept
generation and evaluation in engineering design. Accordingly, there is an opportunity to extend,
generalize, and operationalize existing frameworks of survivability design principles.
Chapter 4 presents a general, empirically-validated set of seventeen survivability design
principles that either reduce susceptibility (i.e., likelihood or magnitude of a disturbance
occurring within a system boundary), reduce vulnerability (i.e., sensitivity of system value
delivery to disturbance-induced losses), or enhance resilience (i.e., ability of a system to recover
from disturbance-induced value losses within a permitted recovery time) (Table 4-7). Each
principle is precisely defined vis-a-vis the temporal dimension of disturbance, allowing designers
to consider survivability strategies that mitigate value-losses across the entire lifecycle of a
hostile encounter (Figure 4-5). In addition, the seventeen principles are decomposed into
structural and behavioral categorizes to inform two general survivability strategies: (1) passive
survivability - closed (static) systems that resist disturbance based on projections of the
operational environment, and (2) active survivability - open (dynamic) systems that cope with
future uncertainty by stressing architectural agility (Table 4-8).
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Having extended and generalized existing frameworks, the survivability design principles are
operationalized in MATE for Survivability by generating survivable concepts from the design
principles and then parameterizing these concepts with design variables (Section 6.4). The
prescriptive value of the design principles is demonstrated in the satellite radar case application
where 24 unique survivable concepts are generated from the principles and subsequently
parameterized with 23 design variables (Section 7.2.4). Applying the design principles serves
both to augment the creativity of system designers by ensuring consideration of a broad
tradespace of design alternatives and to quickly screen a large number of candidate design
variables before proceeding to concept evaluation.
8.1.3. Value-Centric Survivability Metrics for System Evaluation
Survivability is traditionally incorporated in engineering design as a binary metric using
probabilistic risk assessment (Section 2.1.3). When examined in the context of dynamic, value-
based tradespace exploration, this current approach for evaluating survivability is problematic in
three critical areas. First, a binary characterization of system state fails to distinguish between
systems that degrade gracefully (characterized by a reduced rate and/or magnitude of value
losses) and fragile systems (where small disturbances may cause total system failure). The
ability to make such distinctions is particularly desirable when navigating tradespaces of
thousands of design alternatives. Second, although systems and their environments are
constantly evolving, PRA tends to treat systems and environments as static and unchanging.
Evaluating survivability as a fixed probability against a limited set of operational scenarios is
inconsistent with the lifecycle perspective provided by dynamic tradespace exploration. Third,
PRA lacks a value-centric perspective given the focus on the integrity of system components.
Taking the value-centric perspective, system designers are freed to consider multiple paths to
achieve the same value delivery.
Given these limitations, two value-based metrics are proposed for the evaluation of survivability
in dynamic tradespace studies (Section 3.3). Given the general definition of survivability
(Section 3.2.2), the metrics operationalize survivability as the ability to minimize disturbance-
induced value losses while meeting required levels of value delivery during nominal and
perturbed environment states, respectively. Applying the construct of quality-adjusted life years
from the medical community, time-weighted average utility loss is introduced as a summary
statistic of lifecycle value degradation. To characterize the ability of systems to meet critical
value thresholds, threshold availability is introduced as a modification to traditional formulations
of availability by allowing for changing stakeholder expectations over the course of a
disturbance encounter. As demonstrated in the second space tug computer experiment (Section
5.3), the metrics exhibit three desirable criteria for evaluating survivability: (1) continuous
(rather than a discrete, binary characterization), to enable distinction between systems that
gracefully degrade and those that fail immediately following a disturbance, (2) dynamic, to allow
assessment (and enhancement) of survivability across the lifecycle of a disturbance, and (3)
value-based, to allow comparisons across technically-diverse system concepts.
8.1.4. Methodology for Integrated Cost, Utility, and Survivability Trades
While the proposed survivability metrics address several problems arising from PRA-based
assessments of survivability, they fail to address other limitations of existing survivability
analysis methodologies (Section 2.3). First, survivability models typically abstract the
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complexities associated with path-dependencies in the calculation of survivability by assuming
independence among disturbance events. Second, current methods fail to facilitate decision-
maker trades among system lifecycle cost, mission utility, and survivability. Instead,
survivability is typically treated as a constraint on design.48 Third, the reductionist approach of
typical methodologies is more amenable to bottom-up analysis of system reliability than a
holistic examination of architectural survivability to threats external to the system boundary.
As an advanced system analysis methodology that integrates the proposed survivability metrics
with Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration, MATE for Survivability (Chapter 6) addresses
these three additional limitations. In both the space tug computer experiment (Section 5.3) and
the satellite radar case application (Chapter 7), path-dependencies are incorporated into the
vulnerability and resilience portions of the survivability model. In particular, the work of Ross
(2006) on dynamic MATE is extended by relaxing the assumption of pre-enumerated system
states with Epoch-Era analysis. Given that disturbance encounters may lead to system states that
would never be conceived of in design, a Markov state model is used to generate utility
trajectories that characterize system value delivery through disturbance encounters. Subsequent
Monte Carlo analysis ensures the generation of representative utility trajectories.
Another key contribution of MATE for Survivability is the tear tradespace representation for
allowing decision-makers to trade between the traditional (deterministic) performance metrics of
lifecycle cost and design utility and the (probabilistic) survivability metrics of time-weighted
average utility loss and threshold availability (e.g., Figure 7-22). Preserving the cost and design
utility axes of baseline MATE tradespaces, the proposed survivability metrics are integrated
using shade to depict threshold availability and a line connecting design utility to time-weighted
average utility (i.e., the utility loss, or "teardrop"). In applying the survivability tear tradespace
to analyses of alternative space tug vehicles and satellite radar constellations, the rank-order
preferences of decision-maker are subject to change. In particular, many designs that are
"optimal" in the traditional Pareto front of cost and utility are shown to perform poorly in terms
of the survivability metrics. Filtering the survivability tear tradespace reveals a four-dimensional
surface of Pareto designs, allowing decision-makers to select designs located in the interior of
the tradespace that efficiently compromise among cost, utility, and survivability. Furthermore,
tear tradespace analysis may be used to examine tradespace sensitivities to variable decision-
maker risk preferences. For example, since attitudes towards low-probability, high-consequence
events may not be preserved across stakeholders, each survivability metric may be reported at
multiple percentile levels, and the composition of the Pareto sets in the resulting tear tradespaces
checked for stability or variance.
Finally, the satellite radar case application demonstrates the applicability of MATE for
Survivability to generating prescriptive insights at both the system and architectural levels.
Rather than delaying survivability considerations until after selection of a baseline system
concept (which ignores the survivability implications of alternative system architectures), the
tear tradespaces and response surface plots allow the effects of satellite-level and constellation-
level survivability strategies to be examined in concert (e.g., heterogeneous satellite downlink
48 Historically, treating survivability as a constraint was appropriate given the systems under analysis (e.g., piloted
combat aircraft). However, investigating trade-offs among survivability, cost, and performance is critical to
exploring the tradespace for current, autonomous systems (e.g., UAV's).
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option and different levels of constellation distribution, respectively). As illustrated for satellite
radar, incorporating survivability considerations into the definition of the system concept is
especially critical if the additive survivability design variables have a small impact on
survivability relative to the fundamental system architecture.
8.2. Implementation Issues
In this section, four implementation issues associated with MATE for Survivability are
discussed: (1) value elicitation for low-probability, high-consequence events, (2) fidelity of cost
estimation and performance models, (3) minimum resource requirements, and (4) scalability of
analytic effort.
8.2.1. Value Elicitation for Low-Probability, High-Consequence Events
One of the implementation issues of applying MATE for Survivability is that decision-maker
preferences may change as the system passes through nominal and perturbed environmental
states. While the process of eliciting attributes and associated utility functions is already
complicated by the need for decision-makers to think using value-based, concept-neutral metrics
(Ross 2003) and issues of measurement stability (Spaulding 2003), MATE for Survivability adds
further complexity to the process since, as in Epoch-Era analysis (Ross 2006), the definition and
scale of the utility axis are subject to vary across epochs (e.g., space tug). Furthermore, unless
the definition of utility is constant across epochs (e.g., satellite radar), the permitted recovery
time also needs to be elicited from the decision-maker.
As discussed in Section 3.3.4, two approaches may be taken for completing the value elicitation
in MATE for Survivability. Most generally, the applicable multi-attribute utility functions across
all potential epochs may be elicited from the decision-maker. However, excessive time may be
required with the decision-maker to collect such data without a process for bounding the large set
of future environmental states. An alternative is to make the assumption that the attribute set
remains fixed across nominal and perturbed epochs, with only the acceptability range subject to
change (Figure 3-7). Regardless of which approach is followed, a common challenge is to elicit
the "true" value proposition of the decision-maker during, and in the immediate aftermath, of
finite-duration disturbances
In conducting the utility interview (e.g., lottery equivalent probability method), it is important to
provide the proper context for the decision-maker to answer lottery questions (de Neufville
1990). Typically, this context is provided through a carefully crafted scenario (Ross 2003).
However, thinking in terms of probabilities is difficult, and may be particularly challenging for
decision-makers attempting to provide their "true" value proposition during low-probability,
high-consequence events. While the complexity associated with eliciting multiple utility
functions was not present in the satellite radar case application (where the military value
proposition for GMTI is constant across disturbances in the natural space environment), future
applications of MATE for Survivability may be subject to changing value thresholds (e.g.,
survivability of transportation infrastructure to catastrophic terrorism).
When validating the elicited emergency value threshold and permitted recovery time is not
possible or practical, alternative approaches towards eliciting decision-maker preferences during
low-probability, high-consequence events may be pursued. For example, prior to conducting
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utility interviews, decision-makers might be placed in a wargaming environment that simulates
the experience of low-probability, high-consequence events. 49 Also, if low-probability, high-
consequence events warrant the development of scripted contingency plans (e.g., nuclear
command and control), such plans might inform establishing minimum system requirements.
Finally, in addition to simulation and contingency planning, historical low-probability, high-
consequence events might be consulted to specify emergency value thresholds and permitted
recovery times.
8.2.2. Model Fidelity
Determining the appropriate level of model fidelity requires balancing between competing
desires for rapidly comparing design alternatives and for generating more accurate tradespace
insights. While lower-fidelity models require less time and resources (e.g., parametric
relationships and look-up tables), they may provide less prescriptive value than higher-fidelity
models involving multiple developers and more computation power (e.g., physics-based
simulation). Given that MATE for Survivability is a conceptual design methodology for
generating broad tradespace insights (at the expense of a deeper understanding of a small number
of "point" designs), it is important that model development in phases five and six does not
overwhelm the other six phases of the methodology. Furthermore, given that model accuracy is
often determined by the weakest assumption in a model (and that the assumptions made in
conceptual design are often characterized by a tremendous amount of uncertainty), the analyst
should carefully select an appropriate level of model fidelity.
Following the approach taken by Ross (2006), models for tradespace exploration in this thesis
opt for a heterogeneous approach to fidelity selection. While low-fidelity models of causal
relationships are applied to most design variables and intermediate variables, higher-fidelity
models are selectively developed for analyzing key attribute relationships. For example, the
selection of launch vehicles in the satellite radar case application is determined using a simple
algorithm to minimize launch cost given a set of mass constraints. Since launch vehicle type
does not impact attribute performance but only lifecycle cost, details associated with structural
loading requirements and thermal interactions are abstracted. In contrast, the computation of key
constellation performance parameters (e.g., target acquisition time, target track life) are modeled
at a higher level of fidelity by propagating orbits and computing coverage statistics. The
heterogeneous approach focuses fidelity improvements on the areas with the most significant
impact on the tradespace results.
8.2.3. Resource Constraints
Implementing a MATE for Survivability analysis (Chapter 6) requires access to a critical set of
resources: (1) a decision-maker, (2) analytic expertise, (3) computing power, and (4) time. First,
the availability of a decision-maker is a foundational aspect of any value-driven tradespace
49 A wargame is "an abstraction of reality based upon a suite of models, data, rules and procedures used to represent
movement, detection, firing, and other aspects of the mechanics of combat. They include human decision-making
and conflict, and do not produce rigorous, quantifiable or duplicate results" (Bowley and Lovaszy 1999). The
historical benefits of wargaming in the 20 century for preparing the U.S. military enterprise for the next conflict are
well-documented (Haffa and Patton 1998). These benefits include informing the science and technology research
portfolio, acquisition purchases (e.g., importance of aircraft carriers in lead-up to WWII), national security strategy,
operational concepts, tactics, and doctrine.
206
study. Before initiating modeling activities, it is essential to have elicited a set of attributes to
guide the enumeration of design alternatives and subsequent performance evaluation. If access
to a decision-maker is limited or delayed, a proxy decision-maker may be identified to
approximate the preferences. However, without direct decision-maker input, the tradespace
results may be invalid. Second, applying MATE for Survivability requires software
development expertise (e.g., Excel, MATLAB) and domain-specific expertise in the type of
system under investigation and in the environment in which the system will operate. Third,
tradespace exploration requires significant computing resources to accommodate the geometric
growth of the tradespace as design variables are added to the model. Computational efficiency is
a particular concern for MATE for Survivability given the large number of Monte Carlo trials
required to generate representative distributions of lifecycle performance. Fourth, whether
constructing a low-fidelity model in a week or a higher fidelity model over several months,
adequate time should be allocated in system development schedules to accommodate multiple
iterations of a MATE for Survivability analysis. The computer experiments and case
applications benefited tremendously from a spiral development approach in which initial
tradespace models evolved iteratively. Not only does the spiral development approach allow the
selective improvement of model fidelity (Section 8.2.2), but it also informs the enumeration and
sampling of design variables towards higher-value regions of the tradespace.
8.2.4. Scalability
The effort required to implement MATE for Survivability may be scaled depending on the
availability of time, expertise, and computing resources. While Chapter 6 provides an overview
of the 29 tasks comprising a MATE for Survivability analysis (and Appendix E provides a
detailed description of each task), selected tasks may be skipped or compressed for a minimalist
analysis. As illustrated in Table 8-1, there are three areas where the level of effort may be scaled
back while still preserving the fundamental analytic structure: (1) elicitation of value thresholds
in disturbance environments, (2) explicit mapping of survivability design variables to
disturbances, and (3) detailed sensitivity analysis on a subset of the tradespace.
First, to simplify the value elicitation phase, the analyst might assume that the multi-attribute
utility function governing decision-maker value in nominal environmental states is applicable to
the time period during, and immediately after, a disturbance. If this assumption is made, Tasks
1.4 and 1.5 may be skipped as the required and emergency value thresholds are both set at the
common limit of attribute acceptability (i.e., corresponding to zero utility for each attribute
level). A dialogue with the decision-maker is required to determine the appropriateness of this
simplifying assumption. For example, military decision-makers may have constant expectations
on mission utility, regardless of the presence of environmental disturbances. In contrast, this
assumption may be less appropriate for civilian infrastructures where performance requirements
may be temporarily reduced following low-probability, high-consequence events (e.g., natural
disasters).
Second, the tasks comprising the application of the survivability design principles in phase four
(Tasks 4.1-4.5) may be merged into the concept generation activities of phase two. Rather than
revisiting the design vector following the characterization of the disturbance environment in
phase three, the analyst might establish the final design vector in phase two. In particular, the
mission statement may be consulted to infer the types of disturbances within the operational
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environment and to inform the incorporation of survivability considerations into the design
vector. Since the survivability design variables may score very poorly in the design value
mapping matrix (in terms of impacting attribute value), the analyst must apply engineering
judgment to determine which dedicated survivability design variables to keep (if any). Omitting
phase four eliminates the formal process of parameterizing the survivability design principles.
While this omission eliminates a significant amount of work, it also eliminates the structured
approach to quickly generate and screen a large number of survivable concepts before
proceeding to concept evaluation.50
Table 8-1. Minimalist Implementations of MATE and MATE for Survivability
MATE for Survivability Tasks (full) i
1.1 Develop mission statement X X
1.2 Identifiy decision maker X X
1.3 Elicit multi-attribute utility function X X
1.4 Specify emergency value threshold
1.5 Specify permitted recovery time
2.1 Identify constraints X X
2.2 Propose design variables X X
2.3 Map design variables to attributes X X
2.4 Finalize baseline design vector X X
3.1 Enumerate disturbances X
3.2 Gather data on disturbance magnitude and frequency X
3.3 Develop model(s) of disturbance environment X
4.1 Enumerate survivable concepts from principles
4.2 Parameterize survivable concepts with design variables
4.3 Assess ability of design variables to mitigate disturbances
4.4 Filter survivability design variables
4.5 Finalize candidate design vectors
5.1 Develop software architecture X X
5.2 Translate design vectors to attributes X X
5.3 Translate design vectors to lifecycle cost X X
5.4 Apply multi-attribute value function X X
6.1 Calculate stochastic susceptibility X
6.2 Model probabilistic vulnerability X
6.3 Model probabilistic recovery X
6.4 Generate distributions of utility trajectories X
7.1 Establish percentile reporting levels X
7.2 Calculate average utility and theshold availability X
8.1 Conduct integrated cost, utility, and survivability trades X
8.2 Select designs for further analysis
50 Conversely, the survivability design principles need not be applied within a MATE for Survivability analysis to
aid in the generation of survivable concepts.
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Third, the selection of designs for detailed sensitivity analysis (Task 8.2) might also be
eliminated in a minimalist implementation of MATE for Survivability. Given that the tear
tradespace representation evaluates each design alternative in terms of the key performance
metrics of cost, utility, and survivability, drawing detailed response surface plots for the impact
of the survivability design variables may be superfluous.
In addition to these three aspects which might be eliminated to reduce the scale of effort required
to implement a MATE for Survivability study, the scale of effort may also be reduced by
limiting the scope of the remaining tasks. For example, the scale of effort required for modeling
and simulation activities (phases five and six) may be reduced by limiting the number of
survivability design principles that are parameterized and incorporated into the final design
vector. While generating concepts from each design principle provides a structured way to
consider a broad portfolio of options for mitigating disturbances, the inclusion of design
variables for all seventeen design principles is not practical from an analytic perspective (given
the limited engineering hours available in front-end system analysis) or from a computer runtime
perspective (given the geometric growth of the tradespace as design variables are added). While
a tension between the scope of the design vector and the fidelity of the system performance
model always exists, a scaled-down version of MATE for Survivability might fix the system
performance model at mid-fidelity while further narrowing the scope of the design vector.
8.3. Future Work
The scope of this thesis is limited to the challenges discussed in the problem statement (Section
2.4). However, in addressing these challenges, several promising areas for future work have
emerged. This section describes six propositions for future work: (1) validate design principles
outside aerospace domain, (2) parameterize CONOPS in design vector, (3) incorporate path-
dependent environmental states, (4) model adversary decision-making, (5) extend scope for
system-of-systems engineering, and (6) perform additional case applications.
8.3.1. Validate Design Principles outside Aerospace Domain
In Chapter 4, the survivability design principles are empirically tested by tracing them to the
survivability features of aerospace systems that have successfully operated in severe disturbance
environments. This iterative process is valuable for establishing the validity of the design
principle framework. However, the stratified sampling of operational systems with established
survivability records is limited to the aerospace domain. While no assumptions are embedded in
the design principle framework to preclude application to systems outside the aerospace domain,
future work should test the general validity and applicability of the seventeen principles.
There are several domains that might be pursued to further the testing and application of the
survivability design principles. In terms of testing the survivability design principles, perhaps
the most fruitful cross-cutting insights may be derived from systems that possess similar
operational requirements yet are built by different industries. For example, parallels have been
drawn between the reconfiguration and repair of aerospace/military systems and Formula One
Racing pit stops (Csere 2000). In both cases, operators are under intense time pressure51 and
51 Pit stops in Formula One motor racing typically include replacement of four tires and refueling in approximately
seven seconds (Catchpole, de Leval et al. 2007).
209
must decompose tasks into distinct modules with clear lines of responsibility and interchangeable
actors. Furthermore, both are life critical operations that are frequently carried out by multi-
national teams. Future work might examine pit stop approaches towards situational awareness
(e.g., failure-modes and effects analysis for predicting pit stop tasks and risks), design
refinements (e.g., quick-release electrical and fuel connection), and process discipline (e.g.,
fanatical training and repetition) for general insights regarding Type III survivability (Cross and
Cross 1998).
In terms of applying the survivability principles outside of the aerospace domain, the hardening
of critical infrastructures from natural disasters and terrorist attacks offers several areas for future
research. Of particular concern are vulnerabilities in networked infrastructures that increasingly
characterize banking and finance, transportation, Sower production and distribution, information
and communications, and water and food supply.
8.3.2. Parameterize CONOPS in Design Vector
Future work might also seek to incorporate concept-of-operations considerations into MATE for
Survivability. Currently, the design vector is defined as a combination of design variables,
which are designer-controlled quantitative parameters that reflect an aspect of a concept.
Although defined generally, design variables in MATE analyses have traditionally focused on
physical properties of alternative systems while ignoring behavioral properties by assuming a
fixed CONOPS. Given the tremendous impact of operational behavior on system survivability
(e.g., see discussion of Nuclear Command and Control System in Section 4.2.2), it may be
valuable to formalize CONOPS design in MATE for Survivability. There are many avenues for
pursuing this line of research.
First, the survivability design principles might be refined for generating alternative CONOPS for
subsequent tradespace exploration. For example, the seventeen principles might be decomposed
into structural and behavioral categories, with the behavioral design principles tested for rigor
and completeness against historical cases. There are several historical examples of engineering
systems that achieved better survivability (without structural modifications) through
modifications to operational behavior (e.g., B-17's in WWII, B-52's in Vietnam). Second, given
a set of CONOPS principles, alternative operational strategies might be specified for parametric
tradespace analysis through the inclusion of operational variables within the design vector.
Third, the evaluation of system alternatives (defined in both structural and behavioral terms)
might be improved by incorporating operational costs in the tradespace analysis. For example,
just as the survivability metric of time-weighted average utility loss serves as a statistic for the
probabilistic distribution of multi-attribute utility, a metric for operational cost might serve as a
statistic for the probabilistic distribution of system lifecycle cost. This is an improvement to the
implementations of MATE for Survivability in this thesis which abstract uncertainties in
operational cost by incorporating them into the (deterministic) lifecycle cost estimate.
52 In addition to the technical challenges associated with evolving legacy infrastructures to more survivable states
while meeting critical ongoing availability requirements, a critical public policy challenge remains: who will pay for
hardening? One option is to mandate private investment through regulations promulgated by Congress. Another
option is to provide government subsidies to share the burden. The current approach leaves the assignment of risk
and blame to the insurance market and tort courtrooms.
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In summary, just as MATE parameterizes the design space to gain a broad understanding of the
physical design options available, it might also be possible to parameterize CONOPS for
exploration of robust operational decision-making. Given the growing importance of improving
the survivability of systems and of rapidly responding to threat (yet slow time-scales and
expenses associated with modifying physical system architectures), a formal process for
specifying and evaluating alternative operational behaviors would be a valuable addition to
MATE for Survivability.
8.3.3. Incorporate Path-Dependent Environmental States
Another promising area of future work is to incorporate path dependencies in environmental
states. Current implementations of MATE for Survivability feature a Markov state model of
system health to model path-dependent vulnerability. A valuable extension would be to also
address path-dependencies in system susceptibility. The approach taken for incorporating path-
dependent susceptibility would likely vary depending on whether disturbances originate from the
natural environment (discussed in this section) or from hostile adversaries (discussed in Section
8.3.4).
In the case of modeling the occurrence of disturbances from the natural environment, the Markov
state model of system vulnerability might also be applied to system susceptibility. For example,
in modeling satellite susceptibility to orbital debris, the occurrence of debris events is assumed to
follow a (memory-less) Poisson process. However, susceptibility to debris may increase in the
time period immediately following a breakup due to elevated local flux. Therefore, just as path-
dependent vulnerability is modeled using a Markov state characterization of system health, path-
dependent susceptibility might be modeled by specifying a finite number of environmental states
with empirically-derived transition probabilities. Figure 8-1 provides a notional diagram for
implementing this approach for orbital debris.
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Figure 8-1. Incorporating Path Dependencies in Environment and System States
Instead of pursuing a discrete state modeling approach, path-dependent susceptibilities might
also be incorporated into survivability analysis using system dynamics. System dynamics
models are composed of a combination of positive (reinforcing) and negative (balancing)
feedback loops in addition to state and rate variables (Sterman 2000). At its lowest level, a
system dynamics model is a mathematical system of coupled, first-order, non-linear, ordinary
differential equations presented in a graphical form accessible to policymakers.
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Figure 8-2. Path-Dependent Susceptibility Model of LEO Debris Environment
Figure 8-2 presents a systems dynamics model of satellite susceptibility to orbital debris.53
Rather than modeling susceptibility as only a function of debris flux and exposed cross-sectional
area, the probability of hit also varies over time as a function of previous impacts and the fidelity
of a space-situational awareness (SSA) infrastructure. In particular, SSA is used to detect
conjunction events and then warn threatened spacecraft, enabling operators to perform collision
avoidance maneuvers. Given that SSA is a resource that provides a benefit that may be shared
by several users, there is also the potential for its cost to be amortized over multiple users in a
collaborative systems-of-systems (SoS). (The general challenge of incorporating survivability
considerations into SoS engineering is discussed in Section 8.3.5.)
8.3.4. Model Adversary Decision-Making
If disturbances originate from intelligent adversaries in the environment, a different approach
may be required for modeling system susceptibility. Since disturbances are the result of
53 Figure 8-2 has four major loops: Debris Tracking Burden, Own Tracking Burden, Satellites Lost from Impact, and
Impacts Generating Impacts. The first and last are reinforcing loops, while the middle two are balancing loops.
Impacts Generating Impacts models the increased number of collisions given increases in the debris population.
Debris generation leads to more debris generation--hence the loop is a reinforcing loop. As another reinforcing
loop, Debris Tracking Burden also presents a problem. As debris levels increase with a fixed tracking capacity, the
probability of successfully tracking a given piece of debris declines. Decreased tracking success leads to even more
debris, which will further decrease tracking success.
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calculated actions, it may be necessary to incorporate adversary decision-making into the
susceptibility model. Five generic steps are suggested: (1) define threat types, (2) define
strategies available to adversary, (3) define game structure, (4) determine how strategies are
selected, and (5) update belief structure following hostile engagement.
In the first step of modeling adversary decision-making, different portfolios of systems that the
adversary might deploy are defined (e.g., Interceptors A and B, or Interceptors A and C). In the
second step, the strategies available to the adversary for operating each portfolio of systems are
defined (e.g., shoot-look-shoot). Given the capabilities of the defender as perceived by the
attacker, success probabilities for each attack strategy are assigned. In the third step, the
strategic interaction between the attacker and the defender is modeled as a non-cooperative
game. In particular, a static Bayesian structure is assumed in which agent behavior is
characterized in terms of payoffs, actions, and beliefs. In the fourth step, a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium structure governs how strategies are selected, with agents maximizing their
respective utility based on their beliefs. In the fifth step, Bayes Rule is applied (for an iterative
game) to update beliefs following each hostile engagement. This generic approach for modeling
adversary decision-making may also be applied to the defender. Given the discussion in Section
8.3.2, such an application may provide prescriptive insights for improving survivability through
improved operational strategy.
8.3.5. Extend Scope for Systems-of-Systems Engineering
Just as information superiority offers a tremendous asymmetric benefit in terms of enhancing the
effectiveness of modem military operations (Ballhaus 2005; Ryan 2006), it also represents a
strategic vulnerability. Furthermore, this asymmetric advantage/vulnerability has not gone
unrecognized by potential future adversaries. For example, Carter and Perry (2001) describe
three asymmetric threats facing the United States: catastrophic terrorism, weapons of mass
destruction, and "vulnerabilities in the complex but fragile information technology-based
systems-of-systems." While the former two concerns have received a tremendous amount of
attention from U.S. national security policymakers over the past decade, relatively little attention
has been paid to the latter threat.
A systems-of-systems (SoS) may be defined as a synergistic configuration of systems in which
constituent systems are independently managed and operated (Maier 1998). SoS engineering
may be defined, in turn, as "the process of planning, analyzing, organizing, and integrating the
capabilities of a mix of existing and new systems," with an emphasis on "discovering,
developing, and implementing standards that promote interoperability among systems developed
via different sponsorship, management, and primary acquisition processes (AFSAB 2005). SoS
engineering has been the subject of studies in industry (Maier 1998), government (Chen and
Clothier 2003; AFSAB 2005; DoD 2007b), and academia (Eisner, Marciniak and McMillan
1991; Sage and Cuppan 2001; Crossley and DeLaurentis 2006). While integrating coalitions of
systems has always been inherent to complex military operations, SoS engineering has emerged
as a formal practice following the host of integration problems in the First Persian Gulf War. 54
54 A host of integration problems occurred during Desert Shield and Desert Storm as C4ISR systems were deployed
for the first time in support of tactical operations for a large-scale conflict. Older platforms were used for missions
for which they were not designed (e.g., Defense Support Program satellites for Scud detection), new technologies
were applied piecemeal, and interoperability problems hindered full exploitation of information technology (Spires
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To improve military preparedness for asymmetric countermeasures that future adversaries might
employ against networked information systems, it is important that survivability considerations
are incorporated into SoS engineering. Furthermore, given the increasing reliance of all modem
enterprises on collaborative systems, incorporating survivability considerations into SoS
engineering presents a general challenge and opportunity for systems engineering (Fovino and
Masera 2006; Morris et al. 2007; Singh and Dagli 2007).
To understand the unique challenges posed by incorporating survivability considerations into
SoS engineering, it is helpful to distinguish SoS engineering from traditional systems
engineering. Table 8-2 provides seven criteria for using SoS methods and contrasts each to the
traditional systems engineering paradigm (Eisner, Marciniak and McMillan 1991). Eisner's
seven criteria provide an initial definition of SoS engineering as a unique class of problems
related to, but different from, systems engineering. SoS are systems that are composed of other
systems, and have some additional properties. For example, Maier (1998) describes the
constituent systems of an SoS as exhibiting operational and managerial independence.55
Traditional systems engineering techniques are difficult to apply to SoS design where authority
is distributed among constituent systems. In particular, there is a misalignment of the top-down
methods of traditional systems engineering with the bottom-up authority structure of SoS. This
misalignment leads to additional challenges for the system architect who must not only manage
the development of the SoS as a whole but also ensure that the needs of the constituents are met.
2001). Some of these integration problems were solved during the six month build-up to war (e.g., early warning
satellites were used successfully for detection of tactical ballistic missiles) while others were not (e.g., paper copies
of air tasking orders had to be flown from the command center in Riyadh to the decks of aircraft carriers) (Zinn
2004).
55 Operational independence means that, should the SoS constituents be removed from the SoS, they still exist and
are able to function as they did prior to joining the SoS. Managerial independence means that, not only can the
constituents function independently, they continue to do so even while part of the SoS.
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Table 8-2. Eisner's Seven Distinguishing Characteristics of Systems-of-Systems (1991)
1 There are several independently acquired systems, each Subsystems are acquired under
under a nominal systems engineering process. centralized control.
Overall management control over the autonomously The program manager has almost
managed systems is viewed as mandatory. complete autonomy.
3 The time phasing between systems is arbitrary and not Subsystem timing is planned and
contractually related. controlled.
4 The system couplings can be considered neither totally Subsystems are coupled anddependent nor independent but, rather, interdependent. interoperating.
The individual systems tend to be uni-functional and the The system is rather uni-functional.
systems of systems multi-functional.
The optimization of each system does not guarantee the Trade-offs are formally carried out in an
optimization of the overall system of systems. attempt to achieve optimal performance.
The combined operation of the systems constitutes and The system largely satisfies a single
represents the satisfaction of an overall coherent mission. mission.
The fundamental challenge posed by SoS to survivability analysis is the emergent behavior that
arises in collaborative operations. While individual systems may be survivable in isolation,
unintended behaviors during SoS integration and operation could adversely affect mission
survivability. Since MATE for Survivability was only developed for single-system architecture
trade-off decisions, there is a need to also consider mission dependencies on multiple systems
and the dependencies of constituent systems on joint missions (Ellison, Fisher et al. 1999).
Considering the implications of Eisner's seven distinguishing criteria of SoS (Table 8-2) for each
phase of MATE for Survivability (Chapter 6) informs specific propositions for future work. In
the first phase of MATE for Survivability, Elicit Value Proposition, the metrics characterizing
system-level performance should be supplemented by attributes, utility functions, and critical
value thresholds elicited by the SoS architect for each joint mission.
In the second phase, Generate Concepts, the traditional, simplifying assumption of "clean-sheet"
design should be eliminated to reflect the temporal mismatch of the constituent system lifecycles.
While the SoS architect may have authority to develop new systems for a joint mission, several
of the constituents are likely to be legacy systems with limited potential for physical
modification (e.g., satellite communications infrastructure). However, the SoS architect may
retain control over how the legacy systems are operated. Therefore, building on the discussion in
Section 8.3.2, specification of the design vector for SoS will involve enumerating design
variables (for new systems) and operational variables (for both new and legacy systems).
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System of Systems Engineering Traditional Systems Engineering
In the third phase, Characterize Disturbance Environment, threats to both constituent systems
and sensitive communication links should be enumerated. Determining a representative set of
disturbances may be complicated by the geographic spread of many SoS.
In the fourth phase, Apply Survivability Principles, the design vector should be revisited with a
particular emphasis on applying the behavioral principles to the generation of survivable SoS
configurations.
In the fifth phase, Model Baseline System Performance, the value of SoS alternatives should be
determined based on performance in joint mission attributes. Building on the modeling of SoS
constituents, a theater-level fitness function might be specified that accepts inputs from the
system-level performance models (Soban and Mavris 2000).
In the sixth phase, Model Impact of Disturbances on Performance, SoS considerations should be
incorporated into models of susceptibility, vulnerability, and resilience. In many cases,
collaboration with other systems might decrease susceptibility to attack (e.g., through a stronger
collective deterrent). However, in certain cases, collaboration with other systems might also
increase susceptibility (e.g., by introducing new failure modes). The space tug computer
experiment (Section 5.3) provides an example of the importance of internalizing SoS factors in
modeling survivability performance. In that implementation of MATE for Survivability,
recovery strategies are enabled by purchasing insurance (e.g., servicing for repair) which
neglects the possibility of a common-cause failure across a shared infrastructure (e.g., loss of
launch site, impulsive demand for servicing). The problem of neglecting this common-cause
failure could be mitigated by taking a system-of-systems approach whereby the survivability
choices of individual decision-makers (e.g., system level survivability investments, contributions
to hardening infrastructure) affect the availability of recovery assets. 56
In the seventh phase, Apply Survivability Metrics, time-weighted average utility loss and
threshold availability should be applied to the distributions of utility trajectories for each
constituent system as well as the joint mission (or missions).
The eighth and final phase of MATE for Survivability, Explore Tradespace, would require the
development of new tradespaces to allow the SoS architect to trade among the local value
propositions of the constituent systems and the global value propositions of collaborative
missions. Rather than focusing exclusively on the impact of alternative survivability design
variables, response surface analyses should also explore the impact of alternative sources of
architectural leverage (e.g., standards and protocols, incentives and side-payments).
56 Resilience path-dependencies are not included in the current space tug model which assumes that the servicer is
always available when needed. Given the small cost-increment assigned to servicing, it is more likely that servicing
will be a shared resource financed through insurance payments from many spacecraft. The SoS formed by these
spacecraft and the servicing infrastructure will collectively impact the survivability of each individual spacecraft. In
such a shared servicing architecture, the usefulness of servicing will therefore depend upon the design choices of the
other customers utilizing the servicing infrastructure. For example, servicing responsiveness could decrease as other
spacecraft make design choices that lead to greater susceptibility and therefore use the servicing infrastructure more
often. Ensuring fair access to a jointly-financed infrastructure is a critical problem for designing survivable systems
that depend on a shared resource to reduce vulnerability or enhance resilience.
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8.3.6. Perform Additional Case Applications
There are many engineering systems that are strong candidates for conducting a MATE for
Survivability analysis. From a research standpoint, several criteria might guide the selection of
future cases:
* criticality of survivability considerations during conceptual design
* unit-of-analysis (with architecture-level preferred to fully leverage design principles)
* accessibility of decision-makers for value elicitation
* availability of models and data for prediction of technical performance
* availability of data on environmental disturbances
* amenability of system to dynamic state characterization
* phase in lifecycle development (with earlier preferred to impact design of real system)
Given these criteria, two potential future case applications are discussed: (1) Mars rovers and (2)
operationally responsive space. Mars rovers offer a promising application area for MATE for
Survivability given the host of severe environmental interactions characterizing roving
operations. Over the past several years, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory has developed
parametric models to explore the tradespace of alternative Mars rover concepts (Figure 8-3).
However, current analysis incorporate limited survivability considerations (e.g., solar array
degradation) (Lamamy 2007). Future work might apply MATE for Survivability to alternative
rover concepts, including disturbance models of dust storms, extreme thermal cycling, and
navigation obstacles.
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Figure 8-3. Future Case Application: Mars Rovers (Lamamy 2007)
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Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) offers a second promising case for applying MATE for
Survivability. ORS has been defined broadly by the Department of Defense as "assured space
power focused on timely satisfaction of Joint Force Commanders' needs... while also maintaining
the ability to address other users' needs for improving the responsiveness of space capabilities to
meet national security requirements" (DoD 2007a). The purpose of ORS is to reduce the time
constants associated with space system acquisition, design, and operation to allow the national
space architecture to keep pace with changing missions, environments, and technologies (GAO
2006). The fundamental idea is to trade off the reliability and performance achieved by satellites
under the "Big Space" paradigm-the currently accepted way of conceptualizing, specifying,
developing, and operating space systems-for the speed, responsiveness, and customization
which may be achieved by architectures that incorporate elements such as small, modular
spacecraft and low-cost, commercial launch vehicles (Figure 8-4). Given that the need to
address space architecture fragility has been articulated by national leaders (Section 1.2), ORS
offers an interesting case for examining how architectural agility might emphasized to address
the mismatch between rapidly changing environments and the 15-25 year generational turnover
of satellites (GAO 2006).
TacSat 1 TacSat 2 TacSat 3 TacSat 4
Figure 8-4. Future Case Application: Operationally Responsive Space (GAO 2006)
In addition to obtaining capability on-orbit quickly, ORS attributes include tactical control and
assured access. Assured access refers to the potential ability of small, tactical spacecraft to be
used to partially reconstitute Air Force space mission areas (i.e., Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance; Position, Navigation, and Timing; Communications; Environmental Sensing;
Missile Warning; and Space Control) should adversaries negate existing space capabilities
(Cebrowski and Raymond 2005). Implicit assumptions in the ORS and "Big Space" paradigms
may be traced to their respective historical contexts and original beneficiaries. Table 8-3
provides a first-order approximation of the distinguishing characteristics of each approach.
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Table 8-3. Distinguishing Operationally Responsive Space from "Big Space"
Characteristic "Big Space" ORS
Historical Context Cold War acquisitions crisis; fragilities inherentin integral, long-life designs
Original Beneficiary White House theater combatant commander
Programmatic Drivers performance cost, schedule
Innovation Dynamic capability-pull technology-push
Payloads customized, satisfy multiple missions Off-the-shelf; single-mission focus
Design Life 10+ years 1+ year(s)
Risk Tolerance (current) risk averse risk tolerant
Despite the purported benefits of ORS, progress on operationally responsive programs has been
slow. In addition to a well-documented set of implementation hurdles (GAO 2006; Flagg, White
and Ewart 2007), ORS progress is stymied by an uncertain value proposition to the U.S. military.
Existing analyses in the literature conflict, with advocates finding that ORS "delivers the most
utility to the warfighter per dollar spent" (Fram 2007), while a former deputy director for the
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities at Air Force Space Command declares that
"tactical satellites cannot serve the effect their proponents claim to want to achieve" (Tomme
2006). Mr. Gil Klinger, Director of Space Policy on the National Security Council from 2002 to
2005, states that operationally responsive architectures deserve, yet have not received, our
"analytic due diligence." 57 This view is reinforced by an inability to find rigorous analyses of
the value proposition for ORS across the Air Force space mission areas.58 Furthermore, because
one of the core values of ORS is an enhanced ability of the U.S. space architecture to sustain
value delivery in hostile contexts-and given the limited ability of traditional survivability
analysis methodologies to accommodate changing system configurations and operational
environments-it is understandable that current evaluations of ORS are unsatisfactory.
57 Personal conversation, 22 August 2007.
58 The only study found, "The Case for Operationally Responsive Space: Cost and Utility" (Fram 2007), is severely
limited in scope (i.e., only examines one of six Air Force space mission areas), in design alternatives (i.e., only three
architectures considered), and in credibility (i.e., assigns zero utility to peacetime intelligence collection-negating
the value of strategic satellites except during war and skewing the results for a tactical solution). In addition, the
availability of a reusable launch vehicle and low-cost commercial launch vehicles are assumed.
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9. Conclusion
This chapter revisits the four research questions posed in Chapter 1 and draws general
conclusions regarding survivability analysis. In answering each research question, key figures
from previous chapters are displayed.
9.1. Revisiting Research Questions
1. What is a dynamic, operational, and value-centric definition of survivability for
engineering systems?
The first research question aims to conceptualize and operationalize survivability for subsequent
tradespace exploration. Survivability may be defined in physical terms as "the capability of a
system to avoid or withstand hostile natural and manmade environments without suffering
abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission" (USAF 2005).
Survivability may also be defined, more generally, as the ability of a system to minimize the
impact of finite-duration environmental disturbances on value delivery. A value-centric
definition of survivability is desirable during conceptual design because it provides a
fundamental metric for relating system properties to desired stakeholder outcomes. Taking the
value-centric perspective empowers decision-makers to compare technically dissimilar system
concepts using a unifying set of attributes. The ability to consider multiple system concepts is
particularly useful for survivability when original value delivery mechanisms may be blocked by
a disturbance.
In defining survivability, it is also important to recognize its inherently dynamic nature.
Survivability emerges from the interaction of a system with its environment over time.
Depending on stakeholder needs, survivability requirements may allow limited periods during
which the system operates in a degraded state, unavailable state, or safe mode. Recognizing
survivability as a dynamic system property informs three general survivability design strategies
over the lifecycle of a disturbance. Type I survivability, susceptibility reduction, is the reduction
of the likelihood of or magnitude of a disturbance. Type II survivability, vulnerability reduction,
is the minimization of the disturbance-induced losses on value delivery. (Systems that are Type
II-survivable may exhibit graceful degradation in which at least minimal functionality is
maintained in the event of disturbance-induced losses. The reduced magnitude and rate of value
losses in systems that degrade gracefully contrasts with fragile systems where small disturbances
may cause total system failure.) Type III survivability, resilience enhancement, is the
maximization of the recovery of value-delivery within a permitted recovery time.
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Figure 3-2. Conceptualization of Survivability
Figure 3-2 provides a notional illustration of Type I, Type II, and Type III survivability in terms
of value delivery over time [V(t)]. Time is discretized across four epochs, periods of a fixed
context with static stakeholder needs. Following successful value delivery during baseline
environmental conditions and stakeholder expectations (Epoch la), the system experiences a
finite disturbance that degrades performance. Value delivery expectations on the system may be
lower during the disturbance (Epoch 2) and in the time period immediately following (Epoch 3)
before returning to baseline expectations (Epoch lb). Type I survivability, depicted as a dashed
horizontal line, is achieved if the disturbance fails to reduce V(t) below the required value
threshold [Vx] over all of the epochs. In order to determine whether the system is Type II or
Type III survivable, two additional factors must be defined: the minimum acceptable value to be
delivered during and immediately after the disturbance [Ve] and the permitted recovery time
elapsed past the onset of the disturbance [T,]. In Figure 3-2, the solid line depicts a system
achieving Type II survivability by maintaining V(t) at a level above Ve during Epoch 2 and
Epoch 3. The solid line also depicts a Type III-survivable system as V(t) recovers to a level
above V within Tr.
2. What design principles enable survivability?
The goal of the second research question is to develop a framework of structural and behavioral
principles that enable survivability across the entire lifecycle of disturbances. The principles
provide designers with a portfolio of concept-neutral strategies of architectural choice for
achieving survivability during concept generation. Existing sets of survivability design
principles tend to exclude non-physical factors and to focus on concept-specific techniques. A
general set of design principles allows the consideration of survivability strategies that may
mitigate disturbances across the entire lifecycle of a given encounter. Within the context of
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tradespace exploration, the design principles are intended to augment the creativity of system
designers by ensuring evaluation of a broad set of design alternatives.
Seventeen empirically-validated survivability design principles were identified in an iterative
process of hypothesis generation and testing. Twelve design principles for enhancing
survivability were initially deduced from a generic system-disturbance representation, from
consulting the literature, and from retrospective case studies (e.g., U.S. nuclear command and
control system during the Cold War). Next, the validity of these initial results were tested by
inductively mapping the survivability features of the A-10 Thunderbolt II combat aircraft and of
the UH-60A Blackhawk helicopter to the design principle set. Results from this mapping
identified missing design principles, taxonomic imprecision in design principle definitions, and
deficiencies in the underlying system-disturbance framework-requiring an expansion to a set of
seventeen design principles. Subsequent empirical testing validated the completeness of the
seventeen design principles when applied to the Iridium satellite communications system and the
F-16C Fighting Falcon. Table 4-7 shows the seventeen design principles, spanning Type I, Type
II, and Type III survivability strategies.
Table 4-7. Validated Set of Survivability Design Principles
1.1 prevention suppression of a future or potential future disturbance
1.2 mobility relocation to avoid detection by an external change agent
1.3 concealment reduction of the visibility of a system from an external change agent
1.4 deterrence dissuasion of a rational external change agent from committing a disturbance
1.5 preemption suppression of an imminent disturbance
1.6 avoidance maneuverability away from an ongoing disturbance
2.1 hardness resistance of a system to deformation
2.2 redundancy duplication of critical system functions to increase reliability
2.3 margin allowance of extra capability for maintaining value delivery despite losses
2.4 heterogeneity variation in system elements to mitigate homogeneous disturbances
2.5 distribution separation of critical system elements to mitigate local disturbances
2.6 failure mode elimination of system hazards through intrinsic design: substitution,
reduction simplification, decoupling, and reduction of hazardous materials
2.7 fail-safe prevention or delay of degradation via physics of incipient failure
2.8 evolution alteration of system elements to reduce disturbance effectiveness
2.9 containment isolation or minimization of the propagation of failure
3.1 replacement substitution of system elements to improve value delivery
3.2 repair restoration of system to improve value delivery
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Figure 4-5. Mapping of Design Principles to Disturbance Lifecycle
Figure 4-5 depicts the time intervals during which each of the seventeen design principles may
positively affect value delivery in a disturbance lifecycle. Each design principle is classified as
either passive or active. A focus on passive principles will lead to the construction of closed
(static) systems that resist disturbance based on projections of the operational environment. A
focus on active principles will lead to the construction of open (dynamic) systems that cope with
future uncertainty by stressing architectural agility to recover from disturbances. The distinction
between passive and active survivability is useful because it specifies which design principles
may be used based on the changeability of the architecture.
As demonstrated in the MATE for Survivability study of a satellite radar system (Chapter 7), the
design principles may be consulted both to augment the creativity of system designers by
ensuring consideration of a broad set of design alternatives and to quickly screen a large number
of candidate design variables before proceeding to concept evaluation.
3. How can survivability be quantified and used as a decision metric in exploring
tradespaces during conceptual design of aerospace systems?
Survivability is evaluated based on the relationship between stochastic trajectories of system
value delivery (e.g., multi-attribute utility over time) and critical value thresholds elicited from a
decision-maker (i.e., required value threshold, emergency value threshold, and permitted
recovery time). For example, Figure 5-12 shows a sample utility trajectory and set of critical
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value thresholds for an orbital transfer vehicle. The ten-year operational life is characterized by
a series of non-catastrophic debris impacts and two restorative servicing operations.
Utility Trajectory - DV(1137)
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Figure 5-12. Sample Utility Trajectory
The characterization of system value delivery provided by the utility trajectories allows
survivability to be evaluated as a dynamic, continuous, and path-dependent system property. In
particular, two metrics are proposed to summarize the relationship between utility trajectories
and critical value thresholds: time-weighted average utility loss and threshold availability. In
keeping with the survivability definition, these metrics collectively evaluate the ability of a
system to minimize value losses while meeting critical value thresholds before, during, and after
environmental disturbances.
Time-weighted average utility loss assesses the difference between the design utility (at
beginning-of-life), Uo, and the time-weighted average utility achieved over the system design
life, Tda:
U = - 1 . JU(t) dt
dl
While time-weighted average utility loss is useful for evaluating the impact of various
survivability features on a single system, it is less useful for comparisons across systems since Uo
is not conserved across designs. Therefore, to appreciate the survivability implications of a
system's ability both to incorporate margin in value delivery and to minimize losses in value, it
is necessary to evaluate time-weighted average utility loss from the design utility value, Uo.
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Threshold availability assesses the ability of a system to meet critical value thresholds.
Specifically, it is defined as the ratio of the time that U(t) is above operable (required or
emergency) utility thresholds (i.e., time above thresholds [TA T]) to the total design life:
TAT
T-,
As survivability is a stochastic, path-dependent property, a single utility trajectory from a single
design alternative is not necessarily representative or meaningful from a decision-making
perspective. Rather, each utility trajectory constitutes one data sample from a continuous
distribution of potential system lifecycles. Furthermore, there is a need to distinguish across
collections of utility trajectories of different design alternatives in the tradespace. However,
observing all of the utility trajectories generated in a MATE for Survivability study--typically
500 or more for each of several thousand design alternatives-is not practical. Therefore, time-
weighted average utility loss and threshold availability are applied as aggregate measures for
each set of utility trajectories. Figure 5-18 shows how the survivability metrics may be
integrated with traditional performance metrics of cost and utility in a survivability "tear(drop)"
tradespace.
Pareto Efficient Set for Cost, Utility, Utility Loss and Threshold Availability (n=594)
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Figure 5-18. Four-Dimensional Pareto Surface of Survivability Tear Tradespace
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The survivability tear tradespace provides a new approach for conducting survivability trades
during conceptual design by integrating survivability considerations into the selection of the
baseline system concept. (Use of the word "tear" is meant to describe regret associated with
system utility loss.) The survivability tear tradespace preserves the axes in a traditional MATE
analysis by plotting alternative system designs in terms of cost and utility. The new probabilistic
survivability metrics are integrated using shade for threshold availability and a line drawn
between utility and time-weighted average utility to indicate time-weighted utility loss. As
illustrated in Figure 5-18, the large number of designs in the survivability tear tradespace may be
filtered over the four-dimensional Pareto surface of cost, utility, time-weighted average utility
loss, and threshold availability. This expanded region of Pareto efficiency reveals several
interesting designs in the interior of the tradespace. While not located along the Pareto front of
cost and utility, these designs join the "optimal" set based on performance in the survivability
metrics.
4. For a given space mission, how can alternative system architectures in dynamic
disturbance environments be evaluated in terms of survivability?
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration for Survivability is introduced in Chapter 6 as general
methodology for the assessment of alternative system architectures that must operate in dynamic
disturbance environments. In particular, the existing MATE process (i.e., a solution-generating
and decision-making framework that applies decision theory to model-based design) is extended
to leverage the proposed survivability design principles and metrics in concept generation and
concept evaluation, respectively. MATE for Survivability consists of eight iterative phases: (1)
define system value proposition, (2) generate concepts, (3) specify disturbances, (4) apply
survivability principles, (5) model baseline system performance, (6) model impact of
disturbances on dynamic system performance, (7) apply survivability metrics, and (8) select
designs for further analysis. Figure 6-8 provides a flow chart of the process and identifies
relationships with the legacy MATE process.
Figure 6-8. Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration (MATE) for Survivability
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The satellite radar case application (Chapter 7) demonstrates the prescriptive insights that may be
yielded from a MATE for Survivability analysis. Thousands of architectural alternatives are
evaluated for a future military satellite radar capability, including various satellite designs,
constellation structures, and supporting communications networks. Figure 7-17 provides a flow-
chart representation of how survivability considerations are incorporated into the satellite radar
tradespace by modeling lifecycle performance.
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Figure 7-17. Incorporation of Survivability Considerations into Satellite Radar Tradespace
Treating the static tradespace model as a black-box, implementation of the survivability analysis
involves seven general steps. First, the design vector is expanded to include survivability design
variables. Second, a physics-based model of satellite radar performance is used to assess the
total lifecycle cost and design utility of 3,888 design alternatives. Third, susceptibility to debris
impacts is modeled as a function of the exposed cross-sectional area of alternative constellations
and debris flux. Fourth, the vulnerability of the designs to debris and signal attenuation is
calculated as a function of satellite shielding and available communications downlinks. Fifth,
the resilience of each design is assessed based on the availability of satellite spares. By
continuously monitoring constellation performance in the attributes, multi-attribute utility is
assessed over the entire lifecycle. Sixth, time-weighted average utility loss and threshold
availability are calculated at the end of each ten-year simulation as summary statistics for the
utility trajectory output. As each run of the simulation is stochastic and path-dependent, a 500-
run Monte Carlo analysis is performed for each design to obtain a representative distribution of
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utility trajectories. Seventh, the probabilistic survivability metrics are integrated with the
deterministic metrics of lifecycle cost and design utility for integrated tradespace exploration.
Many lessons are extracted from the satellite radar case application. Most fundamentally, the
model results indicate that the satellite radar alternatives within the design vector are survivable
to the space environment. However, the tear tradespace analysis shows that the rank-order
preferences of the decision-maker on alternatives are subject to change when threats are taken
into account. Response surface plots also yielded several insights regarding the impact of
alternative survivability design variables. In particular, shielding is found to have a small impact
on time-weighted average utility, while the relay backbone option is very important for
maintaining threshold availability. Investments in satellite spares have a variable impact, with
sparse constellations benefitting the most from the option to rapidly reconstitute. Interestingly,
survivable designs that are most insensitive to decision-maker risk preferences are found to
mitigate disturbances architecturally. The tear tradespace enables identification of constellations
co-located in the baseline tradespace (of cost and utility) with variable survivability performance.
In particular, by sacrificing individual satellite performance and accepting moderate growth in
lifecycle cost through selecting a more distributed constellation of less-capable satellites, it is
possible to achieve higher levels of survivability.
9.2. General Conclusions
Counterintuitively, the risk-averse nature of the space industry exacerbates space
architecture fragility by increasing the magnitude of potential downside losses.
The development of MATE for Survivability as general system analysis methodology is
motivated within the space domain by the growing societal dependence on space-based services,
the emergence of threats, and unintended consequences of the current paradigm. The risk-averse
nature of the space industry has manifested in the common satellite design elements of
subsystem redundancy, proven technology, and long design lives. As a result of these practices,
the pace of generational turnover has slowed tremendously over the past half-century, increasing
the magnitude of potential losses and reducing the speed at which capabilities might be
reconstituted. Given the high cost of launch, traditional performance metrics of minimizing cost-
per-function reinforce these trends by incentivizing the concentration of revenue-generating
payloads onto fewer satellite platforms. While traditional approaches may optimize stakeholder
value within fixed contexts, their value propositions are fragile in the presence of changing
needs, markets, and environments.
The growing need for survivability in the space domain parallels the growing need for "-
ilities" in engineering systems.
The misalignment of the rate of change of current space architectures and the rate of change in
the environments in which they are deployed is shared by many terrestrial systems that are
increasingly characterized by long design lives, dependencies with other systems, and large
numbers of stakeholders. A common challenge for these engineering systems is the
incorporation a broader set of"-ilities" (e.g., flexibility, robustness) into the high-leverage phase
of conceptual design. Just as survivability is a special case of robustness (with a finite condition
on disturbance durations), the desire for robustness is, in turn, a subset of this general challenge
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of identifying the degree to which systems are able to maintain or even improve function in the
presence of change. System analysis methodologies that can generate and evaluate various "-
ilities" during conceptual design are a prerequisite to the deliberate selection, development, and
deployment of dynamically relevant systems.
The evaluation of survivability requires assessing system value delivery across hostile
contexts that may modify both system performance and stakeholder expectations.
Achieving survivability requires meeting minimum stakeholder expectations during nominal and
disturbed environmental states. Assessing survivability involves a confluence of two
dimensions: (1) the mapping of a system's form as mediated by the operational environment to
determine technical performance, and (2) the mapping of stakeholder expectations as mediated
by the operational environment to technical performance. While technical performance may be
projected using physics-based models, stakeholder expectations such as emergency value
thresholds and permitted recovery times are specified by the decision-maker. Accordingly, there
are distinctively objective and distinctively subjective aspects to a value-centric calculation of
survivability.
The survivability design principles enable generation of technically-diverse sets of system
solution concepts that may be evaluated within a common tradespace using the value-based
survivability metrics.
The value-centric perspective enables the unified evaluation of technically diverse system
concepts through the application of decision theory to engineering design. Just as the
survivability design principles operationalize the value-centric perspective for concept
generation by enumerating concept-neutral strategies of architectural choice, the survivability
metrics operationalize the value-centric perspective for concept evaluation by comparing
thousands of design alternatives along the common axes of time-weighted average utility loss
and threshold availability. Avoiding the limits of local "point" solutions that severely constrain
the range of alternatives under consideration, these metrics may be universally applied to design
alternatives incorporating various combinations of passive and active survivability features that
span susceptibility reduction, vulnerability reduction, and resilience enhancement strategies.
Evaluating survivability during concept selection allows the identification of inherently
survivable architectures that efficiently balance competing performance metrics of lifecycle
cost, mission utility, and operational survivability.
Two recurring trends in applying MATE for Survivability underscore the importance of
incorporating survivability considerations into conceptual design: (1) the lack of survivability of
the designs located along the traditional Pareto front of lifecycle cost and mission utility, and (2)
the tremendous variation in the survivability of the baseline system concepts before the addition
of survivability design variables to the design vector. The first trend suggests that traditional
implementations of tradespace exploration (which focus on selecting a small number of
technically diverse systems located along the Pareto front for more-detailed design activities)
will exclude survivable alternatives from subsequent analysis. The second trend suggests that
survivability may be incorporated more effectively at the architecture-level rather than as an
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additive feature to a baseline system concept. Taken together, these trends indicate that delaying
survivability analysis until detailed design may lead to globally suboptimal trades among cost,
utility, and survivability. Conversely, the survivability tear tradespaces may be used to conduct
integrated trade-offs along the Pareto efficient surface of cost, utility, and survivability.
Affordably addressing survivability requires a heterogeneous approach to eliminating,
resisting, and accommodating disturbances.
To reduce the architectural fragilities in complex engineering systems, designers should embrace
a portfolio of behavioral and structural strategies that reflect the diversity of the environmental
disturbances they must mitigate. Just as disturbances vary in type, magnitude, and frequency, the
effectiveness of alternative survivability approaches varies across systems in terms of monetary
costs, performance penalties, and survivability benefits. The incorporation of survivability
analysis into tradespace exploration allows the sensitivity of alternative designs and survivability
strategies to be evaluated in terms of stakeholder value, allowing the identification of systems
that maintain dynamic relevance through hostile contexts.
9.3. Concluding Thought
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration for Survivability seeks to address the motivation
outlined in the introductory chapter by enhancing the generation and evaluation of design
alternatives that maintain value delivery in the presence of finite-duration disturbances. While
existing survivability engineering techniques optimize the physical survivability of individual
systems, the evolution of engineering systems to higher levels of complexity necessitates
architectural solutions to emerging threats. Accordingly, MATE for Survivability complements
existing survivability approaches focused on detailed design trades by allowing survivability
considerations to be incorporated into the selection of the baseline architectural concept. It is
hoped that the survivability design principles and metrics introduced in this thesis may be
applied prescriptively as analytic tools, shifting one aspect of the systems architecting process
from an art to a science.
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Glossary
architecture
attribute
decision-maker
design
design variables
epoch
era
-ilities
reliability
resilience
robustness
the structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and
guidelines governing their design and evolution over time (DoD
2003a)
decision-maker-perceived metrics that measure how well decision-
maker-defined objectives are met (Ross 2003)
a stakeholder with control over system development resources
[V] the process of devising a system, component or process to meet
desired needs.... [includes] the establishment of objectives and criteria,
synthesis, analysis, construction, testing, and evaluation
(Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology)
[N] the detailed formulation of the plans or instructions for making a
defined system element (Maier and Rechtin 2002)
designer-controlled quantitative parameters that reflect aspects of a
concept, which taken together as a set uniquely define a system
architecture (Ross 2003)
a scenario in which constraints, design concepts, available technology,
and articulated attributes remain fixed (Ross 2006)
a set of ordered epochs (Ross 2006)
temporal system properties that specify the degree to which systems
are able to maintain or even improve function in the presence of
change
the probability of functioning for a prescribed time under stipulated
environmental conditions (Leveson 1995)
the ability of a system to recover from disturbance-induced value
losses within a permitted recovery time
insensitivity of system value delivery to changing contexts
freedom from accidents or losses (Leveson 1995)
protection of a system's informational, operational, and physical
elements from malicious intent (Laracy and Leveson 2007)
an entity with interests in the outcome of a system developmentstakeholder
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safety
security
survivability
susceptibility
system-of-systems
SoS engineering
systems engineering
tradespace
utility
value
vulnerability
the ability of a system to mitigate the impact of a finite-duration
disturbance on value delivery
the likelihood or magnitude of a disturbance occurring within a system
boundary
a synergistic configuration of systems in which constituent systems
are independently managed and operated (Maier 1998)
the process of planning, analyzing, organizing, and integrating the
capabilities of a mix of existing and new systems, with an emphasis on
discovering, developing, and implementing standards that promote
interoperability among systems developed via different sponsorship,
management, and primary acquisition processes (AFSAB 2005)
the art and science of developing an operable system capable of
meeting requirements within imposed constraints (Griffin 2007)
the space spanned by an enumerated set of design variables
an ordinal metric for specifying stakeholder benefit
a subjective measure of benefit from a bundle of consequences that is
specified by a stakeholder (Keeney 1992); benefit at cost
the sensitivity of system value delivery to disturbance-induced losses
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Appendix A. A-10A Design Principles
The A-10 "Warthog" is a single-seat, twin-engine combat aircraft used by the U.S. Air Force
(USAF) to provide close air support for ground forces. Equipped with 16,000 pounds of mixed
ordnance, including a 30-mm gun and air-to-surface missiles, the primary mission of the A-10 is
to attack tanks and other armored vehicles. As documented in Ball (2003), the motivation for
developing the A-10 stems from the United States experience in the Vietnam War during which
approximately 5000 aircraft-nearly equally divided between fixed-wing aircraft and
helicopters-were lost. A large number of these aircraft were brought down by small arms fire,
surface-to-air missiles, and low level anti-aircraft fire-indicating the need for reducing the
vulnerability of future aircraft. To fill the need for survivable long-loiter aircraft for close air
support, the A-10 was developed as a heavily armored aircraft incorporating over 100
vulnerability reduction features (Ball and Atkinson 1995). In doing so, the A-10 became the first
USAF aircraft to be designed exclusively for the close air support mission as well as the first
modem fixed-wing aircraft to be designed (from its inception) to a complete set of survivability
requirements.
Two indepqndent, Dual fire
separated, jm-free S -Searali n wals Two shot
flight <ontrol systems egine fuel fir dtectio n
Ful nsfr syem
lines inside
tanks
BulledSpall
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anopy Both fiuelage separated hydraulic
n ctann feed systems- Aircraft
tubor both engines can be own
without hydraulcs
Self-Sealing
fusetage
fud tanks Closed-CA
Ammunition foam in dry
drum ballisically bays arond
protected fuel tanks
Figure 9-1. Some Vulnerability Reduction Features on the A-10A Thunderbolt II (Ball 2003)
Since its delivery to the USAF in 1977, the survivability of the A-10 has been validated through
its extensive combat experiences, including the first and second Persian Gulf Wars, Kosovo, and
Afghanistan (Ball 2003; USAF 2007). Among other attributes noted in the USAF fact sheet,
"the aircraft can survive direct hits from armor-piercing and high explosive projectiles up to
23mm" into the "titanium bathtub" within which the pilot sits. The ability of the A-10 to absorb
a gross amount of punishment was proven in the first Persian Gulf War. Flying an average of
193 missions per day for 42 days, the A-10 destroyed half of the armor in two Iraqi Republican
Guard divisions while losing only six A-10 aircraft and two pilots (Smallwood 1993). Figure 9-1
illustrates some of the vulnerability reduction features incorporated into the A-10: self-sealing
fuel tanks to prevent fires, explosions, and fuel supply depletion; redundant flight control,
hydraulic, and fuel tank systems; and other features.
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In selecting the A-10, the unit of analysis is a piloted aircraft operating in a hostile combat
environment (e.g., confronting guns and missiles carried by enemy air and ground systems). The
required value threshold for the system is a safe and successful completion of a given mission.
The emergency value threshold is met if the crew and vehicle are able to exit the combat zone
despite a failure to achieve mission objectives. Survivability features may add value over the
entire lifecycle of a given disturbance (i.e., Epoch 1 a, Epoch 2 and Epoch 1 b).
Table 9-1. Tracing of A-10A "Warthog" Survivability Features to Design Principles
Design Principles
Type I Type II Type III
A-1OA: Sample Survivability Features E >S 8 . T . 2
s redundant primary structure X
dual vertical stabilizers to shield heat exhaust X
long low-set wings (flight possible even if missing 1/2 wing) X
interchangeable engines, landing hear, and vertical stabilizers
pilot sits in a titanium/aluminum armor bathtub X
spall shields between armor and pilot X
. bullet resistant windscreen X
spall resistant canopy side panels X
ACES-I ejection seat X
night vision goggles for operating in darkness X
situational awareness data link
two self-sealing fuel tanks located away from ignition sources X _ X
short, self-sealing feed lines X
wing fuel used first X( most fuel lines located inside tanks X
. redundant feed flow X
2open cell foam in all tanks X
closed cell foam in dry bays around tanks X
draining and vents in vapor areas X X
maneuverability at low airspeeds and altitude X X
two widely separated engines X
engines mounted away from fuselage -
dual fire walls X X
fail-active fire detection with two shot fire extinguishing X
engine case armor X
separation between fuel tanks and air inlets
one engine out capability -
two independent, separated mechanical flight controls X X
two rudders and elevators X
armor around stick where redundant controls converge X
Stwo independent, hydraulic power subsystems X
- manual reversion mode for flight controls X X
dual, electrically powered trim actuators X
less flammable hydraulic fuel X
lam-free X
one 30 mm GAU-8/A Avenger Gatling gun X X X
16,000 pounds of mixed ordnance X X X
infrared countermeasure flares XE
electronic countermeasures chaff X
E iammer pods X X
illumination flares - -
AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles X X X
Upon gathering data on 42 survivability features of the A-10 from Ball and Atkinson (1995) and
the USAF Fact Sheet (2007), the features were sorted into six categories (i.e., structure, cockpit,
fuel system, propulsion, flight control, and armament) and traced to the twelve initial design
principles. Table 9-1 presents the results of this empirical mapping. As one might expect, the
density of Type II mappings is much higher than Type I mappings, strongly suggesting the
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emphasis designers placed on vulnerability reduction in the A-10. Not every feature contributing
to the survivability of the A-10 is successfully traced to an existing design principle, and the
mapping of some of the features was problematic (as noted in cells shaded grey). In the process
of resolving these problem areas, potential improvements to the survivability framework, current
set of design principles, and definition of certain design principles were revealed.
In the process of tracing the 42 survivability features of the A-10 to the design principles, four
insights emerged. The first relates to the definition of redundancy. Moving down Table 9-1 to
the first grey cell, one sees the survivability feature of [structure] long low-set wings (with flight
possible even when missing half of a wing) intersecting with the design principle of redundancy.
Redundancy, which is defined in terms of duplication of critical system components, is a poor fit
for this survivability feature. Redundancy implies substitution of components to maintain a
consistent level of performance whereas an ability to fly missing half of a wing is indicative of
design margin. While redundancy and margin are related in terms of having something "extra,"
they are fundamentally different concepts because margin implies a continuum of capability
which, if reduced, may impact end-user value. Another example in Table 9-1 of the benefit for
having margin as a separate design principle is the [propulsion] one engine out capability (i.e.,
the second engine does not provide true redundancy; rather, the propulsion system
accommodates graceful degradation).
The second insight arises from eight rows down with the [cockpit] situational awareness data
link feature as well as near the bottom of the matrix with the [armament] illumination flares
feature. In attempting to trace situational awareness to the framework, it was not clear which
design principles, if any, are employed by these features. For example, just as health monitoring
is necessary to conduct effective repair and replacement activities following a disturbance,
situational awareness is a prerequisite for any design principle that involves decision-making
before or during a disturbance. These active design principles include prevention, mobility,
deterrence, preemption, avoidance, and evolution. However, situational awareness by itself does
not employ any of these principles. Rather, it is an essential activity taken by an internal system
agent to inform decision-making before actions employing particular design principles are taken.
The third insight arises from a closer look at the column under the Type II survivability principle
of diversity. As defined in the preliminary design principle set (Table 4-3), diversity is
characteristic or spatial variation to limit the effectiveness of homogeneous disturbances. This is
an extremely broad definition that includes variation in both the properties (i.e., heterogeneity)
and locations of system elements (i.e., distribution). These are two fundamentally different
concepts. The need for a decomposition of the diversity design principle into two separate
principles such as a heterogeneity and distribution is underscored by the fact that five of the six
manifestations of "diversity" in the A-10 survivability features (shaded in grey) employ
distribution: [fuel system] two self-sealing fuel tanks located away from ignition sources,
[propulsion] two widely separated engines, engines mounted away from fuselage, separation
between fuel tanks and air inlets, and [flight control] two independent, separated mechanical
flight controls.
The fourth insight gained from examining the A-10 is recognition of the distinction between
physical redundancy and functional redundancy. Defined in the preliminary design principles as
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the duplication of system components to increase reliability, this definition was found to be
inapplicable upon considering the survivability feature of [flight control] manual reversion mode
of flight controls. Replacing the existing definition of redundancy (based on physical
duplication) with a definition based on functional duplication would fix this problem.
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Appendix B. F-16C Design Principles
The F- 16 "Fighting Falcon" (Figure 9-2) is a single-engine, multirole tactical jet fighter in use by
24 nations. The F-16 platform supports more than 100 weapon and sensor systems, enabling a
variety of air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. As a compact and highly maneuverable
"dogfighting" aircraft, the F-16 has proven to be highly survivable with only six shootdowns in
over 200,000 flown sorties. The operational experience of the F-16 (in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Kosovo) and extremely low sortie loss rate affirms the survivability of the system to its specified
combat environment. For example, only four F-16's were damaged in Operation Desert Storm
despite the fact that more sorties were flown by F-16's than any other aircraft. These 13,066
sorties included attacks on airfields, military production facilities, and Scud missile sites (Ball
2003). When first introduced by the U.S. Air Force in 1978, about 1,000 F-16's were to be
produced. As of today, 4,500 have been built with Lockheed Martin's backlog of 116 foreign
orders scheduled to keep production running until at least 2012 (Dorr 1991; Rosenwald 2007).
Length 49.7 ft - /7
Span 31 f
Wing Ares 300 tInternal Fuel 7,162 Ib
(http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/planes/q0163. shtml)
Figure 9-2. F-16C Fighting Falcon
The experience of the U.S. Air Force in Vietnam---during which a lack of maneuverability of
U.S. fighters at transonic speeds hindered performance against agile enemy fighters-was the
impetus for an F-16 concept that focused on compactness and extreme maneuverability (Hehs
1999). Departing from the dominant paradigm of U.S. fighters at the time (e.g., high cost,
complexity, and weight of F-4 and F-1ll aircraft), the F-16 was the winning design of the
Lightweight Fighter Program that stressed low-cost and high procurement numbers (Dorr 1991).
To achieve superior dogfighting capabilities, the F-16 design embraced many innovations:
frameless bubble cockpit, fly-by-wire control system, cropped delta wings and long wing-body
strakes, negative static stability, and a side-mounted control stick and reclined seat for pilot
tolerance of 9-g turns.
To test the baseline set of design principles, survivability features were gathered from open-
source literature on the F- 16C, Block 40 Build (Ahmed-Zaid et al. 1991; Dorr 1991; ACC 1996;
Blaylock and Swihart 1997; Hehs 1999; Thomas et al. 2005; Rosenwald 2007). (Block 40 F-
16C's entered service in 1988 and featured an improved all-day/all weather strike capability with
the LATIRN navigation pods. LATIRN includes a terrain-following radar, forward-looking
infrared, and laser targeting.) In testing the design principles against the F-16, the unit of
analysis is a piloted F-16C vehicle operating in a hostile combat environment (e.g., confronting
guns and missiles carried by enemy air and ground systems). The required value threshold for
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the system is a safe and successful completion of a given mission. The emergency value
threshold is met if the crew and vehicle are able to exit the combat zone despite a failure to
achieve mission objectives. Survivability features may add value over the entire lifecycle of a
given disturbance (i.e., Epoch la, Epoch 2 and Epoch ib).
Upon identifying 36 survivability features of the F-16, the features were sorted into five
categories (i.e., structure, cockpit, propulsion, flight control, and armament) and traced to the
seventeen general design principles and ODA loop. Table 9-2 presents the results of this
empirical mapping. As one might expect, the density of Type I mappings is higher than Type II
mappings, indicative of the emphasis that designers placed on susceptibility reduction in the F-
16. The F-16 is adept at avoiding disturbances given its superior maneuverability provided by a
29,000 pound thrust engine and negative static stability. The F-16 is also able to conceal itself
from enemy sensors given its compact size (i.e., 50 x 31 x 16 feet) and small infrared and radio-
frequency signatures. A full suite of modem threat warning systems enables active concealment
strategies, including electronic countermeasures and chaff and flare dispensers. Many
vulnerability reduction features are also incorporated into the design, such as buried fuel lines,
fuel inerting systems, critical systems redundancy, fault tolerant flight control, and shielding.
Table 9-2. Tracing F-16 Survivability Features to Design Principles
Design Principles
Type I (Reduce Susceptbility) Type II (Reduce Vulnerability) Type III
F-16C: Sample Survivability Features C 8 -2 E & 8 M M W
small visual IR and RF signature (50 x 31 x 16 ft) X
sustains 9-g turns X X X
U tail and wing proximiy for enhanced maneuverability X X
blended wing fuselage to reduce transonic drag X X X
situational awareness data link X
autonomous preasion targeting (if necessary) X X X X
Sbubble canopy for enhanced visiblity X
Scockpit compatbility with night vision goggles X
LANTIRN navigation pod for nighttime operations X
modular avionics X X
30 degree seat back angle to increase g tolerance X
ACES II ejecton seat
C buned fuel lines X X
fuel inerting system X X X
- -29,000-pound engine thrust class X X
thrust-to-weight ratio >1 X X
fly-by-wire system for enhanced responsiveness X
negative static stability for enhanced maneuverability X
electronic-hydraulic stability augmentation system X
E fault tolerant control surfaces (aerodynamic redundancy) X X X X
8 ground collision avoidance widissimilar-source validation X X X
override feature of computers alpha-hmiter X
Sredundant electrical generating and distribution equipment X
four sealed-cell battenes for fly-by-wire system X
two separate and independent hydraulic systems X X X
M61 20-mm six-barrel rotary cannon X X X
AIM-9 infrared, beyond-visual range air-to-air missiles X X X X
rocket pods X X X
Z anti-ship missiles X X X
E AGM-88 anti-radiation missiles X X X
Sstandoff precision stnke weapons X X X X
AN/APG-68 pulse doppler radar X
AN/ALQ-131 electronic countermeasures pod X
AN/ALE-40 chaff and flare dispenser X
fier optic towed decoy X
In contrast to the first two empirical tests (i.e.,
features were left untraced to the design principl
UH-60A and A-10A), no F-16 survivability
framework and no problems were identified
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with the design principle definitions. Interestingly, all seventeen design principles were utilized
by at least one of the 36 identified F-16 survivability features.
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Appendix C. Iridium Design Principles
Iridium is a space-based telecommunications system consisting of an interconnected network of
66 satellites (and six spares) distributed in six planes in low Earth orbit (LEO), ground-based
system control facilities, gateways to the public switched telephone network, handheld phones,
and communications links among nodes (Garrison, Pizzicaroli and Swan 1997). Iridium
employs a unique concept-of-operations for commercial space communications by providing
connectivity between satellites using dynamic crosslinks (Wertz and Larson 1999). While its
economic failure is worthy of a value-centric analysis (de Weck, de Neufville and Chaize 2004),
Iridium is also an interesting case application for the design principle framework in terms of
survivability because the communications service is achieved not only by the individual Iridium
satellites but also by the overall network architecture. Figure 9-3 provides an illustration of the
major components an Iridium satellite.
Sketch of the Iridium
satellite design
BUS command
module stucture
Solar panels
Battery module
Butler feed
L-band
array (x3)
Main misson
antenna
Communication antenna (3) 1
Communications
section
Crosslink ,"
antennas
Communication antenna (3): Gateway
* 86 cm wide antennas
* 186 cm high
.4 cm thick
.106 radiating elements
* 16 beams per antenna
.48 beams juxtaposed
Figure 9-3. Iridium Satellite (Iridium LLC)
Iridium's constellation survivability has been evaluated by comparing packet rejection rates, hop
counts, and average end-to-end delay performance of degraded Iridium constellations (Stenger
1996). These evaluations and related analyses (Fossa et al. 1998) have concluded that the
Iridium communications service is robust to node removal. For example, even with 36 of the 66
spacecraft removed, the system is still functional (i.e., packet delays do not exceed 178
milliseconds, well within an emergency value threshold of 400 milliseconds). Iridium's
approach to survivability was validated to dramatic effect following the collision between an
operational Iridium satellite and an old Russian military communications satellite on February
10, 2009. The hypervelocity, broadside collision occurred at an altitude of 790 km and shattered
the 689 kg Iridium satellite into a debris cloud spreading out over a heavily used region of Low
Earth Orbit (Morring, Butler and Mecham 2009). However, the collision resulted in only limited
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disruptions of service, with the company implementing a network solution within days (lannotta
2009).
To test the baseline set of design principles, survivability features were gathered on the Iridium
architecture from the literature (Comparetto and Hulkower 1994; Maine, Devieux and Swan
1995; Stenger 1996; Garrison, Pizzicaroli and Swan 1997; Pizzicaroli 1997; Swan 1997; Fossa,
Raines et al. 1998; Karpiscak 1998; Lemme, Glenister and Miller 1998; Pratt et al. 1999;
Puderbaugh et al. 2002; lovanov et al. 2003; Swinerd et al. 2003; de Weck, de Neufville and
Chaize 2004; He and Zhao 2007). In tracing Iridium design features to the design principles, the
unit of analysis is the overall communications network. Design features include any aspect of
the communications architecture (e.g., satellite design, constellation configuration) that
contributes to the survivability of the network, given the removal of constituent nodes or
supporting infrastructural elements.
Upon identifying 33 survivability features of the Iridium architecture, the features were arranged
into five categories (i.e., satellite design, constellation configuration, communications links,
ground segment, and deployment infrastructure), then traced to the seventeen general design
principles and ODA loop. Table 9-3 presents the results of this empirical mapping.
Table 9-3. Tracing Iridium Survivability Features to Design Principles
Design Principles
Type I (Reduce Susceptibility) Type II (Reduce Vulnerability) Type III
Iridium: Sample Survivability Features = = 1 .M .6 g 8 0 1 V
spare Motorola/Freescale PowerPC 603E processor X
small exposed cross-sectional area (7 m2 ) to debns X
end-of-life deorbit X X
functional independence of TT&C from payload X X
electronic equipment redundancy X
ascent/deboost backup capability via ACS X X X
60% hydrazine reserve (assuming 8-year life) X X
multi-point system health status monitonng - X
authenticated command messages X
autonomous safing mode X X X
dynamic control of routing and channel selection X X X X
6 planes of 11 satellites separated by 31 6 X
A spare satellite in each orbital plane X
altitude (780 km) above residual atmosphere X
altitude (780 km) below Van Allen radiation belts X
2150 active beams over the globe X X X
autonomous Intersatellite links X X
availability of numerous alternate transmission paths X X X X X
two gimbaled inter-plane crosslink antennas X X
-x omnidirectional secondary link for backup TT&C X X
guardband of 2 kHz between channels X X
rate 3/4 forward error correction coding X X
16 dB link margin X
low altitude reduces exposure to a ground jammer X
multiple physical gateways around the world X X
only single gateway required for global coverage X X X
Backup Control Faclity (BCF) in Rome, Italy X X
spaceomrne handset to handset routing (autonomous) X
" Delta 1, Proton-K and Long March 2C compatibility X
launch risk distnbuted over 14 launches X X X
8, launch sites in U S, China, and Kazakhstan X X
rapid assembly and test X
interchangeable parts X X
In contrast to the F-16 (Appendix B), the density of Type II mappings is higher than Type I
mappings. Rather than emphasizing maneuverability away from threats or pursuing their active
elimination, Iridium embraces a survivability strategy of graceful degradation and rapid
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reconstitution. While utilizing some legacy satellite survivability techniques to assure capability
at the spacecraft level (e.g., autonomous safe mode, redundant electronics, fuel reserves), the
primary survivability of Iridium is achieved at the constellation level. (In fact, Iridium's
reliability requirement for determining redundancy of critical spacecraft 'components is only a
0.58 probability of success for a five-year mission.) These constellation level survivability
features include dynamic control and routing of satellite crosslinks around unavailable nodes, on-
orbit satellite spares, and the ability to control all 66 operational spacecraft from a single ground
facility. For example, following the shattering of the satellite on February 10, 2009, Iridium was
able to move one of its in-orbit spares into the network constellation within a month (lannotta
2009). "...[T]he design philosophy provides redundancy at the system level instead of the
hardware configuration level. Autonomous operation and dynamic resource management and
routing provide constellation failure mitigation. In effect, the traditional hardware redundancy is
spread over many spacecraft" (Garrison, Pizzicaroli and Swan 1997).
As with the F-16, no Iridium survivability features were left untraced to the design principle
framework and no problems were identified with the design principle definitions. Fourteen of
the seventeen design principles were utilized. (Prevention, deterrence, and preemption were not
employed in this commercial communications architecture.)
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Appendix D. Space-Based BMD Experiment
This appendix documents the assumptions, governing equations, and parametric analysis of the
space-based BMD experiment. Given that the purpose of the computer experiment is to examine
the use of cost-estimating relationships as one approach for front-end survivability analysis
(rather than prescribe space-based BMD systems), a very simple model was utilized.
Table 9-4 documents the assumptions made in an engagement scenario. The first four
assumptions are first-order estimates while the subsequent three assumptions are taken from the
literature (Canavan and Teller 1990).
Table 9-4. Interceptor Assumptions
Constants/Assumptions
probability of missile intercept 0.5
number of missiles launched per round 3
cost of interceptor 30 million $
BMD development cost 10 billion $
time between launch and warhead deployment 600 sec
effective radius from which missiles are launched (interceptor) 2000 km
interceptor velocity 6 km/sec
radius of Earth 6378.1 km
pi 3.1416
The equations governing the model in the baseline case are given below. The first two equations
are based on Canavan and Teller (1990), the third equation reflects the assumed decision logic of
the BMD system, the fourth is a binomial probability of success (assuming interceptor
independence), and the fifth equation is based on the non-recurring (development) cost and
recurring cost assumptions.
range int = radius effective + velocity int time deploy (9-1)
absentee = ;r. (range)22)
4.r . (radiusearth )2
Number of interceptors fired per missile =
=Minimum[Integer(Numlntercept*absentee/MissilesLaunch/rounds), 25] (9-3)
Probability of leak proof defense = (1-(1-
PlnterMissile)^Allocatedlnt)^MissilesLaunch ) (9-4)
Cost of defense = Clnter*Numlntercept/1000+Cdevelop (9-5)
Table 9-5 illustrates the results of the first-order space-based BMD model. As observed across
the 30 candidate architectures, the costs of the systems vary from 10 to 40 billion dollars. The
performance of each BMD-assessed as the probability of a leak-proof defense against a three-
missile salvo (per round) from any point on the Earth's surface-ranges from less than 10% to
performance in excess of five 9's of probability.
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Table 9-5. Cost and Performance of Candidate Architectures (with Promising Baseline Outlined)
3 30 10
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 30 2 5600 0.193 0 0.00000 10.9
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 60 2 5600 0.193 1 0.12500 11.8
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 100 2 5600 0.193 3 0.66992 133 30 10
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 150 2 5600 0.193 9 0.823979415 14.5
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 225 1 5600 0.193 14 0.99982 16.75
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 350 1 5600 0.193 22 1.00000 20.5
.       .  .  50  1  .  25 1.000  25
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 750 1 5600 0.193 25 1.00000 32.5
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 1000 1 5600 0.193 25 1.00000 40
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 10 2 5600 0.193 0 0.00000 10.3
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 30 2 5600 0.193 0 0.00000 10.9
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 60 2 5600 0.193 1 0.12500 11.8
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 100 2 5600 0.193 3 0.66992 13
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 150 2 5600 0.193 4 0.82397 14.5
0.5 3 30 600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416 225 2 5600 0.193 7 0.97675 16.75
600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416
600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416
600 2000 6 6378.1 3.1416
600 2000
600 2000
600 2000
600 2000
600 2000
600 2000
600 2000
600 2000
600 2000
600 2000
600 2000
6 6378.1 3.1416
6 6378.1 3.1416
6 6378.1 3.1416
6 6378.1 3.1416
6 6378.1 3.1416
6 6378.1 3.1416
6 6378.1 3.1416
6 6378.1 3.1416
6 6378.1 3.1416
6 6378.1 3.1416
6 6378.1 3.1416
5600 0.193 11 0.99854 20.5
5600 0.193 16 0.99995 25
5600 0.193 24 1.00000 32.5
1000
10
30
60
100
150
225
350
500
750
1000
5600 0.193
5600 0.193
5600 0.193
5600 0.193
5600 0.193
5600 0.193
5600 0.193
5600 0.193
5600 0.193
5600 0.193
5600 0.193
25 1.00000 40
0 0.00000 10.3
0 0.00000 10.9
1 0.12500 11.8
2 0.42188 13
3 0.66992 14.5
4 0.82397 16.75
7 0.97675 20.5
10 0.99707 25
16 0.99995 32.5
21 1.00000 40
Following establishment of a baseline space-based BMD system, the computer experimented
focused on calculating the outcome of a given attack and the resources expended by the attacker
and defender. Table 9-6 lists the assumptions made regarding the attacker effectiveness and cost.
Table 9-6. Attacker Assumptions
ConstantslAssumptions
probability of ASAT intercept 0.5
minimum number of interceptors - requirement 225
minimum number of interceptors - emergency 187
mass of interceptor 100 kg
absentee factor 0.19
launch cost 10,000 $ per kg
ASAT cost 3 million $
number of ASAT launched 10
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Appendix E. MATE for Survivability Activity Descriptions
This appendix provides an extended description of each of the 29 tasks comprising MATE for
Survivability. Following the "cookbook" template of describing the MATE process in Ross
(2003), each task is discussed in five parts: (1) inputs, (2) outputs, (3) task description, (4) task
dependencies, and (5) worked example. Rather than continuously referring the reader back to
Chapter 6, the abbreviated task descriptions from the chapter are included in the detailed task
descriptions.
Phase 1: Elicit Value Proposition
The first phase of MATE for Survivability is focused on gaining a precise understanding of the
value proposition for the system under analysis. This value proposition will drive the process of
selecting and evaluating design alternatives. Five tasks comprise the first phase: (1.1) develop
mission statement, (1.2) identify decision-maker, (1.3) elicit multi-attribute utility function, (1.4)
specify emergency value threshold(s), and (1.5) specify permitted recovery time(s).
Task 1.1 Develop Mission Statement
InMuts.
Although the first task in the design process, developing the mission statement is coupled with
the second task of identifying a decision-maker for the system development. Writing a mission
statement requires the analyst to be in communication with the system decision-maker.
Outputs:
The outputs of Task 1.1 are a concise statement of stakeholder needs, the rationale for those
needs, and the expected scope of the system analysis.
Description:
Developing a mission statement involves identifying the purpose for the creation of the system,
stating the vision for the system development, and establishing boundaries for the system
concepts to be considered. The goal of defining the mission is to clearly articulate stakeholder
needs and the context in which a system is to be developed.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.2
Outputs: 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 3.1
Space Tug Example:
The purpose of the study is to analyze system alternatives for a national capability for the timely
repair and/or relocation of satellites in a low-Earth orbit. The general system concept is to
deploy an orbital transfer vehicle that can rendezvous and dock with space objects and perform
any desired stabilization or relocation maneuvers. The vehicle should maximize cost-
effectiveness and be survivable to an environment characterized by a high flux of debris.
Task 1.2 Identify Decision-maker
Inputs:
The need and context of the need helps clarify where the critical system stakeholders are located.
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Outputs.
The key output of Task 1.2 is the identification of an actual or proxy decision-maker (i.e.,
stakeholder with influence over the allocation of resources for a project) with a rigorous
understanding of the value proposition for developing a system and of the system's use context.
The decision-maker's understanding should include knowledge of performance requirements and
of financial constraints.
Description:
As discussed in Ross (2004), MATE formalizes the inclusion of various stakeholders typically
not considered by the design engineer. Depending on the purpose of the MATE study, these may
include external policy stakeholders, organizational stakeholders, and system user stakeholders.
In MATE for Survivability, the identification of a decision-maker is synonymous with
identifying a representative customer stakeholder (which may be separate from end-user
stakeholders) since this stakeholder controls the resources for the system development and is
responsible for providing design requirements. 59 If the system is dominated by multi-stakeholder
considerations, it may be possible to identify a "benevolent dictator" decision-maker who seeks
to create a successful system by balancing competing stakeholder requirements while remaining
within budget.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.1
Outputs: 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 2.1
Space Tug Example:
For the space tug computer experiment, a proxy decision-maker was selected from the analyst
team to represent a DARPA program manager interested in a general-purpose orbital transfer
vehicle (i.e., military and commercial applications).
Task 1.3 Elicit Multi-Attribute Utility Function
Inputs:
In order to quantitatively specify the evaluation criteria for the system analysis, it is necessary
first to understand the mission context and to identify a decision-maker. Furthermore, iteration
on the value function may occur based upon changing stakeholder needs and emergent lessons
from the tradespace analysis (e.g., lack of feasible designs given overly-stringent requirements).
Outputs:
The outputs of Task 1.3 are a set of attributes (i.e., decision-maker-perceived metrics that
measure how well decision-maker-defined objectives are met), the acceptability ranges
associated with the attribute set, single-attribute utility functions, (defining user satisfaction
ranging from 0, minimally acceptable, to 1, highest of expectations), and a multi-attribute utility
function. The multi-attribute utility function provides a universal metric against which the
performance of design alternatives operating in a nominal environment may be assessed.
59 Ross (2006) demonstrates how the assumption of a unitary decision-maker may be relaxed within a MATE
analysis for multi-stakeholder insights.
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Description:
Following Task 1.2, the system analyst engages with the decision-maker to extract objectives
from the mission statement. Attributes are defined by the decision-maker as quantifiable
parameters for measuring how well decision-maker-defined objectives are met.60 In lieu of fixed
requirements to drive the design process, acceptability ranges for each attribute are elicited
(where the minimally acceptable level becomes a requirement and extra benefit is delivered for
exceeding that level). In order to satisfy the axioms of Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (Keeney
and Raiffa 1993), the analyst must ensure that the attribute set is defined by the decision-maker;
including precise definitions for each attribute with units, an acceptability range, and a
monotonic preference for the direction of increasing goodness.
Having agreed to a set of attributes and acceptability ranges, the analyst next elicits the single-
attribute utility functions to assess the amount of benefit provided to the decision-maker for a
particular level of attribute. Utility is an ordinal metric (ranging from 0 to 1) that captures the
preferences of the decision-maker across the acceptable attribute levels in the presence of
uncertainty (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). For systems that have multiple attributes (N)
with varying weights (ki), computing a single scalar value function that fully reflects decision-
maker preferences can be difficult. As a proxy for benefit, the multi-attribute utility function,
U(X), as defined in Keeney and Raiffa (1993), is used to reflect preference orderings.
N
KU(X)+I I-[Kk,U,(X,)+1]  for K 0
-N (9-6)
or U(X)= U(X,) k, for K = 1
i=1
N
where K is the solution to K +1= I [Kk, +1]; and -1 < K < 1,K 0. (9-7)
The issue of stakeholder value elicitation is core to the MATE process and well-documented in
existing literature. Ross (2003) provides a detailed explanation of the multi-attribute utility
function and a description of recommended techniques for eliciting the single-attribute and
multi-attribute utility functions (i.e., lottery equivalent probability method and corner point
interviews, respectively). To examine the trade-off between rigor and ease of implementation,
Spaulding (2003) discusses the implications of simplifying the elicitation of single-attribute
utility functions using hand-drawn utility curves and linear, risk-averse preference relationships.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.1, 1.2, 5.4
Outputs: 1.4, 1.5, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4
Space Tug Example:
Three attributes comprise the space tug's multi-attribute utility function: total AV capability,
capability of the grappling system, and response time. As illustrated in Figure 9-4, the single
60 Attributes must be complete, operational, decomposable, non-redundant, minimal, and perceived independent
(Keeney and Raiffa 1993).
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attribute utility function for AV is continuous while discrete steps characterize the utility
delivered by the grappling system. Response time utility is a binary distribution where all non-
electric propulsion vehicles deliver utility 1 and electric propulsion receives a minimally-
acceptable score of 0. When attribute levels are worse than minimally-acceptable levels, the
utility function is undefined and any designing delivering that attribute level is removed from the
tradespace. For example, the utility of any space tug with a capability level below "low" during
normal operating conditions is undefined. (Conversely, performance in an attribute better than
the level associated with a utility of 1 cannot gain utility above this maximum level).
AV Utility Capability Utility
o
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 none low medium high extreme
DV
Figure 9-4. Single-Attribute Utility Functions for Space Tug during Nominal Conditions
A linear weighted sum is used for multi-attribute utility with weights assigned of 0.6 for AV, 0.3
for grappling capability, and 0.1 for response time.
Task 1.4 Specify Emergency Value Threshold
Inputs:
In order to specify the minimum acceptable level of value to be delivered during and
immediately after a disturbance (Ve in Figure 3-2), the analyst consults with the identified
decision-maker to probe whether lower performance across the attributes may be temporarily
acceptable.
Outputs:
The output of Task 1.4 is a set of worst-case attribute levels for the set of single-attribute utility
functions during, and in the aftermath, of a disturbance event. Depending on decision-maker
preferences, these levels may either be constant or vary across nominal and disturbed
environmental states.
Description:
To incorporate survivability considerations into the need identification phase, it is necessary to
elicit changing decision-maker expectations across disturbance environments. Survivability
emerges from the interaction of a system with its environment over time. Depending on
stakeholder needs, survivability requirements may allow limited periods during which the system
operates in a degraded state, unavailable state, or safe mode (Bayer 2007).
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As discussed in Section 3.3.4, one implication of value thresholds changing as a function of the
environment is that the definition and scale of the utility axis will vary across epochs. A general
response to this implication is to elicit applicable multi-attribute utility functions across all
potential epochs from the decision-maker. However, depending on the particular system under
analysis and the decision-maker, it may be possible to assume that the attributes comprising the
utility functions are constant (with variation only in terms of acceptability ranges and scaling of
the single-attribute utility functions). Therefore, the analyst should inquire whether the lower
bounds of attribute acceptability may be temporarily broadened in the presence of finite-duration
disturbances and, if so, the magnitudes associated with that extension.
As in the process of eliciting utility functions during nominal conditions, the process of eliciting
attribute acceptability ranges during disturbance and recovery epochs requires the analyst to
engage in a scenario-based dialogue with the decision-maker (e.g., following the loss of satellite
X before the launch of satellite Y, can you accept a higher maximum acceptable revisit time for
ground targets?). This scenario-based dialogue may help to place the decision-maker in the
proper mindset for the utility interview and help the analyst determine whether different
emergency value thresholds need to be elicited for each disturbance type.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3
Outputs: 1.5, 6.4, 7.1
Space Tug Example:
In following the discussion in Section 3.3.4, the attribute set comprising the multi-attribute utility
function is constant across normal, disturbance, and recovery epochs for space tug. However,
the acceptability range of the utility function for grappling capability is relaxed during the
disturbance and recovery epochs to include "none" as a temporarily acceptable level. Therefore,
a utility of 0 (in the capability utility plot in Figure 9-4) is now achieved at the bottom of the
previously undefined range. In addition, the shape of the single-attribute utility curve is
reassessed across the expanded acceptability range. Single-attribute utility curves for total AV
capability and response time as well as the linear aggregation for the multi-attribute utility
function are unmodified.
Task 1.5 Specify Permitted Recovery Time
Inputs:
The analyst consults with the decision-maker to identify the maximum acceptable duration for
the system to meet only the emergency value threshold (in lieu of meeting the required value
threshold).
Outputs:
The output of Task 1.5 is the permitted recovery time following the beginning of a disturbance
(T in Figure 3-2).
Description:
Establishing the duration of the emergency value threshold defines the boundaries for system
recovery. In performing this activity, it is useful to understand the time constants associated with
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performing the mission of the system under investigation (e.g., availability requirements for on-
demand operations). In the limit that the permitted recovery time goes to zero, the required value
threshold is operable over the entire system life.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 4.5
Outputs: 6.4, 7.1
Space Tug Example:
Given that the space tug is envisioned as an infrastructure capability for performing infrequent
servicing operations, the permitted recovery time following a debris event is one year.
Phase 2: Generate Concepts
In the first phase, the MATE for Survivability methodology was initialized by eliciting the value
proposition for the system under analysis. In the second phase of concept generation, analysts
and engineers formulate the design effort by explicitly linking back to the value proposition.
Four activities comprise the second phase: (2.1) identify constraints, (2.2) propose design
variables, (2.3) map design variables to attributes, and (2.4) finalize baseline design vector.
Task 2.1 Identify Constraints
Inputs:
Having developed the mission statement and identified a decision-maker, any constraints on the
design effort should be elicited from critical system stakeholders (e.g., customer, builder, user).
Feedback from the subsequent tradespace analysis may cause the decision-maker to modify the
constraints imposed on the design effort.
Outputs:
The outputs of Task 2.1 may include formal guidance regarding preferred system concepts,
available technologies, and available supporting infrastructures.
Description:
Constraints are requirements that must be satisfied in order for the system to be feasible.
Constraints may derive from physical laws, concepts-of-operations, policy (e.g., requirement to
use domestic launch vehicles), and environmental considerations (e.g., minimum practical orbit
altitude to avoid atmospheric drag). As demonstrated in Ross (2006), some constraints are
subject to change and must be carefully tracked as shifts may significantly alter the "best"
outcome for a particular problem.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.1, 1.2, 2.2, 8.1
Outputs: 2.2, 5.2, 5.3
Space Tug Example:
The only explicit constraints in the space tug computer experiment are physical constants.
However, current satellite bus technology is implicitly assumed by basing design constants on
empirical data (e.g., specific impulse of engines).
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Task 2.2 Propose Design Variables
Inputs."
In order to determine what concepts to parameterize for tradespace analysis, the designer
inspects the decision-maker attributes and uses expert judgment to propose candidate design
variables. Context for this process is provided by the mission statement, and limits for the
proposed system concepts are provided by the identified constraints. Feedback from the
subsequent tradespace analysis may cause the designer to modify the design variables under
consideration.
Outputs:
The output of Task 2.2 is a list of proposed design variables that will be traced to the attributes
and allow preliminary development of the model.
Description:
The concept generation phase of tradespace exploration is concerned with the mapping of form
to function. In thinking through solutions for how the attributes might be acquired, the designer
inspects the attributes and proposes various design variables (and associated ranges and
enumerations). Design variables are designer-controlled quantitative parameters that reflect an
aspect of a concept, which taken together as a set uniquely define a system architecture. Each
combination of design variables constitutes a unique design vector, and the set of all possible
design vectors constitutes the design-space. In the process of proposing design variables, a
natural tension exists between including more variables to analyze larger tradespaces and the
computational limits on evaluating a larger set of designs.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.1, 1.3, 2.1, 8.1
Outputs: 2.1, 2.3, 5.1
Space Tug Example:
The space tug design variables are propulsion system, fuel load, and equipment mass.
Task 2.3 Map Design Variables to Attributes
Inputs
The inputs to Task 2.3 are a set of proposed design variables and a finalized list of attributes.
Outputs:
The output of Task 2.3 is an estimation of the impact of each design variable on each attribute to
aid in the finalization of the baseline design vector and in the development of the performance
model.
Description:
Design variables are mapped to the attributes to ensure that the system concepts address the
needs articulated by the decision-maker. This mapping consists of a qualitative assessment in
which a modified Quality Function Deployment process is followed. (The qualitative
assessments may be revisited after models have been developed in Task 5.2.)
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Four general steps comprise mapping the design variables to attributes. First, a matrix is drawn
with the elicited attributes as columns and the proposed design variables as rows (or vice versa).
Second, estimates regarding the strength of the relationship between the design variables and
attributes are made in the intersecting cells. Typically, a non-linear scale is used: 0 (no impact),
1 (low impact), 3 (medium impact), and 9 (strong impact). Third, the rows are summed to
provide an estimate of the importance of a particular design variable. (An aggregate sum is
computed for each design variable row as an indicator of the importance of its inclusion in the
design-space. The size of the tradespace grows geometrically as design variables are added,
requiring the pre-screening of design variables if limited computing resources are available.)
Fourth, the columns are summed to provide an estimate of the degree to which each attribute is
addressed by the proposed set of design variables. Verifying that each attribute is affected by the
design variable under consideration is crucial to ensure that the trade study includes concepts that
are traced to the value proposition of the decision-maker.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.3, 2.2, 5.2
Outputs: 2.4, 5.1, 5.2
Space Tug Example:
Table 6-1 shows the mapping between the design variables and attributes of space tug.
Task 2.4 Finalize Baseline Design Vector
Inputs:
To finalize the baseline design vector, the analyst consults the final set of attributes, proposed set
of design variables, and the estimated impact relationships. The baseline design vector may be
modified based on feedback from development of the system model.
Outputs.
The output of Task 2.4 is the finalized set of baseline design variables and associated
enumeration and sampling strategies.
Description:
The concept generation phase is completed with the finalization of the design variables,
including the range and step size for each design variable. Whether discrete or continuous, the
selection of the number of steps for a given design variable may be broken into the enumeration
phase and the sampling phase. In the enumeration phase, a "full" range of values is selected that
will drive the dependent variables across a large range. In the sampling phase, a subset of values
in the enumerated range is selected for inclusion in the tradespace analysis. The sampling phase
is necessary to efficiently utilize finite computing resources.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.3, 2.2, 2.3, 5.2
Outputs: 3.1, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.5, 5.1
Space Tug Example:
Table 6-2 shows the baseline design vector for space tug.
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Phase 3: Characterize Disturbance Environment
Following completion of the first iteration of concept generation in a typical tradespace study,
the analyst models and simulates the design alternatives to calculate the costs and utilities of
alternative concepts. However, in MATE for Survivability, it is first necessary to characterize
any disturbances in the operational environment (Phase 3) and to apply the survivability
principles to the tradespace (Phase 4). Phase 3 is comprised of three tasks: (3.1) enumerate
disturbances, (3.2) gather data on disturbance magnitude and occurrence, and (3.3) develop
system-neutral models of disturbance environment.
Task 3.1 Enumerate Disturbances
Inputs.
Enumerating disturbance types requires familiarity with the operational environment and
knowledge of the candidate system concepts.
Outputs:
The output of Task 3.1 is a list of disturbance types to focus the data collection effort on
disturbance magnitude and occurrence.
Description:
The first step of applying the design principles is to enumerate potential disturbances. Prior to
consulting the design principles, this step is necessary to provide context to the survivability
analysis. Data for the system threat assessment may be derived from a combination of causal
methods, historical data, scenario planning, and aggregated expert opinion (e.g., Bayesian
treatment, Delphi technique, interactive approach).
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.1, 2.4
Outputs: 3.2, 4.1
Space Tug Example:
Spacecraft operating in a low-inclination orbit at 800 km may require design changes to cope
with trapped radiation, micrometeorites, and debris (Pisacane 2008).
Task 3.2 Gather Data on Disturbance Magnitude and Occurrence
Inputs:
The input to Task 3.2 is a list of disturbance types for the system concept(s) under consideration.
Outputs:
The output of Task 3.2 is an importance score for each disturbance type based on the magnitude
of impact and likelihood of occurrence.
Description:
Task 3.2 is to gather data on the magnitude and occurrence of different disturbance types to
support subsequent model development. Just as each attribute may vary in importance to the
decision-maker, the impact of each type of disturbance on system performance may vary. If all
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disturbances are not of equal concern, an importance score for each disturbance is assigned based
on the magnitude of impact and likelihood of occurrence.
In the process of gathering data on disturbance magnitude and occurrence, it is important to
check for non-additive disturbance interactions (e.g., in the case of a combat aircraft, the
combination of an adversary jamming warning sensors and firing a missile will impact the
system more than each disturbance in isolation). If multiple disturbances are likely to occur
together and impact the system in a nonlinear way, such combinations of disturbances should be
treated as separate disturbances. In the case of intelligently-engineered disturbance
environments, such interactions may be common.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 3.1
Outputs: 3.3, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5
Space Tug Example:
Pisacane (2008) provides a relative ranking of space environment disturbances on mission
impact (with a scale of 1-10). In low-inclination LEO, micrometeorites receive a 3 (may require
design changes), trapped radiation receives a 5 (may reduce mission effectiveness), and debris
receives a 7 (may shorten mission). Given the relative importance of debris and limited scope of
the space tug computer experiment, debris is the only disturbance for which empirical data is
gathered.
There are millions of kilograms of objects in Earth orbit that pose a series of challenges to space
mission designers. Normal satellite operations frequently deposit orbital debris (e.g., dead
satellites, spent upper stages, separation devices, bolts, and paint chips). Using a distributed
network of radar and optical sites that are operated by the U.S. Air Force, Army and Navy, U.S.
Space Command tracks more than 9,000 space objects with major axes in excess of ten
centimeters. An additional 100,000 objects ranging from one to ten centimeters is estimated to
be in Earth orbit and it is estimated that the debris population continues to grow by more than
175 metric tons per year (Futron 2002).
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Figure 9-5. Number of Space Objects in US Catalog (UN 1999)
The population of tracked objects presents a manageable debris hazard, even to large spacecraft
such as the International Space Station. However, including untrackable objects into a debris
hazard assessment increases the flux rate by orders of magnitude. While 1 mm objects will
likely only cause surface degradation, a 1 cm collision at high relative velocities is capable of
producing significant impacts (Wertz and Larson 1999).
Determination of the precise distribution of near-Earth debris is a difficult proposition. Although
the trackable population has grown linearly since 1960 (Figure 9-5), it is unclear how much the
undetectable population has grown. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the <10 cm
diameter population is more strongly influenced by fragmentations. Predictions of the absolute
number of debris objects and flux (i.e., expected number of collisions per cross-sectional area per
year) require accurate models of debris sources and sinks. These models are calibrated by both
sampling portions of the spatial volume around Earth for debris density and observing impact
rates on spacecraft surfaces returned to Earth (Wertz and Larson 1999). Inferences regarding the
population of debris in models maintained by civil space agencies are continually updated as
understanding of the environment grows.
In order to understand the threat environment for a given orbit, it is necessary to obtain a
probability density distribution of orbital debris as a function of both mass and relative velocity
(as momentum is the key determinant of damage). This distribution may be calculated by
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obtaining distributions of orbital debris flux and applying a distribution of relative velocity or by
obtaining debris density and utilizing an average relative velocity.
To assess debris collision risk in LEO, the ORDEM2000 model maintained by NASA's Orbital
Debris Program Office at Johnson Space center is applied to candidate space tug orbits.
ORDEM2000 is a computer-based engineering model utilizing a maximum likelihood estimator
to convert observations into debris population probability distribution functions (Liou et al.
2002). Several sources of debris samples inform the database:
* Space Surveillance Network (SSN) catalog
* Haystack and Haystack Auxiliary radar data
* Goldstone radar data
* Impact measurements from the Long-Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF)
* Hubble Space Telescope Solar Array impact data
* European Retrievable Carrier impact data
* Space Shuttle window and radiator impact data
* Space Flyer Unit data
* Mir impact data
The ORDEM2000 model is based on five debris populations which are distinguished based on
size thresholds: 10[tm and greater, 100 plm and greater, 1 cm and greater, 10 cm and greater, and
1 m and greater. The distribution of these five populations is highly nonlinear. Figure 9-6 shows
how frequency of particles grows logarithmically at smaller sizes (e.g., there are -8,000 objects
greater than 10 cm, -11,000 between 1 and 10 cm, and -35 million between .1 and 1 cm) (Remo
2005). The SSN catalog is used to build the 10 cm and 1 m populations, Haystack radar data is
used to build the 1 cm population, and LDEF is used to build the 10pm and 100 ptm populations.
No systems are available for directly sampling the 1 mm population. Instead, ORDEM2000
linearly interpolates between the 100 pm and 1 cm populations (with Goldstone radar data of 3
mm objects used to justify the interpolation).
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Figure 9-6. Spatial Density of LEO Orbital Debris
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The ORDEM2000 model was run for candidate space tug altitudes ranging from 150-1950 km.
Figure 6-2 shows the distribution of average orbital velocity for LEO debris. For a limited range
of altitude, debris velocity appears constant across >1 cm populations which may simplify
relative velocity calculations (i.e., accounting for difference between debris and space tug
velocity vectors) for the objects most likely to cause series space tug damage.
In order to understand the implications of the results obtained from the models of LEO debris, it
is necessary to know their degree of precision (or lack thereof) by understanding the underlying
physical relationships between the sampling observations and the inferences drawn about the
debris population. One method used for calculating the surface area of orbital debris-
correlating radar cross-section (RCS) observations with the effective area of space objects-is a
good illustration of the need to recognize and account for sampling errors in the engineering
models. Badhwar and Anz-Meador (1989) compared RCS measurements from the Eglin radar
operating at 70 cm wavelength to 196 satellites of known shape, size, and mass. Knowledge of
these 196 satellites was used to calibrate the calculated mass to the observed mass and to develop
a relationship between the mean RCS and the effective area of the object.
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Figure 9-7. Correlating RCS to Area (Badhwar and Anz-Meador 1989)
Figure 9-7 is Badhwar and Anz-Meador's plot of the effective (projected surface) area versus the
mean of the RCS for the objects with known geometry as well as the best-fit least-squares line to
a power law fit. The proposed power law relation for effective area to RCS is
A_eff=k[RCS]A.76. The proportion of variance accounted for is computed with an R-square
calculation of .578, indicating only a moderately good fit (e.g., the assumption that all objects
were tumbling in random directions when observed by the Eglin radar is only an approximation
of reality as these objects would be expected to become gravity gradient stabilized in a given
orientation, presenting a non-random face to the radar beam).
To establish a power law relationship between mass and effective area, Badhwar and Anz-
Meador (1989) applied a regression analysis to 2600 debris fragments. By dividing the RCS of
the debris by the area-to-mass ratio (calculated using the orbital elements), a plot was generated
of the calculated mass against the effective area (Figure 9-8).
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Figure 9-8. Correlating Area to Mass (Badhwar and Anz-Meador 1989)
Badhwar and Anz-Meador contend that this establishes a power law relation, m=kA^(1.86), for
relating debris mean mass to mean effective area. However, there is no discussion of the
proportion of variance accounted for nor a discussion of whether the data satisfies the
assumptions required for inferences to be discussed. For example, Figure 9-8 clearly exhibits
heteroscedastic data with a larger spread of calculated masses towards the lower-end of effective
areas. Given that effective area is derived from the RCS, it is understandable that there would be
more noise in the data for smaller pieces of orbital debris. However, the authors do not discuss
why a linear regression was used despite a lack of homoscedastic data. The spread in values can
be attributed to a variety of reasons, but only increased heterogeneity among smaller objects
(e.g., objects with larger masses are expected to be largely aluminum while smaller objects can
be aluminum or less dense plastics or insulation materials) is discussed. To address the need for
normally distributed data, a subsequent figure in Badhwar and Anz-Meador (1989) does a good
job showing that the log of the mass is fairly Gaussian. Although valid for capturing first-order
effects (and informing a first-order parametric study of space tug survivability), one should not
characterize the validity of these relationships as precise. (The authors note in the conclusion
that their overall technique is valid to only about 30%.)
Indeed, although engineering models of LEO orbital debris models make every effort possible
for verification and validation (e.g., NASA's ORDEM2000 has compared its model to precise
radar observations and to in-situ measurements of Space Shuttle, Hubble, and Mir debris flux), it
is important to remember that the results are not absolute and subject to sampling error.
Task 3.3 Develop System-Independent Models of Disturbance Environment
Inputs:
The input to Task 3.3 is a set of causal relationships, empirical data, and expert judgments that
characterizes the types, magnitudes, and frequencies of disturbances in the operational
environment of the envisioned system concept.
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Outputs:
The output of Task 3.3 is a set of system-independent disturbance models with system-specific
hooks.
Description:
Having gathered data to characterize the disturbance environment, it is necessary to organize,
structure, and format the data for subsequent disturbance modeling. Given the baseline system
concept developed in Phase 2 and knowledge of the disturbance environment, descriptive models
of each disturbance type are created. The models are parametric in nature to allow for
applications to all design vector variations within a given system concept.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 2.4, 3.2
Outputs: 5.1, 6.1, 6.2
Space Tug Example:
As discussed in Section 5.3.2, a general model of orbital debris was developed by calculating
conjunction events around a volume encompassing all sizes of candidate space tug vehicles. The
conjunctions are generated according to a Poisson process where the arrival rate is determined by
the debris flux. All space tugs are assumed to launch in 2009 into an 800 km circular orbit at a
42.60 inclination. Flux is assumed isotropic and constant over the ten-year operational life.
The distribution of momentum for the impacting debris is computed by assuming an average
collision velocity of 7 km/s (Figure 6-2) and a probability density function of debris mass. The
distribution of mass is based on the spatial density of debris diameters (Figure 5-10) and
relationships for relating debris diameter to debris area and debris area to debris mass (Badhwar
and Anz-Meador 1989).
Phase 4: Apply Survivability Principles
After the baseline set of design variables is established and the disturbance environment is
characterized, the survivability design principles are applied to the tradespace. Applying the
design principles (Phase 4) supplements the concept generation activities in Phase 2 by
incorporating survivability strategies that mitigate the disturbances identified in Phase 3. This
phase consists of five steps: (4.1) enumerate survivable concepts from design principles, (4.2)
parameterize survivable concepts with design variables, (4.3) assess ability of design variables to
mitigate disturbances, (4.4) filter survivability design variables, and (4.5) finalize design vector.
Task 4.1 Enumerate Survivable Concepts from Design Principles
Inputs:
Generating survivable concepts requires knowledge of the baseline system concept and of the
disturbances of concern. The subsequent tradespace analysis may feedback to Task 4.1 if the
concepts initially enumerated fail to meet basic survivability requirements.
Outputs:
The output of Task 4.1 is a set of concept enhancements associated with each survivability
principle.
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Description:
The seventeen design principles (Section 4.4) are consulted to inform the generation of system
concepts that mitigate the impact of each disturbance. Each design principle provides a concept-
neutral architectural strategy for achieving survivability. These architectural strategies include
both structural principles (e.g., distribution, heterogeneity) as well as behavioral principles (e.g.,
prevention, avoidance). To instantiate these design principles, the designer must select how each
structural or behavioral principle may be represented in a concept (i.e., the encapsulation of a
mapping of function to form).
Dependencies:
Inputs: 2.4, 3.1, 8.1
Outputs: 4.2
Space Tug Example:
Figure 6-3 shows the concept enhancements for space tug to orbital debris. The five concepts
span the three types of survivability.
Task 4.2 Parameterize Survivable Concepts with Design Variables
Inputs:
The inputs to Task 4.2 are the baseline design vector, disturbance data, and set of survivable
concepts.
Outputs.:
The outputs of Task 4.2 are a set of design variables and associated enumeration ranges that
collectively represent the survivability concepts.
Description:
To operationalize the proposed survivability concept enhancements for tradespace exploration,
each concept is parameterized by specifying a representative set of design variables. While
concepts are qualitative descriptions of system strategies, design variables are quantitative
parameters that represent an aspect of a concept that can be controlled by a designer. Each
design variable includes units and an enumerated range of values for analysis. Determining the
enumeration range for each survivability feature is informed by data on disturbance magnitude
and occurrence.
Given the competing desires for including more design parameters to explore larger tradespaces
while minimizing the computational constraints associated with modeling an excessive number
of design vectors, both a reasonable number of design variables and a reasonable number of steps
(for continuous variables) must be chosen. To reduce the total number of design variables
considered, the baseline set of design variables is consulted, utilizing existing design variables
where possible in the process of concept parameterization.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 2.4, 3.2, 4.1
Outputs: 4.3, 8.1
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Space Tug Example:
The five survivability concepts for space tug are active collision avoidance, reduced exposed
cross-sectional area, bumper shielding, increased capability margin, and on-orbit repair. Design
variables for active collision avoidance include additional propellant, data-sharing with tracking
facilities, and coordination with co-orbiting spacecraft operators (Wertz and Larson 1999). A
design variable for bumper shielding may consist of dedicated mass or shielding thickness. On-
orbit repair may be represented as servicing interface option (e.g., none, tug, refuel, component
change-out, and general repair). The remaining two survivability concepts-reduce exposed
cross-sectional area and increase capability margin-are intermediate variables derived from the
baseline design vector. In other words, the initial concept generation activity already
incorporates these survivability considerations in the tradespace.
Task 4.3 Assess Ability of Design Variables to Mitigate Disturbances
Inputs:
The inputs to Task 4.3 are the survivability design variables and data on disturbance type,
magnitude, and occurrence.
Outputs:
The output of Task 4.3 is an estimation of the impact of each survivability design variable on
each disturbance to aid in the finalization of the design vector and in the development of the
survivability model.
Description:
The ability of candidate survivability design variables to mitigate the impact of system
disturbances is assessed to determine which design parameters to include in the system model.
Estimating the degree of impact of each survivability design variable on each disturbance type
follows a process analogous to the design value mapping matrix (where the ability of proposed
design variables to impact the attributes is evaluated).
If multiple design variables and disturbances require assessment, a matrix of survivability design
variables (rows) and disturbances (columns) may be structured with the strength of relationship
assessed in intersecting cells (e.g., 0, 1, 3, 9). In the process of building the matrix to estimate
the effectiveness of the survivability design variables, it may be necessary to consolidate
redundant design variables. While most survivability enhancement concepts are specified by a
unique design variable or set of design variables, a few design variables may serve to
parameterize more than one principle and concept. In consolidating duplicate design variable
rows in the survivability design matrix, the maximum mitigating impact score for each
disturbance is used.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 3.1, 3.2, 4.2
Outputs: 4.4, 5.1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3
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Space Tug Example:
For space tug, bumper shielding was estimated to have a high impact on mitigating orbital
debris. On-orbit servicing for repair and active collision avoidance were estimated to have
medium and low impacts, respectively.
Task 4.4 Filter Survivability Design Variables
Inputs:
The input to Task 4.4 is the assessment of the level of impact of the survivability design
variables on the disturbances.
Outputs:
The output of Task 4.4 is an aggregate impact score for the consolidated design variables under
consideration.
Description:
After applying the design principles to incorporate survivability considerations into concept
generation, it may be necessary to filter the expanded number of design variables for inclusion in
the tradespace. This filtering process begins by examining the representation of the seventeen
design principles across the consolidated set of design variables. While it may not be wise or
possible to include design variables spanning all seventeen design principles (e.g., tension of
many susceptibility reduction and vulnerability reduction features), it is useful for the system
analyst to understand the implications of including or excluding particular design variables on
the tradespace. For example, design variables which utilize multiple principles should receive
particular consideration for inclusion. Also, if the operational environment of the system being
designed is highly uncertain, it may be wise to ensure representation of Type I, Type II, and
Type III survivability trades in the design-space.
If multiple disturbances are included in the system analysis, it is necessary to aggregate the
impact of each consolidated design variable across the disturbances. For example, a linear-
weighted sum for each survivability design variable may be computed by summing across the
rows in the survivability design matrix, weighting each disturbance based on the importance
score in Task 3.2.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 3.2, 4.3
Outputs: 4.5
Space Tug Example:
Given the small number of survivability design variables in the space tug computer experiment
and single focus on the threat posed by orbital debris, the analysis did not require building a
survivability design matrix to filter the design vector. (Section 7.2.4 provides an example of the
survivability design matrix in the satellite radar case application.)
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Task 4.5 Finalize Design Vector
Inputs:
The inputs to Task 4.5 are the baseline design vector and the filtered set of survivability design
variables. Feedback from the model development may inform changes to the design vector.
Iterative changes to the design vector may also be required following completion of the
tradespace analysis.
Outputs:
The output of Task 2.4 is the finalized design vector, including enumeration and sampling
strategies.
Description:
Finalizing the design variables is required before modeling and simulating the design
alternatives. Finalizing the design vector requires an understanding of the relationship between
the design variables and attributes as well as between the design variables and disturbances.
Several considerations are recommended for determining which survivability design variables to
incorporate into the baseline design vector: the aggregate mitigating impact score of a particular
design variable, the distribution of design variables across survivability design principles,
downstream computational constraints associated with growing the design-space, and whether a
particular survivability enhancement feature should be permanently turned "on" (i.e., making
survivability enhancement features that are certain to be incorporated into design constants).
Dependencies:
Inputs: 2.4, 4.4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4, 8.1
Outputs: 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3
Space Tug Example:
See Table 5-5. Space Tug Design Options (n=2560)
Phase 5: Model Baseline System Performance
In Phase 5, the lifecycle cost and design utility (i.e., utility at beginning-of-life) of each design
alternative is computed by evaluating the design vectors in a physics-based, parametric model.
This phase consists of four steps: (5.1) develop software architecture, (5.2) translate design
vectors to attributes, (5.3) translate design vectors to lifecycle cost, and (5.4) apply multi-
attribute utility function.
Task 5.1 Develop Software Architecture
Inputs:
Decomposing the model code requires a finalized set of attributes, the finalized design vectors,
and physical knowledge of the relationship between the design variables and attributes.
Although the disturbance models are not integrated into the model until Phase 6, the system-
independent models of disturbance occurrence developed in Task 3.3 are also consulted to
inform the software architecture.
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Outputs:
The output of Task 5.1 is a list of software modules and an N-squared matrix describing the
inputs and outputs of each module.
Description:
The initial mapping of design variables to attributes during concept generation (Task 2.3)
consisted of using judgment and experience to determine which design variables to include in the
trade study. In developing the software architecture, this mapping is performed at higher fidelity
in which an N-squared matrix documents how design variables will be translated to attributes
through intermediate variables. Modules within the matrix enable the model to be decomposed
to enable parallel development.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.3, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, 4.3, 4.5, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3
Outputs: 2.4, 5.2, 5.3, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3
Space Tug Example:
See Table 6-3 for an n-squared matrix representation of the space tug software architecture.
Task 5.2 Translate Design Vectors to Attributes
Inputs:
The sampled design variables are input to the performance model to calculate the attributes of
the multi-attribute utility function.
Outputs:
The output of Task 5.2 is the calculated performance of each design vector in each attribute.
Description:
Following completion of the software architecture, the sampling plan of the design variables is
determined. (Due to the geometric growth of the tradespace, multi-disciplinary optimization
techniques may be required in lieu of a full-factorial sampling.) This sampling of the tradespace
is then input to the parametric computer model which calculates the set of attribute values for
each design vector.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.3, 2.1, 2.3, 4.5, 5.1
Outputs: 2.3, 2.4, 4.5, 5.1, 5.4, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3
Space Tug Example:
As documented in McManus and Schuman (2003), a simple performance model translates the
space tug design vectors to attributes. For example, the AV attribute is computed from the rocket
equation.
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Task 5.3 Translate Design Vectors to Lifecycle Cost
Inuts:
The sampled design variables are input to the cost model to calculate the attributes of the
tradespace. Task 5.3 may also require input from Task 6.3 if the system incurs costs associated
with recovery operations.
Outputs:
The output of Task 5.3 is an estimate of the lifecycle cost of the design vectors.
Description:
In addition to translating design variables to attributes, the model also translates design variables
to estimates of lifecycle cost. Developing cost models during the conceptual design phase of
complex systems is a challenge. While detailed bottom-up estimating may be accurate for
established programs, it is a weak method for systems with immature designs and low
technology readiness. Analogy-based estimating may be applied only if similar systems exist.
When known physical, technical, and performance parameters can be related to cost, the
parametric costing method is best for conducting conceptual designs under time constraints
(Wertz and Larson 1999).
Dependencies:
Inputs: 2.1, 4.5, 5.1, 6.3
Outputs: 5.1, 8.1
Space Tug Example:
The launch and first-unit hardware procurement costs for space tug are estimated using the
vehicle wet and dry masses (calculated in the model as intermediate variables) and assuming
$20,000/kg in cost for wet mass and $150,000/kg in cost for dry mass.
Task 5.4 Apply Multi-Attribute Utility Function
Inputs:
The inputs to Task 5.4 are the multi-attribute utility function elicited from the decision-maker
and the attribute values calculated for each design vector.
Outputs:
The output of Task 5.4 is a utility value for each design vector representing the benefit delivered
to the decision-maker in a nominal environment.
Description:
Having calculated the performance of design alternatives across the attributes of concern to the
decision-maker, these attribute levels are input to the elicited utility functions to arrive at an
overall assessment of decision-maker satisfaction.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.3, 5.2
Outputs: 4.5, 6.4, 8.1
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Space Tug Example:
Figure 5-6. Baseline MATE Tradespace shows the calculated utility values for each space tug
alternative and plots them against cost.
Phase 6: Model Impact of Disturbances on Performance
Phase 6 involves modeling and simulating the performance of design alternatives across a
representative sample of disturbance encounters to gain an understanding of how decision-maker
needs are met in perturbed environments. While the previous phase is focused on assessing
deterministic measures of system effectiveness (i.e., lifecycle cost, design utility), this phase
focuses on dynamically characterizing system performance from a path-dependent, probabilistic
simulation. Phase 6 consists of four tasks: (6.1) calculate stochastic susceptibility, (6.2) model
probabilistic vulnerability, (6.3) model probabilistic recovery, and (6.4) generate distributions of
utility trajectories.
Task 6.1 Calculate Stochastic Susceptibility
Inputs:
The inputs to Task 6.1 include the system-independent models of the disturbance environment
and the finalized design vector.
Outputs:
The output of Task 6.1 is a set of disturbances and associated times of impact events for each run
of the susceptibility model across the tradespace.
Description:
Having gathered data and developed a system-independent model of the disturbance
environment (e.g., debris flux as a function of mass per m2), a system-dependent model of the
disturbance environment is created (e.g., debris flux as a function of mass per exposed cross-
sectional area). If disturbances occur probabilistically, a Monte Carlo analysis is conducted to
generate representative distributions of disturbance timelines for the design vectors.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 3.3, 4.3, 4.5, 5.1
Outputs: 5.1, 6.2
Space Tug Example:
See Figure 5-9. Conjunction Outcomes.
Task 6.2 Model Probabilistic Vulnerability
Inputs:
The inputs to Task 6.2 are the system-dependent disturbances in a given run of the simulation,
their associated time-stamps, and the survivability design variables in the finalized design vector.
Outputs:
The output of Task 6.2 is a series of time-stamped utility losses for each run of the simulation
which characterize degradation of system attributes in the disturbance environment.
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Description:
Given that a disturbance has affected the system, the impact of the disturbance is characterized
through a probabilistic vulnerability model. Since there may only be mid-fidelity
characterizations of the environment and system during conceptual design, the damage
assumptions are often coarse. The vulnerability model takes the form of a probabilistic lottery in
which multiple runs are required to extract the distribution of potential outcomes. Although
static, the vulnerability model is only activated when directed by the stochastic susceptibility
model to capture the dynamics of utility loss over the lifecycle. Path-dependencies are
incorporated into the vulnerability model by transitioning between pre-enumerated degraded
states in the case of non-catastrophic losses.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 3.3, 4.3, 4.5, 5.1, 6.1
Outputs: 5.1, 6.3, 6.4
Space Tug Example:
See Table 5-6. Debris Impact Outcomes.
Task 6.3 Model Probabilistic Recovery
Inputs:
The key input to Task 6.3 are the survivability design variables in the finalized design vector and
the outcomes of disturbance impacts from the vulnerability model.
Outputs:
The output of Task 6.3 is a series of time-stamped utility gains (and any associated costs) for
each run of the simulation with recovery operations.
Description:
Given the occurrence of a disturbance, system degradation in the vulnerability model, and
incorporation of Type III survivability design principles in the design vector, system recovery is
modeled. As with the vulnerability model, the recovery model takes the form of a lottery in
which outcomes are determined probabilistically and require multiple runs to determine central
tendency. In the case of partial recovery, path-dependencies are incorporated by transitioning
among pre-enumerated states.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 4.3, 4.5, 5.1, 6.2
Outputs: 5.1, 5.3, 6.4
Space Tug Example:
For space tug design vectors incorporating a servicing option, an on-orbit repair mission is
attempted following non-catastrophic debris hits. Successful servicing missions fully restore
grappling capability to the original (baseline) level in the design vector. A given servicing
mission is assumed to have a 70% success rate with response times lognormally distributed (with
a mean of six months and a standard deviation of a year).
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Task 6.4 Generate Distributions of Utility Trajectories
Inpu ts.
The inputs to Task 6.4 are the critical value thresholds and permitted recovery times elicited
from the decision-maker, the beginning-of-life utility for design alternative, and the perturbations
of utility over the lifecycle as provided by the survivability models.
Outputs:
The outputs of Task 6.4 are utility trajectories of each design alternative in each run of the Monte
Carlo simulation.
Description.:
As defined in Chapter 3, survivability is the ability of a system to maintain value delivery within
stakeholder-defined thresholds over the lifecycle of a disturbance. Tradespace exploration for
survivability incorporates this definition by evaluating utility performance of alternative designs
across disturbance events. These utility trajectories are plotted over time with any applicable
value thresholds and permitted recovery times to characterize survivability. Because utility
trajectories are probabilistic and path-dependent in nature, a Monte Carlo analysis is performed
to generate representative distributions.
Determining the appropriate number of Monte Carlo trials requires a trade-off between the
accuracy of the reported survivability metrics and computing time (Hazelrigg 1996). To
determine the number of runs, it is advisable to conduct a convergence study on a small number
of design vectors to examine the sensitivity of the reported survivability metrics to the number of
Monte Carlo trials. Precisely understanding the variance of the reported survivability metrics is
particularly critical if the tear tradespace is subsequently filtered for Pareto efficiency.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 1.4, 1.5, 5.4, 6.2, 6.3
Outputs: 7.1, 7.2, 7.3
Space Tug Examples:
See Figure 5-13. Sample Utility Trajectory Outputs from Design Vectors 19 and 1137 and Figure
6-5. Monte Carlo Convergence for One Design Vector.
Phase 7: Apply Survivability Metrics
Having generated utility trajectories over the distribution of possible degradation and recovery
sequences for each design vector, summary statistics are collected to measure central tendency of
lifecycle survivability. Phase 7 consists of three tasks: (7.1) establish percentile reporting levels,
(7.2) calculate time-weighted average utility, and (7.3) calculate threshold availability.
Task 7.1 Establish Percentile Reporting Levels
Inputs.
The inputs to Task 7.1 are the utility trajectory distributions. Establishing percentile reporting
levels may also incorporate feedback from subsequent tradespace analysis.
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Outputs:
The outputs of Task 7.1 are the percentile reporting levels for the distributions of time-weighted
average utility and of threshold availability.
Description.:
The output of the survivability simulation is a distribution of utility trajectories for each design
alternative. To enable comparisons among design alternatives, it is necessary to extract
measures of central tendency from the utility trajectories. Time-weighted average utility and
threshold availability, introduced in Chapter 3, are intended to provide these measures.
However, experience indicates that the distributions of the survivability metrics are often highly-
skewed, suggesting the use of percentiles rather than potentially misleading measures of central
tendency such as an average. To determine what percentile level to use (e.g., time-weighted
average utility-5th percentile is the level of time-weighted average utility achieved by 95% of the
simulation runs of that design vector), the analyst must incorporate two considerations. First, the
selected percentiles will ideally show variation across the tradespace to allow the decision-maker
to discriminate among design alternatives using the survivability metrics. Second, the selected
percentiles will reflect decision-maker risk preferences (where risk aversion manifests itself
through the selection of lower percentiles). Selection of the percentile reporting levels is an
iterative process with Task 8.1, Conduct Integrated Tradespace Exploration.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 6.4, 8.1
Outputs: 7.2, 7.3
Space Tug Example:
In the space tug example, the median (5 0 th percentile) is selected for time-weighted average
utility and the 5t percentile is selected for threshold availability. These selections improve data
visualization since the survivability metrics varied over the tradespace at these reporting levels.
Additionally, decision-makers are likely to be more risk-averse regarding threshold availability
(a construct for measuring assured access to some level of minimum capability) than time-
weighted average utility (a construct for assessing degree of degradation).
Task 7.2 Calculate Time-Weighted Utility and Threshold Availability
Inputs:
The inputs to Task 7.2 are the utility trajectories and the percentile reporting levels.
Outputs:
The outputs of Task 7.2 are the probabilistic survivability metrics of time-weighted average
utility and of threshold availability.
Description:
The percentile reporting levels are applied to the distributions of the two survivability metrics,
adding two probabilistic quantities for inclusion with the deterministic metrics of lifecycle cost
and design utility in the tradespace.
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Dependencies:
Inputs: 6.4, 7.1
Outputs: 8.1
Space Tug Example.
See Figure 5-14. Distributions of Time-Weighted Average Utility and Figure 5-15. Sample
Distribution of Threshold Availability.
Phase 8: Explore Tradespace
Having applied the survivability metrics, the final phase focuses on tradespace exploration: (8.1)
conduct integrated cost, utility, and survivability trades and (8.2) select design for further
analysis.
Task 8.1 Conduct Integrated Cost, Utility, and Survivability Trades
Inputs:
The inputs to Task 8.1 are the calculated values for lifecycle cost, design utility, time-weighted
average utility/utility loss, and threshold availability.
Outputs:
The direct output of Task 8.1 is a broad understanding of the tradespace to inform selection of a
subset of designs for more detailed analysis. However, insights gathered from tradespace
exploration may also cause the decision-maker to relax constraints on the design space (Task
2.1) and modify the percentile reporting levels of the survivability metric (Task 7.1). In addition,
if the design alternatives fail to meet stakeholder needs and expectations (e.g., sparse
tradespace), the analyst may be inspired to consider new design concepts (Task 2.2) and
survivability strategies (Tasks 4.1 and 4.5).
Description:
The purpose of tradespace exploration is to map the decision-maker preferences in the value
domain onto the space of possible designs in the technical domain. Traditionally, these are
presented in a cost-benefit format in which multi-attribute utility is plotted against lifecycle cost
(in accordance with the philosophy of cost as an independent variable). With technically diverse
designs evaluated against a common set of attributes, unified trades may be made and interesting
designs (e.g., Pareto-optimal) may be identified for more detailed analysis.
In conducting tradespace exploration for survivability, the probabilistic survivability metrics of
time-weighted average utility loss and threshold availability are integrated with the cost-utility
metrics using a survivability tear tradespace representation. Decision-makers may navigate the
tradespace by examining designs near the top-left (high utility, low cost) with high availability
(darker) and minimal utility loss (shorter tail).
Dependencies:
Inputs: 5.3, 5.4, 7.2
Outputs: 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, 4.5, 7.1, 8.2
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Space Tug Example:
Figure 6-6 presents a survivability tear tradespace from space tug in which designs at the Pareto-
surface of cost, utility, and utility loss are displayed.
Task 8.2 Select Designs for Further Analysis
Inputs:
The inputs to Task 8.2 are decision-maker insights from the tradespace.
Description:
In the final task, the broad knowledge gained from exploring the tradespace may be applied to a
variety of activities: magnification of a particular region of the tradespace by reducing the range
and decreasing the step size of design variables, sensitivity analysis of uncertain model
parameters, and the selection of a small number of design vectors for higher-fidelity modeling.
To assess how the various survivable concepts perform, response surfaces may also be drawn to
show how the survivability design variables affect performance across the survivability metrics.
This analysis may be conducted on specific designs for prescriptive insights as well as to the
entire tradespace to show larger trends.
Dependencies:
Inputs: 8.1
Space Tug Example:
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Appendix F. Tradespace Plots of Satellite Radar
Satellite Radar Tradespace by Altitude (n=2268)
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Figure 9-10. Effect of Orbit Altitude on Baseline SR Tradespace
Satellite Radar Tradespace by Antenna Area (n=2268)
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Figure 9-11. Effect of Antenna Area on Baseline SR Tradespace
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Satellite Radar Tradespace by Communications Architecture (n=2268)
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